3 comments about Panama: The Whole Story.

1. Having lived in Panama during the Noriega dictatorship, I am an avid reader of books covering this particular period of Panamanian history. While I found Kevin Buckley's book to be generally well written, it tries to cover too much ground in too little space, providing readers with an abbreviated account of major events during the rule of strong men Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega. For a more in-depth perspective on Panamanian history, I found that using the names of these two dictators as key words in my search resulted in a better selection of books.



2. Very useful, readable account of the events surrounding the invasion, and vivid details of another example of the age-old American policy of overthrowing foriegn regimes.
   Often critical but never overtly opinionated, Buckley's best section relates to the failed U.S.-backed coup and its tragic aftermath.



3. Buckley shows how America sometimes creates its own problems. This is shown by the rise and fall of Manuel Antonio Noriega (MAN for short). MAN played both sides of the street. He supported the Contras and yet also supported the Marti front in El Salvador. He turned in drug smugglers but also facilitated the mass importation of cocaine to the U.S. from Columbia. Yet the United States supported him until he became an embarassment to U.S. Foreign policy. Bush I met with him twice. MAN was also a killer. He used his PDF to suppress the oposition. MAN was also a drunk most of his waking hours. Why the U.S. ever supported him is beyond me.
   
   Buckley shows the contradictions in U.S. policy. Eventually, the U.S. had to use extreme force in Operation Just Cause to topple MAN's regime. This is a nice read about an embarassment in U.S. Foreign policy. For another nice read on the same subject see "In the Time of Tyrants". The only improvement in this book would be the addition of pictures.

4 comments about The Noriega Mess: The Drugs, the Canal, and Why America Invaded.

1. This book touches on the history of the United States Government's influence and control of the drug trade in the Americas. Truly honest people must read this book! This is a literary work that touches on critical issues of drugs in the United States and how the US government uses the media to manipulate it's citizens and the world.



2. I had the opportunity to read this book while I was in Panama last year and it's worth reading each of the 900+ pages. This book gives a very detailed and unbiased account of what has transpired in Panama for the last 90+ years since gaining their independce from Colombia, with special emphasis on the 21-year military government and the U.S. reaction (or lack there of) to Panama's situation.

   It gives a very detailed account on the lives and roles of key players in the military government and sheds some light on a lot of things that were happening that were previously unknown by the general public. I would recommend this book to anyone that is eager to learn the truth about what really happened down there.




3. Noriega -- what a scourage on a hapless little country about to
   become truly independent. How did it happen? Why did he reign so long? What went wrong and why? Panama has long been ruled by its "fifty families" but it never had a harsh dictator. How then did the complex, cruel and vindictive Noriega seize and retain such absolute power?

   Professor Murillo's careful documented slice of reality provides useful answers. His vivid and accurate rendering presents a very bizarre and tragic story. As usual "the little people" paid with blood and suffering for events beyound their control. We should all ponder how drugs, mis-guided politics and lack of decisive leadership inevitably leads to corruption and suffering.

   Have we learned our lesson? Probably not. We could were we to study and heed the lessons in this carefully written and accurate book.




4. I read this book while in Panama and found it very good. I see now where the names for so many of the streets in Panama come from. For a 900 page history book it is a surprisingly fast read. It is very comprehensive on the subject, dating back to the founding of Panama in the early 1900s. And living here I recognized the places and names described in the book right away. The author gives very detailed descriptions of his sources and I recommend the reader read these because good information is included. There is also some very good extra information included in the back that help put subjects in the book in context (ie, list of all previous Panamanian presidents, US ambassadors to Panama, what the Gini coefficient is, etc).
   
   However, the books tone is a bit to sarcastic at times, reading like a mob novel. I would prefer a more nuetral approach. The way its written the author`s bias is strong. However, this does not mean his views are not warranted.
   
   Also there are some editing errors along with the design of the book that make it seem less legitimate.
   
   Overall, its probably one of the better books on the subject. I would read also Path Between the Seas by David McCullough to complete the story of Panamanian recent history.

No comments about Invasion : The American Destruction of the Noriega Regime in Panama.

5 comments about BLACK CHINOOK: An Army Ranger's Story.

1. Recommend it to anyone looking for an inspirational story and a first-hand account of the specialized training and schools offered to the Special Ops community, or anyone interested in a in the 75th RGR Regt and Just Cause research.



2. A very honest, exciting glimpse into the world of a US Army Ranger from basic training to real life missions. Brings headlines to life from Panama and Haiti to Germany and Korea. It gives a real appreciation for the sacrifices and dedication of our servicemen.



