1 comments about The Fate of the Maine.

1. Although written in 1957, This book gives a factual account relating to the loss of the Maine, America's first battleship. Good historical background account that a recent National Geographic article used for background information. The controversy rages on today. Was she mined, or was it an internal explosion due to a design defect in the Maine class battleships. The only thing I would like to see added is Admiral Hymen Rickovers account, written in 1976,which he "proves" and contends, that it was an internal explosian that sent the Maine down in Havana harbor. The incident that started the Spanish-American war and made the U.S. into a world power is well worth reading.

1 comments about Battleship Oregon: Bulldog of the Navy : Documentary.

1. This is an excellent little paperback book about the U.S.S.Oregon in both war & peace. It gives a narrative of the Oregon's entire history and is profusely illustrated with photos and drawings.

2 comments about The Spanish Armada: The Great Enterprise against England 1588 (General Military).

1. This book has excellent art work on the ships,people involved and battles,something you do not usually see in a book about the Armada. Though the book is really a compilation of earlier Osprey books about the subject, the book is well worth the time and most of all the money to purchase. The story line flows prettty well and keeps your interest going. Also if you are interested in basic histories this is one to get.



2. The book is basically a rahash of the myths about the Armada of 1588. That war actually lasted from 1585 to 1604. The author never mentions anything about the English Armada of 1589, where Drake and Norris were decisively defeated ending any English aspirations for command of the seas. The author also does not mention the revived post 1588 Spanish Navy shipped almost 3X as much precious metals from the New World to Spain. Meaning that it was actually the Spanish that controlled the seas and won most of the naval battles culminating the with the Spanish victory off the coast of Panama where Sir Francis Drake perished after he was utterly defeated. When the peace treaty of 1604 was signed, on mostly Spanish terms, no Spanish territory was lost and Spain was still fully entrenched in the Low Countries just accross the English Channel.

3 comments about Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy: The Spanish Experience of Sea Power.

1. While the author has made the point that there were many fine officers in the Spanish Navy, and that there were many excellent ships, the facts indicate that this combination was never capitalised upon, and the result was invariably disasterous. The best of leaders can only do so much with what they are given, and in the case of Spain, this meant far too few seamen, far too much influence by the Army, far too little training for crews, and some of the worst treatment imaginable. There is no point in building enormous warships if they cannot be effectively manned! Further, it is well-documented that ships of the line of the Spanish navy, although enormous in size, were laughably undergunned compared to their contemporaries. This is not made clear in this book. That said, it would also be of enormous benefit to view some of the plans and profiles of these ships, so as to compare them with their British and French contemporaries. Dozens of books have been written about HMS Victory and other Royal Navy ship types, but almost nothing about the ships of the other navies of the time, and even less in English! It is a great pity the author chose to use so many primitive contemporary Spanish paintings for illustration rather than something either commissioned for the book (expensive, no doubt!), or obtained with a bit more research into what is available.



2. Author John Harbron's book is a nice relief from the all long line of Anglocentric Naval historians that like to downplay the accomplishments of the Spanish and, to a lesser extent, French navies in the 1700s. The Spanish Royal Navy did a fine job in the 18th century given the fact that they were outgunned and outmanned and could rarely coordinate effectively with their French naval counterparts in their battles against the British Royal Navy. The results speak for themselves. During the 18th century Spain was able to successfully maintain her vast American empire vitually intact despite contant British Royal Navy attacks. It was only when revolutionary movements in her American empire that Spain lost most of her territories and not because of British actions.
   John Hebron's book articulate accomplishments of great Spanish commanders like Blas De Lezo and Bernardo Galvez who had a consistant record of defeating British foes. Facts that are rarely mentioned or glossed over in English language history texts.



3. John Harbron's book is a refreshing re-balance of naval history during the Age of Sail that counters the all too often Anglo-centric and borderline jingoist view of naval from authors like N.A.M Rodger. Despite what has been written about the Spanish Navy in the English speaking world, the facts stand out for themselves. Given that Armada was outnumbered and out gunned by the Royal Navy since about the 1650s, the fact of the matter is that the Armada did a fine job despite frequent attacks by Britain and it's privateers. The Spanish Empire held intact well ito the 1900s due in large part to it's great navy. Spain's navy produced great Admirals like Blas De Lezo, who was instrumental in helping acheive victory against the full might of the British during the War of Jenkin's Ear(1739-1748) when the British so wrongfully thought they had the Spanish Empire on the ropes.

