No comments about The Yom Kippur War.

5 comments about The Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War.

1. Howard Blum's "The Eve of Destruction" is written in the unique narrative style that similar articles for Vanity Fair and like periodicals have utilized. These include looking at an historical period through the eyes of actual participants from different vantage points, using recently declassified intelligence, sprinkled in with some gossip, speculation, and innuendo. Nonetheless, Blum's book is an easy read that drills into the reader several concepts that he or she is sure to come away with.
   
   Among those themes: (1) the complete aura of self-confidence bordering on conceit among certain Israeli military and political leaders following their smashing victory in the 1967 Six-Day War that the Arabs would not even dare to launch an attack; (2) "The Concept", the plan designed by Egyptian Saad el Shazly which was predicated on crossing the Suez Canal, breaching the Israeli forces on the other side, and then STOPPING rather than continuing to penetrate deep into the Sinai; (3) the reliance on "The Source", an Egyptian spy (double agent?) who assured his Israeli handlers that war would not come; (4) the sense of panic among some Israeli leaders (Moshe Dayan's "Third Temple" cry, Golda Meir's contemplating suicide rather than being the prime minister who oversees Israel being overrun); (5) the valiant, courageous, and indefatigable bravery of men such as Avigdor Kahalani, commander of a tank battalion in the Golan Heights region on the Syrian front.
   
   The central characters continually revisited are Yossi Ben Hannan and his wife, Nati. Ben Hannan was an Israeli celebrity, featured on the cover of LIFE magazine right after the euphoric 1967 War. He and his wife were actually on their honeymoon in India when he made the trek back to Israel (using unconventional means!). Battlefield accounts as seen through various Israeli and Egyptian military men supplement the newlywed's storylines.
   
   Blum is way too critical when he attempts to second-guess military strategy and generals. Military decision-making involves split-second decision-making made in real time, in the heat of battle. Much like a baseball player's batting average, your misses are compared not to a 100% success rate, but to historical norms and other battlefield commanders. A hitter who is successful 1/3rd of the time is going to bat .333 and be a star, not someone criticized because he fails 2/3rds of the time. That said, the criticism of Ariel Sharon reeks more of the Vanity Fair mindset to disparage strong military men and conservatives, in this case a career general and former Likud political leader, rather than pointing to specific flaws in his battle strategies. Indeed, the post-war Israeli commissions praised Sharon, even as they whitewashed the judgments of Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan. Dado Elazar, the Chief of Staff, took the blame along with the intelligence services (brokenhearted, Elazar died of heart troubles and depression in 1975).
   
   On the other hand, Blum does give you an in-depth look into the difficulty of the decision making that Israeli leaders had to make. When "The Source" had warned of a possible attack in May 1973, the entire country was put on alert. This is something that we in the United States never have to contend with. However, Israel is a small country (population in 1973: about 4 million) and mobilization and then de-mobilization for false alarms is not only nerve-wracking but also costly in economic terms (most able-bodied young men and women have to leave civilian jobs and report to their units). When you are convinced that you are superior to your enemy, and you have a border-line call about whether he is going to attack, and if a false mobilization will cost your economy a good chunk of yearly production growth, you may decide "eh, what the hell" and downplay it. This is what Israeli intelligence did (for a number of reasons, not just economic) and since the overconfidence was not justified, it had nearly disastrous results.
   
   "The Eve of Destruction" is not a book that introduces any new historical insight. It's a narrative that weaves together articles from Israeli and Arab newspapers, first-person accounts and autobiographies from men involved in the conflict, and recollections from some of the major actors. If you want a behind-the-scenes look at some key individuals involved in the 1973 conflict, this book gives it. If you are looking for a comprehensive account of the 1973 conflict -- like Rabinovich's "The Yom Kippur War" -- you're looking in the wrong place.
   
   My main quibbles with this book: if you are going to utilize narratives of various characters who tell you how they lived through and experienced the 1973 conflict, then you need a "Where Are They Now" section to complete it. What did Yossi and Nati Ben Hannan and all of the other characters do after the war the next 30 years? Blum's post-war summary is woefully short of telling us what happened between the 30 years since the end of the Yom Kippur War and the suicide-bombing war that Israel was confronting in 2003 which introduces the book.
   
   There is also very little tactical or strategic military overview; most of the book focuses on localized battles (this is the nature of the narrative style he uses so it is not unexpected). The book itself fails to live up to the attention-grabbing title; there is not much coverage of the deliberations (serious or feigned) considering the use of nuclear weapons, as Israeli leaders (if not Dayan) never really considered Israel to be on "the eve of destruction." Finally, the detail drops off very quickly as we approach the end of the conflict; the war just seems to end very quickly relative to the in-depth accounts leading up to the war and during it's early stages.
   
   All things considered, a good story that is easy to read and understand. If you don't want to read a longer, more difficult story of the 1973 conflict, this book will give you the basics and you can pursue more detailed analysis from any of the paths Blum's book just touches upon.



2. The Israeli swagger that became a regional pose following the military victories of 1948 and 1967 quickly became a limp following near defeat at the hands of Egypt and Syria in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Howard Bloom's appropriately-titled chronicle of that October surprise reads like a novel, complete with an amorous young couple whose honeymoon was rudely interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities and a mysterious double agent called 'the In-Law'. Yet the events he describes were all too real.
   
   Though Blum is able to distill the self-denying heroism of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers into page-turning narrative, he reserves harsh invective for the Israeli military and political leadership whose success 17 years earlier blinded them to the realities of Egyptian and Syrian military rehabilitation on two of their nation's borders.
   
   Had it not been for Egyptian over-reaching-a breathtaking victory of hubris over battlefield facts-the Jewish 'Third Temple' experiment might well have gone down in flames. The close call stunned Israel and contributed to the volatile mix of military strength and a persistent sense of insecurity that has characterized the state ever since.
   
   Blum is especially compelling when he describes the internecine battles within Egypt's ruling caste and the impossible survival of the Israeli line in the Golan during the hellish tank battles that should have put Syrian tanks in Tel Aviv rather than left them in smoking ruins just miles from Damascus. In its desperation, Israel nearly went nuclear, a scenario almost too dire for contemplation.
   
   Blum's reporting is heavily dependent on personal interviews with those for whom a now settled fact was a minute-by-minute struggle for survival.



