5 comments about Rommel's Desert War: Waging World War II in North Africa, 1941-1943 (Cambridge Military Histories).

1. If you're interested in the WWII Western Desert campaign you'll love this book. I own many of the classic books on the subject...from Corelli Barnett's- "The Desert Generals" to Agar-Hamilton's- "Sidi Rezigh Battles" and "Crisis in the Desert"...and I'm always looking for new ones. In my opinion, Martin Kitchen's- "Rommel's Desert War" ranks right up there with this subject's classic works. "Rommel's Desert War" is well researched and written, very readable...in fact hard to put down, full of little known facts attesting to the author's research, and supplemented by good maps and interesting photographs. The Axis perspective in this campaign has never been so clearly detailed to the reader. Yes, from the quality of the paper (you won't believe how heavy this little gem is) to the quality of the scholarship this is a first rate book. There are good researchers and good writers but only a few historians are able to meld the two disciplines into an enjoyable and illuminating read. Martin Kitchen is one of the few and should be proud!



2. This book is an excellent overview of Rommel's North African campaign but it also emphasizes the higher elements of command from mainly the Italian and German leadership perspective. Thus it may not satisfy those looking for a book that gives more in-depth descriptions of what warfare was like as experienced by individual infantrymen or tank commanders. For that I recommend Holland's Together We Stand. Instead this book discusses and describes the planning and implimentation of military operations across the desert and especially the internal conflicts between the more agressive ambitious Rommel and those in both the Italian and German High Commands who prefered Rommel engage in more of a holding campaign rather than striking for the Suez Canal. The discussions of the critical battles are probably adequate for most readers but those expecting a more detailed operational account may find the author too sketchy or incomplete and the maps also omit some of the finer details. This is especially true concerning Operation Crusader.
   
   This book is also partly revisionist in that its portrayal of Rommel is considerably more negative than most other books on this topic. The author concedes Rommel is a far superior tactician, especially compared to his British opponents, but also considers him vainglorious, callous toward his men, reckless, arrogant, and prone to blame and even punish others for his mistakes. From a military perspective, Rommel's tendency to ignore the logistical impossibilities and subsequent futility of his military goals contributed to his final defeat thus making his earlier victories much in vain. Perhaps the North African Campaign indeed verifies the comment among the German High Command that Rommel was an excellent divisional commander but no more than that.
   
   Other strengths of the book include a more in-depth discussion of the Italian Command structure while also providing a respectable analyses of the logistical problems involved with the North African Campaign. Finally, while this book can be considered scholarly, the author's writing style still keeps the topic interesting. Overall I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in WW2.



3. Well... (1) Scholarship is impressive; I'm pretty conversant with the secondary sources and some of the primary sources, and he's done his homework. (2) I don't mind revisionist views of Rommel, but (3) it would be a lot better if the author separated his assessments of Rommel's performance from the in-line text. The problem I'm having is that a (almost always negative) assessment of Rommel is mixed in with the narrative of facts, and in some cases the facts do not support the assessment. So after about 1/3 way through, I'd say "Buy this for the research, but beware of the author's clear biases."



4. Rommel-bashing....
   
   
   This is a nice book on the campaign in North Africa. While not providing any sensational new info, much of the relevant info is here put into context. It details not only the fighting itself, but also how the political decisions made in Rome and Berlin influenced the campaign.
   It does, however, have some serious drawbacks.
   
   While most contemporary students of the North African campaign agree that Rommel was a highly controversial military leader with as many flaws as virtues, this book really takes it a step further, too far in my opinion.
   Indeed, the focus seems to be "Rommel-bashing", using every available negative scrap of info against him, only grudgingly admitting that he had some strengths as well, usually only as he was forced on the defensive in the later part of the campaign.
   In addition, it even claims that Rommel never wrote about feelings when writing to his wife, while allegedly enjoying nude swimming with younger officers...
   
   (To be fair, the book is also highly critical of the British leadership)
   
   The work has some minor factual mistakes, while not serious, they are irritating. My guess is that the author is well conversant with the political and strategic game, while lacking the insight and knowledge of the military details.
   
   The word panzer is used ad nauseam, and while it is true that Panzer is the correct plural form in German, it would be more correct to write panzers when writing in English and describing several vehicles. Details...
   
   It could also have had a slightly better layout, as it can be a bit tedious and unstructured at times, and the coverage tapers off after El Alamein, almost as if caused by lack of space or writing stamina.
   
   While the supply situation determined the eventual outcome of the campaign, this was not decided at sea.
   Occasionally the British effort to strangle the supply lifeline would succeed, but only temporarily. The real flaw was the lack of capacity in the African ports (even if operating at full capacity, disregarding enemy attacks and interruptions, they could never attain the level needed to support the entire army).
   Furthermore, offloaded supplies accumulated in the ports due to a lack of land transport to the front. This is mentioned briefly, but still too much emphasis is placed on Malta and the Brits hindering the flow of supplies.
   
   I would hesitate to recommend this work to a novice student of the campaign. When read with a critical eye and together with other more detailed books on the topic, it can be a nice addition.
   
   
   PS. Can authors please stop repeating the old propaganda lie that the Germans had to heat the armor plating of a Panzer with a blowtorch in order to fry an egg on it..? Obviously, they have never been in the desert..



5. I gave this three stars. I would have liked to have given it more, but to be honest I feel a little uneasy about giving it even three. Two and a half would have been more accurate. Why?
   
   On the positive side, this book goes a long way toward debunking the myth that Rommel was a great general. He wasn't a great general. He would have been a great regimental commander (colonel) and a very good division commander (major general). But he represents a classic case of someone who was promoted above his level of competency. One of his colleagues describes him as "neurotically ambitious". I am not certain that either he nor I am qualified to render a clinical evaluation, but his ambitions in North Africa were unreasonable and dangerously insubordinate, as the author makes clear. It was Hitler's mistake to give him an independent command as he was someone who badly needed to be closely supervised by someone whom he respected.
   
   The down side of this book is that it is so poorly written and produced as to be almost useless as history of the campaign. I found the chronology extremely muddled with events very often taken out of order for no apparent reason other than possibly the author wrote them down as they occurred to him without ever going back to put them in their proper order. This is aggravated by the fact that he seldom gives precise dates. It is not only entirely possible to come away from this book with a wrong sense of the order in which events unfolded, but for a student new to the campaign it is virtually inevitable. A good editor would have caught this and had the author do a better job. Seemingly no such person was on hand. Most of the relevant facts are in there, but it falls upon the reader to arrange them in a better order.
   
   Almost as serious is the poor quality of the maps provided. This seems to be becoming endemic in military history books and given how necessary good maps are to properly grasping military events, it is a damning indictment of the genre. I think there was one or at most two maps covering the entirety of Operation Crusader. That battle was so fluid and chaotic that it requires daily and sometimes hourly maps to properly envision its ebbs and flows.
   