4 comments about The Ships of Trafalgar: The British, French And Spanish Fleets, 21 October 1805.

1. There were 73 ships from the British, French and Spanish navies in the ocean off Cape Trafalgar. This exhaustively researched book tells the story of each ship that was there from the 136 gun 'Nuestra Senora de Santisima Trinidad' to to the 30 (maybe 35) men on board the Armed Schooner 'Pickle.' (The 'Pickle' was smart enough to stay out of the way of the big boys and watch the battle. Afterward she went in to rescue sailors from sinking ships.)
   
   Each ship is described in detail, many with drawings made by the author for this publication. The history of each ship is given along with a description of what she did at Travalgar. Along with the history of each ship, there is a good bit of summary information about the three fleets. Carrying some 47,000 men these ships were the visible evidence of the most complex things yet devised by man.
   
   This is a beautiful book, and includes several pages of full color illustrations from paintings of the period, modern photographs of models of some of the ships, and current photographs of the preserved flagship 'Victory.'



2. Peter Goodwin's "The Ships of Trafalgar: The British, French and Spanish Fleets, October, 1805" is a fine new naval reference book. Goodwin is Keeper & Curator of HMS Victory and the author of "The Construction and Fitting of the English Man-of-War, 1650-1850" and "Nelson's Ships: A History of the Vessels in Which He Served, 1771-1805". Like Goodwin's previous books, the present volume is large and clearly printed on heavy, glossy stock. Each vessel present at Trafalgar, whether British, French, or Spanish, from the largest First Rate down to the smallest cutter is described in careful detail, with technical specifications, service history prior to Trafalgar, a description of its activity during that battle, its service afterwards, and its ultimate fate. Many of the ships, especially those of the Royal Navy, are accompanied by plans of some sort, even if only a profile. An insert of colorful paintings and model photographs are a welcome addition to illustrate how these ships look two centuries ago. Appendices discuss comparative armament and sources of timber and fittings.
   
   There have been many "Trafalgar" books published in this bicentennial year, but few can match this book's sumptuous look and level of detail.



3. While this book did indeed contain a wealth of written detail of the ships, I was surprised and disappointed to find that aside from some center color plates, there was no information provided on ship color schemes and none on flags and pennants displayed. Most particularly, the French ship Redoubtable, described in the book as "the most acclaimed French ship to fight at the battle of Trafalgar" had no drawings, model photographs or paintings of her appearance at the battle. Also, a map showing the development of the positions of these ships during the course of the battle would have been useful although this is available elsewhere.
   On the positive side, HMS Victory and many others were well represented by line drawings and despite a concentration on technical rather than visual information this is a useful book to those interested in the battle.



4. While this is a very good and exhaustive compendium of the British ships involved, this book, like so many other written in English, gives quite short shrift to the fleets of France and Spain. 162 pages are given to the British fleet, and a total of 72 pages to include BOTH the Spanish and French fleets! Further, the detail given about the Spanish and French ships themselves is quite sketchy, and includes few drawings or diagrams, and in most cases these are from British sources.
   
   Granted, most of the French and Spanish ships simply did not have the kind of lengthy and varied careers that most of the British ships had, but all the more reason to have a better look at their design particulars. What a pity the authors did not stir themselves and collaborate with the inestimable Mr. Boudriot of France for a proper view of 'the other side!'
   
   All that said, this is an excellent volume, especially if your main interest is the British ships involved (they DID win the battle after all!).

No comments about The Spanish Main 1492- 1800 (Fortress).

2 comments about The Treasure of the San José: Death at Sea in the War of the Spanish Succession.

1. Don't be fooled by the title, this book has really very little to do with the Spanish naval operations against Britain, and even less about the loss of the treasure of the San Jose. Instead, it is more of an expose' on the convoluted corruptions of the Spanish government and its impact on naval operations in the New World. In fact, after reading about the interminable bribery, double-dealing and graft associated with squadron command, it is amazing the Spanish were able to get anything done in the New World, or elsewhere. If you are of a legalistic turn of mind, you will probably enjoy this book, but if you are looking for any sort of detailed discussion of Spanish ships, personalities, Caribbean operations, or tales of the treasures of the Spanish Main, you will be quite disappointed! Far better to read Arpestegui's book 'Pirates of the Caribbean' to get a detailed Spanish view of the intricacies of Caribbean operations in the days of Spanish hegemony.