3. On 6 October 1973 , on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar , the Arab nations launched a cowardly surprise attack on Israel.
   After three days of intense and bloody fighting , Israel was fighting for survival , while Arab armies where closing in on the Jewish heartland , poised to destroy Israel and anihilate her Jews.
   In this gripping and skilfully written volume , Howard Blum brings the Yom Kippur War to life , through meticulous research based on declassified Israeli government documents and revealing interviews with soldiers , generals and intelligence operatives on both sides of the conflict.
   We are reminded of just how close Israel came to being destroyed , hence a second holocaust.
   The author enters the mind of General Moshe Dayan and his review of events during the frightening early days of the war:
   "When he reviewed the events that brought him to this point he saw another continuum of Jewish history: a woeful march from Masada , to the Holocaust , to October 7 , 1973 - the destruction of the Jewish state"
   We learn therefore how precarious Israel's position is and the reason for this tiny nation having to take all steps neccesary to ensure her security.
   Focusing on commanders such as Ariel Sharon and Avigdor Kahalani , and on the Egyptian side Saad El Shazly , we are given an exciting and lively account of the war , always focusing on the human side.
   We are also given an insight into the lives of the men and women of Israel who , through their sheer determination to see their country survive , snatched victory from the jaws of a horrible defeat.
   The intelligence war is also well detailed.
   The author also highlights the sheer numerical superiority of the Arab forces with over 1 million troops , 5000 tanks , more than a 1000 planes and 4 800 in field artillery , compared to Israel's 415,000 troops; 1,500 tanks , 561 airplanes and 945 artillery units.
   After the Yom Kippur War , the Arabs realized that it would not be possible to defeat Israel by conventional millitary means and embarked on a two pronged war of terrorism and invidious propaganda against Israel and her people , to prepare for Israel's destruction.
   The survival of Israel is indeed a miracle.
   Long live the State of Israel.



4. Thirty years ago, on October 6th 1973, on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, the Arab world launched a bold and ingeniously conceived surprise attack on Israel. Caught totally unprepared, the attack nearly destroyed Israel and changed the Middle East forever.
   
   This book is the story of those who made the plan, those who executed it, those who inspite of ample warnings ignored it, those who attacked fearlessly and those who, defending their motherland, "fought and fell like lions". This also is a love story of a young bride and groom, tossed into the conflict.
   With a fast paced and gripping narrative that gives it the feel of a Dan Brown novel, the author takes us on a historical journey to the Middle East of the 1970s. Israel, triumphant, basking in the glory of its military victory in the Six Day war, is celebrating the wedding of the year, between a young army man and woman, Yossi and Nati. To the entire nation they personify the best of Israel: youthful, brave and victorious. To many, it was not just a wedding celebration, but also "the crowning era of the return to Zion".
   
   Caught up in the carnival atmosphere, Israel fails to hear the slow drumbeats of the approaching war. The Egyptians, seething in their defeat in the Six Day war, are busy plotting vengeance. The chief of staff of the Egyptian army, a pragmatic officer called Saad el Shazly, has in his mind the key to an ingenious strategy. Coordinating with the Syrians who are to the north of Israel, the Arab armies unleash a torrent of destruction on Israel on Yom Kippur.
   
   The ratios are staggering: in the north an Israeli force of 157 faces an onslaught from 1,100 Syrian tanks. In the south, a 100,000 strong Egyptian force with 1550 tanks pound an Israeli force of 436 soldiers and 3 tanks. Stunned, the Israelis react bravely. Some of the individual acts of heroism are mind blowing. In their darkest hour, Israel considers the "Samson option", nuking the population centers of Arab countries.
   
   But within two weeks, the tide turns and the Israelis bravely push back the Syrians and invade Egypt.
   
   While the first half of the book details the events leading to the war, the second half focuses on the battle mostly from an Israeli perspective. An excellent read. Do check it out.



5. Overwhelmed by a massive surprise attack, the Israeli armed forces were nearly decimated within 72 hours. How did the Israelis reverse their bad fortune? How did this happen to begin with? In this narrative, Mr. Blum presents us with the perspective of individuals, major and minor, on both sides of the conflict.
   One must ponder what the result could have been, had the Israeli people failed in their darkest hour. Israel's enemies have stated very frequently and openly about the genocide to follow, if they ever succeed in their goal. Israel, a thriving free nation on the very precipice, can not afford to make such errors in judgement again.

3 comments about The Yom Kippur War.

1. Peter Allen is a British writer and has told his version of the events of the 1973 Yom Kippur War (also called the Ramadan War by the Egyptians, the Tishreen War by the Syrians, and sometimes the October War elsewhere) using a point of view very similar to the UK's stance in 1973. What I mean by this is that the UK had made many investments politically, miltarily, and economically in many of the Arab states and so often took a pro-Arab stance during the Yom Kippur War while at the same time being a strong ally of the USA and a member of NATO, which led to occasional support for Israel. Allen mirrors this British government stance in that some parts of his book advocate Arab forces and others seem to support the Israelis at the expense of the Soviets. Although Allen is partisan (he relates his opinions with no concern about being impartial to either side), this book, nevertheless, is a great and entertaining read.

   What Peter Allen did do was interview hundreds of the fighters (both Arab and Israeli) of the Yom Kippur War which culminated in this entertaining 1982 book. If you are looking for a book to support academic arguments then this isn't the book for you, Allen didn't use footnotes although he did list a bibliography of selected materials. His interviews also weren't documented as Israeli security doesn't often allow interviewee's give their names and most Arab interviewee's (primarily Egyptians) were also not allowed to give out their names except in a few cases where approved by the Egyptian government. While Syria won't help most researchers of this war (in which Syria was militarily defeated), at the time of publishing, the author initimated he was able to interview some Syrians incognito abroad.

   Why buy the book?

   The story is told very well and having been a WWII historian before this book, Allen makes a number of interesting comparisons between WWII generals such as Patton and Montgomery and Arab and Israeli generals. He also did some very good research and his telling of the conflict includes the political aspects of the war (What vexed Golda Meir, how Sadat was dealing with the Soviets, etc.), the tactical miltary aspects of the war (how the Israelis continued to practice tactics developed in the 1967 War, how the Egyptians failed to venture out from under their missile shield, etc.), strategic elements (the Israelis always plan to carry war to the enemy's soil, the Arabs plannned very limited victory conditions, etc.), as well as some great individual stories gained from his research and interviews.

   The maps included with the book are excellent and much easier to read than those of many other books chronicling the Yom Kippur War. The maps include important ridges and hills that are often left out. The two photographic inserts have some rare photographs such as those of the Israeli Gilowa bridging craft, the Israeli home-made steel roller bridge, and some great pictures of the Arab Egyptian forces. Some of the Egyptian army photos are exclusives that I haven't seen in any other books chronicling the period and I have most books about the Yom Kippur War published between 1973 and 2002. Allen's exclusive Egyptian photos are a result of his friendship with H. el Komayessi, an Egyptian photographer during the war. I will however point out that at least two of the photographs are incorrectly labelled:

   1. One photograph is labeled "Egyptain crossing equipment," but actually has a photo of cheering Egyptian soldiers around a Sherman tank with observation equipment and Israeli ID markings.

   2. Another photograph is labelled "Wreckage of Israeli Phantom, downed by a missile" but actually is the wreckage of a liason plane.