   So, while I recommend this book to the serious non-professional who already is well-versed on the general outline of the desert war as well as enough of its details, I would be gravely cautious about handing it to a newcomer. And that is most regrettable. It is the newcomer who is most likely to have been dazzled by the legends that have grown up around Rommel and how extraordinarily brilliant he was. The truth is that in many critical instances, he did not so much win his battles as the British lost them.

5 comments about Panzer Tactics: German Small-Unit Armor Tactics in World War II.

1. ...at least in my own ever-growing collection. We have the experiences of a Guderian, von Mellenthin, or Manstein, self serving as they sometimes may be, but at all these decades remove the view of the actual panzer crewman starts to get a little hazy. This book remedies this by way of hundreds of photographs that I don't believe are published in any other popularly available work. The CAPTIONS to these are of value! (For example: "Proper spacing is 100 meters - these Pz IIIs are too close!).
   
   Each chapter begins with a concise exposition of the topic (Offensive operations, Defensive operations, Unit Movements, Command and Control, Logistics and Maintenance, etc.) from the point of view of the experienced veteran. A number of reproductions of the actual training materials for panzer crew from the period are included. The author takes pains to show how, during actual operations over the course of the war, panzer crew were repeatedly forced to improvise, departing from rigid adherance to the doctrine in these materials. Also included are a number of sketch maps of various operations at the smaller unit level, to further illustrate the principles. I believe a number of these are from actual after-action reports, hand drawn by the officers involved.
   
   But it's the photos that are of the most value. These bring to life all the gritty little details of the panzer crew's existence, which was at times boring, terrifying, exhausting, freezing, burning, bleeding, and at most times thoroughly miserable. Life in a tank in WW II was hard. Operating them with enough skill to accomplish impossibly difficult missions with any chance of survival was even harder. This book goes some way towards showing how the Germans did it.
   
   If you are a modeler or wargamer, mark this one down as a MUST HAVE.



2. This is a great resource book. It goes into tremendous detail about how Panzers were deployed and used in WWII. It is well writted and easy for the non professional soldier to understand.



3. and very illustrative book to comprehend the details of panzer tactics, which decide the success on the battlefield. Good eye opener before taking up some WWII memoirs.



4. Great b&w photos, and the maps are interesting although would be more useful if translated. The Panzer tactics shared are nothing more than what good common sense would dictate in a combat situation. This book is on the pricey side for what you get. I would recommend Otto Carius' "Tigers in the Mud" or Michael Whitmann as more interesting subject matter regarding Panzer tactics.



5. This book is packed with rare photographs of panzers and german equipment in service through both the russian, western european, and some north african campaigns. the book format reads like a military technical manual but in more laymans terms and generalizations. A MUST HAVE FOR ANY TANKER LIBRARY.

No comments about M60 vs T-62: Cold War Combatants 1956-92 (Duel).

5 comments about Panther vs Sherman: Battle of the Bulge 1944 (Duel).

1. I wish I had had this book fifteen years earlier before I constructed my table-top game of the Bulge (12' x 6', several tiers, HO scale trees, tanks, and soldiers on stands). The students would moan and groan (those driving the Shermans ,1/72nd scale tanks)when the German tanks would clobber their thinclads at extreme ranges. In reality, the book confirms that. But one needed to take into account the heavy forested areas that impaired line of sight during this winter onslaught by the Germans.
   Overall, this is an extraordinary book that explains the advantages and disadvantages for the two armoured fighting vehicles. This is an outstanding book for the WWII armor enthusiast, as well as for the wargamer. This is another book that I will be passing along to my grandson.



2. I recently purchased this book expecting a 'straight down the middle'evaluation of the pros and cons of these two famous tanks.What I got was a work full of Mr Zaloga's skewed logic regarding German technological achievements.He frequently cites examples of sherman successes whilst ignoring most of the more numerous panther examples.More research into original German and American combat reports and statistical documentation by the author would have helped to even out the many incorrect pieces of data.Not his most authoritative work.



3. It's the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte, not Liebstandarte. Otherwise, it's an enjoyable small book.



4. Osprey offers excellent books. Their graphics are nonpareil, and information outstanding. This book outlines the pros and cons of two tanks fighting it out in 1944 Europe, the American Sherman and the German Panther.
   
   Missed by some commentaries on tank action in Europe is simply that the Sherman's job involved attacking fixed fortifications manned by infantry. The Sherman hit the infantry line and broke through, then a different allied tank, the Tank Destroyer with a larger gun, came up and defeated the German (or whomever) tank's counter attack. After that, the Shermans took off and ran around behind the lines shooting everyone up and making the breakthrough stick. Thus, the Shermans were not supposed to fight other tanks very often. This was the theory. In practice, things seldom worked according to the theory.
   
   The Panther development stemmed from German dismay at the Russian T-34. General Heinz Guderian set forth the necessary requirements which were not filled. Because of political infighting, the best design lost out. Then Panthers were rushed into production, hampered by design changes on the fly, and other problems encountered because of Nazi mismanagement. Panthers improved as the war went on, but many basic design flaws remained throughout its production.
   
   Osprey covers all the Panther's production problems; however, they fail to mention the tactical differences in the theory of the Sherman's use and its actual use. I view this as a major oversight.
   
   The author, Steven J. Zaloga, does outstanding work in showing how the Sherman's strengths are overlooked, while the Panther's weaknesses are often ignored. It seems the tanks were each blessed and cursed, but the blessings could be an overwhelming advantage at some points, but overcome by the curses at others. For example, high fuel usage by the Panther, coupled with Germany's inability to produce enough fuel, proved a major shortcoming; however,its optical sights were superior to the Shermans, and coupled with the excellent 76mm high velocity gun,they enabled the Panther to destroy Shermans at long range. So, what is more important, high fuel usage (a negative) or long range striking power? As Germany's fuel shortage was acute, that disadvantage gains importance. Also, the Sherman detailed in the book is the 76mm gun version. Superior to the 75mm low velocity gun originally mounted.
   
   In the end, it seems a toss up on some levels. You, the reader, can decide. My conclusion is the Sherman comes off better than expected.
   
   I took another star away for a sophomoric error by an excellent company: the stats for the Sherman are in feet and inches while the measurements for the Panther are in metric units. Now I have to do conversions. Uncool. Please use only one unit of measurement. Mixing the units is simply unacceptable.
   
   AD2



5. This is one of those Osprey books, this time in the "Duel" series. The duel here? Sherman tanks versus Panthers in the Battle of the Bulge.
   
   On paper, the Panther was a superior tank, so the so-called duel would seem to have been one-sided. However, as the book argues, there were simply more Shermans than Panthers and American tank crews were better than the depleted German tankers. As a result, the Sherman tanks ended up, as a group, doing well. The author notes that (Page 4): "On the face of it, the contest between Sherman and Panther seems preordained in the Panther's favor." But, obviously, the Panther did not carry the day for the German forces as they launched their surprise attack in the Ardennes, precipitating the Battle of the Bulge.
   