2. Phillips, Carla Rahn. The Treasure of the San Jose: death at Sea in the War of the Spanish Succession. 1st. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. 0978-0-8018-8580, 248 p., il, maps and charts.
   
   
   
   Phillips (history, Univ. of Minnesota; Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century). Sunk by the British in 1708, the Spanish galleon San José was said to hold the richest cargo ever lost at sea. European conquests foundered, family fortunes were lost and history was changed in many ways. Still unfound today the San Jose has become "Black Pearl" of real history and the stuff of dreams and legends. However, the facts survive in the formidable archives of the colonial Spanish empire that only a scholar of Phillips standing could take on and survive. With careful research Phillips shows that the tale of the San Jose that most people know is "virtually in all of the details it contains are false". Yet even though this maybe the definitive scholarly book, Phillips begins her book with Gabriel Garcia Marques haunting description of the wreck of the San Jose near the harbor of Cartagena de Indias as a metaphor for lost dreams. It is in truth, the tale of the magnificent galleon San Jose under the command of the Count of Casa Alegre and manned by 600 souls that still rests untouched and waiting. Larger public libraries, academic libraries and specialized maritime collections.
   
   Suzanne Lay

No comments about Spanish Galleon 1530-1690 (New Vanguard).

5 comments about The Confident Hope of a Miracle: The True Story of the Spanish Armada.

1. On the one hand, this book is a meticulous reconstruction of a now almost apocryphal event: the Defeat of the Spanish Aramada. On the other hand, it is a finely told story of suspense and adventure. And finally, it is a superb tale of the days when Spain was the Master of the World, England was hanging on by its fingernails, and wooden ships were not yet the miracles of technology that they later came to be in the days of Nelson.
   
   I love the detail and connections in this book! For example, the author of Don Quixote, Cervantes, was involved in events leading up to the Spanish Armada(s). We learn more about Elizabeth I's (told from a decidedly UNsympathetic historian's point of view) and Sir Francis Drake's (who comes off as a superbly competent though self-interested risen-from-the-common-ranks adventurer) roles. We learn MUch more about Phillip II, King of Spain and effective secular Master of the Western World (until, that is, the defeats of his Armadas).
   
   Sailing in the 1500's was so much a matter of luck, timing, logistics, weather, and fortitude. New naval technologies and strategies were in their infant states. The Spanish had the popular vote to win. The English had the technology (guns and gunnery) if only they had the food. Poor planning on the Spanish side and supremely fortunate timing on the English side managed to counteract English budget frugalities and supplier shenanigans.
   
   In the end it is a rip-roaring story, all the more enthralling for the details. Hanson builds the story masterfully: element by element, personality by personality, circumstance by circumstance... from Phillip's "brainstorm" to invade England, to the climactic sequence of battle encounters as both fleets were pushed along the English Channel by wind and storm.
   
   It's hard indeed to remember how uncertain setting sail was back then. This was the same era as the setting of Clavell's "Shogun" book - Blackthorne the devil-take-all English pilot and his precious navigation Rutters. Galleons and Arquebuses ruled back then. Oh my!



2. Hanson's story of the Spanish Armada is meticulously researched and wonderfully told. The portraits of the great names of the age -- Elizabeth I, Walsingham, Phillip II, Drake, the Duke of Medina, the Duke of Parma, and others -- create a powerful vision allowing us to see their motivations, plans, blunders, and triumphs. In particular, a true account of Elizabeth is a great service and stands in stark contrast to the fantasy and fatuous glorification in the cinematic portrayals of the past seventy years. In the end, one is left hoping that one day Hanson will turn his powerful gaze to a proper full length biography of Elizabeth or Drake (or both!).
   
   Hanson builds his narrative using well-selected quotes of the protagonists themselves and their contemporaries. His careful catalogue of the Spanish preparations for the Armada can be tedious at times, but it serves the purpose of showing how the great events took shape, and provides a necessary basis for understanding the climax of the narrative.
   
   Hanson's telling of the Armada's run through the Channel, the brilliant sail of the English, the dogged discipline and enormous weight of the Spanish fleet, and the skirmishes and bitter fights in the days leading up to the night of the Calais fireships which precipitated the grand drama of what proved the decisive battle off Gravelines the next morning, is engrossing and as fine an account of an historic naval battle as one can find.
   
   To Hanson's credit, he also takes the plunge as an analyst of the events, and attempts to identify the causes of England's triumph and survival, and of the Armada's doom. Here, however, his conclusions come a bit unhinged from the story he has just told.
   
   For example, he finds England's victory to have been decisively determined on the basis of the technological superiority of the English vessels and gunnery over their Spanish counterparts (**). While the English superiority in ship and gun was indeed crucial, and well-documented by Hanson, there were other telling differences between the two sides.
   
   The leadership of the English commanders (Howard, Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, and Seymour)under a unified command structure detached from the Queen, as carefully documented by Hanson, was at least as important. Their skill and structure helped lay ground for the technological advantage Hanson speaks to, and allowed them to exploit that advantage, an outcome that was not inevitable. English lines of communication were short, English commanders and crews were well-prepared and highly disciplined, and they reacted to battle conditions and events with amazing speed and dexterity.
   
   One fascinating example of the difference men make, detailed by Hanson, was Drake's decision to conduct gunnery practice prior to the battle, an innovation which drew censure from the penurious Elizabeth and her Lord Treasurer Burghley as a waste of the Crown's money. Hanson acknowledges that Drake's foresight paid off in the battle with well-trained gun crews whose drill devastated the great Spanish galleons. But in drawing his conclusion that the decision in the Channel was drawn on differences in technology he fails to note that technology without well-led and well-trained sailors and gunners is useless.
   
   In contrast, the plodding Armada was guided by the Duke of Medina, less a commander than an administrator devoted to carrying out Phillip's deeply flawed invasion plan to the letter. Compared to England's battlefield arrangements, Medina's lines of communication were not even merely lengthy, they were non-existent. He had no ability to communicate with the land-bound Phillip, whose commands Medina was unwilling or unable to countermand, about changes of plan or the exigencies of the battlefield. Even more importantly, from first to last he had no direct communication line to Parma and his Netherlands-based invasion force. Given England's advantages of position and as the defender, in and of itself the failure of Medina and Parma to work together in attack was a defect likely fatal to the Spanish enterprise. Hanson's narrative compellingly contrasts this basic failure of leadership, and the differences between the English and Spanish structures, plans, crews, and commanders. But he does not draw the natural conclusion: This battle, like any other, was fought by desperate men, and the English made the most of their chances whilst the Spaniards made the least of their own.
   
   This apparent wrong turn in the analysis does not however detract from the quality of the book, and indeed it testifies to Hanson's objectivity for the evidence against his theory is found in his own pages, under his own hand. In one sense at least Hanson is correct: the English mauling of the Armada would never have been possible without their technological superiority. His mistake is merely in failing to note there were other, equally crucial, elements to the English victory.
   
   This is a very good, and perhaps great, book which is a profound addition to the literature of one of history's epochal confrontations.
   
   (** Hanson uses a badly flawed example to make his point. On page 385 he states "In our own era wars between Israel and the Arab nations have invariably ended in Israel's favour," which he attributes to the fact that "Israel is a U.S. client state and has been equipped with weapons that are decades ahead of those produced by the Arab world's principal suppliers, the states of the former Soviet Union."
   
   But Israel's last war against the armed forces of an Arab state was against Egypt, then a Soviet client state, in 1973. Indeed, Israel has never fought a significant action against an Arab national armed force supplied by states of the former Soviet Union.
   
   One may argue as to the technological differences between Soviet and U.S. arms supplied their clients in 1973, but the difference was not counted in "decades."
   
   Furthermore, in its penultimate war with Arab nation armed forces in 1967, Israel was effectively a client state of France, not the U.S. The U.S. flow of arms to Israel was minimal or nonextistent prior to the 1967 war and French President DeGaulle's decision to embargo arms to Israel three days before the start of the war, crippling Israel ability to resupply in an extended campaign, and breaking the Israel-France alliance dating to before the Suez campaign of 1956. In any event,
   French weaponry was not "decades" ahead of the Soviet weaponry in the hands of Egypt and Syria in 1967.
   
   Also noteworthy in reference to Hanson's main point is that the climax of the the 1967 War, in its opening hours, was the destruction on the ground of virtually the entire Egyptian air force. Obviously, the fact the Israeli's French Mirages were in the air, and their opponents' Soviet MIGs were parked on runways, does not speak to any technological advantage of French over Soviet weaponry.)



3. The Spanish Armada is one of those historical cliché about which I knew nothing other than the Spanish lost and it was a turning point. Neil Hanson's narrative account, "The Confident Hope of a Miracle" works to take away the cliché and make this iconic conflict come alive.
   
   The big takeaway from me was that Queen Elizabeth did nothing to help to defeat Armada. If anything her indecision, miserliness and quest for spoils, served to undermine the efforts of her subjects.
   
   The book also does a good job of showing how Philip the Second believed passionately in the "enterprise of England," the conquest of Queen Elizabeth's realm for religious reasons but that other Catholic monarchies weren't so ready let Catholic Spain speak or act for them.
   
   The contrast between the cultures, technology and strategies of Spain and England are very well delineated. The Spanish effort comes across as strategically flawed, cumbersome, massive and rigid while the English come across like guerilla warriors, opportunistic, flexible, smart and knowledgeable. Hanson acknowledges a weakness to the English approach in that they weren't prepared to press their advantage. There were times when they could have vanquished the Armada in battle but chose to preserve their options and resources. Given how badly the Armada ended up, mostly shipwrecked on the coast of Ireland, maybe the English had the right approach.
   
   There are a couple of weaknesses; the battle scenes are difficult to visualize. Because Mr. Hanson holds close to the documentary evidence, he doesn't have enough detail to always make the blow by blow account engrossing. Maybe he could have tried a different approach. Also, the secondary characters don't come across distinctly. I could tell who was Spanish and who was English but didn't have a good sense of the individual characters. And while the portraits of Philip the Second and Elizabeth are well drawn in the beginning chapters, they fade into the background for the remainder of the book. Is that really necessary?



4. I gave this book a "Good Plus" rating for three reasons:
   
   First, it's a compelling and cohesive narrative. It engages both intellect and emotion with rich, colorful language and good storytelling.
   
   Second, it paints a vivid and convincing sense of the times. It makes events come alive by skillfully knitting together the words and descriptions of a wide range of participants. While it clearly editorializes (lambasting the Virgin Queen among others) it also leaves plenty of room for the prime players to speak for themselves.
   
   Finally, I like the way that this book presents history. It depicts a major world-shaping event as the product of societal forces and human motivations that we readily recognize. It presents history, to quote Barbara Tuchman, as a "Distant Mirror" of our world today.
   
   On the down side: The book only partially avoids a common pitfall faced by histories of military events - too much reference to the record: too many names of too many ships and too many captains. While distracting at times, this flaw does little to detract from the otherwise well created (and sometimes stunning) drama of events.



5. This book was recommended to me by a friend, whose recommendations are always great. We both read a great deal of history and non-fiction and are always seeking good ones.
   He raved about this book and he was right. Some authors of history (David McCollough, William Manchester, Steven Ambrose, David Halberstam, Rick Atkinson, Hampton Sides, to name a few of my favorites) have a true gift of being able to take what could be the driest of facts and bring them to life in a most remarkable way.
   This book does the same. A detailed history of the Armada, and all that was going on in Europe at that time. Also a detailed account of why the Armada took place and the struggles between Queen Elizabeth and Mary Queen of Scots.
   I would highly recommend this book. It also has unusually good artwork and maps for a paperback.

5 comments about Manila And Santiago: The New Steel Navy in the Spanish-American War.

1. The origins of the Spanish-American War lay in American support for the independence of Cuba from Spain. Spain's brutal suppression of Cuban insurgents horrified the American public. The U.S. government sought a diplomatic solution, but the explosion and sinking of the USS Maine in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, while on a goodwill mission, made a successful diplomatic outcome problematic. President McKinley ordered the U.S. Navy to blockade Cuba on 21 April, and Congress declared war on April 24. The U.S. Navy had started planning for a war with Spain in 1895, whyen the NWC began an exercise to identify the options available to the Navy. These options were seen as: a direct attack on Spain; an attack on Spain's Pacific colonies of the Philippines and Guam; or an attack on Spain's colonies in the Caribbean, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Over the next several years, the options were reworked with an input from ONI and reviews by a planning board that reported to the Secretary of the Navy. In this process, the first option of a direct attack on Spain was ruled out. Jim Leeke's Manila and Santiago places the reader in these crucial battles that firmly established the United States as a world power and established the validity of Mahan's The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. An outstanding account-Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn, Florida Guard



2. This is one of the best written books abouth The US Navy during the Spanish American War that I have ever read. It is told with references to the key officers ad politicians that shaped the navy in the period from the Civil War to The Spanish American War.It's only problem is that most of the pictures are of the individuals of the action in Manila bay than of ships or the battle off of Santiago,though that is not altogether a bad thing the picture section could have been better



3. "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." This famous quotation is known by plenty of people who don't know who Gridley was, or who gave the famous order, or what the battle was. One of the reasons the quotation is famous is that it was uttered by Commodore George Dewey, who after his rousing victory in Manila in 1898 became a naval hero to every true American at the time. One of the reasons the situation for the quotation is obscure is that Dewey's effort was part of the Spanish-American War, about which even its most famous participant, Teddy Roosevelt, said, "It wasn't much of a war but it was the only war we had." But the war was no negligible comic-operetta conflict. Its two main naval engagements are the subject of _Manila and Santiago: The New Steel Navy in the Spanish-American War_ (Naval Institute Press) by Jim Leeke. Yes, it was a little war, especially compared to the big Civil War before and World War One after. And yes, victory got us involved in the Philippines and in Cuba in ways that may have caused us more difficulties than the victory was worth. But Leeke, a Navy veteran, journalist, and historian, has shown how the war brought the U. S. Navy onto the world's stage as a real player, and how the Navy learned lessons that were going to pay in not only the First but also the Second World War. Leeke also brings into focus a forgotten part of the war; the victory of Dewey at Manila was celebrated and is still remembered, but who remembers the possibly more important victory of Sampson at Santiago?
   
   The Union Navy had played its role in the Civil War; it was the most modern fleet in the world. The war won, the Navy "started disintegrating into a rotting, impotent force that would have been hard-pressed to defeat a fifth-rate banana republic." With Theodore Roosevelt acting as the secretary of the navy, Dewey assumed command of the Asiatic fleet, and after the sinking of the _Maine_, he steamed into Manila. He was lucky; the Spaniards put up a gallant fight, but their ships were older, smaller, weaker, and wooden hulled. The unexpected, speedy, and total victory proved to be a sensation for national pride. The victory of the Atlantic squadron in Santiago, Cuba, was just as decisive and influential, but it was far less dramatic. Rear Admiral William Sampson was in charge of the fleet that blockaded the fortified harbor of Santiago, where the Spanish cruisers had taken refuge. There was some rivalry between different commanders in the fleet, and some confusion because Sampson was beginning to show what was probably early Alzheimer's, but the main lack of drama was because of the inherent static nature of a blockade. After two months, the fleet of the Spanish Admiral Cervera was ordered (against his better judgement) to leave the harbor, and American ships quickly scuttled the Spanish ones. Cervera was an interesting character; he had impressed the Americans with his polite note to them assuring them that American prisoners he had taken were safe and had his admiration for their bravery. After his defeat, he was congratulated by the victors for his heroic fight, and when he was transferred later to Annapolis and to New York to wait out the end of the war, he was a celebrity. Americans respected his gentlemanliness and courtesy, and gathered on the streets to shake his hand. He returned to Spain, became a senator, and had a soft spot toward America for the rest of his life.
   
   The naval victories validated the Navy to be the Big Stick which Roosevelt would brandish when he became president. As Leeke's entertaining and thoughtful analysis shows, the great effect of the war was a new elevation of the Navy's status. In evaluating naval performance during the war, tacticians found that greatest of its shortcomings was its poor gunnery performance, with something like 2% of shells hitting their targets; the guns succeeded because those of the Spaniards performed even worse. The Navy was to begin applying the gunnery principles of British Admiral Scott, instituting regular target practice and innovations in shipboard ordinance. The battles at Santiago and Manila had shown convincingly how essential a robust Navy was to an America taking its part among other nations, and Congress quickly authorized new cruisers and battleships, all of which would become part of Roosevelt's celebrated Great White Fleet. The war with Spain may not have been much of a war, but it was the start of a new and modern Navy.



4. I was in the Navy with Mr. Leeke, and I am amazed at how much I didn't know about a relatively recent time in naval history. I found the book well constructed and it filled in many holes in my knowledge about the period and allowed me to contrast it to my time on board ship in the '70's. All in all, a very good read while being instructive at the same time. What more could one expect?



5. Well researched, detailed description of historic characters, describes the development of US Navy's capacity to wage sea-based warfare and extend its area of influence to displace another country's sphere of influence.
   Historically probably very accurate from the US perspective. The book is not very readable - I feel it could have been written in a more dramatic and better paced style - overall a bit dry. Some photos are there - but more maps and drawings of ships would have added value. A rare topic to be covered.