5 comments about Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988.

1. Count me as another participant in Operation Earnest Will who strongly recommends this book. I served aboard the USS Hawes (FFG-53) as an electronic warfare operator in the summer and fall of 1987, between the Stark and Samuel B. Roberts attacks, and during the Iran Ajr capture and destruction.
   
   Despite the fact that my ship merits only a single mention, I found this book to be factually accurate and very, very well written. I've been waiting for this book for 20 years, and it was worth the wait.
   
   The only thing this book lacks is something that likely would only be verifiable by a select few that further mitigates the actions of the USS Vincennes' tragic engagement and destruction of the Iranian Airbus in 1988. I know from personal experience (via electronic intelligence) that the Iranians flew F-14 and F-4 jets out of Bandar Abbas in the radar shadow of civilian airliners. They no doubt sought to mask the presence of these military flights, but that subterfuge was undermined by the fact that these aircraft invariably used their radars, and the radar used on the F-14 was unique to the point that it could not possibly be misidentified as anything other than the AN/AWG-9 radar used on the F-14. Other than that, Mr. Wise does a fine job of describing this and all other events.
   
   Frankly, I'm grateful that Mr. Wise's description of events refreshed many forgotten memories I had of my participation in the Gulf in 1987. His fine account corrected many things I misremembered of that time, and put the importance of my ship's participation in a proper (i.e., objective) context.



2. I was on one of the ships involved in ops in the Arabian Sea and the gulf. From the reviews I was hoping for a good read, but was very disappointed. This was obviously written by someone that does not know much about the subject he is writing about. It appears to be mostly taken from news reports, with a lot of filler. I admit I only read part of the book, but it was all third person, and way too tedious. There was some comic relief, like having 'big eyes' (signalman's high-powered binoculars) referred to as 'high-intensity' binoculars. It goes downhill from there.



3. This book is truly an amazing one. From the beginning to the end you feel like you are watching an action packed movie -- not reading a non-fiction novel. The story is gripping as well as very detailed and educational. Harold Wise truly has mastered the art of making history come to life with Inside The Danger Zone. This is a must read. I can't wait for his next book.



4. I served on board the USS KIDD during the time frame this book was written in. This book validates for me the personal experience. It is very accurate, engaging, and as fair a representation of situation as I think is possible. I'm grateful to the author for undertaking this work which is important not only to me personally but to all would seek to understand the Tanker Wars.



5. I read all twelve reviewer's comments posted here prior to reading Inside the Danger Zone and, although I had many reservations, I must say that I was impressed by the extent of his research and the attention to detail he incorporated into the text.
   
   From the opening depiction of the attack on the Stark by the Iraqi piloting his F-1 Mirage to all of the IRG small boat attacks, Wise did a great job shedding light on the forgotten aspects of the Persian Gulf tanker war. Popular culture seems resigned to the ideals suggesting that the U.S. was the aggressor, living up to the "Great Satan" moniker applied by the Iranian antagonists. With President Obama's recent (video-taped) message and the Iranian response (feigning innocence to any belligerency in the Persian Gulf), it appears that our own government is short-sighted regarding Iran's bloody terror enacted on all merchant shipping within the confines of the Gulf.
   
   Mr. Wise methodically laid out each interaction with the Iranians (including the less-known encounters) and the subsequent responses by the U.S. Forces. As the U.S. increased force levels, they evolved their Rules of Engagement (ROE) with each attack by the Iranians (the initial permutation of the ROE occurred in response to Iraq's "accidental" attack on the Stark).
   
   Where I had difficulties with Wise's work was in the final chapters. Clearly, Wise was not privy to the (still) classified details and accounts regarding the engagement on 3 July 1988 and while his conclusions were still positive reflections on the actions of the USS Vincennes and her crew, the picture painted by him was still inaccurate.
   
   As a CIC team-member of the CG-49 during the 1988 deployment, I read books like Wise's with much reservation. Harold Lee Wise has done a fantastic job overall in informing the reader of the gritty details of those years in the Gulf.

5 comments about Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat (Combat Aircraft).

1. this book tell us about F-14 tomcat belong to IRIAF, not U.S Navy, very good book,many stories is new for me, just like shot down Tu-22 iraq by AIM -54 Phoenix.
   this book highly recomended for F-14 tomcat Fans just like me.



2. A weak book written by an annonymous author of some unknown origin claiming to be an expert on Iranian Air Force whose [...] forum is the cesspool of anti-Semitism and rants by Jihadists. This awful book is only based on rumors, Iranian regime's official stories and some other lies told to the unknown author by, again, unknown people whose names are withheld.. One of the weakest books of the Osprey series. Not Recommended! Of course, it is also a bad publicity for Osprey when it allows Anti-Semites to write books.