3. Major (Ret) David Combs has chronicled his military life in an extraordinary book called "Black Chinook: An Army Ranger's Story". He takes the reader through basic, AIT, Jump School, various Ranger Training Classes and OCS in great detail. The hardships both physical and mental become evident to the reader as he shares what it was like going through everything to become not only an Airborne Ranger but also an officer.
   
   The author shares his part in The Panama Invasion, which although was brief, still had much potentially dangerous possibilities. He also tells us about Ranger operations in Haiti and other locations. But there is a moving chapter in the book about going to Normandy and being with the original Rangers who fought on those D-day beaches. The book is full of details about ranger training and the creeds that they follow. It should be required reading for anyone one thinking of this as a military career path or who have an interest in ranger history or who have a family member in the Rangers. This book will give you a better understanding of what they have gone through.
   
   I found myself admiring these men and the sacrifices they make for their country and their fellow ranger team members. Of course, the personal price he pays is a divorce. It is not an easy career path to follow. Combs does not let you learn much about his inner life but shares much about what he has be able to accomplish in the Army. One gets the feeling that there is much emotional energy left undiscovered in this story. So we do not really get to fully know the author accept as a military man doing his job. We do know this much--David Combs is one tough Ranger and a patriot.
   
   I personally recommend this book for your personal military library. It is an informative and entertaining read.



4. This is a well written straight forward account of the different phases of training of an Army Ranger. Mr. Combs tells of his personal experiences while in training throughout all the phases. Without breeching protocol or security he gives detailed descriptions of some of the harrowing missions he was on. From missions in Laos, the Panama Canal and Korea you will get a true picture of what it takes to be an Army Ranger.
   
   Mr. Combs tells of his dream of becoming an Army Ranger since he was in college and saw a training documentary on them. He barely made it in because there are only a certain amount of spots available per year. He had told them at the enlistment office that it "was the Rangers or nothing." He was accepted and went off to the toughest training the Army can provide.
   
   `Black Chinook' is the name that the Rangers give to death whether while in training (which does happen) or in the line of duty. When a Ranger falls they say the Black Chinook came to take him away. This is a possibility that exists every day of their lives from the moment they start their training. There is a special intensity both physically and mentally that each man who becomes a Ranger must have. Throughout Combs story you will see glimpses of this intensity in himself and the others he served with throughout his tour of duty.
   
   I found this an interesting read if not a bit dry. Black Chinook is very matter-of-fact and probably would appeal greatly to others that have been in the service or those curious about what it's like to be in the special forces. I think it would be a must read for any considering going into the Army Ranger's so that they would know exactly what it was like.



5. Mr. David Combs shares his experience from visiting the recruiter, training at camps, earning Ranger, preparing and executing missions, and training others to do the same. All the episodes give an honest account without military jargon or exagerations. After reading this book I have gained a fuller understanding of the Army Rangers and respect their way of life. This is a great book for fellow veterans or anyone curious about the Rangers. David Combs continues to "lead the way" with this book.

1 comments about Operation Just Cause: Panama, December 1989: A Soldier's Eyewitness Account.

1. This is an easy read of the story of the 82nd Airborne in the invasion of Panama. Briggs served in this unit as a First Lt, and he describes his experiences in Operation Just Cause. His unit occupied the city of Colon and came into conflict with the PDF and the Dignity Battalions. Since the conflict was not short, that means the book is also short, about 155 pages total.
   The one thing this fails to relate is why the conflict took place. This is purely the experiences of a small unit in this small conflict. If one wants to understand why the United States invaded Panama in 1989, one has to read elsewhere, such as in The Fall of Tyrants. A pleasant read about a small conflict which lasted a few days. I like Briggs description of the evolving roles the military has to play in the conflict from combatant to constable. This is relevant to our present status in Iraq.

2 comments about The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama.

1. This excellent title describes in good detail the small wars that the United States Marine Corps was involved in from 1898-1989 in the Caribbean. Mr. Musicant (a former Marine himself) weaves a well-written tale, which is primarily focused in the military situation, but adding just enough of the political background so that one who has little or no knowledge on the subject comes away with a full understanding of our involvement in these "banana wars". Recommended reading!



2. Musicant has worked together a series of small histories of Western Hemisphere campaigns by America during the last 100 years; his is a wonderfully researched and well-told history. He takes us through the various Cuban and Haitian dramas; wars in Nicaragua and Panama, plus the the Dominican Republic emergency and, finally, the Grenada invasion. In every case there is an intiial effort to explain the politics, followed by an accessible description of the campaign. I fine work that enables people to understand both the politics of Western Hemisphere intervention, plus the military realities. I found the Grenada invasion chapter the best.