   I'm not sure if the incorrectly-labelled photographs are a result of Peter Allen's or el Komayessi's error.

   My favorite part of the book, however, were the many individual vignettes that the author included interspersed throughout the book. The many stories of individual soldiers, journalists, civilians, and observers make the story come alive with a nice human touch. Some of the things that Allan wrote that Sadat said to Kosygin were full of humor (mostly taken from Sadat's memoirs).

   This book makes a nice addition to any of Chaim Herzog's or Egyptian general Shazli's accounts of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. However, it is a much more general accounting of the war and is, as previously mentioned, not vigorously documented.




2. Allen does a solid if unimpressive job documenting the Yom Kippur War. The book has both an Arab, Israeli, and American perspective, but it leans to the Israeli side. All the battles are detailed, as well as some of the politics from 1967-73.
   Allen is much more generous towards the Israelis than other books.
   The perspectives in this book are pretty stark. The Soviets were trying to stir up trouble in the Middle East to enhance their position. The Egyptians, Syrians are both portrayed as the aggressors in this and past conflicts. Other Arab governments are portrayed as opportunists, reacting to the conflict by piling on. The rest of the Third World are portrayed as gullible to the propaganda of the Arab and Soviet sides. Not a pretty picture, but perhaps true.
   I enjoyed the portrayal of some of characters in this story, especially Ariel Sharon. Sharon seems to have caused as much problems with other Israelis as he now does with the Palestinians. The Yom Kippur War may have settled things with Israel and Egypt, but the conflict in the Middle East still simmers. This is an interesting read on this conflict.



3. On October,6 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Syrian and Egyptian forces, supplied by Soviet arms, and encouraged by the USSR, launched a cowardly surprise attack on Israel from the north and south.
   
   The massive attack found Israel vastly outnumbered and unprepared and the use of "smart" weapons rendered Israel's air force ineffective giving the attacking Arab forces an unprecedented advantage on the battlefield.
   
   Israel's existence was under mortal threat but with a courageous by the Israeli tank battalions and the daring counter attacks ordered by Israel's generals turned the imminent destruction of Israel into a route of the invading Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi armies.
   Peter Allen relies on hundreds of interviews and eyewitness account, relaying both the desperate fighting and the diplomatic shenanigans, when the Soviet Union that had egged the Arabs into the war, threatened to join in the attack on Israel, once there Arab clients started losing.
   
   The author illustatrates how Israel forewent a response of pre-emptive action, in a false and tragic belief that world opinion would swing to her support.
   As the author explains she was wrong and "the novel and brave political move did nothing to prevent her condemnation by the swaggering Third World hanger-on to Soviet policy...As her losses mounted and the Arabs were seen to be winning, other states began to pour in aid to deliver the coup de grace."
   And so it has always been since, particularly in the last two decades.
   no matter how the Arabs have clearly been the aggressors to any unbiased and honest observer, every outbreak of conflict leads to hysterical and emotionally charged condemnation of Israel from around the world.
   On October,6 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Syrian and Egyptian forces, supplied by Soviet arms, and encouraged by the USSR, launched a cowardly surprise attack on Israel from the north and south.
   
   The massive attack found Israel vastly outnumbered and unprepared and the use of "smart" weapons rendered Israel's air force ineffective giving the attacking Arab forces an unprecedented advantage on the battlefield.
   
   Israel's existence was under mortal threat but with a courageous by the Israeli tank battalions and the daring counter attacks ordered by Israel's generals turned the imminent destruction of Israel into a route of the invading Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi armies.
   Peter Allen relies on hundreds of interviews and eyewitness account, relaying both the desperate fighting and the diplomatic shenanigans, when the Soviet Union that had egged the Arabs into the war, threatened to join in the attack on Israel, once there Arab clients started losing.
   
   The author illustratrated how Israel forewent a response of pre-emptive action, in a false and tragic belief that world opinion would swing to her support.
   As the author explains she was wrong and "the novel and brave political move did nothing to prevent her condemnation by the swaggering Third World hanger-on to Soviet policy...As her losses mounted and the Arabs were seen to be winning, other states began to pour in aid to deliver the coup de grace."
   The Israeli government would not strike first even after they knew a massive Arab attack was imminent so as not to upset world opinion. Thousands of Israelis died to placate world opinion, and Israel received only world persecution.
   And so it has always been since, particularly in the last two decades.
   no matter how the Arabs have clearly been the aggressors to any unbiased and honest observer, every outbreak of conflict leads to hysterical and emotionally charged condemnation of Israel from around the world.
   
   Nevertheless Islamic and Leftist historical revisionists continue to distort facts and events to paint Israel as the aggressor, never hesitating at brazen lies and distortions.
   
   The author covers well the open invitation by the Soviets to attack Israel, the training and massive arming of Egypt and Syria by the USSR and other Communist States.
   The massive Soviet replenishment of arms to the Arab belligerents, while US arms were blocked from reaching Israel by most states in Europe, wild and vicious Soviet accusation at the UN, when Israel defended herself (echoed almost word for word by polemicists of the international left today), and end eventually when the Syrians and Egyptian were being routed, Soviet threats to attack Israel directly.
   
   The last word go's to the author when he exclaims how the answer to all the questions and dilemmas surrounding the Middle East conflict boil down to what is "so deeply embedded into the Jewish nature that is life ands death itself. Ten million Jews walked unresisting into the gas chambers, believing that some great force would surely save them at the last moment. now they have that great force, and it beyond belief that they will ever again go pacifically to their doom, now they fight".
   Which is precisely what fuels the rage of the Islamic world and international left.
   "But who is take the chances for Israel if not Israel herself? Who will stop the next holocaust except the victims of the last."

No comments about War in the Middle East: A Reporter's Story: Black September and the Yom Kippur War.

5 comments about WAR OF ATONEMENT: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War.

1. October 1973. The Yom Kippur War. Few people will be ignorant of this conflict when Egypt and Syria carried out their surprise attack upon the Israelis at the most Holy time in the Jewish calendar, when the Israeli forces were at their most vulnerable due to religious observance.

   As I had just begun my own military training in my own country, I remember wondering if the conflict would expand and include our own military due to the sabre-rattling of the super-powers as the Israelis turned initial defeat into eventual victory.

   I have read a number of accounts of that historic conflict since then, but few come close to this account by Major General Chaim Herzog.

   It's recent re-release is most welcome. The author's articulate and extremely well written record and analysis is a worthy addition to anyone's library. Some might find it controversial and expect it to be biased due to the author's own nationality. I did not find this.

   Instead I found this to be a brilliant account of unbelievable bravery in the face of heavily outnumbered forces, self-sacrifice and incredible counter-attacks. The author describes how early Egyptian and Syrian advances which threatened the very existence of the Jewish state, were thwarted and repulsed. Advances that subsequently turned into a retreat which saw Israeli forces within artillery range of the Syrian capital Damascus and well on the road to the Egyptian capital Cairo.