3. F-14 Tomcats remain the mainstay of the IRIAF today and pose a serious challenge to anyone who plans an air strike against Iran. The book gives a nice operational record of the type in Iranian service with many photos and personal stories of heroism, triumph and sacrifice. The IRIAF of the 1980s was initially decimated by the mullahs but the F-14 fleet kept enough of its skilled personnel to give the Iraqis a bloody nose. "Shah's pilots" returned to duty en masse after the Iraqi invasion (pardoned by the revolutionary government) and used the F-14 in a most professional way scoring numerous kills. The author overturns some myths about the F-14s, like that the American technicians sabotaged the AIM-54 missiles or that the lack of spare parts reduced the number of available aircraft to a mere handful. The Iranians not only put the F-14 to use as a pure air to air fighter, but they used boldly the AWG-9/AIM-54 combination scoring kills from extreme ranges like 56, 64 and even 100 km! In one case an AIM-54 hit destroyed three (!) Iraqi jets with its blast and there were cases where single F-14s engaged eight or more enemy aircraft in dogfight and prevailed! The main problem was the TF30 engines which caused more losses than the enemy fire. Of course the lack of published records does not help to verify the total number of kills achieved by the IRIAF F-14s but they must be several dozens given the superiority of the type over the Iraqi MiGs and Mirages. It is doubtful though whether the IRIAF Tomcats remain as potent today and how many AIM-54 missiles are left in stock, but surely their pilots and technicians know the F-14 well and have even made some improvised corrections to it.



4. In his review, R. A Forczyk (Laurel, MD USA), unwittingly notes the cause of US animosity towards Iran as the 1979 Hostage Crisis. However, he fails to mention that the source of hostage crisis is indeed the 1953 CIA coupe against the democratically elected and legal government of Iran. In fact, it is this unwise, and shortsighted effort by CIA only a few months after a Republican was elected into the office, that set the stage for terror in the Middle East in the coming years. R. A Forczyk conveniently ignores the undeniable facts of our current history. The reality is that the Iranian Air Force outperformed their Iraqi and non-Iraqi/Arab counterparts inspite of all adversity and inspite of lack of spare part and munitions for their aircrafts. No other Air Force could have acheived the results acheieved by the Iranian Air Force. It shows the depth of creativity by Iranian Air Force personnel demonstrated and documented by this book. This a great read by a couple of informed individuals. I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the military affairs.



5. (Updated 8/2/2009) When I looked at this item in July 2009 it was unavailable, but copies were going used for over $70.00. I pleaded for Osprey to republish the book. Now, in August 2009, new copies are available again. Thanks, Osprey & Amazon!
   
   The information in this book simply isn't available elsewhere. If you are looking for narrative descriptions of the Tomcat in action, then you will find more examples in this book than anywhere else. I can remember that even in the 1980s the U.S. Department of Defense took the position that it was doubtful that Iran could field any airworthy F-14 Tomcats due to the unavailability of replacement parts. This book completely refutes that statement. According to this book, Iran fielded combat-ready Tomcats for at least 20 years after the United States cut off suport following the 1978 revolution. The Tomcat performed a crucial role in the air defense of Iran throughout the various Iran/Iraq conflicts, serving not just as a fighter but also as an ad-hoc AWACS platform.
   
   During a trip last year to the Davis-Monthan aircraft boneyard outside of Tucson, Arizona, I saw that all of the non-museum Tomcats are being sliced up to make sure that Iran can't get parts. This is a shame, and it's like closing the barndoor after the horse has escaped. Iran developed a domestic avionics industry in large part to produce domestically the spare parts needed to keep its Western-bloc aircraft flying. For all its anti-Israel rhetoric, throughout the conflicts with Iraq, Iran kept a backchannel trade with Israel for parts and expertise that were withheld by the United States, but as time went on support through Israel became less and less necessary. (As I was writing this update 8/2009, I did a quick web search. Apparently there have been recent confirmed sitings of Iranian F-14s in the air, seeming to confirm to a degree that Iran is able to produce or procure the parts they need despite the US ban.)
   
   I want to add one final thing. The author uses pseudonyms to refer to the various aviators who contribute their stories. Presumably, everchanging political winds in Iran make it impossible to get the participants to talk with attribution under their real names. Unfortunately, that makes it difficult to verify any of the combat narratives in the book. The reader can choose to believe them or not.

5 comments about The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict.

1. As Pres. Bush tries to talk everyone into supporting an attack on Iraq, this is a wonderful book for getting a little background on Saddam Hussein and Iraq. It doesn't give too much detail over his chemical weapons program, except how the use of Nerve and Mustard gas on the front was the tool that gave Saddam the ability to push the Iranians out of Iraq(and influence Iran's ability to recruit for the frontlines). The book uses GDP and other economic indicators throughout the middle east repeatedly to tell how the war was affecting the populaces involved. A very interesting read.