2 comments about Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama.

1. "Gunboat Democracy; U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama," by Russell Crandall is clear and conclusive evidence that this Davidson College professor is one of the bright shining stars of Latin American studies in the United States. Crandall is a rational voice...backed with precision research and pragmatic volume.
   
   This book is an impressive follow-up to the eye-opening 2002 publication of, "Driven by Drugs; United States Policy toward Colombia." On that note...both books examine history with a strong focus on White House decision-making.
   
   The author's first chapter, "The Evolution of U.S. Interventions and Occupations in Latin America," raises the curtain with careful attention to the American zeitgeist. This chapter is comprehensive and establishes a firm path to understanding U.S. leadership motives. Crandall takes no short-cuts and provides a balanced examination of the U.S. policy of intervention and occupation.
   
   It is comforting to know that there are so many talented academics studying Latin America. However, this man is truly special and demands further public service attention. Crandall is qualified. And obviously will one day be a an excellent choice for U.S. Ambassador in a key Latin American nation or to fill the senior Western Hemisphere decicion-making position in the State Department. Highly recommended.
   
   Bert Ruiz



2. In the U.S. policy arsenal, a series of specialized weapons stand ready to defend democracy, and perhaps of equal importance, to serve Washington's strategic interests abroad. In "Gunboat Democracy; U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama" (2006), Professor Russell Crandall, on leave from Davidson College in North Carolina, contextualizes a particular series of U.S. involvements in the Caribbean over the past several decades in order to pinpoint how strategic regional interests have shaped U.S. policy towards the three specific countries under discussion. Crandall's central and most controversial claim is that democracy has been made unquestionably stronger in the Caribbean after the United States intervened with overwhelming military force.
   
   Professor Crandall's prose is easy to read and graciously styled, but is also grossly opinionated and wondrously simplistic. His main objective is to provide objective criteria in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the three radical interventions which become the raw meat of his analysis. The criteria includes whether or not Washington made prudent decisions based on all of the information that was available at the time. Also, Crandall means to weigh in on the consequences of U.S. military intervention in the purported defense of democratic institutions in these countries. Ultimately, and perhaps inevitably, given his highly wrought security/strategy background, and his adept penetration of the Pentagon's bureaucratic corridors, Crandall easily concludes that the three interventions were legitimate.
   
   Regarding Russell Crandall
   
   The PR notes made available by his college spell out Professor Crandall's meteoric progress: first as a member of the Bush National Security Council team, then to Obama's campaign, and now into his current Pentagon service as an advisor. They reveal an ambitious academic who is skilled at working political networks effectively enough to hold respectable positions under both administrations. When it comes to Latin America issues, divergent ideological battle lines between the Republicans and Democrats have never seemed to get in Crandall's way. One can only conclude that his ebullience over the Bush administration's regional policy might have limited his ability to sympathize with Obama's more enlightened approach to Latin America. George W. Bush's Latin America, after all, was the antithesis of Barack Obama's. Given Washington's present initiative to place a string of military bases throughout Colombia, and perhaps elsewhere, for many skeptics the question remains as to whether Professor Crandall can be comfortable with a regional map that isn't laced with U.S. military facilities.
   
   Democracy on the Run
   
   Crandall, always affable, does not state his own personal agenda outright, as much as he clearly strives to brush off critics who disapprove of his support for "democracy promotion" at the barrel of a gun. In light of Washington's multiple failings in its struggle to secure democracy in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Crandall seeks to prove what others might term as a tendentious thesis: that U.S. military intervention abroad can be justified if it ostensibly nurtures democratic institutions, defined of course, by Washington's policymakers. Russell Crandall is more than willing to prove that there is a positive correlation between the weight of U.S. military force used in the interventions, and the subsequent strength of the democracy that is later experienced. Even in light of an overwhelming literature which argues that freedom and democracy cannot be imposed by force, Crandall adamantly disagrees, stating that, "Grenada was now [after the U.S. intervention] more free and democratic than at any point in recent memory" (p.161).
   