   This is not all about the `glamour and glory' of an Israeli victory. Far from it. It endeavours to tell the real story, as much as possible the full story of the war with all it's successes, omissions and failures. It is also the story of a people in possibly their greatest hour of challenge in present day history.

   The Arab media had promised it's masses that the entire Israeli population, men, women and children, would be subject to destruction and annihilation in the most brutal manner. With the horrors of the holocaust being only recent memories, those Israelis who took these threats seriously must have been horrified.

   The outset of the war and initial Israeli losses have been subject to a variety of claims surrounding poor intelligence etc.. The impotence of the UN and the super-powers in preventing this conflict is there for all to see, as is the shadow of a potential nuclear catastrophe resulting from the super-powers' involvement towards the end. Notable is the fact that whilst the Egyptian and Syrian attacks were in full swing, there was little movement towards enforcing any ceasefire. Yet when the roles were reversed, the world bent over backwards to ensure a ceasefire was adhered to.

   It is also notable that Chaim Herzog, even a quarter of a century ago, makes reference in this book to the phased plan of the Arab nations towards destroying Israel involving an initial withdrawal by the Jewish state to the 1967 borders.

   (Ring any bells pertaining to present day politics ?)

   Notably also is the authors remarks of that time to the effect that the civilian populations in the region will become exposed to no less a degree than the military forces in any future war. We need only look around us now to see the veracity in his remarks.

   Read this book to see what, if any lessons have been learnt by either side, and how the world reacted at different stages of the conflict. It is a sobering read and will open your eyes, not only to the military situation in the Middle East in 1973, but to the attitude of the nations and a present day scenario which threatens similar conflicts in the future.




2. The most amazing war fought by the Israelis agains their neighboors was the Yom Kippur war when the Israeli army, in the first few days of the war, suffered enormous losses in armor and aircraft. For many it was a trauma, when the undefeated IDF and IAF seemed impotent to arab aggression. For Egypt it marked the popular triumph over thier hated enemy. Harzog, former president of Israel, was on hand to be an eyewitness as the events unfolded. THis is his study of the conflict. It is throrough and he gives an unbiased account of the many israeli actors who fought the war, men like generals Aden and Sharon and the prime minister Golda. The downside of the book is that it appears to emphasize the Syrian front far to much. The Syrian offensive, like the Egyption one, took the ISraelis by suprise when it was not defeated in the first day. But the Syrian front was not, in my opinion, the most important theater of the conflict. THe large egyptian army(we must remmember Egypt and Nasser had been ISraels principal antagonist since 1948) and the fighting near the suez was the most important and where the war was decided(when Sharon brilliantly crossed the canal and encircled the Egyption third army). So this is a fair account of the war, their are other books. Aden(Bren) wrote a book about his experiences in the Sinai, as well as Sharons 'Warrior'(autobiography) and the book 'Two of Clock war' appears to be well written although not lenghty. Their is also at least one other book entitled 'the Yom Kippur War' that is a very professional, although critical of Sharon, account of the war.



3. The 1973 Yom Kippur War left in it's wake shattered illusions , an escalation in the energy crisis and a reshaped poltiical situation in the Middle East.
   
   This work , originally written two years after the Yom Kippur War , by one of Israel's foremost millitary analysts and later President of Israel, traces the roots of the war to the Six Day War , and gives a detailed analysis of the war on two fronts , the Northern Front , in the Golan against the Syrian attackers (aided by auxiliaries from Iraq, Jordan , Morocco , Saudi Arabia . Kuwait and Cuba among others) and the Southern Front , in the Sinai , against the Egyptian invaders.
   
   The author , in tracing the conflict from the 1967 Six Day War , illustrates how the Soviet Union instigated the war , arming the Arabs , falsely advising the Syrians about the concentrations of Israeli troops on their borders , playing down the escalation in the United Nations and heavily arming Syria , Egypt and Iraq , egging them on to a war of anihilation against Israel.
   
   Herzog details the backdrop to the war with the reality that Israel was faced with:
   "As Arab hysteria rose and the Arab media promised the Israeli population - men , women and children - destruction and anihilation in the most brutal manner , the horrors of the Nazi holocaust rose to the fore in Jewish consciousness. The Jewish people knew that these where not mere words , recalling how many nations nurtured on the tenets of Christianity had either participated in the previous bloody massacres or had looked on. And indeed the world looked on , petrified , incapable of taking action".
   
   Herzog details how Israel's extraordinary victory in the Six Day War lulled that nation into a false sense of security. The War of Attrition (1969-1970) by Egypt against Israel. The very magnitude of the Arab defeat in the Six Day War , with it's damaging implications for Arab pride , self-respect and honour set the stage for the next war , points out the author , detaling Nasser's resolve that "what was taken by force must be returned by force". The Soviet Union rebuilt the armed might of Egypt , Syria and Iraq , with the latest weapons and equipment , continually urging the Arabs into another war with Israel.
   The author details the political machinations of the Soviet Union and Arab powers leading to the war , and reveals the shocking fact that Israel knew several days before the war that a massive Arab attack was imminent on Yom Kippur but miscalculated the hour , believing it would be four hours later then when it actually took place.
   
   The author details how "the inherent strength and resilience of the people of Israel was revealed in the stark , grim and tragic days at the outset of the war , when fighting back against overwhelming odds , they overcame the initial setbacks and achieved millitary success."
   He sizes up in his opinion the strengths and weaknesses of Israel's foremost Generals in the conflict such as Moshe Dayan , David Elazar , Shmuel Gonen , Ariel Sharon , Chaim Bar Lev and Raful Eitan. Finally he detailed the political implications of the war.
   Looking at his comments today about perfidious role of the Soviet Union in encouraging the Arabs not to compromise with Israel , and egging them on to belligerance , one realizes that although the Soviet Union is no more , Communist rule having collapsed in that part of the world , it's role has been overtaken by others with an implacable hostility to Israel, including Red China ,and the South African led Non Aligned Movement , which continue the Marxist inspired hatred of Israel , originally created by the Soviets.
   Finally Herzog reminds us how Israel has never been the elment to block peace moves and that the basic problem continues to be Arab insistence that Israel has no right to exist (today backed up by the international hard left).
   "Only when Arab actions indicate a willingness to modify their atttitude to the basic issue of the existance of the State of Israel will it be possible for Israel make concessions."
   Unfortunately the failed Oslo process proved that the Arabs only saw the agreement of Arab rule of the disputed territories as an intitial stage in the road to Israel's destruction.
   Those on the international Left who encourage the Arab dream of Israel's destruction , only make genuine peace more unrealizable.
   The Israeli people desperately want peace and always have wanted peace , but must fight to
   survive and avoid a second holocaust.
   If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence.
   