2. Despite its small and squeezed font, the content is attractive as the book thoroughly covers the 8-year Iraq-Iran war.
   With a good amount of information, mostly from news reports, Hiro produces an account of the history of animosity between the two oil rich neigbors.
   Hiro extensively covers statements by Iraqi and Iranians officials and also includes statements by officials of foreign governments who were involced in the conflict.
   Hiro, however, fails to describe the brutality of the Saddam Hussein regime and at times writes that the deposed Iraqi dictator enjoyed popular support. This is, by most other accounts, far from the truth.
   Despite its extensive coverage, the book sometimes quickly surveys important issues such as the Iraqi usage of WMDs.
   Hiro also reports, with minimum details, the tip of the balance in Iraqi favor. He does not provide enough information about the Iraqi military operations that reversed the course of the war.
   Overall, the book is one of a few that documents one of the longest wars in modern history.



3. "The Longest War" by Dilip Hiro provides a thorough political history of the Iran-Iraq conflict. Those with little to moderate exposure to the war will probably find it interesting, while more knowledgeable students of the era will most likely gain little insight, as it is largely based on press clippings.
   
   Readers of other military histories will be disappointed to find a lack of primary evidence into motives; however, it is important remember that such evidence was not available at the time of publication, as it is with, for example, a history of World War II.
   
   One interesting factor about this book is that it was (apparently) written prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. This has positive and negative effects. For instance:
   
   (1) Hiro does not have the benefit of being able to use future events to improve his analysis. For example, given the later invasion of Kuwait, Sadaam Hussein's invasion of Iran seems much more like a megalomaniac stab at natural resources (and their commensurate power) than the establishment of a bulwark against Shi'ite Islamism.
   
   (2) Hiro's analysis does not suffer from bias created by later events. For example, American support of the Iraqi regime in the latter stages of the war is presented in the context of (a) Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, (b) protecting American interests in the gulf states from Iranian interference and (c) the political climate in America following the Iran-Contra affair. Today, it is common to see such support described as misguided or even hypocritical, given what happened in 1990-1 and in 2003. Hiro lays out reasons for American support to Iraq that were indeed very rational given what was known to American policymakers at the time.



4. Now that the U. S. led coalition has invaded Iraq and removed Saddam Hussein from power, the current fashion is to demonize him as much as possible. However, there was a time when the United States was strongly allied with Iraq when it was at war with Iran. The Iraqi invasion of Iran was launched by Saddam Hussein at a time when Iran appeared weak. His goal was to achieve a quick victory and gain control over the Shatt al Arab waterway and perhaps even some of the Iranian oilfields. Therefore, there was no doubt that Iraq was the aggressor.
   However, this was a serious miscalculation on the part of Hussein, Iran did not fold and was able to counterattack and even occupy significant segments of Iraq. Once it appeared that Iran was militarily gaining the upper hand the United States weighed in heavily on the side of Iraq, even launching military attacks against Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf. In fact, it can be strongly argued that American support kept Iraq from being defeated. All throughout the war, U. S. spy satellites provided regular intelligence on Iranian troop movements, enabling the Iraqi forces to anticipate their attacks. The second reason why Iraq was able to fend off the Iranians is due to their extensive use of several types of poison gas in combat. Therefore, as is explained very well in this book, the United States was allied with a nation that launched an aggressive war against another nation and used poison gas, an explicit violation of several major international treaties. However, because an Iranian victory was considered contrary to U. S. interests, these actions were met with implicit approval.
   The Iran-Iraq war was the longest declared war of the twentieth century, lasting eight years and ending right where it started. The political machinations among all the nations in that area were extensive, and they were very complex. Hiro explains the background of the shifting and partial alliances among the Muslim nations, detailing why each nation adopted the policies that they did. Considering that Iraq has been involved in two wars since then, one where Iraq invaded Kuwait and was clearly the aggressor, the Iran-Iraq war has not received the attention that it should. Many nations were eager to engage in commercial relations with Iraq during the conflict, even against stated international embargoes. Those contacts continued after the first gulf war, when Iraq was hit with economic sanctions. Some of these violations are now coming to light, but the origins are clearly described by Hiro.
   With American troops now fighting in Iraq under the pretext that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical weapons and was willing to use them, it is forgotten that he received tacit approval when he used them against the Iranians. Given the dependence of Iraq on American assistance in the middle years of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq could not have ignored a strong statement of U. S. disapproval of their use of chemical weapons. The U. S. sided with Iraq because it considered strong Iranian influence in Iraq to be contrary to the national interest. Now, recent reports are that Iranian agents are exerting strong influence in Iraq and the Iraqi Shi'ites are poised to take power in Iraq. This may lead to a religious based government in Iraq with close ties to Iran. Therefore, the American invasion may accomplish an Iranian goal that eight years of war could not.



5. An interesting book on a subject that does not have a lot of coverage. It's chapter arrangement by actor is sometimes confusing but in the end I saw why the writer used that method rather than a strictly chronological narrative.
   