   The book features many photographs, specifications of the competing tanks, and maps. The book considers a number of factors, from the technical specifications of the two tanks, to the tank crews who fought one another, to the strategic situation, to the nitty gritty of combat. The Conclusion notes why the Panthers did not perform better. The legacy of these tanks? The book concludes by noting that (Page 75): "It can certainly be argued that the Panther was the forebear of the modern main battle tank concept."

No comments about The Infantry's Armor: The U.S. Army's Separate Tank Battalions in World War II.

5 comments about Tigers in the Mud: The Combat Career of German Panzer Commander Otto Carius (Stackpole Military History Series).

1. I enjoyed reading this book, to hear from the veteran, his own story, is enlightning. One can sense the bitterness that underlies the fact of losing after trying so hard and paying such a high price to win. We need to hear more such stories before they are all gone, historians can paint the picture however they like but nothing beats the mark 1 eyeball. Some nice pictures and a very good read.



2. Otto Carius is a hero.
   I hope he reads this message so I can just say to him and the soldiers who fought with him that I understand why they fought, and how Germany should be very proud they had such fine soldiers like you. It was war, and I hope you found some measure of happiness after all that sorrow. My uncle who fought against you guys in the war told me that there was nothing more scary than the sound of a Tiger tank. He also said many times that the Germans were fine soldiers. After reading your book I cant believe we won the war.
   Best Regards,
   bigbadbri57@mac.com



3. This first hand account of a German tank officers combat in Russia during WWII. It has been translated into English which makes the reading sometimes rough and clunky. It is a pretty good account of non-stop combat. The biggest problem is that it doesn't dive deep enough into the authors feelings. Kind of sterile.



4. The first had account of the Eastern Front is detailed and complete from the perspective of the author. Details of the operations with the infrantry troops explain many of the tactics and out comes from the engagements. The one area the book is lacking detail with concerns the engagements with Allied forces in the Ruhr pocket. The author is severly injured, recovers and then gains a combat assignment with :Hunting Tigers" on the Western Front. I would have enjoyed to read more on the "Hunting Tiger" and it real capabilities as the author fully detailed with his Tiger tank on the Eastern Front. Overall, a great book to read!



5. This book really needed some editing. Just about the time I thought it was getting interesting the author went off on a tangent only to return far from where he left off, or not at all. That being said the accounts of action were well written and sometimes edgy. Although slow at times the reader will come away with knowledge about life in a tank that was not assumed, frosty walls, asphixiation fears and the fear of being stranded in no-mans land. Otto was one of those soldiers that deserves respect. He was the kind of leader who fought his superiors and subordinates alike, all for the right reasons. If you like this genre of history give it a try, for me it was more afterthought than I bargened for.

5 comments about M1 Abrams vs T-72 Ural: Operation Desert Storm 1991 (Duel).

1. This book describes the two tanks in great details and then covers their confrontation in the first Gulf War. Photos from inside the tanks give excellent illustrations on not only the different design philosophies of west vs. east but also what the fighting men had to deal with in combat situations. In-depth tactical analysis explains clearly the contrasting doctrines of the opposing sides as well as the reason for the lopsided results. Overall, a must-have for military history buffs.



2. In Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural, author Steven Zaloga concludes that, "the tank fighting during Operation Desert Storm represented one of the most lopsided contests in 20th century military history. The Iraqi army was outclassed in all respects and suffered appallingly high losses while inflicting minimal casualties on the coalition forces. In the case of the M1A1, more Abrams tanks were destroyed by friendly fire than Iraqi action." This addition to Osprey's Duel series outlines the brief contest for armored supremacy between the M1A1 tank and the Soviet-designed T-72 tank during the 1991 Gulf War. Although the outcome of the Duel is never really in doubt, the author does a superb job in outlining how design decisions and crew training shaped the eventual outcome. Throughout the volume, Zaloga's expertise in armored warfare shines, particularly in explaining the subtleties of technical points. Overall, this volume is an excellent addition to the Duel series and a worthwhile addition to anyone interested in the military details of the Gulf War.
   
   In the introduction, while the author notes that the M1A1 had important technical advantages over the T-72 tank, he hews to his holistic view of armored warfare that he has espoused in other books: "the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as on the machines themselves." The author then delivers a well-written 14-page section on the design and development of each tank. The most interesting comments in this sections was about the American and Soviet efforts to develop new types of composite armor. The following 16-page section on technical specifications is also excellent and focuses on the key areas of firepower, protection and mobility. It would have been nice if inter-tank communications were discussed - no small point in armored warfare - but there clearly was insufficient space.
   
   The 8-page section on the combatants was good, but a notch below the two previous sections in terms of detail and insight. For example, gunnery training for U.S. tankers is discussed, but not for Iraqis. I suspect that Iraqi tankers even in the Republican Guard had some access to sub-caliber training and probably fired a modified Soviet-type gunnery table, but this is not elaborated upon. There are some editing errors in this section as well, such as a sentence that claims that "Young second lieutenants were sent to the Armor Officer Advance Course," but it was actually the Basic Course (I graduated from AOB 7-85C, myself). Elsewhere, it is mentioned that Bravo Company 2-70 AR scored "842 out of a possible 1,000 points" but this is unintelligible. At the time, each tank fired an individual Table VIII and platoons went through Table XII, but I never heard of a company -level tank table. I think this passage was referring either to the company's mean score on these lower tables, or the personal score of Captain Mark Gerges, the Bravo Company commander. The 8-page section on the strategic situation is also good and enumerates the number of M1A1 and T-72 battalions involved in Desert Storm. There's also a couple of editorial slips in this section, too, such as adding up the number of tanks in a U.S. tank battalion (4 x 14 + 2 =58, not 55). The discussion about the interaction between the M1A1 Abrams and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopters also gives the impression that the Apaches were primarily a division, rather than a corps asset (some divisions still had AH-1s).
   
   The 13-page section on the campaign primarily focuses on the actions of Task Force 2-70 AR at Medina Ridge. This section is interesting and well-written, but is primarily taken from Captain Gerges' account. There is only very limited perspectives provided by Iraqi tankers, although this is not surprising. The author's technical dissection of how the American M1A1s defeated the Republican Guard T-72s is first-rate. There are a couple of subtle points here that could have been a bit more elaborated upon. First, U.S. tankers were trained to identify the target while in hull defilade, move up, shoot, then back up to avoid any return fire, then repeat (Driver Move Up, Gunner take over...), but this apparently did not occur on Medina Ridge because the Iraqi T-72 rounds were falling so short of the M1A1s. Further, U.S. tank tactics normally emphasized bounding overwatch by platoons, but Bravo Company fought entirely on line. These methods worked against the Iraqis, but they might not have done so well against better-trained enemies. Second, if the Iraqis had fought like the Egyptians in 1973 and created an anti-tank screen with lots of infantry, with their armor further back, the Americans would not have been able to fight such an armor-pure battle. When the Israelis tried that, they lost two tank brigades to Saggers and RPG7s.
   
   Graphically, M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural is an attractive volume that offers 3-way views of both the M1A1 and T-72M1; data tables for each tank; the view through the T-72M1 gunsight; the M1A1 gunsight view through both the daylight channel and the thermal sight; and interior turret diagrams of both tanks. It also has two maps: an operational-level map of the U.S. VII Corps attack on the Republican Guard Corps on 26-27 February 1991 and a tactical map depicting the attack of Team Bandit, 2-70 AR on Medina Ridge, 27 February 1991. A color battle scene - it almost looks like a photograph - depicts Team Bandit on Medina Ridge. The photographs in the volume are very good but several are recycled from earlier Osprey volumes. There are also numerous photos of T-72s with their turrets blown off, but not a single photo of any damaged M1A1s, even though such photos exist. The author also provides a 2-page bibliography and an index. Overall, a wonderful volume on modern armored combat, although one that could benefit from a bit tighter editing.



3. I have recently become a fan of books written by Steven Zaloga, however, I thought this book was just okay. I much prefer Armored Thunderbolt, which is outstanding and I also liked Zaloga's Panther vs. Sherman: Battle of the Bulge. To be fair, M1 Abrams vs T-72 is still worth reading. I had no idea that the T-72 is a poor tank (the manner in which the rounds are stored make it a death trap) and it details the reasons that the M1 is such an outstanding tank. Much like the 1991 war, the chapter on the Battle of Medina Ridge is very short and the book does not make the details of the M1 and T-72 as interesting as Armored Thunderbolt does with the details of the World War II Sherman. Armored Thunderbolt is a must buy while this book is a buy.



4. This represents one entry in the Osprey Duel series. This slender volume focuses on the tank combat in Desert Storm, in 1991. Two key tanks: the M1 Abrams on the American side and the T-72 (a Soviet-built tank) on the Iraqi side. Indeed, as the author notes at the outset, the tank combat in Iraq may have served as something of a model for what might have happened had Warsaw Pact and NATO forces engaged in combat.
   
   Both sides in Desert Storm had significant armored forces. Outcomes in battle were a function of two factors--the ability of the tanks and the training and performance of the tank crews. Both have to be accounted for.
   
   Early on, as with other books examining weapons systems, design, development, and technical specifications of the tanks are provided. Pages 15 and 23 provide tank to tank comparisons (although it is annoying that physical dimensions are in feet for the M-1 and in the metric system for the T-72). Then, there is a discussion of the crews. The m-1 had a crew of 4 and the T-72 of 3. American crews were, overall, better trained and better fit for field combat. Iraqi tankers tended to be rather poorly trained--a genuine hazard once combat began.
   
   Next, the strategic thinking of the two opponents are discussed and--then--the actual fighting. The end result was a battering of the Iraqi forces. More American tanks were destroyed by friendly fire than by Iraqi tanks.
   
   A nice brief volume on tank versus tank in Operation Desert Storm.



5. If you've never read much about the M-1 or T-72, this book is going to be an excellent surprise. It is well written, accurrate and provides concise summary of these two tanks. Many excellent photographs (all in color), cut-away drawings, statistics and facts support Steven Zaloga's premise...the M-1 is hands down the better tank. I always enjoy photos of the interior of tanks, this book has several for each tank.
   
   Zaloga, who has written many books on Soviet and US armor, explains in detail how each tank was developed and how the different needs of each Army shaped the design of each fighting vehicle. The M-1 has emerged as the worlds best tank providing superior firepower, protection and mobility. It does have its flaws - it gups fuel and requires a long logistical tail. But that's ok, the US can afford that & it's well worth it to protect our crews. There are also sections of US tanker's first hand experiences during the Gulf War which demonstrate why the battle was so one sided.
   
   Highly recommended for beginners of tank warfare or someone seeking a concise book on the armor aspect on Desert Storm. Not so much a book for modelers, although the photos will give you a lot of ideas on how crews stored their equipment. While very informative, if you know anything about either tank, there is nothing new or surprising here. It is a good buy for the money - quality paperback.

5 comments about Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting.

1. An honest and well written book about command and control. The author puts you in the "TOC" and in the "tank". It is written so well that when I finished reading, I thought I was standing next to H.R. McMasters. I undertood the fog war and how politcal our military leaders are. The no-nonsense approach taken by Dr. Macgregor is written with first hand knowlegde and clarity. IT IS A MUST READ FOR ALL MILITARY HISTORIANS.



2. So said the Iraqi brigade commander of the Republican Guard unit that then-Major Douglas Macgregor's 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment "Cougars" (Toujours Pret!) had just annhilated at the Battle of 73 Easting in Feburary, 1991. Unfortunately, Macgregor and the rest of the U.S. military had their orders; a ceasefire was soon implemented, preventing 2/2 ACR and the rest of VII Corps from pursuing and destroying their enemy. Consequently, the main body of the Iraqi Republican Guard was able to retreat and later crush Shiite and Kurdish rebellions inside Iraq, keeping Saddam Hussein in power for another 12 years.
   
   There aren't a lot of books published about the First Gulf War, but this is a worthy addition to what is already out there and should spark debate, as it goes against "conventional wisdom". Macgregor takes the reader on a detailed and fascinating accounting of his experiences as operations officer of the famed cavalry squadron who engaged with and destroyed a brigade-sized Iraqi armored formation thanks in large part to the actions of then-Captain H.R. McMaster's Eagle Troop. McMaster is now a Brigadier General and one of the more notable names to come out of the Iraq War, having made news as the commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in 2005, one of the most successful case studies of counterinsurgency warfare practiced by the U.S. military in modern combat.
   
   The book is an extremely compelling read for many reasons, but is not without flaws. As I have noted in two previous reviews of books by LTG (ret.) Ricardo Sanchez and LTC (ret.) Nathan Sassaman, there is a palpable sense of anger, bitterness and frustration on the part of the author; I found myself questioning how much of his views were clouded by the natural self-serving instincts that often pervade autobiographical works. We, the readers must take Macgregor at his word when it comes to his conclusions and his outspoken critique of the army's senior chain of command during Operation Desert Storm. As one reviewer has already mentioned, Macgregor goes out of his way to cast light on his own situation early in the book (referring to himself as an "outcast colonel" during a meeting with CENTCOM commander GEN Tommy Franks, not to be confused with VII Corps Commander LTG Fred Franks, whom the author holds largely responsible for the failure to destroy the Republican Guard and achieve a decisive strategic victory over Iraq in 1991.) and I think the several reminders of his own situation and career detract from the overall body of work.
   
   That said, "Warrior's Rage" is well-written and highly readable. Macgregor skillfully introduces the reader to all of the important characters and members of the Cougar Squadron who played critical roles in the battle, from squad and platoon level all the way up to battalion staff and even those in leadership positions at the regimental level. Again, some of the bitterness creeps in, and the reader will find that quite evident as events unfold and 2/2 ACR prepares to go to war. The battle itself, which was no contest thanks to the superb training, leadership, equipment and aggressiveness of Brig. Gen. McMaster's Eagle Troop, along with that of Ghost Troop and the rest of the cavalry squadron's warriors who were a part of the biggest American armored battle since WWII and its greatest tactical victory. The author goes out of his way to praise the Soldiers, from the the courageous NCOs, and junior officers, to the cavalry troopers who made the victory happen. The book has no shortage of great anecdotes that only add to the cavalry mystique.
   
   However, when it comes to the senior leadership, Macgregor issues a scathing indictment of general officers he felt were too risk averse, saving the majority of his anger for VII Corps Commander, Lt.Gen. Fred Franks, whom the author faults for not accomplishing the mission he was given by CENTCOM commander GEN Norman Schwartzkopf: Destruction of the Republican Guard. It is clear that Macgregor saw himself as the defacto commander of the squadron, giving the actual commander a pseudonym (LTC Larson) and depicting him as a waffling, indecisive martinet who made virtually no real command decisions. Although less-scathing in his language, it is also clear that the author was disappointed with the actions of the 2nd ACR's regimental commander, then-Colonel Don Holder. Were the problems and personalities in the regiment as dysfunctional as Macgregor would have you believe? I wasn't there, so that is for those who were to decide.
   
   In the end, I recommend this book, because it attempts to debunk the belief that Operation Desert Storm was an overwhelming tactical AND strategic victory. He takes on the media-created myth of the operation's unqualified success and ties the erroneous conclusions and self-satisfaction that the Army as a service took from the event to the many struggles and setbacks which have occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002. The author takes a morally courageous stand in the face of what is sure to be a vitriolic response from those he takes issue with, and his book is a highly controversial one that not only challenges long-established views about Operation Desert Storm, but lays the blame of many of our military's current setbacks and shortcomings in the Middle East at the feet of those making the calls during the First Gulf War.



3. "Warrior's Rage", by Douglas MacGregor, is the story of the brave men of `Cougar Squadron', one of the units that participated in the world's largest armored conflict since the 1944 Battle of Kursk. In this rather lop-sided Feb 1991 battle, armored elements of the United States Army demolished the vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard, suffering relatively few casualties in return. This book is told from the perspective of one of the tactical leaders who was there.
   
   On February 22, 1991, Cougar Squadron entered Iraqi territory with the mission of engaging and destroying the Republican Guard. MacGregor does an incredible job of chronicling the events over the next few days as Cougar Squadron smashed into a much larger force at 73 Easting. Readers will empathize with the fears, frustrations, and exhilarations of armored combat as expertly described by the author. MacGregor also pays a fitting tribute to Sgt Andrew Moller, the sole fatality of this small part of the war. If MacGregor would have focused solely on this aspect of the war, it would have been an outstanding book.
   
   As a battle study, the book lacks a description of how Cougar squadron fit into the overall context of the war. The author did not provide a single map of where the unit fought in Iraq, in relation to other units in VII Corps. There are numerous tactical level charts that show how the sub-units deployed on the battlefield, but readers like me would have benefitted from an operational level chart.
   
   MacGregor argues that the US Army could have defeated the Republican Guard and deposed Saddam Hussein back in 1991. While I will concede that he presents a compelling argument, it is one-sided. MacGregor fails to discuss both the United Nations Security Resolution which gave the coalition the legal authority for DESERT STORM; and he also fails to analyze the political constraints effected by the Bush-41 administration by its desire to end the ground war at the arbitrary 100-hour mark. A discussion of either of these points would have effectively answered the "why" to the question of why we didn't finish the job in 1991. The short answer is that the the United States did not have the political will nor the legal authority to become an army of occupation in 1991. Because of this, the United States had to defeat the Iraqi army, but leave it in a condition strong enough to act as a regional deterrent force against Iran.
   
   MacGregor is a very talented author, making this book a very fast read. If you are looking for great read about modern armored combat as seen from the men on the ground, you won't find a better book. However, the author should have kept the book focused on his area of expertise, rather than presenting a one-sided argument about strategic decisions made by military leaders. His viewpoint only covers the effects of what those decisions were, failing to include any discussion as to the "why" the decisions were made. It's a good book on armored combat, but his jaded opinions overshadow the incredible accomplishments and heroism of a small group of men who were the tip of the spear in Operation DESERT STORM.
   
   The Naval Institute Press provided me with a complimentary copy of the book.



4. The Author has an excellent story to tell. Throughout the volume he continues to question the actions of the Dept of Defense and the "high command" of the US Army strategy-wise. As an outside observer, my feeling is thay his comments and thoughts are probably right on target given the post Gulf War events right up to the present.
   
   I found his narrratives of the battles leading up to "73 Easting" fascinating. I did find his narratives a bit confusing and hard to follow at times. Nonetheless, the author does an excellent job of showing just how superior US and Allied forces were vs the much-vaunted Republican Guard troops.
   
   If you are at all interested in military action type stories, the battle narratives alone make this book a worthwhile purchase.



5. Warrior's Rage is certainly an interesting and engaging story. I had difficulty putting the book down. Readers get a really close up look at what it was like to plan and execute a major tank battle in the modern age. You get a taste of the good and the bad and how grueling and horrific war can be, even if only for 100 hours. But what I found truly extraordinary was to read about something that we may never see again in many lifetimes, a major tank battle between two huge armies.
   
   Warrior's Rage however also sheds light on a decision that occurred in 1992 that many have puzzled over to this day. For those of us who wondered for years why Desert Storm ended as it did and why Saddam Hussein was able to stay in power after all of the effort in Desert Storm, Warrior's Rage explains much. Macgregor reveals what was going on inside the U.S. Army in Feb 1992 as VII Corps prosecuted its attack across the desert, and it is not a pretty story.
   
   I doubt the Generals involved in this fight will like what much of what Macgregor said, but one thing is absolutely inescapable, the United Stated failed to achieve one of the single most critical strategic objectives of the entire endeavor -- to destroy the Republican Guard.
   
   Someone is responsible for that failure and when you read Warrior's Rage you will know it was not the young men and women at the front lines of that war who fought valiantly. Everyone at the time, from the President, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Commander in Chief of US Central Command knew that the Republican Guard was the single most important center of gravity in Iraq. It kept Saddam Hussein in power. Why else would they have ordered its destruction?
   
   Yet it was not destroyed and that does not appear to be accidential. Responsibility for the failure to destroy the Republican Guard and severely weaken Saddam Hussein's grip on power rests with President Bush for stopping combat operations too soon. It also rests with Chairman Powell for not effectively arguing that the job wasn't done. But most importantly responsibility rests with the military leadership. It rests with the General Schwarzkopf, the military commander ultimately responsible for the outcome of this war. And as the author documents the failure emanated from and lays directly at the feet of the VII Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Fred Franks.
   
   Macgregor makes an excellent point, over the 30 years prior to Desert Storm the US had invested tremendously in building heavily armored yet highly mobile fighting forces so it could out maneuver enemies and attack with lightning speed, only to see that advantage squandered by a timid attack plan and Corps commander who ordered his forces to advance as speeds worthy of tank warfare 80 years before. Macgregor's story from the front suggests that if the CENTCOM Commander had acted on his dissatisfaction and instincts early on and removed Gen Franks replacing him with an aggressive general who would have accelerated the plan and allowed his forces to do their job, VII Corp would have accomplished its mission to pin down and destroy Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard. What you see in Macgregor's critique of the Army senior leadership is how the tremendous investment of our nation to give the Army every possible advantage on the battlefield was lost by what appears to be personal loyalty among Army Generals trumping professional judgment. Macgregor documents for us how Lt Gen Franks orders allowed the Republican Guard to flee and fight another day, ultimately required us to go back 12 years later to finish the job, costing us thousands more lives on both sides, and billions more dollars.
   
   Whether one likes what Macgregor says or how he says it, or not, his book is an excellent read for those with an interest in military affairs and leadership. However, it is an absolute must read for those who aspire to duty in the armored ranks. Most certainly this book, and Macgregor's critique of senior Army leadership must be studied and debated as part of the professional military education curriculum of the Army, from West Point to Carlisle Barracks by men and women who will be following future leaders and betting with their lives.

5 comments about Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare.

1. Dennis Showalter, a professor and noted author, has written a well researched and interesting book on the history of German panzers and the subsequent war doctrine that was built around this lethal weapon. The history starts at the beginning near the banks of the Somme in WWI and deliberately evolves through the dark days of the 1920s and into the 1930s when Hitler's influence escalates. The author develops the history of the panzer, its war doctrine and follows the evolution of new models and their increasing capacities as well as the increasing popularity and recognition of the value of this "new" weapon.
   
   Guderian may have been the most vocal proponent of the panzer but there were others, like Volckheim, Rabenau and Fritsch, that promoted panzers and mobile warfare. With each new panzer model, Volckheim would critcize the gun barrel for being too small and puny. The large barrel panzer that had power and distance would win the war. He would be proven right. By 1939, Germany had an arsenal of Mk IIIs and some Mk IVs to deploy and a blitzkrieg doctrine that would conquer much of Europe and intimidate most of the world. (I've wondered what would have happened, if it would have made a big enough difference if Guderian had Panthers instead of Mk IIIs driving toward Moscow in late 1941 or Hoth driving north toward Stalingrad in 1942.)
   
   The author doesn't present a daily chronology of battle events but does provide an interesting overview of how tanks or tank commanders influenced key battles of the war. Some of the key battles include Kiev, Moscow, Tunisia, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, Kursk, Korsun, Vitebsk, Brody and the Ardennes Offensive. Some of the key commanders discussed are Guderian, Hoth, Hoepner, Kleist, Kluge, Model, Manstein, Rommel and Rundstedt. Some of the key panzer units were also discussed: Das Reich, Totenkopf, LAH, Lehr and others.
   The Spanish Civil War is also included as a training program for German tank commanders as well as the Russian side of tank warfare. The author compares the strengths and weaknesses of the Sherman against the Panther, Tiger and T34. The author even mentions the German prototype called the Maus that weighed 188 tons and sported 10 inch armor. The author also discusses the psychological makeup of Hitler and how he influenced the extravagant designs of the Panther and Tiger.
   
   Sorry to say there are no illustrations or photos of the different tanks discussed. There are no maps of the battles discussed. There is also no Notes or Bibliography which is surprising and disappointing. Even though the presentation is excellent, there isn't any ground breaking new material in this volume so people who are already well read on the war or on tank doctrine may not learn a lot but it would be a terrific book for beginners, intermediates or collectors.



2. Dennis Showalter is a renowned World War II scholar and his unparalleled depth of knowledge on the subject at hand is clearly evident in this book. I have been avidly reading military history for four decades and while I am not as familiar with the Eastern Front and Spanish Civil War as I would like, I could not find fault with Showalter's research. Showalter's tremendous breadth of knowledge translates into accounts of battle that explain why events began in a certain manner, how those dynamics influenced engagements during battle, and what occured in the wake of a particular fight. His command of both descriptive writing and analysis is impressive. An example might suffice better than my own description of this book's contents:
   
   On the Fighting around Gembloux during the 1940 campaign in France between Erich Hoepner's XVI Panzer Corps and General Rene Prioux's French Cavalry Corps(p. 118 - 20):
   
   "Rene Prioux had nothing of Joachim Murat or Jeb Stuart in his professional makeup. He was too worried about the Luftwaffe and his own lack of air cover to undertake even the limited spoiling attacks originally enjoined by his superiors. The result was a head-on, two day encounter battle that began around the village of Hannut on May 12. In a fashion prefiguring the behavior of Israeli armor in the early days of the Yom Kippur War, 4th Panzer Division attacked with more energy than tactical sense, and took heavy losses from French artillery fire and armored ripostes. The SOMUAs in particular, boldly handled in company strengths, proved an unpleasant surprise as the greenhorns of the 3d Light Mechanized Division came away victors on points from a good day's work. Fuel shortages also hampered the German deployment to a point that Hoepner, instead of continuing to probe opportunistically for weak spots, decided to reorganize, resupply, and mount a two-division set-piece attack the next day.
   A ball peen hammer is a good tool. A nine-pound sledgehammer is also useful. Guderian might have done it with more finesse, but beginning a little after noon on May 13, 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, around 560 tanks all told, struck 3d Light Mechanized Division on an eight-mile front. There was bitter fighting in defended villages, with riflemen clearing strongpoints and tanks bypassing them whenever possible. Survivors of disabled French tanks fought on with pistols against armor plate. A captain of the 35th Panzer Regiment described two observers in a water tower engaging tanks with rifles until "shot full of holes like sieves." It was not until 3pm that the German tanks reached open ground, only to face a series of armored counterattacks. French tanks seemed to be everywhere at once, bypassing the panzers and engaging the infantry, forcing the tanks to turn around and bailout their comrades. The close-gripped seesaw fighting featured small German armor-piercing shells ricocheting harmlessly off French turrets and hulls. The 6th Panzer Regiment and a company of antitank guns hit every tank in a retiring French column with everything in the inventory, including 75mm rounds. The vehicles just kept moving, with one crew eventually counting 15 antitank hits and 42 bullet scars.
   The tactical differences were coordination and cooperation. The Germans fought in combined-arms teams, with towed antitank guns supporting the panzers under a consistently effective air umbrella. The French fought exposed to the sky, in compartments, each arm on its own. The German tankers fought by battalions; the French never went beyond company levels. Even individual French tanks often failed to support each other. Their lack of radios required at least one company commander to transmit orders by running from tank to tank under fire. Their small turrets in practice made tank commanders no more than gunners once combat was joined.
   The 3d DLM, moreover, fought alone against superior numbers. The 2d Light Mechanized Division remained in its positions all day, facing front and fixed in place by German infantry, force-marched forward. As the Germans freed themselves from the melee and resumed their advance, Prioux, his local reserves exhausted, ordered a withdrawal to the main positions by now established around Gembloux. The cavalry force had done its job; no reason remained to risk an elite force in an isolated forward position.
   When losses were tallied, 3d DLM had accounted for 160 German tanks at the cost of around 100 of its own. It was true that the Germans held the field, and so were able to recover and repair a good many of their own losses. It was true as well that casualties had been absurdly light by Great War standards - only 150 total in the entire 4th Panzer Division. Nevertheless the consciousness of superiority recorded in the corps war diary did not translate into immediate pursuit in a deepening twilight, where all tanks seemed to look alike.
   For Erich Hoepner it had been a good day's work. Committing his panzers en masse had paid off despite the losses. German tanks might be inferior in a stand-up fight, but thier mobility and skill of their crews and commanders had set the stage for the next scene: breakthrough at Gembloux. Preliminary orders went out at 3 AM; the French spent the next 18 hours executing a fighting retreat that tied the panzers in knots and completed the cavalry's delaying mission. Instead of overrunning the gap before the French could assume the position, Hoepner's corps confronted a solid defense manned by three first-class divisions: 1st Moroccan and 1st and 5th Motorized Divisions, with Prioux's tanks deployed by battalions to their rear. A few tentative probes were so strongly recieved that Hoepner ordered his advanced units to fall back and prepare for a coordinated corps-scale attack the next day.
   The resulting engagement of 15 May was the first time the panzer divisions were used to break through a major, prepared defensive position......."
   
   Showalter's analysis of Kursk, and especially the oft celebrated battle of Prokorovka, is equally compelling. Before one gets the impression that this book focuses on the victories of Germany's panzer arm, let me explain further that Showalter examines its weakenesses along with its strengths. The last chapter "Finale" is particulary instructive as unsparing analysis illustrates how far the panzers had fallen by the time of the Anglo-American invasion of France on 6 June 1944. This is one of the best single references published on the panzers, although its lack of photos and maps will force readers to buy other books to supplement Showalter's work.



3. As an avid reader of Eastern Front and WWII literature I was looking forward to reading this look at Hitler's armored forces throughout WWII. Unfortunately, I was thoroughly disappointed by all but the first chapter. As an historian it is simply criminal to write anything that has to do with history and leave out both endnotes/footnotes and a bibliography. But this is exactly what the author did here. According to him, it was done for "reader-friendliness." How exactly endnotes would have taken away the "reader-friendliness" is anyone's guess; if you're too lazy to go and look at the back of the book, that's your problem. But there's no reason that someone's laziness and nonexistent curiosity should impede those readers and researchers who do have an interest in where all of the information presented comes from. There are references to several historians, Citino, Bartov, Glantz, Van Creveld, Zaloga and Heinz-Frieser, as well as the multivolume set "Germany and the Second World War", but aside from that, we can only guess what sources are being used.
   
   Leaving the above aside, there are interesting arguments offered within this text. But immediately two problems arise: are these arguments original and what sources are their foundations based on? Thus even if there is something of interested offered, no one can say if it is original and merits the purchase of this book. Looking solely at the Eastern Front, which I'm most familiar with, there is nothing original. There are, however, multiple mistakes from misspelling Zhukov's name throughout the text as Zukhov, to giving incorrect losses for the Red Army, claiming the 1st Tank Army contained 5 mechanized and armored Corps during Kursk, generalizing both the Red Army's abilities and weaknesses throughout the text, and so on. While the narrative is mainly focused on the Panzer arm of the Wehrmacht, that does not preclude the author from doing his research when he wants to discuss the opponents the Wehrmacht faced. While the product description for this book purported an "unbiased study of Nazi Germany's armored forces" one cannot help but notice the author fawning like a school girl over Rommel. There are other inconsistencies throughout the text; I would argue the only unbiased account is when referring to the tanks themselves, not the men who were using them. The detailed background information for each tank and self-propelled artillery piece is nice in the general context of the Wehrmacht's history, but banal and inundates the reader with numbers, ranges, and countless letter variations. Interesting for those who enjoy such details, but at times unnecessary when there are literally hundreds of histories of these models already available. In the end, it appears that if anyone was given the opportunity to become part of Germany's armored forces, be they tank or self-propelled artillery, they automatically become Germany's greatest warriors who inflict amazing amounts of destruction on their enemy in exchange for their own limited losses.
   
   While I was fascinated by the historical background offered in chapter 1, the arguments in respect to the intertwining nature of Wehrmacht ideals and that National Socialism, and the idea that the only time the Waffen SS made a lasting impression on their Wehrmacht comrades was when given the use of the latest equipment, including tanks (example given is the retaking of Kharkov in 1943), in the end these are all assertions with no offered source base. But I will say that in regards to the last argument, it makes some sense, as earlier Waffen SS histories highlight their aggressive/fanatic behavior and high losses for limited gains when compared to what the Army was able to accomplish. Finally, the operational abilities of the Wehrmacht were overwhelmingly evident in 1941/1942. By 1943 Wehrmacht hubris could hardly keep up with rising casualties and the growing Soviet proficiency on the field of battle. While tactical victories throughout Ukraine might yield higher kill to loss ratios, they won't win the war. This book, sadly, has 0 value for historians and only limited value for those seeking 'reader-friendliness.' The exaggerations, omissions, and at times too limited space devoted to the Third Reich's opponents make for a skewed view of Hitler's armored force.



4. The story of the tank force of Nazi Germany is an often told one within postmodern historical narratives. The reasons for this are ample: fascination with the machinery itself, fascination with the offensive operations early in WWII and lastly, fascination with psychological impact of mechanizing warfare on a previously unimagined scale. As such however, there has been very little effort to produce a scholarly synthesis of these various areas of research regarding the Panzers.
   
   As such, for that minority of you reading who, like myself are graduate students in history, desiring a narrative full of primary sources and notes to follow the trail of Dr Showalter's research, this book probably isn't for you.
   
   The good news is that for those of you who are simply curious about the development and use of the Panzer arm of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, this is well worth your time as a first read on the subject. Stylistically speaking, the book is quite well written and combined with solid editing, it is a very easy read. The events are described in a chronological manner which certainly helps the flow of the narrative-there are few flashbacks for the sake of starting a new topic.
   
   The weakness of this book is, as mentioned above, a nearly complete disregard for the conventions of historical writing that is inexplicable by most standards. For the sake of 'reader friendliness' Showalter eschews the notes and bibliography which could have made this book an indespensible overview of tactics, operations and the psychology of Panzer warfare, as developed by the Germans. Furthermore, it could have served as a fantastic introduction to the development of the weapons systems themselves. Towards this end, even the inclusion of 20-30 photo plates would have gone a long way towards improving the book. Also a further set of 4-5 more operational maps would have made following the eastern front campaigns much simpler an act. Lastly, the possible inclusion of charts of organization for the panzer, motorized infantry and panzer grenadier divisions would have been quite helpful in following their evolution.
   
   With that said, the weaknesses of this book, although significant are not insurmountable. How the inclusion of a 5-10 page bibliography reduces 'readabillity' is beyond me and HOPEFULLY Dr. Showalter will see the light on this and include it as well as endnotes in subsequent editions of this book. With those items included, even the armchair historian can verify points of particular interest within secondary sources. For the trained historian the value of this book would be much greater and need not be beaten to death here as well as the point that Dr. Showalter can only make assertions without these critical tools to effective history writing. A few relevent examples of where his book could improve with these tools in place include, but are not limited to:
   His analyis of the the concept of the Blitzkrieg drawn from the Polish Campaign (pp. 86), German emphasis on Race as a significant factor in the defeat of France and its significance to those involved in planning the war(pp. 132), and lastly Dr. Showalter's summarizing of the issues and limitations of an 'operations' focussed Wehrmacht within the context of a 'strategic' war against the USSR(pp. 178-79).
   
   In short this is a well told story. It could however with a few important fixes be a GREAT overview with all kinds of relevence to the armchair historian and serious history student alike.
   PLEASE MAKE THE CHANGES DR SHOWALTER!



5. From their origins in the lessons learned from the defeat of World War I to their collapse in 1945, Germany's Panzers were formidable fighting forces that changed the field of warfare. Proven historian and author Dennis Showalter brings these armored forces to life in //Hitler's Panzers//.
   
   Showalter's sources for this new study are said to include "interviews with soldiers, archival documents, and other information." Readers will have to take Showalter at his word, due to the absence of references or other bibliographic material. Showalter attributes this to an appeal "to reader-friendliness," though the sophisticated nature of the material begs for attribution. A few maps help make the text a bit more accessible, though also including some images to illustrate the machinery discussed in the text would have been instructive as well.
   
   Showalter's in-depth study of Nazi Germany's revolutionary tools and tactics provides numerous details about the machinery, material, and men who fought on the front lines. Although interesting, this study is by no means a primer; readers looking for an introduction to the Panzer divisions will not find it here. Instead, those already familiar with the topic likely will find some new insights and information to be of interest.
   
   Reviewed by Kelli Christiansen

5 comments about The Battle of Kursk.

1. This is an exhaustive look at a major WWII battle.
   I found its detailed very good but the writing dull
   in parts. Over-all though a very solid effort to
   give a comprehensive look at an important battle that
   gets insufficient attention in the West.



2. The war for Hitler and his Allies had been deteriorating since Stalingrad and Hitler had to have a major victory to keep his coalition together. Though he wasn't convinced that Citadel would be that victory, his Chief of Staff sold him on it.
   
   The first two chapters is an introduction and overview of the first two years of the war. Talks a little bit about Hitler and his reasons for the offensive on the Kursk salient, rebuilding of the Wehrmacht and also about his obsession with weaponry etc. The section on Tigers, Panthers and Elephants is of special interest.
   The next 5 chapters describe the operational details of the assault and the Soviet counterattack. I was a little disappointed with this section for Mr Glantz was not as thorough here as he usually is. There are several other books that have minor battle action that is missing here but this book is still the most complete tactical coverage I can find. The battles involving the 48th PzC and the 2nd SS PzC on the southern boundaries are especially revealing. The author excelled with the tank battle near Prokhorovoka which made up for the missing coverage of the few days prior to this engagement.
   A key interest to many is the number of panzers that were destroyed in the campaign. Mr Glantz creates a spreadsheet, broken down by Corps, Division, type of tank, and by day. In summary, the Germans for both fronts lost 323 destroyed tanks and 1612 damaged but recoverable tanks compared to 1614 destroyed Russian tanks. The author makes a point that the Germans were able to repair and redeploy most of those 1612 panzers. Mr Healy in his book, "Zitadelle", makes similar arguments and numbers.
   
   There are 32 maps spread out throughout the book; you'll have a pertinent map close by to study as the narrative develops. The maps are busy with lots of detail but are much more readable than the maps Mr Glantz has in his last two books. There are so many units involved and individual engagements that maps are critical in following this campaign and these maps are helpful in this respect.
   
   The author does such a good job of describing the battle. You can see the momentum change from the German's beginning few days of the assault to the slowing of their advance and then the stopping of the advance at Prokhorovka. The Germans never really had a chance to reach their objectives; the Soviets had build too strong of a defense, had too many men and definitely had too many tanks for the Germans to overcome. The book also shows the Soviet's continuing habit of grinding down the German offensive, sacrificing their first echelon in order to suck the enemy in and launch a counter offensive in an attempt to surround and destroy the enemy. It happened in front of Moscow, at Stalingrad and now here.
   
   Mr Glantz ends the book with important and poignant conclusions about the battle action and for the expectations of the rest of the war. The Germans lost all strategic long term offensive capabilities and would be forced on the defensive, limited to minor tactical counter-attacks for the rest of the war. There were political implications as well that were discussed.
   This battle is so important to the outcome of the war and Mr Glantz does a very good overall job of telling us about it. This is one of the three best books (English) on this campaign and if you're a war buff you should definitely read it. The other two authors are Mark Healy and Steven Newton. Their books offer different insights and they complement each other for a fuller picture.



3. World War II was one of the major events, if not the major event, of the twentieth century. Three of the four major competing political philosophies: communism, fascism and democracy, collided, and two were hopefully, relegated to the trash heap of failed ideas. Democracy survived. Two of these philosophies collided in eastern Europe, as Adolf Hitler and the Nazi fascist machine attempted to expand into Russia and neutralize the growing Soviet communist threat. Four major encounters along that contributed in a significant way to the final denouement of the Nazi fascist experiment. These battles were the Siege of Leningrad (St.Petersburg), the attack on Moscow, the showdown at Stalingrad (Volgograd) and the slug fest at and around the town of Kursk. Hitler an the Nazi war machine lost all four. Following the loss at Kursk, most of the Nazi High Command concluded the war could not be won, and so advised Hitler. This book chronicles how Hitler and the Nazis approached the battle, the thinking by Stalin and the Soviet High Command, the assumptions on both sides, and what the final deciding factors were.
   
   There are other books about both the Soviet-Nazi conflict and associated battles, and about Kursk in particular. However, anyone interested in the whys and wherefores of Kursk most surely needs to have this book nearby.



4. Detailed write up on the actions during the Kursk battles.
   Highly recommend this book for anyone interested in this subject.



5. This book points out that the Soviet Union would have had their rear ends handed to them by the Germans at kursk had they not received 17,000 UNITED STATES made jeeps and 90,000 UNITED STATES made trucks. The USA sent food, clothing etc.... The united states capitalist system won the war on both fronts. The USA factory workers were the biggest muscle in the Allies war of attrition. Obviously, due respect must be given to the Russian foot soldier for his dogged determination, courage and bravery. But, if America stayed out of the war, it would have been a nightmare for the Soviets. Anothe source i read stated that the SOVIETS received almost a half a million vehicles from the UNITED STATES during world war two.