   What Crandall fails to see is that there is a body of history here that tells a different and somewhat more complex story, and it makes all the difference if one is talking about Maurice Bishop's Grenada, or "General" Hudson Austin's Grenada. Crandall contends that in Panama and the Dominican Republic, the general outcomes were the same, "the taking out of Noriega by the United States ended up being a quick and lasting way for Panama to get rid of its oppressor" (p.200), and "the [Dominican] intervention also has helped promote a modern political system" (p.94). Crandall fails to mention that, in the fullness of time, the `modern political systems' in question would come to be dominated by strongman governments resulting in drug running, corruption, bank fraud, and money laundering - projecting the pretense, rather than the substance of democracy. Ultimately, Crandall might bring himself to argue that the world ought to be grateful that the contemporary history of the Dominican Republic, Panama and Grenada were conceptualized by the National Security Council, and scripted by the Pentagon.
   
   Surprisingly, Crandall acknowledges that the democratic institutions established in the Dominican Republic after U.S. intervention by the Johnson administration were somewhat weaker than in Panama and Grenada. But when asked why, he argues that insufficient U.S. military force had been committed; as if thousands of troops were not enough to handle a disorganized revolutionary force numbered in the hundreds. It remains unclear to the reader from the introduction of "Gunboat Democracy" to its conclusion, why the extent of force used in the interventions became a unifying function of their success.
   
   Saving Latin Americans from Themselves
   
   Underlining the author's belief is an uncompromising America-knows-best attitude, fortified by a robust script in which Latin Americans are seen to be the victims of inevitable and self-inflicted ideological problems, against which they must be immunized. Regarding the intervention in Panama, in which Manuel Noriega was removed from power by U.S. forces, Crandall postulates that, "even if the Panamanian people had removed Noriega themselves, it was more than likely that someone who was far from democratic would have replaced him" (p.200). This process of serial interventions could be described as Crandall's sense of noblesse oblige.
   
   Many of Crandall's formulations are dressed up in a disturbing hip-hip-hooray rhetoric, which must have annoyed at least some of his readers, especially those like myself, who happen to be of another nationality. Throughout much of his study, Crandall seeks to point out that those living in the Caribbean (especially in Grenada), were in dire need of U.S. direct action to protect them against becoming captives of leftist authoritarian actors, but it is here that his evidence truly runs thin. The White House's passion to oust Maurice Bishop's Marxist New Jewel movement from power soon after it took office was based upon an utter myth; that Bishop had commissioned the construction of a military airport on Grenada at the behest of Havana, in order to facilitate the movement of Cuban troops to aid in the revolutionary wars in Africa. Furthermore, President Bush's insistence that General Noriega was a major drug runner and human rights violator was equally inflated. Although Noriega was a somewhat unsavory figure, only a small number of fatalities could truly be ascribed to him. Manuel Noriega was, after all, a former CIA asset, who for years served as a highly appreciated functionary of the Agency.
   
   Even with these facts aside, it is odd that Crandall did not bother to canvas other writings on democracy (for example, Robert Dahl comes to mind) in search of deeper explanations for the advent and endurance of democratic regimes. Because he isolates his work from others who have taken on the task of explaining where, when, and how democracy thrives, Crandall's book comes out rather narrow in its scope, totally predictable in its attitude, and somewhat shallow in its overall analysis of democracy as a process. In effect, he utilizes meager theory to thump a very big drum. Furthermore, despite his fluency in the language, he ignores important Spanish sources that presumably could have broadened and deepened his enterprise.
   
   The Protection of U.S. Citizens: A Pretense for Invasion
   
   Professor Crandall had no problem in swallowing the line that securing the supposed safety of American citizens lent a compelling argument for the execution of the Dominican Republic intervention, but he tortures the "we did it to protect U.S. citizens" apologia well beyond its proper functional range. In such settings, Crandall alludes to the scheming Communist side as the main threat to American life, often with little effort to substantiate his claim with historical evidence buttressed with recent documents and other primary sources. If he had, perhaps he would have acknowledged that the number of U.S. casualties from these interventions, to no one's surprise, was negligible. Occasionally Crandall lets his true beliefs show, stating at one time that, "a better way of viewing the situation is to accept that at least some risk of a Communist takeover existed" (p.37).
   
   In the case of Grenada, Crandall has attempted to refute some of his expositors' critiques, but ultimately refers to the "what if the U.S.A. hadn't intervened" stream of analysis. Crandall does not acknowledge that only a small group unanimously considered Grenada a win for Washington diplomacy. Of equal importance, he fails to remind us that U.S. public opinion had been deceptively manipulated in order for Americans to accept a political ideology which was fraudulent to its core. This includes the arresting of a political process whereby Washington could have targeted "General" Hudson Austin, rather than pretending to avenge the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, who had been slain by the Austin coup. To this end, Crandall never explains why such overwhelming military force was necessary to secure the lives of American citizens, when the threat was if anything, palpably modest.
   