   One error in the book was that it talked about Reagan campaign staffers meeting with Iranians in Paris prior to November 1980 elections. This story has been debunked by many reliable sources.

5 comments about American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945.

1. Nearly two decades ago, Douglas Little appeared on the diplomatic history scene with a monograph entitled "Malevolent Neutrality," about the United States, the United Kingdom and the origins of the Spanish Civil War. Although much of the book consisted of quarrels and squabbles between the US, the UK and Spain over foreign investors in Spain, the book nevertheless had a certain power. Here was the Spanish Republic desperately trying to preserve its democracy while the US and UK were whining over foreign investment rules, exaggerating Communist and Anarchist influence and imposing the malevolent neutrality of the title. Now Little has come up with a new book with the promising title "American Orientalism." The book consists of eight chapters which look at American images of the Middle East, America's relationship with Middle East Oil, the relationship between America and Israel, National Security and the Soviet Threat, the Nasserist "threat", the idea of modernization, "limited war" in the Gulf from the 1958 Lebanon intervention to the defeat of Afghanistan, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The book has certain virtues. We certainly get more historical perspective than most discussions of the topic. We learn about the generally condescending and shallow American view of Arabs, usually seen as narrow-minded, backward frustrated fanatics. We learn about how the American government bent or ignored the anti-trust rules so that American oil companies wouldn't be inconvenienced in their exploitation of Arab oil. We learn about the long Arab-Israeli peace process, where Israeli recalcitrance and bad faith is as much a problem as Arab terrorism. We learn about the United States' trust in the "white revolution" in Iran, and the inevitably bad reputation that occurred when the Shah was overthrown by an angry population.

   But ultimately this is an unsuccessful book. The first problem is one of evidence. Although Little has looked at around 50 collections of papers and oral histories, restrictive government policies ensures there is little primary evidence after the Johnson administration. A more serious problem is that Little can apparently neither speak nor read Arabic. Stylistically, the chapters themselves, about thirty to forty pages each, are too short for really profound or original discussion of the subject at hand. Yet at the same time various themes, such as the Suez crisis or the Yom Kippur war, keep recurring, so we get repetitive discussions of these matters which at the same time are incomplete. For example, he really doesn't discuss Raymond Garthoff and Richard Ned Lebow's stunning portrayal of Kissinger's irresponsibility in the latter conflict.

   There is a larger problem with Little's perspective. He concentrates on government-government relations, about economics and security. There is little on the details about Arab society. We learn that when Ayatollah Khomeini first opposed the Shah in the early sixties, the Shah sharply cracked down and killed a thousand people, with American support. But we learn less about why the White Revolution failed and why the mullahs were the beneficiaries. Other areas do not get the discussion they deserve. The Vincennes affair only gets a paragraph, Little's discussion of Israel's attempts to get nuclear weapons peters out in the early seventies, when they almost certainly succeeded, while his discussion of the 1986 attacks on Libya and the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 are surprisingly superficial and conventional. The discussion of the Lebanese civil war and Israel and America's intervention there tell us appallingly little about its origins. We do not learn that two great democracies supported the squalid, vicious sectarianism of the Maronite Phalange for the most selfish and ignorant of reasons. Nor can one accept Little's view that the Americans were as even-handed in the Arab-Israeli conflict as he argues. For decades Israel has been the United States' main beneficiary of foreign aid, while the United States in the seventies and eighties did much to demonize the PLO as nothing but terrorists.

   The most depressing aspect about Muslim societies from Pakistan to Morocco is the way that politics are polarized between corrupt authoritarian governments and religious bigots capable of appalling acts of viciousness. Little tells us little about how this problem arose, and even less how we should solve it. He only provides enough to tell us that our glorious leaders have helped to get us this into this mess, but have no idea of how to get us out of it.




2. This book was billed as an inspection into American attitudes and the Middle east since the 1940s. But instead this book is polluted with the false idea that no matter that Americas roles was over the last 60 years it was always `wrong' and usually full of `racist' `stereotypes'. The false logic here goes so far as to say that America didn't understand middle eastern `culture' and therefore basically no matter what America did, whether it supported secularism as in the Shah or support militant Islam as in the Muhadeen in Afghanistan, America must be somehow `bad'.

   This is the false foolish logic that permeates this political tripe of a text. Here we find the argument that somehow because America supported Israel's `right to exist' since 1960 that America deserves to be hated in the Middle east. OF course this ignores the fact that America under Eisenhower supported Nasser and Egypt. And it ignores the fact that America helped create and prop up half the regimes that exist in the middle east, from Saudi to Pakistan. There is very little to be gleaned here unless you are one of these people that believes with the analysis that America is evil, and racist and never does anything good or proper. In the end this book neither admits nor understands the very American policies it was supposed to tell the history of, thus making one wish they had an actual history book in front of them, rather then a political broad sheet.