   If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.



4. Of all the volumes on the 73 war, this one perhaps is the most informative picture of the overall war in a small package. Although not going into extreme detail of any particular front or aspect of the war, it does touch on all of them. Unfortunately, this overall review, does come at the expense of making the book somewhat dryer read than many of the excellent first hand accounts of the people actually invovled in the fighting. If someone really wants a detailed look at the war, the definitive work is yet to be written, although their are a number of books that give detailed examinations of particular theaters of the struggle - especially the battle for the Golan Heights.
   
   The author has been critisized for being biased. Given his role as an Israeli cabinet member, a certain amount of bias should not be a surprise to anyone reading the book, realizing it's written from the Israeli perspective. However given the fact that the book is admittedly written from the Israeli side, it's actually relatively objective in its examination - much more so than anything likely to be written from the Arab side. An example of a more Arab view of the war would be Edgar O' Balance's No Victor, No Vanquished.



5. Very good book on the strategy of the war as told from the Israeli point of view. I recommend it to anyone interested in the events that took place during the Yom Kippur War.

2 comments about Teach Yourself The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Teach Yourself: General Reference).

1. It is a very interesting book for the people that see the news in the television. The suffering of all the involved people is made clear together the actions of each actor in this drama. There is already 60 years of killings in the region and it seems the only way to get out of this loop is "forget the past" and "build a future". The dead can not be saved. Lets try to save the present and the future.



2. Of course, it's impossible to write a truly unbiased book about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but this book is laced with relentless vitriol about Israel. Seemingly every event is interpreted to cast Israel in the worst possible light and the Palestinians in the most heroic. Of course, Israel is not above criticism, but this goes way beyond rational criticism and into the territory of anti-Semitism. (What else is one to make of a reference to "archetype Jewishness" in discussing Herzl?). Appalling.

5 comments about The Two O'Clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel.

1. Mr. Boyne does an incredible job of explaining all the facets of this terrible war. He investigates Israel's decision to not call up the their reserves (I believe 20% of the IDF is composed of reservists) & the mistaken belief that air power would overwhelm the Arabs as it did in 1967. On the Arab side(mostly Egyptian), Boyne discusses the improved battle plan over the 1967 Six Day war debacle. Of course, the Soviet Union was responsible for arming them and instructing in how to use the anti-aircraft SAMS that devastated the IAF.
   Also, unlike the hideous "Eve of Destruction" book, Mr. Boyne keeps us up to speed throughout the book on the diplomatic actions that were occuring.
   Mr. Boyne does a great job explaining all the major players on all sides: Henry Kissinger, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Anwar Sadat, vegetarian Assad, but also other future figures Hosni Mubarak and Ariel Sharon.
   Finally, he recounts in intimate detail the story behind the Henry Kissinger led US airlift that essentially saved the great State of Israel.
   Thank you Mr. Boyne for an incredible book.



2. It was with some discomfort that I read Mr. Henning's review. I have heard this statement before, ie "The FACT is most of the weapons sent were replacements for those taken out or un-used additions to what was available and in use. Most never saw action." (His emphasis) Apparently that is the official Israeli position. Now, I can understand why the State of Israel would want to promote this idea, after all, no one surrounded by possible future enemies in another war wants to admit a weakness. The trouble is, that statement is just plain nonsense. I was there. I was a US Air Force C-141 pilot at the time and flew a load of supplies from Charleston to Lajes, then was detached from my crew and used to augment other crews on the round trip to Lod. As a result I flew multiple round trips without ever returning to the States, thereby making many more trips to Israel than most. I remember what we were carrying and how much we were carrying. I remember the frantic atmosphere and the sense of desperation among the people at Lod. (I also remember the lovely El Al stewardesses who met every flight and gave every crew member a dozen red roses!) I remember the post mission recap where it was disclosed that the time from arrival at Lod until the ammunition was expended was eight hours. And I remember the FACT (my emphasis) that the vast majority of the Arab tanks destroyed were destroyed by Maverick and Tow anti tank missles, missles which were almost nonexistant in the prewar Israeli inventory.
   I haven't really thought much about Operation Nickle Grass in the thirty years since but was amazed when I recently became aware of this apparent attempt to minimize the impact of this airlift. It is just not true and, frankly, is a bit irritating and insulting.



3. If you're looking for light, casual Middle East reading, this book is for you. If you prefer a to-the-point book (more difficult to write, because you can't ramble and have to constantly prove your point like an intelligent person), stay away. Especially if you need it for a book report.
   
   It's more of a general history of the 1973 War, with information about the airlift in there at random places. Why is it called the Two O'Clock War? See, I thought the airlift that saved the day was done at 2 AM, then the title would be commemorating the last-minute nature of the airlift. No, it turns out that the Arab attack occurred at 2 PM on October 6th. Huh? The current Iraq War began at 9:30ish PM, do we start calling that the 9:30 War? I can understand if the time was an unusual time of day, but two in the afternoon? Sheesh.
   
   OK, so it's full of fluff and anecdotes, which is good if you're not up-to-date on Middle East history and looking for relaxing fireplace reading, but for Middle East wonks, it'll largely be a waste of your time.
   
   As said previously, it's kinda easy to write a book filled with tangents and your points of view on everything from American foriegn policy to Golda Meir's humble origins in Russia. Doing research to write 200+ pages on the airlift, and how it saved Israel? Not here.
   
   It can still be for you, depending on your level of familiarity with the conflict. If you're new to Middle East history, it's a great start. If you're looking for quirky anecdotes, also great. Serious info about the airlift which takes up half the subtitle? Nah.



4. COL Walter Boyne tells a very compelling story of the Yom Kippur War and the efforts by the United States to resupply its closest ally in her time of need. The book is great at portrayng the war from almost every point of view - from Henry Kissinger's efforts through "Shuttle Diplomacy" to arrange a ceasefire to the disarray of Israel's leadership in response to the surprise attack to the cockpits of the C-5As and C-141s as the pilots winged their way to Israel with the desparately needed cargoes.
   
   The airlift saved a nation in dire need. So important was this aerial lifeline that Prime Minister Golda Meir paid a personal visit to Lod airport to see, "the great planes", for herself and show her appreciation of the young pilots who flew them.
   
   But what is only touched on is the real story of a very professional and very capable United States Air Force of the 1970s. While the rest of the U.S. Armed Forces remained borderline disfunctional from the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Air Force was an experienced, well trained and professional force who accomplished astounding achievements in the early 1970s. Only 18 months before the Yom Kippur War, the U.S. Air Force expeditiously deployed enough fire power back to Southeast Asia to stop North Vietnam's 1972 Easter Offensive and forced the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. They followed this up with a massive airlift of munitions and equipment to make good on ARVN material losses early in that offensive. In hindsight, one can say that this airlift was a rehearsal for the even larger one that took place during the 1973 war.
   