   The cable traffic between the State Department and Pentagon to their agents in the field indicates that the call for U.S. troops to protect U.S. and foreign nationals (who sought refuge at the Embajador Hotel in the Dominican Republic and at St. George's Medical School in Grenada), had been authored in Washington. The calls to intervene were not authored by General Wessin y Wessin, in the name of the Dominican Republic military, or by the responsible officials at St. George's. Unnoted by Crandall, Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, the vice chancellor at St. George's University School of Medicine, insisted at the time that the safety of American medical students was never in doubt, and was only compromised once the U.S. invasion began. Ultimately, Professor Crandall's analysis proves that the world of "what if" is better left untouched by U.S. academics with a strong military tropism.
   
   A Strangled Truth
   
   To be fair, Crandall energetically tries to establish that American lives were truly at stake, but here he is fatally limited in what inside truths he can ultimately muster after relying so heavily on his collection of ideologically-driven White House sources, and little else. As a result, in many respects, he puts himself in an awkward position. By using such skewed evidence to illuminate critical moments in the buildup to the interventions, he has struggled to lump his three little wars together in order to defend the administration-of-the-day's actions. He chose to do this as opposed to proving, with irrefutable evidence, that specific decisions to intervene at each transformative stage were merited. One must humbly chide Professor Crandall for not making use of an entire file of COHA material that was issued at the time, which had useful disclosures about the role of the CIA and State Department in fabricating a case for intervening in Grenada and generating false interpretations over the use of the island's new airport. Perhaps he might have been a more credible analyst had he chosen to consult a broader base of sources and more thoroughly explored critics' claims - which might be inconvenient for him, but still necessary to address.
   
   The Dominican Script
   
   Although there are a number of systemic problems with the conclusions he reaches, the most obvious example is that he skims over the fact that the United States undeniably worked to undermine the sovereignty of the Caribbean nations under his purview. In his assessment, Crandall avoids the concept of respecting sovereignty, and instead zeroes in on what he sees as the high point of the interventions, stating that "while far from perfect, Dominican democracy was unquestionably stronger than it had been before the U.S. intervention" (p.93).
   
   In order to further substantiate his claim, Crandall details subsequent elections in the Dominican Republic, unabashedly stating that future democratic success in the Dominican stemmed from U.S. military intervention: "given the country's tumultuous and violent history, a compelling case can be made that the U.S. intervention prevented an incipient civil war from turning into something much worse" (p.94). What Crandall doesn't stress is that, in fact, democracy was hardly improved; it was, in fact, worsened by the U.S. thunder.
   
   Crandall does not appear to have considered that had the U.S. chosen not to intervene, perhaps the Dominican Republic might have become a more substantive democracy than it is today, instead of the kleptocracy in which its presidential politics has specialized in for years. He also makes the same blanket judgment for Panama and Grenada, stating that if nothing else, at least the rate at which democracy developed in these countries increased as a result of the U.S. interventions. His ultimate thesis: "democracy could also have easily taken much longer to put down deep roots [without U.S. intervention]" (p.227).
   
   In many ways Professor Crandall dusted off a scuffed up thesis that does not provide a fully satisfying description of any of the three instances of Caribbean interventions he has chosen to chronicle. According to his own criteria, he not only seeks to analyze the interventions by submitting the process to academic rigor, but also seems intent on proving, without a hint of embarrassment, that the ends justified the means. In many ways, he may have bitten off more of an ethical argument than he could chew and, in doing so, he impaired some of the more meaningful insights that have been laid out by conservative analysts elsewhere regarding Washington's decision-making process.
   
   Despite this impasse, Crandall's analysis of the Dominican intervention is noteworthy, because of his ability to see things the way President Lyndon B. Johnson did in commissioning the Dominican Intervention of 1965. However, one might argue that framed by Fidel's victory in Cuba, not yet been beleaguered by Vietnam, but knowing that he would not tolerate another "Havana," President Johnson contrived the entire Dominican script. This action relied upon Johnson's ability to justify the landing of tens of thousands of U.S. troops, allegedly to rescue U.S. and foreign nationals who had been urged to take refuge at the Embajador Hotel by local authorities. In other words, Crandall fails to acknowledge that Johnson and his aides raised a Potemkin village to justify the White House's escapades.
   