   Seth J. Frantzman




3. I discovered this book when a chapter from it appeared in a collection of readings for a college class on national security. The chapter, "America and Israel: the making of a special relationship" impressed me with its account of the events involving the two countries from before Israel's statehood. I've now read the entire book and find that chapter and another, "Opportunities Lost and Found" dealing with the issue of the Palestinians and attempts to find a way to peace in the area are the best of the volume. To revisit events in a concise, chronological order gave me a new appreciation of the frustrations experienced there in the last 50 years.

   Approaching the mid-east on different subjects, be it the oil issue, the Cold War, or the Arab nationalist movements, Little moves right along finding just the right amount of detail to relate. He is able to cover the same period repeatedly from different angles without repeating himself. Each chapter presented a new field of events to be tied into others already described. One comes away with a sense of the complexity of the mid-east. This is what Little is trying to convey.

   I did not feel that the author portrayed the United States as "bad" by any means. What he is saying is that the U.S. desire to make things better combined with an often simplistic view of the Orient can easily get the U.S. into trouble. He points out the there is "occidentalism" in the view from the mid-east of the U.S. It's no accident that he discusses Mark Twain's book "Innocents Abroad" in the first chapter and returns to it in the last.

   A second important point is that domestic politics can deflect the U.S. from a path it might otherwise follow, particularly in regard to Israel. Over the period covered, there has been no real Arab constituency in the United States, whereas pressure to support Israel has been constant, a fact acknowledged by every U.S. president from Truman on. There is no way the U.S. government can take an even-handed stand. Events described in the book provide evidence that momentary actions which are not interpreted as pro-Israel are all that can be taken by an American administration, because a groundswell of political opposition makes it's continuance impossible.

   I've lived through the time period of most of the events described, but I was enlightened by the relationship between them that Little reveals. This is a solid book that will keep your interest throughout. As mentioned, it stood out among the 35 readings for the class I took and the book as a whole did not disappoint.




4. A good survey of the history of American relations with the Middle East. The survey however is one-sided, for the author doesn't bring any sources from the Middle East and confines himself mainly to sources from American politics. Also, the events of 9/11 predispose the analysis and thus turning it into a search after whom/what to blame in 9/11 attacks. On the hand, this predisposition is also beneficial for it allows him an important critical perspective on American activities in the Middle East. If you don't know anything about the history of the Middle East, this is a good start, and good archive for preliminary information.



5. In American Orientalism, Douglas Little sets out to chronicle America's involvement with the Middle East since 1945. On the whole, Little's work is an informative read, but there are several problems that ultimately keep the book from being successful.
   
   The book is organized thematically, with chapters devoted to oil, the special relationship with Israel, and America's struggle against Arab nationalism, among other subjects. Within each chapter, Little begins around 1945 and works his way up to the Carter administration. Most of the major issues as far as American interests go are covered, and Little handles the topics in a thorough manner. However, there are some problems with the organization of the book. The first chapter deals with American "orientalism." In this chapter, Little discusses the ways in which Arabs have been historically portrayed in America. The chapter feels completely tacked on and does not fit in well with the rest of the book at all. There is an obsession with the magazine National Geographic that borders on the absurd, as if the ways in which the magazine portrayed Arabs somehow affected U.S. policy. It goes without saying that America at times portrays other cultures in a negative way, but this has nothing to do with the bulk of Little's work. A cynic might suggest that Little included this chapter for the sole reason of naming the book after it, which could possibly result in increased book sales among the Edward Said crowd. This is particularly troubling and perhaps hypocritical when Little refers to Yemen as a "backward" land on page 184.
   
   Another issue that arises is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Little does include a chapter on the subject, but it also does not seem to fit along with the rest of the book. Judgement should not necessarily be passed here since many historians treat the issue separately from U.S. involvement in the region during the period, but Little fails in integrating the topic into the rest of the book in a satisfactory manner. Unless an author is willing to devote the appropriate amount of space to an important topic, it should be left out of the book.
   
   Stylistically, Little's writing is very difficult to navigate. His rampant use of passive voice and colloquial language is quite distracting. On numerous occasions Little refers to the President as "the man in the Oval Office, or the State Department as "Foggy Bottom." This might not bother some, but it comes across as unprofessional and informal. It's hard to imagine the final version of this book making it past an editor's desk because in the end, these flaws detract from the effectiveness of the book in a major way. When passive voice or other indices of poor writing show up almost every other paragraph, the book's 328 pages seem particularly long and burdensome.
   
   Some significant faults aside, Little's book is still worth the read. Even though the scope is decidedly smaller, Salim Yaqub's Containing Arab Nationalism is by far a superior piece of research covering the Eisenhower administration and the struggle against Nasser and should be read along with American Orientalism, perhaps first. Readers will also have to look elsewhere for a more complete take on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Anglo-American response to it.