   Equally important, in his epilogue COL Boyne outlines the lessons learned from this operation that shaped our nation's airlift capability. This included adding an aerial refuelling capability to our airlifters so that we no longer had to rely on our "allies" for refueling stops. More of the valuable C-5s were added to the fleet. And command and control changes were made that allowed the USAF authority to control joint airlift forces. All this proved invaluable when the nation's airlifters were called once again in 1990 to sustain our response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
   
   The story of the airlift and its importance is unknown to the American public and largely forgotten now except by those who were there. Yet it will go down in aviation history along side the Berlin Airlift as one of America's best moments and COL Boyne's book gives overdue credit and recognition to those who made it happen.



5. I have long held an interest in the Yom Kippur war. It has often been said to have been Israel's off-day. In fact if any other army but the IDF had performed it it would be praised. But of course Israel is supposed to be "Rabbi Rambo" and so having a hard fight is a bit of a let down from expectations. Past glories are not always easy to live with.
   Yom Kippur was Israel's best performance ever. The '48 showed tenacity, ingenuity and resilience but little professionalism. It was also tainted by the reciprocal terrorism engaged in by both sides. The six day war was brilliant but required a conveniently helpful incompetence from the enemy that no army can afford to count on. In the Yom Kippur War Israel was attacked suddenly on two fronts by an enemy which had corrected many of it's previous flaws, before Israel had completely mobilized. In two weeks it had seized the initiative, practically conquered Syria and trapped an entire Egyptian army. One day perhaps, Israelis will look on these days as a "heroic age". If so the Yom Kippur war might be thought of as marking the end of an era.
   The Two O Clock war is an exciting book. It goes from the fighting to the halls of power to the American airlift which kept Israel alive. Much of the book centers on Kissinger's machinations. Kissinger was a cold-blooded power-politician of the old style, and was a master at playing international poker with nations and peoples as the stakes. His personality grates on Americans and can be distasteful to the spirit of liberal democracy. But he was often useful. Like Tommy Atkins in the Kipling poem, Americans can dislike Kissinger and want to "shuck him out the brute". But though we don't like to think about it, it can be good to have him around, "When the guns begin to shoot"-and right after as well. If he was unscrupulous and autocratic, he was also a grandmaster of the game, and his cunning was if not always a credit to, certainly a windfall for our country. And for that alone his enemies might moderate their venom.
   The Two O Clock war was a well written work on a campaign that holds a fascination. It is well worthy of your attention.

4 comments about Campaign 118: The Yom Kippur War 1973 (1) The Golan Heights.

1. Given the space constraints, this is a concise and well-balanced summary of the war, and synthesizes the usual sources quite well. The "Battlefield Today" section is especially nice. The big disappointment is the illustrations, which concentrate on Israeli forces. The few Egyptian photos are well-known and have been widely reprinted in the west, and are poorly reproduced here. The 3 two-page spread paintings are remarkable for their lack of detail. Given Osprey's extensive back catalog of Middle East titles, it's amazing they didn't reproduce any of the much better photos and paintings that graced earlier books. If you're looking to own a single book on the Sinai Front in the 1973 War, this could be it. If you already own standard works like Dupuy, Herzog, Shazly and Pollack, give this one a miss unless you're a completist.



2. Osprey's The Yom Kippur War: The Sinai is the first in a two-volume study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and a departure from the Campaign series normal aversion to modern topics (in the last 13 years and 126 volumes, the series has had only one other title on a post-1945 campaign). Armor aficionado and film maker Simon Dunstan provides a detailed summary of the dramatic events between 6-24 October 1973 on the Sinai front, where the war swung between initial Egyptian success, to stalemate, to Israeli triumph. Overall, most readers should find this volume excellent, if slightly biased toward Israel and armor issues (at the expense of air operations).

   The Yom Kippur War: The Sinai begins with a short introduction that covers the results of the 1967 Six Day War, the construction of the Bar Lev line and the 1969-1970 War of Attrition. In the next section, the author covers the meticulous Egyptian planning for Operation "Badr" - the assault crossing of the Suez Canal - and the Israeli defensive plans. The only really weak section in the entire volume is that covering opposing armies, which is only four pages in length. Although there is considerable detailed data available on the Yom Kippur War, the author fails to incorporate it into this section. For example, the author only mentions that the Egyptians had about 1,700 tanks, without breaking out how many there were of each model (an odd omission for an armor expert). Both the Egyptian and Israeli air forces are fairly ignored, with no order of battle provided, or breakdown by type. The section on opposing commanders is overly weighted toward Israel, and there are too few photos of the principal military leaders (amazingly, none of Sharon). The Yom Kippur War: The Sinai also has too few maps to support the narrative; there are only five 2-D maps (Israel in 1973, the Bar-Lev Line, the Egyptian bridgeheads, Battle of Chinese Farm phase 1 and phase 2) and three 3-D Birds Eye View maps (the Egyptian assault, the Egyptian offensive on 14 October 1973, and the Israeli crossing of the canal). The 3-D maps were designed to cover tactical battlefields, not entire operational areas, and these BEVs are zoomed too far out to convey much detail. The initial Israeli counterattacks on 6-8 October and the crossing of the canal are particularly difficult to follow on these maps (critical items mentioned in the text, like the "Missouri" position are not depicted on any of the maps). On the other hand, the three battle scenes (the Egyptian crossing of the canal, the Israeli roller bridge and Israeli tanks SAM-hunting) are quite good and add value to this volume.

   Dunstan's description of the Egyptian preparations for the canal crossing and the very successful deception operations are first-rate, and should be studied carefully by military readers. Indeed, Operation "Badr" was almost a model of how opposed river crossings should be conducted. While the author mentions the defeat of the initial Israeli armor counterattacks against the crossing, he fails to discuss the simultaneous shock when the initial Israeli air counterattacks ran into the SA-6 belt along the canal. Indeed, for an armor enthusiast, the author might have mentioned that these engagements between Egyptian commandos and Israeli armor on 6-7 October 1973 were one of the rare instances when light infantry defeated armor. The rest of the campaign narrative covers the political pressure that resulted in the abortive Egyptian offensive of 14 October and the Israeli counterstroke that decided the campaign. The emphasis in this account is primarily on armor operations, with little mention of the contributions of other branches and even air operations are overly neglected. The author's background as a filmmaker also betrays itself in one indiscretion where he notes in a photograph caption that an Israeli "squadron of Phantom [jets] was loaded with 13 20-kiloton nuclear weapons" when Israeli leaders feared defeat. Where is the source on this wild claim? While Israel's possession of nuclear weapons has been an open secret for some time, this claim seems unusually detailed and suspect. After the first few days of war, Israel had fewer than 90 F-4 Phantoms still operational and the author wants the reader to believe that the IAF would tie up 15% of its best strike asset to sit around on "nuclear strip alert." Such a preposterous claim certainly warrants a footnote or explanation.