   Ideology and Intervention: A Disturbing Duo
   
   As a result of his lackluster approach, much of Crandall's professional analysis suffers from a near-fatal illness. It is a shame that Crandall, in stressing the desiderata of the interventions, burdens himself with such an unworthy redemptive task in writing "Gunboat Democracy," when some of his insights into Washington's motivations for military intervention could have made the cut. Perhaps if he had been able to avoid using paternalistic logic to justify the three interventions in question, Crandall might have emerged as a more balanced analyst. The approach he uses in his writing largely mimics the stand taken by Reagan's advisors during the Grenada intervention, embodied in a speech that the then-president made to an audience of 90,000 Grenadians. After having ordered the invasion of their country in the name of defending democracy, Reagan said, "I will never be sorry that I made the decision to help you" (p. 162).
   
   Subjective omissions notwithstanding, Russell Crandall has written a flawed, but provocative book, showing that he feels comfortable in defending U.S. military intervention in the Caribbean in a number of settings. More broadly, he seeks to defend, mirabile dictu, America's right to uphold democratic freedoms around the world. Regrettably, in "Gunboat Democracy," Crandall first codifies and then commits many of the same errors that both Republican and Democrat administrations did at the time that these interventions were transpiring. It may be that one of the clearest reasons to be disappointed with "Gunboat Democracy," is that Crandall, a born again buccaneer, mistakes ideologically-driven and anecdotal prejudices as legitimate grounds for military intervention.
   
   One can only hope that in Crandall's upcoming endeavors he will articulate a stronger, more insightful understanding of Latin America, and rally a sense of common cause with the region's drive for autonomous democracy. The people of the region are capable, eager and willing to defend democracy according to their own goals, definitions and agendas. Looking ahead, it becomes a question of whether or not the Obama administration will permit the region to determine its own direction. The degree to which Washington means to harmonize its own policy with that of the rest of the hemisphere should be determined in short order, not only with friendly ports-of-call like Peru, Costa Rica, and Colombia, but also with less hospitable provenances like sulking Venezuela, and Bolivia.
   
   by COHA Research Associate Shantel Beach

5 comments about The U.S. Invasion of Panama: The Truth Behind Operational 'Just Cause'.

1. I am sorry so many people were offended by the book, but the truth is the truth. My family lives in Panama- not on a military base- but as Panamanian nationals and they have witnessed these things first hand that the media doesn't cover. Of course the US media is not going to display it's military killing civilians- innocent poor people- they targeted the poorest areas. There are plenty of PANAMANIANS with missing limbs who can tell you all about it. Wake up!



2. Stationed on Howard AFB 1yr before, during and 1yr after Just Cause. This book is completely true. If you were not there and only came in for the invasion you have no idea what really went on leading up to the invasion, during the invasion, and after the invasion. There is a little thing called propoganda that the U.S. likes to use to display "Just Cause".



3. Great insights. But can we have views a review from the other perspective. The folks that were in bed when the invasion started. Looking for any views here.



4. I've known a lot of Panamanians who experienced the invasion first hand, and I'm married to one. I have been to Panama many times. Sorry to all those who hate the US and the US military, but the invasion was pretty innocuous...as invasions go. One Panamanian told me the worst part afterwards was the curfew because some people got stuck in discos overnight. My wife said the soldiers were very nice, and they gave a lot of their MREs away. She also said a lot of babies were conceived during the occupation because many of the women wanted an American father. Not exactly the sort of thing that happens when a populace hates the occupiers. Sure some people died in the invasion, but if anyone cares to recall, Noriega declared war on the US! Our soldiers are brave people, and they aren't the Viking barbarians who pillage, plunder, and kill innocent civilians. On the other side, I have yet to meet one Panamanian who doesn't despise Noriega and his Batallones de la Dignidad.



5. If I recall correctly, approximately 3,000 innocent civilians were killed by the illegal invasion of a sovereign nation (Panama) by President Bush the First - who happened to hold a grudge against its leader! The vast majority of those killed were the poorest of the poor, whose only crime was to be in the wrong place at the wrong time! I guess if it was lawyers, politicians, and rest of Panama's elite that got slaughtered instead, then it would not have been okay! And, that gets a one-star reviews from many readers for being "biased!" And one wonders why President Bush 2 invades another sovereign nation (Iraq), who just so happened to hold a grudge against its leader, too? I'd like to know how all these hypocrites would react if other nations around the world pointed to Presidents Bush's 1 & 2 and did exactly the same thing causing total anarchy! One can only pray that President Obama sings a different tune to the rest of the world!
   
   For those wishing more information on this sorry subject, I heartily recommend: Exhumations In Panama - Breaking the Silence (United States Invasion of Panama), which interviews eye witness who survived the carnage. I wish every policy maker in the U.S. State Department read a copy before launching their next godforsaken war!
   
   See also: Post-invasion Panama: Status of democracy and the civilian casualties controversy : hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the ... first session, July 17 and 30, 1991

5 comments about America's Prisoner:: The Memoirs of Manuel Noriega.

1. I have to admit the book is rather enjoyable to read, incredibly interesting and hard to put down. Noriega comes across as very charismatic, but thats how Eisner intended to write him up. While one might see that there was some erroneous CIA propaganda in the whole Panamanian-Noriega Affair, it isn't nearly as prevalent as Noriega would have you believe. The CIA's timing is suspect, but what better time to air out the bad laundry of a drug-dealing dictator than when you want to bring him down. Moreover, Manuel Noreiga and Eisner are no less apt to making propaganda of their own. The Panamanian demagogue would have you believe he is wholly a victim of the evil American imperial capitalists. Eisner more or less tries to portray poor Noriega as the hapless and 'innocent' victim of American imperialism. Noriega, the pox-marked dictator, derided as "Pineapple Face" by his detractors, may never have amassed the massive fortune alleged by the CIA... but he was on the take so to speak. He has always been for sale to the highest bidder whether the Medellin drug cartel or the CIA. Since his early days as a CIA spy, he was selling out intel on his fellow students at a Peruvian Military Academy in the 1950's. Noriega mastered the art of double-dealing... and can fairly be described as a double-agent, if not a "triple" or "quadruple" agent. He was taking payoffs from drug dealers (as most politicians in the region do) and this isn't just CIA propaganda. He essentially crossed Bush one time to many... making one too many overtures to the Sandinistas and the Soviets. Bush Senior pulled the Potomac two-step on Noriega and Noriega reaped the whirlwind for having asked for a divorce. Regardless of what you think about the Panamanian intervention in 1989, Noriega isn't the "patron saint of Panama" that he'd have you believe he is. Nonetheless, I find his biography too be very intriguing.

   If you care about Central American politics, you might like "A Twillight Struggle" by Robert Kagan.




2. This book is of interest because it tells another side of the story of Panama in the 80's. There's a lot of interesting information here. But while I find it almost unavoidable to conclude that American intervention in Panama was guided as much by political expediency and diplomatic incompetence as it was by noble ideals, that doesn't imply Noriega was clean. Sure, Bush, Cheney, Oliver North, Eliot Abrams, etc. were all crooked politicians. But Noriega's portrayal as himself as simply a Panamanian patriot who was destroyed by the USA for standing up to them doesn't hold water. Many controversial aspects of Noriega's reign are not mentioned (Noriega's superstition or alcohol abuse), glossed over (Spadafora killing) or implausibly denied (the fate of the Giroldi coup plotters). He very seldom admits mistakes and even then only half-heartedly ("We should have just cancelled the elections outright instead of waiting until the results were in to anull them") and never shows a trace of regret. The subject of democracy seldom comes up; all opposition to Noriega is characterized simply as the white power elite ("rabiblancos") and their status as pawns of the USA.

   In short, the book is disappointing as it appears Noriega has not used his time in jail for serious, thoughtful introspection and analysis. It's not a truthful confession, or even an intersting autobiography; it's basically a defensive essay on the American invasion of 1989. Still it's worth reading as no doubt some of his accusations against the "wimp" Bush bear examination.




3. "The Memoirs of Manuel Noriega: America's Prisoner" by Manuel Noriega with commentary and analysis by Peter Eisner is an important story. It holds lessons about U.S. imperialism and the demonization of its supposed enemies -- lessons that, unfortunately, appear to have been largely overlooked by the American public. Indeed, the template for the exercise of U.S. power by the elder Bush against Noriega in Panama as described in this book seems to have been knowingly employed by the younger Bush against Saddam in Iraq.

   Given the demonization of Noriega in the U.S. media, one may be surprised but nonetheless impressed with Noriega's personal values as they are expressed in this book. Noriega's support of policies that began with the Torrijos administration on raising living standards among the nation's poor seems to be sincere; no doubt this is connected with his Catholic faith and his familiarity with the Bible, which is quoted in several places in the book. Noriega also writes fondly about his career in the Panamanian military and the honor, discipline and professionalism associated with this career and the duties he performed on behalf of his country. Overall, while Noriega does not appear to be a saint he does seem to be a healthy, balanced and moral person.

   I think that Noriega's contention that he became a marked man due to his insistence on Panamanian soveriegnty is credible. To his credit, Noriega never bought into Cold War ideology, choosing instead to provide safe haven for political refugees of all stripes and to open up channels of communication with Fidel Castro and others. Yet despite years of friendly relations with the U.S. and cooperation with the CIA, his decision to open talks with the Japanese about a new canal combined with his refusal to cooperate with Ollie North's illegal "contra" war in Nicaragua proved to be too much for the White House.

   If Noriega ever did commit a crime that could possibly justify a full-scale invasion, it is also true that the drug conviction against him is highly suspect. The chapters that discuss the dirty dealings with Colombian drug cartels in securing the conviction is very disturbing. On the other hand, the fact that drug shipments increased in the absence of Noriega provides credence to the author's contention that the Panamanian Defense Forces cooperated in the war on drugs during Noriega's tenure.

   Last but certainly not least, the horrible consequences of the war on the innocent Panamanian people are discussed. Clearly, it was unneccesary to use such overwhelming force against a peaceful country in the midst of its Christmas celebrations. Noriega's blistering comments about the leading protagonists of the war -- including Colin Powell and George Bush Sr. -- may cause consternation among some Americans; but on balance the General's narrative is remarkably restrained. Indeed, the book is a cautionary tale of powerlessness and how a small nation and its leaders have few options available once regime change has been deemed desirable by the U.S. government. The sad part, of course, is that thousands of innocent civilians had to pay for these policies with their lives (not to mention the countless others who have been left with the shattered remains of their bombed-out communities).

   In my view, recent events in Iraq, Venezuela, Colombia and elsewhere makes it more important than ever for Americans to gain greater perspective on the consequences of U.S. foreign policy. To that end, "America's Prisoner" is a superbly readable, provocative and informative book that deserves a wide audience. I highly recommend it to all.




4. I still have not read the book, and I was very young during Noriegas year. However, judging by other comments in here, is easy to note that most if not all of them are simply supporters of our famous criminal, assasin and dictator.
   What happened in Panama was not "american propaganda" as other poster clame. I saw things with my own eyes: I do rememeber the brutality of the police squads, beating people who simply went to protest on the streets; I remember hearing of people getting arreested and brutally tortured, just because they critized, precisely, the burtality of Noriega; I remember my father coming home after a two days arrest, covered with bruises all over the body because of such treatment while in jail. I remember my uncle hiding in friends house beacuse it was known that he was on a "arrest and kill" list. All of those brutal acts where by direct order of Noriega.

   Noriega was a saddist, cruel, despotic assasin.

   If you would like to read "Osamas's memoirs", and support his "cause" by buying his book, do it. Same if you want to read about Noriega. In my opinion, I wish he rotts in prison, the same opinion shared by every panamanian who today can enjoy freedom and democracy.




5. After reading this book, I come away with a deep sense of sorrow for my fellow Americans. Clearly Manuel Noriega is no saint. However, compared to Ronald Reagan and George HW Bush and their henchmen, Manuel Noriega smells like a rose in comparison.
   
   I have worked with Latin Americans long enough to know that honor and respect are very important to these people. Noriega clearly was a man of honor and respect among his fellow rulers in Latin America. The history of Panama is that of a client state of the United States. Manuel Noriega just was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Ronald Reagan and George HW Bush were intent on murdering Salvadorans and Nicaraguans to re-establish colonial rule in these countries. Ollie North, their boy, was convicted of obstruction of justice in pursuit of their mission (defying the US Congress' ban on support for the Contras). Manuel Noriega was caught between a rock and a hard place. Being a Latin American he was loyal to his fellow Latin Americans who opposed US rule by fiat. As a client of the United States, Noriega did everything he could to make the US rulers happy. However, in the end, he denied US permission for their covert operations in Nicaragua and El Salvador. This led to his downfall. He chose loyalty to his fellow Latin Americans over being bought off and disposed of by the United States.
   
   I'm sure Noriega withheld a great deal in this book. However, the conclusion I draw is that Noriega chose to stand and defend his position rather than accept the $2 million offer by Eliot Abrams (yes the same Eliot Abrams that urged us that there were WMDs in Iraq) to leave Panama quietly and then be murdered in some dark alley.
   
   If anything Manuel Noriega is a political survivor and not a scumbag in the league of Saddam Hussein or Papa Doc Duvalier.
   
   I, for one, would welcome an appeal of his case to the World Criminal Court in the Hague.

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