5 comments about Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East.

1. Jonathon Cook places the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the perspective
   of Israeli and neo-con foreign policy. Of course, Iran is next on the
   list. I see no reason why President-to-be Obama won't follow through,
   even if he cuts our losses and gets out of Iraq. The tight links
   between Israel and the neo-cons and between the neo-cons and the US
   foreign policy establishment are laid out in detail.



2. While there are one or two points that are cogent most of the information contained in this book are baseless piffle based on anonomous sources, Naom Chomsky's writings, blogs, Lancet and the commentary section of the LA Times. To say the least most of the "facts" contained in the book must be held suspect or viewed with a jaundiced eye. The author obviously holds an extreme leftist political point of view that screams from the pages of the book. Additionally, the author seems to hold a significant bias against persons of jewish ancestry that, again, makes reading this book suspect. My recommendation would be to read something that is based on real facts, without so much bias and a provides decent and well thought out analysis - of which this book has little to none.



3. Jonathan Cook, a journalist, has written an interesting book. Its strength lies in its shrewd analysis of the Zionist state's schemes to dominate the Middle East. Its weakness lies in the unrealistic treatment of the other forces in the region.
   
   Cook sees nothing wrong with Hamas or with the fascistic Iranian government. He also ignores the problems of Islamic fundamentalism and of terrorism, and the role of the Saudi state in funding and promoting fundamentalism and terrorism. Does he think that those who oppose fundamentalism and Sharia Law are `Islamophobes'?
   
   He notes that the British state supported Zionism from the start of the last century, and that the Macmillan government gave Israel the nuclear bomb after Suez. But he does not mention that the British state has supported Israel ever since, never more than under Blair and Brown. He also ignores the US-British-Israeli alliance and the EU's role in backing Israel.
   
   The only acceptable and effective regime change is from within, by class struggle. Occupation by outsiders produces only a war of all against all, the sectarian chaos of feuding warlords and clans, as in pre-revolutionary China and now in occupied Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Now the US-British-Israeli alliance aims to do the same to Iran, Syria and Lebanon. Israel's government wants not `two states for two peoples', but `five states for two peoples'; the core, Israel, surrounded by a ring of armed settlement blocs, and then by four isolated Bantustans for the Palestinians.
   
   Of course, we must oppose the US, British and Israeli states' wars for power and oil in the Middle East. But we must also oppose Islamic fundamentalism.



4. 
   The Book:
   
   In "Israel and the clash of civilizations Jonathan Cook argues that the prevalent view of Iraq's fate - that its civil war was a terrible and unforeseen consequence of the US invasion and a series of bad decisions made by the occupation regime - is profoundly mistaken. Rather, civil war and partition were the intended outcome of the invasion and seen as beneficial to American interests, or at least they were by a small group of ultra-hawks known as the neoconservatives who came to dominate the White House under President George W.Bush. The neoconservatives' understanding of American interests in the Middle East was little different from that of previous administrations: securing control of oil in the Persian Gulf. But what distinguished Bush's invasion of Iraq from similar US attempts at regime change was the strategy used to achieve this goal.
   
   This distinctive new strategy for regime overthrow adopted by the White House originated far from Washington, and was apparently opposed by most of the country's senior military command and by the Sate Department under Colin Powell. In the early 1980s Israel's security establishment has developed ideas about dissolving the other states of the Middle East to encourage ethnic and religious discord. This was in essence a re-imagining of the regional power structure that had existed under the Ottomans - before the arrival of the European colonialists and their forced reordering of the Middle East into nation states - but with Israel replacing the Turks as the local imperial power. In this way, hoped Israel and the neocons, large and potentially powerful states such as Iraq and Iran could be partitioned between their rival ethnic and sectarian communities.
   
   
   Comment:
   
   Writing from within (Nazareth), Jonathan Cook has an unrivaled vantage point for his arguments. It is easy to see why he is labeled an extreme leftist by those whose actions and motives he questions in his books. For an objective and interested reader on the other hand, his books provide insights and enhances understanding.
   
   As I write this review Iran's cleric leaders try to deal with the fallout of the contested elections. In televised "confessions" the western media is blamed for instigating the street protests going into the second week now. What is described as false accusations by the West, - looking into history it is clear that what the clerics fear had happened in Iran in 1953, - bears a deeper meaning for those looking beyond the daily headlines. No one country, politician or point of view (or journalist) can accurately convey even a small measure of objectivity on the whole spectrum of events (historical and present). We should be grateful to writers who present to us their inside knowledge the way they experience it, without demanding omniscience. Yes, we also must oppose Islamic fundamentalism, which is the symptom of the problem not the cause, but we must have the courage to confront one of the root causes nurturing Islamic fundamentalism today, - the enslavement of a whole people for generations. "Israel and the clash of civilizations focuses on Israel and its allies' motives. It is a book that will deepen an objective readers understanding of a very complex issue. What more can one ask for?