   The final sections on the outcome of the war and the battlefield today are brief but interesting. Indeed, Sadat's limited objective campaign is also a model for demonstrating Clausewitz's dictum of "war as an extension of politics." Unfortunately, the author's bibliography is not very impressive, consisting mostly of stock secondary sources, like Trevor Dupuy. There are also more Egyptian sources available in English than the author suggests, but the author seems but little interested in their viewpoint (even Sadat's book has considerable detail on planning for the attack). The photographs throughout the volume are good, but heavily weighted toward armor issues and Israel, with most of the Egyptian-source photos being those normally available in most other sources on the war.




3. We have to admit that the Egyptian Propaganda machine was indeed very fierce and offensive before and during the 1967 Six Days War.
   Before the war, it was specialized in distributing subtle propaganda attacks against the Jordanian and Saudi Arabia monarchies. The Voice of the Arabs (VOA) beamed twelve hours a day directly to Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the more headway it made the bigger the cash they received from the Egyptian purses.
   VOA employed the `best' writers and easy-to-learn articles broadcast live on the high frequencies Egyptian Radio station.
   Ahmad Saeed - a literary agent -in happier times the mastermind behind the VOA, for some reason every thing he said and propagated imprinted itself on the Egyptian (and the Arab) people.
   Even those who took a dislike of Ahmad Saeed were labelled reactionaries, a prelude to being accused of treason.
   
   During the 1967 war, Saeed's influence had been sinister except on both Nasser and Mohamed Hassanein Heikal (a prominent Egyptian Journalist) in particular.
   It is to be noted that VOA was indeed the nerve centre of Egypt at the time, trying with noticeable success to send the impulses of the battle to the rest of the Arab World.
   But the manner in which the Egyptians fought the 1967 war was the inauspicious beginning for Saeed's `lies'.
   The worse the ongoing of the battle had deteriorated the more Saeed's propaganda machine became flagrant and very few could then realize the increasing degeneration of the performance of the Egyptian command (Under Abdul Hakeem Amer).
   Nasser was under no illusion that the tattered Egyptian Command (Amer) could hold for long and he felt that Saeed could not hold back `his tongue' in the middle of the `battle'.
   And when Nasser finally decided to do something with Saeed, alas, it was too late, the die was cast and defeat was inevitable.
   
   During the Yom Kippor War in 1973, Saeed had already been 'shelved'.



4. I am a big fan of the Osprey Campaign series books. Campaign 118: The Yom Kippur War 1973 (1) lives up to my high expectations with the series. It is well writtin and flows quite smoothly for a book of its type. It does not get bogged down in mundane details, nor does it fill the pages with fluff. It has splendid photographs and colorful maps, as do all of the books in the Osprey series.
   I particularly liked this book because the author was able to convey the sinces of urgency and uncertainty that were felt for the Israelis during this battle. While it is full of great information, it is definitely not the only reference to this war you want to have in your libary. As with all of these books, it adheres to a rigid format and length and really only highlights the major events. You could say that this book is a "Cliff's Notes" version of a lengthy and monotone after action report. It is a quick, informitive, and entertaining read.

5 comments about The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East.

1. Rabinovich's The Yom Kippur War is a detailed and compelling narrative about the lead up to the Yom Kippur War, the war itself, and its aftermath. Rabniovich does a particularly good job in describing the extreme peril Israeli fighting forces faced during the early days of the war, and he weaves the stories of foot soldiers and generals, prime ministers and presidents, into a seamless narrative. All and all, this is an excellent top to bottom treatment of the war, gripping, comprehensive, and fast paced. For anyone interested in the history of this conflict, it is essential reading.



2. A very good book. Accurate information. I have a few comments though:
   1- Sometimes the military operations are too detailed.
   2- Not enough discussion of the political dealings which went on at
   the same time.
   3- Not enough description of the air force operations. Even though it
   was severly challanged with the SAMs,it was active.



3. Very comprehensive - on the origins , protagonists , battles , strategy and the aftermath
   
   Would have liked more maps and a bit more of the Arab perspective - but obviously quite comprehensive from an Israeli perspective and first person account
   
   However the air force and navy clashes are disappointingly bare - even trevor dupey does a better job here in his book
   
   Will also recommend on similar subject books by :
   
   Simon Dunston (Osprey Campaign- Sinai and Golan fronts)
   
   Insight team of Daily Telegraph
   
   Chaim Herzog - war of atonement
   
   Mohammad Heikel - road to ramadan
   
   
   Book loses one star - as i thought there could have been many more maps and lack of Appendix which losses in men material is baffling and makes a good work incomplete



4. I was so pleased to read this well written account of the Yom Kippur War. I was there personally and intimate with several of the key individuals so responsible for the Israili successes -- or failures in intelligence. The detail that is revealed in depth here by the author is outstanding. I discovered so many items and instances with experiences heretofore never documented or reported.
   
   It is a very fine book that should not be overlooked by those concerned with this very important time in the the history of Israel.
   
   Bobbi Renae Swan



5. This book is compellingly written and extremely thought provoking, especially the sections on the incestuous nature of international intelligence. (The Brits pass the U.S. wrong information London got from Jordan, without explaining the source. Jordan passes the same information directly to the U.S. The U.S. believes it's received data from two different sources and passes it to other countries, who in turn pass it back to Israel, without specifying provenance. Pretty soon, everyone is confirming everyone else's wrong story.) This book should be required reading for anyone who deals with intelligence, so pervavise and sadly familiar are the intelligence failures chronicled.
   
   Because so many documents related to the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War are still classified, including in Israel and in the U.S., the author relies on hundreds of interviews with key Israelis and Americans as well as, it appears, senior Jordanians. In this, the book is definitely more a piece of journalism than pure history. The author is honest about the limitations he faced in compiling information for the book. Access to key Israelis -- including, I intuit, Ariel Sharon -- was far easier to come by than access to Arab decision makers. Even so, the author does a comendable job of humanizing the Egyptian enlisted soldiers who suffered terribly in the war and the aftermath.
   
   Someday, after the historical records are declassified, there will be a more comprehensive book than this. There will never be a more thoughtful or entertaining one. By capturing so much oral history while key people were still living, Rabinovich did all of us an enormous service.

3 comments about Centurion vs T-55: Yom Kippur War 1973 (Duel).

1. If it were possible, I would have given this title four and one-half stars. This book is readable, insightful, and nicely illustrated. However, unlike other titles in the "duel" series, it's a bit one-sided, giving Israeli experience with its modified Centurions (called "Shot Cal" in IDF jargon), with little background on the Syrians' experience with T-55s.
   
   The first several chapters tell how each tank developed from its WWII predecessors. Then the book gives a wealth of background on the role of tanks in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, and 1967 that led up to the October War of 1973. There is plenty of information on the two sides' competing armored doctrines. Syrian doctrine was heavily based on Soviet ideas and weapon systems, albeit somewhat handicapped by Syria's 60 percent literacy rate. Israeli doctrine was more nuanced, built on western weapon systems, but with plenty of home-grown technical and tactical innovations. An interesting tidbit: the Israelis put Centurion/Shot Cal on the Golan front because it was better-adapted to rough terrain. Their U.S.-built M-48 and M-60 tanks went to Sinai because they were less well suited to the rocky Golan, but faster on open terrain.
   
   The actual story of armored combat on the Golan Heights is well-told and dramatic. But at this point the Syrian point of view disappears. About all the reader can see or hear about them is the dust clouds and shellfire thrown up by hordes of T-55's as Syrians advanced with 1,400 tanks against just 177 Israeli Shot Cals. The author gives the Syrians their due for courage and tenacity despite appalling losses. He comments on the failure of Syrian commanders to exploit their breakthrough on the southern end of the front. Aside from this, the story is told completely from the Israeli side, with plentiful Israeli personal accounts and not one account from the Syrian side.
   
   What factors made the Israeli Shot Cals so far superior to their enemies, on a tank-for-tank basis? By failing to give Syrian perspectives, the author misses an opportunity. He alludes to Israeli advantages - their costly but effective tactic of having tank commanders fight out in the open, their use of tank ramps on the Golan, the superior effective range of their 105-mm guns, their crews' ability to accurately fire ten rounds per minute, and other factors. But the author never directly evaluates the strengths and (especially) weaknesses of the T-55 against the Centurion. Sure, the T-55 had a cramped turret, and the T-55's gun sights were inferior at long range. But there is more to the story than that.
   
   That said, the Israeli side of the story is well-told. The fighting on the Golan Heights October 6-10th 1973 belongs alongside the greatest epic battles in the history of armored warfare, like Kursk, Gazala,and El Alamein. This detailed and informative title will take a prominent place in any collection on armored weapons and tactics.



2. At first glance, Centurion vs. T-55: Yom Kippur War 1973 by Simon Dunstan, is an intriguing title. There are relatively few books available on the tank battles of the 1973 Yom Kippur War (aka War of Ramadan) and Osprey's Duel series offers a compact and affordable analysis of how rival weapons systems performed against each other in combat. Unfortunately, this volume is seriously undermined by three flaws: (1) the author writes entirely from the Israeli point of view, (2) the level of technical detail is insufficient to conduct a true analysis of these two weapon systems and (3) the author's failure to adhere to the series format makes his narrative disorganized and difficult to follow. Readers may also be misled by the title, since this book focuses solely on the Golan Heights. Overall, this volume is not up to the standards of previous volumes in the series and offers at best a one-sided and somewhat derivative account of these tank battles.
   
   There have been a number of Israeli accounts of the tank battles on the Golan Heights, particularly Avigdor Kahalani's The Heights of Courage (1992), upon which this volume draws heavily. However, the author appears to have made no effort to incorporate any Arab viewpoints and no Arab sources are listed in the bibliography. Indeed, not a single Syrian tanker is mentioned by name - they are just ciphers - and the author omits the usual sidebars on opposing combatants in the Duel series and simply provides a profile of Kahalani (wow, that was hard - it could virtually be taken from his book's fly leaf). Although it is clear that the Israeli's won the tank battles in Golan, history is not well served by an account that totally excludes the Syrian combatants. The English-reading world has already been exposed to the Israeli account of the Golan fighting - to which this volume adds very little - and deserve a more well-rounded account than has heretofore been presented.
   
   The level of technical detail is surprisingly low in this volume. While the standard 3-way profile for both tanks is included, the data plates presented on pages 26-27 are rather vague, particularly for the Centurion. It's not clear what model of Centurion the author is referring to and the data appears to be a mix of more than one model. The Israeli modified Centurions he describes in the volume have the 105-mm gun and diesel engine, but the data plate lists the older 20-pounder gun and petrol engine. The T-55 data plate says it had a 100-mm 20-pounder gun (huh?) with 65 rounds of ammunition, which is incorrect; the T-55 carried 43 rounds of 100-mm. The armor data lists thickness but not angle of sloping, which is an important omission. Looks like very poor editing. Crucially, there is no information provided on types of ammunition each tank carried and individual performance (penetration, muzzle velocity) and very little on fire control systems used in 1973. Without this data, it is difficult to compare tank gunnery. Although the author provides enough data to suggest general strengths/weaknesses of each tank - it is clear that that T-55 was superior in mobility and armored protection but the Centurion appears better in firepower - there are simply too many loose ends. This is particularly frustrating when the author claims that Israeli tanks routinely engaged enemy tanks at 2,500-3,000m; this might be possible when firing at a company-size mass of tanks, but engaging individual tanks at that range without a laser range-finder would be very wasteful of ammunition. As a former tanker myself, claims that anyone could routinely hit targets out at 3 km or beyond with the 105-mm (they would be only tiny blobs in the daylight sight) are misleading. Towards the end, the author reverses himself and admits that 70 percent of all engagements occurred at ranges under 2,000 meters.
   
   Finally, the author just didn't avail himself of the Duel series format, so the sections are just jumbled together. The initial section on design and development briefly covers how the British and Soviet tank design philosophies evolved between 1939 and 1946, but this section was supposed to deal with the genesis of each tank in the Duel. The 15-page section on technical specifications actually covers what should have been covered in the design section but spends almost all its entirety discussing the British models of the Centurion, with only a brief nod to the Israeli modified Centurions. Why spend three sentences discussing how British Centurions had a device to boil tea, when this was irrelevant to the duel between Israeli Centurions and Syrian T-55s. Note most of the photos of T-55s in this volume are models in Soviet service, not the ones used by the Syrians. The section on combatants is just horrible and irrelevant, choosing to focus on the Centurion in Korea and Vietnam at the expense of discussing Israeli/Syrian crew training (one paragraph on the Syrians). The strategic situation chapter is equally poor, wasting space on the 1956 War and the 1966 Water War. By this point, it is clear that the author has difficulty deciding what is germane to the Duel analysis and what is not. The final 34-page section on combat is the best part of the volume and gripping at parts, but not too original. While there is an overall map of dispositions in the Golan, this volume should have had a tactical map of the fighting in the Valley of Tears. Overall, this volume is at best an adjunct to earlier books like Kalahani's and at worst, a poorly researched and Israeli-biased account that merely re-packages existing material.



3. The book should have had the title and the subtitles reversed; it would have got three or four stars if this was the case. There was very little information here about tanks. There are books about the war that are A LOT better written, if that is what you are interested in.