5. Why are there so few (only 19) Arab states and so many (1) Jewish states. Why would the United Nations have taken a land where both Jews and Arabs lives, split it into two separate states, instead of giving the entire land to the Arab state. This blatantly biased book makes no pretense of objectivity and its author recently sought to ban Israeli films from a netural Canadian film festival. If you believe Israel should be eliminated and an Iranian/Arab state instituted where women have few if any rights, you will like the book. Otherwise skip it.

5 comments about No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf.

1. I am very impressed by No Higher Honor. It is interesting, well written, and an engaging read. No Higher Honor is an overdue tribute to a group of heroes that deserves to be remembered.
   
   Anyone interested in naval history should read this book. I heartily recommend it.



2. The shopping experience was great with Amazon. The book that I ordered was shipped and had gotten delivered in the amount of time that I had expected and what I needed it for.



3. I am a librarian at a Navy library and a patron recommended this book for purchase as a management book. It is the most exciting, well written and gripping management book you will ever read. It is a tale of heroism, competence and pride.
   
   The first management lesson you will learn is that instilling pride in your workers will get you very far. Captain Paul Rinn worked on this from the day he learned the not yet built guided missile frigate was to be named the Samuel B. Roberts. He researched the first two ships with the same name and the sailor it was named after. He made sure the pre-commissioning crew knew all the history instilling pride in their ship as she was being built.
   
   The second is even non-glamorous jobs are important, sometimes the most important. I suspect that not too many people go into the Navy with the idea of being the best damage control officer in the service. Rinn knew the importance of damage control and had his men trained, drilled and equipped to the best of his and his officer's abilities. He wanted them to be good at all tasks on the ship and gave them the appropriate training and encouragement.
   
   Above being a book about leadership, it is also a gripping tale. The first lines of the book describing the initial spotting of the mines that were to damage the frigate are as gripping as any in any novel about the sea. It also brings into remembrance a dangerous time in our planet's history with Iran, Iraq and the US face to face in the Persian Gulf.
   
   The author's style is both journalistic and literary, making the book a good read.



4. My Brother-in-law was on the Roberts when she hit the mine. The story was well written and is a fascinating example of what men can do when properly trained, motivated and well led.
   
   I believe the author does a good job of relaying the type of atmosphere that persisted on this ship from it's construction through deployment. My only critical point would be he doesn't spend enough time with the common sailors' point of view.
   
   I also found it interesting that he covers Operation Praying Mantis. I was unaware that this was declassified.
   
   All in all, nicely done and an informative and gripping account of one of the forgotten chapters of our continued presence in the gulf.



5. As the Navy Program Manager that was responsible for both the STARK and the ROBERTS repairs, I found this book extremely accurate and readable. While I was a little put off by the large number of footnotes, it did show that the author had done his homework.
   
   I wish he had contacted me during the writing as I could have contributed a lot to his efforts! The quote attributed to me was not accurate but it was taken from a newspaper report and you know how those are!
   
   The repair of a ship in this condition is more taxing than the new construction efforts.
   
   Charles Vinroot
   Captain USN Ret

5 comments about The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 (Essential Histories).

1. This is one of the few volumes to cover a sadly under-reported war. While it would be a good introduction to someone unfamiliar with the conflict, it is a bit shallow for those who already know a little. Karsh does a good job of analyzing the motives and thinking of both sides, without comment on the ethics of either. I found Dilip Hiro's book more informative. Even though Hiro is frankly trying to make a political point, there is a lot of hard data there if you are willing to sift it out.
   
   
   The coverage of particular battles was sketchy, and the typical short format of Osprey precludes a lot of analysis and documentation. The Iran-Iraq war has yet to be described or analyzed by someone of the stature of David Glanz. Therefore, this book gets more stars than I would normally award, simply because there are so few other book worth reading on the Iran-Iraq war.



2. The "Essential Histories" series from Osprey could easily be compared to the Cliff Notes series. They'll give you a nice introduction to a topic you are not familiar with, but no real depth. Most volumns are under 100 pages; therefore, don't expect many "man in the trenches" stories.
   
   This volumn is a nice introduction to a recent war, and presented a bit better than most in the series.



3. The essential histories series is supposed to provide brief, readable accounts of major wars. The inherent problem with this idea is that often times the wars being discussed are much too complex to be covered in substantially less than 100 pages. That doesn't mean the series is without value, but that it should only be used as a first step towards understanding a subject, not the only step. The biggest drawback in this particular installment is that the lack of background info really robs the reader of valuable context. Even though the amount of space devoted to the Iran-Iraq war in one of the general Iraqi history books like Tripp's or Marr's is considerably less, the coverage is ultimately better because of the back story of the 70s that created many of the necessary conditions for the war. Beyond that however, Karsh's book provides a limited and somewhat helpful overview of the military and political aspects that influenced the war.
   
   Karsh's book on the Iran-Iraq war not only suffers from only skimming the surface of a complex subject, but there is also a fairly obvious pro-Iraqi bias. If someone had absolutely no background in Middle Eastern history, they would come away with the impression that Iraq was completely blameless, when in fact Iraq initially began the war. When compared with the accounts of the war in other works on Iraqi and Iranian history, Karsh's version stands alone in its willingness to absolve Iraq of any wrongdoing. Considering that the series is supposed to provide an introduction to the conflict, this type of bias is really misplaced. The editors should have taken a serious pass at Karsh's finished version or had someone else write this particular installment.



4. The historical content and political analysis in the book is so much in line with the way the war was perceived by the media and general public in many countries in the Middle East.
   
   On the other hand, the analysis of the strategy and grand strategy of the war on page 84 is erroneous, and contradicts the basic principles of the theory of strategy. This part of the book shows lack of understanding of the theory of strategy. That is, the analysis is in favor of a general military operation, rather than a limited operation, which is strategically incorrect based on the conclusion that Iraq's limited military operation failed. What really makes the war analysis not convincing is the conclusion that a limited war failed and a general war might also have failed if Iraq pursued it. Added to that, the Iranian strategy was not discussed. The analysis also gives contradicting concepts about the reason behind the failure of Iraq's strategy. In one paragraph the reason is said to be Iraq was trying to "bite off more than it could chew", and in another paragraph the failure of Iraq's strategy was because Iraq "assigned to its military forces tasks which were too limited".
   
   In analyzing any offensive, the author criticized the army that failed to achieve its goals and the army that succeeded by saying it could have achieved more. This type of analysis is the theme of the strategic analysis in the book.



5. A good overview of a war that was never taught about in my high school. great photos and loved the portrait of a child soldier.

No comments about Tensions in the Gulf, 1978-1991 (The Making of the Middle East).

5 comments about 9/11 Synthetic Terror: Made in USA, Fourth Edition.

1. This book tries to connect the dots where none exist. If you're one of the whackjobs who identified themselves as 9/11 Truther, like Van Jones, then you'll probably enjoy this book despite all the baseless accusations and pure lies. If you're a normal red-blooded American, you'll want to burn it.



2. I have heard this man's audio interviews, which compelled me to buy the book. He is full of knowledge and well educated. Don't be fooled by the media spin over 9/11 and Bin Laden. The govt. have Bin Lying.
   We can see that the face they present on the videos which are supposed to be "credible" have two different Bin Ladens'. One is an older guy with a broader nose and a white beard, the other, taken years later on camera, is a younger man with a slender nose.
   Tarpley's book is full of facts, right down to the Gunpowder plot in England.
   He has researched his material with meticulous detail.



3. One of the most intersting books I've read in a long time.
   
   Tarpley has DONE some research!!



4. It all comes down to this: "How can we be sure Webster's claims are true?", indeed a very good question since readiness to doubt is the essence of reason itself. BUT: This principle cuts both ways unless it's just exploited to ward off inconvenient ideas. In fact, with every page you turn you will ask yourself with ever-growing anxiety: "How can I be sure that this guy is not wrong?" Moreover, bypassing the whole question about the veracity of Tarpley's assessment: Even IF this book's scenario wouldn't apply to our current political situation, it most definitely shows how our democracies CAN be destroyed from within. Hence this work, with all its abundance of political scholarship, experience and wisdom, deserves to be read by EVERY concerned democratic citizen. The events unfolded by Tarpley are so utterly monstrous they recall a scene in "Matrix" where "Morpheus" tries to convince Neo that the world is in reality the Matrix. All of us, particularly US-citizens, should very carefully consider the fact that their country has already turned into a police state, that apparently one million (!) (as to March 2009) of their fellow citizens are on the "Terrorist Watch List" ("No Fly List"). George W. Bush, by his own grace, granted the American President dictatorial powers should certain circumstances arise he himself defined, namely "... any incident, regardless of location, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the U.S. population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or government functions." (original quote from "NSPD 51"). Even Adolf Hitler depended on the German Parliament to grant him similar powers through the "Enabling Act" in 1933. Bottom line: the stage is set for the next 9/11 to bring martial law. Crazy stuff, isn't it?



5. In clear and elegant language, this is a must-read, in-depth analysis of the background to 9/11, and how the public, the media, and Congress was hoodwinked by a small band of home-grown terrorists close (if not very close) to the White House. Read this for no other reason than to gain a sense of modern history and you will be well-rewarded. Read it, too, if you thought all along that GWB was too dumb to have masterminded this outrage. (And guess what - you were right!)
   
   Bush emerges as a brainless catspaw - a scared puppet whose strings were pulled by a group of people who can only be described as evil. Tarpley should be front-runner for a Pulitzer for this work, if not a Nobel prize.

No comments about Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs).