5 comments about An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, Volume One of the Liberation Trilogy (The Liberation Trilogy).

1. Overall, I am glad that I read the book. It is a part of World War II that I knew nothing about. After reading the book it is clear to me that this was a critical part of the war for the Allies. The negatives are:
   
   1. Most of the discussion is on the weakness of the allies. This includes lack of adequate planning (e.g., trying to take the wrong hill), bad assessments of Axis strength, lack of aggressiveness especially on the part of US generals, etc. Then all of sudden , the Germans are in retreat and the Allies are at the door of Tunis. Atkinson needed to provide analysis and explain what changed.
   2. There was inadequate discussion of the control of the airways. There were several references to the Luftwaffe attacking the Allied lines but then that stopped. There is practically no discussion of Allied air power and how it neutralized the Luftwaffe, gave air support to the advancing armies., etc.
   3. Similar to point 1, Eisenhower is presented as an unsure, overly political, poorly prepared commander. There is little discussion about what he did, if anything, to lead the Allies to victory, although it is implied at the end. Similarly, Alexander is first introduced as the savior of the Allied effort. All future references to him only cover the battlefield mistakes. It is not clear why Atkinson introduced him in such a favorable way. I assume there were a lot of strategic and tactical skills that he brought to the effort that were left out.



2. WITH A WW II LIBRARY OF ABOUT 400 ITEMS, THIS HAS SHED NEW LIGHT ON ARES THAT WAS QUITE INDEPTH. THE RESEARCH PUT INTO THIS MUST HAVE BEEN COLOSSAL. THIS IS A MUST HAVE FOR ALL WWII BUFFS.



3. This is a conventional and only partly successful history of the US Army in the North African campaign in WWII. Atkinson has done a great deal of research to assemble a generally well written and fairly thorough narrative of the campaign. In assembling the narrative, Atkinson has the advantage of a theme to unify his book; the inexperience and gradual maturation of the American Army. Atkinson describes well the general inexperience of the rapidly expanding American Army and how the Americans struggled when they experienced real combat conditions. After the short but violent conflict with the French during the invasions of Algeria and Morocco, the Americans and the British had to confront the Axis in Tunisia. The Axis forces were composed primarily of experienced German troops led by aggressive officers fighting on good defensive ground and under the overall command of one the very best theater commanders of the whole war, Field Marshal Kesselring. Not surprisingly, the inexperienced Americans did not do well, though neither did the British forces. Eventually, improving combat capacity and the sheer weight of resources led to a substantial Allied victory. Atkinson emphasizes other aspects aspects of the North African campaign; it was forging ground for Allied command structure and American-British cooperation. While long regarded as a sideshow, Atkinson argues (as have quite a few others) that the North African campaign was actually crucial to Allied success. For a more thorough and convincing discussion of this issue, see the work of Douglas Porch.
   
   The defects of this book are several. It is not really a history of the campaign as a whole. To be a real campaign history, Atkinson would have to provide a good deal more information about the Germans and Italians. Not does Atkinson provide much information about crucial aspects of the campaign such as the air war, which clearly proved to be decisive, or naval features. He concentrates on the American Army but here the treatment is not entirely satisfactory. His approach is very much the usual "chaps and maps" approach. There is little description or analysis of the actual experience of campaign from the soldier's point of view. If the campaign did produce improvements in American combat capacity, how did this actually happen? Changes in tactical doctrine, training, equipment? Even at the "chaps and maps" aspects, this book has problems. Atkinson does relatively poorly in describing geography, usually a key feature in determining the character of battle. Finally, Atkinson is generally a good writer but he occasionally veers into unfortunate purple prose.



4. The good part about this book is in the details. Many engagements are described day-by-day and objective-by-objective. The lives and experiences of officers and men throughout the ranks are investigated.
   
   The bad part about this book is its imbalance. If you enjoy reading about inexperience, ineptness, or incompetence, you'll get a full dose. But you will rarely find a description of characters who are experienced, accomplished, or competent. As described in other reviews, there were plenty in the latter category.



5. I highly recommend this book as a great read and an invaluable view of one of the less studied struggles of World War II. If you like the Civil War documentaries of Ken Burns, the works of John Eegan and others of this stripe, you will find equal or greater enjoyment in An Army at Dawn. But the author has more in mind than an entertaining overview or a personalization of battle. He skillfully uses the book's style and content to embody what seem to emerge as his deeper points. Chief among them is the historical and contemporaneous ambivalence toward, and downgrading of, the importance of the North African campaign. This despite what is, at least to Mr. Atkinson, its strategic centrality and its essential role in shaping the American military leadership. Yet again, through his presentation one develops the overall feeling that the story of clashing personalities, political distraction and balky or inadequate subordinates is a reprise of the continuity of the great literature and themes of campaign retrospectives through the ages. The memoirs Ulysses S. Grant came to mind for me. In this respect it does a service that Keegan does not, but perhaps more historical writers like Tuchman manage. This book helps illuminate them, even as it calls you to think about other works as you read on in this one.
   Doing an expert job at the now familiar style of mixing overview and detail, facts and anecdotes, the book lays out a full picture of the North African campaign at every level and engages the reader fully, the whole time. The multiplicity of views is the book's weakness as it leaves one wishing for more of the deeper analysis it begs for in many of its key topics, but you have to draw the line somewhere. The author has done a great service and a yeoman job in digging through and offering up so many new primary sources. The book is in fact a trove of topics and arguments calling to be expanded by other authors. The one thing I would have loved to see added is some kind of suggestion list or organization of some of the key sources, to help a reader follow up

5 comments about Inside Delta Force: The Story of America's Elite Counterterrorist Unit.

1. books were birthday gift for husband a retired army vet and he is enjoying them thank you Yvonne



2. As a huge fan of The Unit, and a history buff, it made sense to branch out into the various military histories. I'd read Marcinko's Rogue Warrior and that was great, but writing could have been better. Also Beckwith's Delta Force and found that to be lacking, so I naturally branched out to Haney's account of his experiences with Delta Force. I was not disappointed. Did the book can easily be broken apart into three main sections: Selection, Training and Action.
   
   Haney did a great job in describing the selection process that he went through to become a Delta candidate. I felt as though I was with him there on his forced marches, that I was seeing everything through his eyes. He would introduce little anecdotes, such as "The Man Who Walked His Feet Off at Delta Force Selection", or the soldier who rode on the back of a motorcycle the last miles of a forced march. Through it all we see how determined and full of spirit he was as he completed each leg of the selection.
   
   Then he gave us an inside account of the actual training they went through. It seems surreal to be able to enter a room after a flash bang and within three seconds shoot and kill all the terrorists hidden amongst the various hostages. Such speed and accuracy is almost unbelievable, but is par for the course.
   
   Finally we get to see the Iran fiasco that completely fell apart. To this point we still hadn't seen much action and yet I was still riveted to the story he was telling. Then he launched into descriptions of the various missions that he and his fellow operators went on in the Middle East and in the Latin countries.
   
   Through it all we get a bared to the world and honest account, the good and the bad of it all. It is this that lends the credibility to what Haney was writing about. Then to top it all off the writing is actually good writing (as opposed to Marcinko and Beckwith), which allows for the reader to become invested in what was being told.
   
   I would definitely recommend for any history buff, especially someone looking for military history. Haney was a great soldier and patriot, and he is also a great author and spokesman.
   
   5 stars.



3. I was very impressed with this account of Mr. Haney's service with Delta Force. I found it to be much better then the Rouge Warrior books. Mr. Haney is obviously a true professional. There are many stories in the book that have been played out in the tv show The Unit. I would love to hear more stories from Mr. Haney's service in Delta Force. As a former Marine I understand the sacrifices that these brave men have made. Semper Fi!



4. Fascinating reading. I liked the understated style of writing and found it a compeling read. The information concerning the depth and detail of their training was impressive. The author gives a vivid accounting of the failed rescue attempt in Iran. I would like to hear more from this author in his second career in dealing with child rescues.



5. I read this book after being a long-time fan of "The Unit". Haney gets straight into how he came to selection with Delta then spends the rest of the book giving generally matter of fact no nonsense descriptions of his time in Delta. Having read a number of books on the special forces world it was interesting finally reading something about Delta Force and I really enjoyed Haneys book. The most memorable thing is how much of Delta Force is taken directly from the SAS. I knew they were inspired by the UK's finest but I didnt realise they were a direct copy! Most of the component arts of Delta are lifted from the SAS - and they rarely even bothered to change names!!!
   Good Book though!

5 comments about Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence.

1. Unlike many of the previous reviewers, I know very little about the war of independence, other than that it was a war about being freed from British rule; I am not an American and have very little interest in military history. So, I will not be able to comment on whether Ferling is biased or not, or to the accuracy of the facts presented in the book.
   
   Having said all that, this is the best non-fiction book I have ever read. I read it only because I had just returned from a wonderful stay in north east US and my husband had the book lying around. So, when I returned home, I started reading Ferling's book.
   
   I found Ferling's narrative writing style to be very engaging (not all narrative style are engaging). His description of the battles reads like a thriller and better than some fiction thriller novels. I found it difficult to put the book down until I knew the outcome of the various battles he described, probably reflecting my lack of knowledge in America's history, but the fact that his writing could have this effect on someone with no interest in military history, reflects on how well Ferling writes.
   
   Ferling made me feel the continental soldiers' anxiety leading up to battle, feel their elation when they won and their sorrow when they lost. My heart went out to the continental soldiers; most weren't properly clothed, some weren't paid while they fought. All this while they endured terrible conditions tracking hundreds of miles from one place to another, particularly during the summer, to do battle with the British.
   
   I cannot comment on whether he treated Washington favourably or spent too much time writing about the battles in the south, etc, but I can say that Ferling made the reader see that the sacrifice made by the more courageous militia men and soldiers were just as important in these battles as the tactics of some of the generals.
   
   I highly recommend Ferling's Almost a Miracle, particularly to those like me, who has no background in this subject matter.
   
   I am now a big fan of Ferling and plan to buy more of his books.



2. All the facts we were never taught nor given the opportunity to review for ourselves can be found in this book for this specific period of time. What a new understanding I have for our forefathers and such a great appreciation for their sacrifices. I will endeavor to protect and honor their sacrifices by being a better American.John Ferling is a masterful author. He documents his material so well and for the most part doesn't concentrate on the most obvious. He takes major characters and describes them as total people. His portrayal of Washington and other significant founding fathers gives an insight into the trials and triblations they endured during the revolutionary times. He tells of their magnificent gestures as well as acts we might won't to forget except for wanting to know the whole truth. The years that our congress nearly cost the revolution its victory. The manner inwhich we treated our military. The inability to sustain action. The lack of support of each states militia and the Continnetal Army. The bailing out of so many of the original signers of the Declaration inorder to pursue other interests, mostly materialistic. A drama unfolds that is much like our political life of today.I would recommend that you read every book that Ferling authors. It is a rare insight into our social, economic, political and military history of our nation. He lends a new appreciation to those who went before us. As mortal as they were, they accomplished truly a miracle in the independence of our nation.



3. This book reminded me of why it can be so valuable to read a well written military history. Warfare is like a mirror that shows us human nature in its nobility and cruelty. This story is a study in human character and leadership, in making mistakes and learning from them, in perseverance and hardship, and in believing in a cause larger than oneself.
   
   I was surprised to learn how the Revolutionary War was not only a fight between the British and the Americans, but also a fight between Americans themselves, that is, between patriots and loyalists. It was in many ways a civil war. Also, I often saw parallels between this British military venture 3000 miles from its shores and current American military ventures overseas.
   
   This war was not won by Washington's steadfastness or by French military assistance, as important as these were. It was won by the common American foot soldiers, who were willing to serve for years without pay and to march through swamps and snows, often barefoot, in service to their country and their ideals.



4. If you want to learn all about the American Revolution, this is definitely the book to read. Ferling does a fantastic job balancing the need for explaining the war's essential facts with the need for keeping it a fast paced narrative. Its analysis is well written and gives some different perspectives on the war and its participants, particularly of George Washington. Lastly, I was pleasantly surprised that in a book on such an extensive topic as the American Revolution, at no point did I become disengaged with it. Maybe it's just me, but from cover to cover, the text captivated my full attention.
   
   All in all, Almost a Miracle is an easy and pleasing way to become very informed on the American Revolution.



5. AAM is a solid piece of historical writing covering the American War of Independence. (I hesitate to say "American Revolution" because it is mainly a military history and does not delve deeply into the social, political, and economic aspects of the larger Revolution). It reads well and moves along nicely.
   
   I think, perhaps, that the author has been unfairly or overly criticized for his detractions from Washington and others. I think it's fairly obvious (to the objective observer) that Washington was not a brilliant general (or an outstanding President, for that matter). Good, yes, but not brilliant. His virtues were more in his character than in his actual accomplishments. I thought the treatment of Washington (and others) was balanced. (I'm tired of writers who insist on either deifying or vilifying the Founders).
   
   Overall, AAM is a well-done and worthwhile book. Keep in mind, however; it is a military history and is thus limited in its scope. Not the definitive work on the American Revolution, to be sure, but worth reading.
   
   Recommended.

5 comments about Band of Brothers : E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest.

1. This gripping account immerses the reader in 101st Airborne's experience during WWII; all the way from training, to the eventual celebration at Hitler's nest. Ambrose primarily tells this tale through the trials and tribulations of Easy Company. Through first hand interviews, diaries, extensive research, and his own trip to the region, Ambrose is able to provide a unique and vivid narrative of war. While reading I often found myself cringing at disturbing depictions of battle, and even laughing out loud at some of E Company's quirky antics.
   
   Although World War II was such an epic battle, and seems daunting to grasp for someone who did not live through the times, Ambrose proves that taking a microscope to the history is perhaps the best method of understanding it. Ambrose writes this piece with a passion. Based on footnotes, it is clear he developed a strong bond with the men he interviewed, yet he also retains his objectivity and supplements the first hand accounts with the exhaustive research he has performed. The enthusiasm Ambrose shows for his subject is evident on every page. 'Band of Brothers' makes for an exciting page-turner, as well as essential reading for someone looking to get a grasp on the military history of the Second World War. My only complaint is that the book didn't go on long enough. If only every history book was so difficult to put down!



2. I bought this for my 16 year old daughter for Christmas. Everyone (adults) we know has asked to borrow it. It has a good reputation for being a true-to-life story. It seems to be the kind of movie (mini-series) people don't mind watching over and over.



3. Bought this book for my grandfather, a Paratrooper...and he really enjoyed this book. I would have given it 5 stars, but I didn't read it myself.



4. Like the movies "Saving Private Ryan" and "Gettysburg", this book (I haven't seen the HBO miniseries) left me fighting tears of pride as I understand my country's greatness and tears of shame as I understand the individual sacrifice such greatness takes, and wonder if I have done anything (let alone enough) to deserve this sacrifice.
   
   E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne spent two year's in training and staging, and a year in combat in Europe, landing behind Utah Beach on D-Day, then fighting under impossible circumstances in the Battle of the Bulge. The training, the combat, and the leadership of E company created indeed a remarkable bond of brotherhood not always reached under such difficult circumstances.
   
   As one of E Company's veterans told a grandson in answer to the question "were you a hero in the war?":
   
   "'No,' I answered, 'but I served in a company of heroes.'"
   
   Ambroses' Citizen Soldiers: The U. S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany is also a classic. See my review there.



5. One of those books; I can't seem to put down. I'm thankful I have watched the movie, Band of Brothers, for I could "picture" everything that was happening though all these pages. This Regiment was truly remarkably determined and proud to be a participant in this long relentless war. How do you understand anything, unless you were there and have gone through all the circumstances? There are so many things we don't realize or understand and this book almost took you there to see what they had to experience. To be so proud and honored is an understatement for men like these and for all of our Military.

5 comments about US Army Survival Manual: FM 21-76.

1. This book is very interesting. I started out planning to give it a quick look and ended up reading it almost cover to cover. It contains a lot of very useful information; however, it has a 1970's copyright date and some of the information seems to be outdated. For instance, with respect to snake bites, it still recommends cutting the bite to suck out the venom and applying a tourniquet. Most authorities now indicate that these practices are not only no longer recommended but are actually now considered to be the cause of most of the serious injuries (at least from the venomous snakes in my area).
   
   With a simple update to insure that all information reflects current knowledge, I would feel comfortable giving this book 5 stars and recommending it to everyone. That said, it is still chock full of valuable and potentially life saving information and at the price, it is still a good investment.



2. I would recommend, as another poster has, to download this book for free just by using google and inserting Fm 21-76, then print in out. Don't waste your money.



3. As a civilian I found myself filtering a lot of the information and wondering how I would adapt if I ever encounter any of the scenarios. I did enjoy the information on the psychology of survival. It gave me food for thought in rounding out my emergency gear.



4. A needed reference for any one who is into survival. Written for the solder in all of us.



5. This is THE definitive guide to survival. There is nothing here to filter out, no political rhetoric, just straight fact and easy-to-understand instructions on how to survive in any wilderness situation. The extended sections on the Arctic were of particular interest to me because I happen to live in that zone. EVERYONE should keep a copy of this in their home, car, and camper!

5 comments about The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

1. As I understand the history of the COIN manual, it was originally published in 1940 by the Marine Corps, and dealt with the lessons to be learned from Black Jack Pershing's development of a strategy against the "Moros" insurgency in the Philippines in 1903. Ergo the double title "Army/Marine." And BTW, what Clausewitz wrote is "War is diplomacy by other means," not "policy" or "politics." He was talking about the two ways that countries deal with one another, one peaceful, the other coercive.



2. Having just completed Rupert Smith's _The Utility of Force_, this was recommended to me by my former executive officer as a companion piece. He was dead-on in his recommendation. Whereas Smith's strength was in disucssing strategy in combating insurgencies (and proposing that the warfare of the future will be of a counter-insurgency nature), Nagel addresses counterinsurgency at the tactical ( battalion. company and platoon) level.
   
   Naturally there is some overlap, particularly as it relates to dealing with and among a population. Nagel, however, literally walks one through waging warfare on the ground, from reconaissnace and intelligence to planning operations through executing and sustaining the campaign. I was particularly impressed by the chapter on leadership and ethics for counterinsurgency and by the numerous vignettes providing a historical perspective on successful counterinsurgency strategies.
   
   While the manual is written (by definition) for professionals, it is an excellent tool in gaining insight and understanding how to successfully engage the types of conflicts we are likely to see more of in the future. Read in conjunction with _The Utility of Force_, a strong foundation for the future of warfare at both the field and company grade.



3. I received the manual in a timely manner, and it was in very good condition as advertised. I would recommend to anyone that they use this supplier to buy a book.



4. I've been studying insurgent warfare for a long time before it became a hot topic... again. I still recommend Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare and Hamilton's The Art of Insurgency which is a great book but is little referenced. There are of course books by Kitson and others. (Nagl's book which I've reviewed is a good dissertation but is limited in it scope and perception. He writes the forward to this edition.) The two volume War in the Shadows is okay background but not worth a two volume read. Which brings us to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which if you are serving and only have time to access one source, this is a dependable one.
   
   Although the CFM is oriented more toward the current unpleasantness the principles of counterinsurgency have been carefully gleaned from the best sources and multiple situations as well as updating insurgent response for the 21st century. Keeping food deliveries out of active insurgent areas might have worked for the British in Malaya, but you could imagine the field day CNN would have with it today. Probably the best things the writers do in this manual is freely admit that the devil is in the details and that these will have to be worked out locally and supported nationally.
   
   For those who still aren't buying into "the insurgent stuff" which unfortunately over the last 30+ years has gone under state department approved phrases like "nation building" and executive office of the President terms like "counter terrorism" you don't have to worry that the Army or Marines are going to lose their conventional edge with these approaches. The CFM makes it clear that this is only one form or warfare and that modern war can slip across the entire spectrum. What is not needed is more doctrine...what is needed is a tool box and the CFM attempts to be one of those tools.
   
   The CFM makes many good points and I'm not going to list them all here, but the most important one I felt has to do with the assumption of more risk. Insurgent warfare requires soldiers to go out and get in the streets with people to provide the basic security for everyday activities that will lead to a legitimate government. Legitimacy cannot come from the national level down no matter what form of government people actually settle for (A basic concept found in any undergraduate PolySci 101 class which no one in the State Deptment or Congress must have taken.) The average Joe doesn't care about the grand schemes. He wants to go to work, get married, raise a family and have a shot at some level of comfort without getting killed. The key to winning against insurgents is that the most committed to providing these basic parameters for the average Joe, wins. You show your true colors and level of commitment when you have to go out and get shot at. But the alternative, which never works, and we still seem to be doing is to concentrate forces on large FOB's and separate them from the population. This has got to be one of the toughest of balancing acts to provide force protection, logistics as well as force projection and maintenance that supports an ongoing relationship with the civilian population. Fighting an insurgency is not for the faint hearted, the draftee, or those who needed to be reelected every 2 years. It takes soldiers in neighborhoods who know the people and have the power to affect their lives...albeit indirectly if possible.
   
   I disagree with the CFM on two points. I disagree with using the idea of "counterinsurgency" for philosophical reasons. The term by its very nature places you at a disadvantage to the insurgents. I believe you fight an insurgent war and win it by being better insurgents, not by being better "counterinsurgents." But this is probably more a matter of semantics. My second area of disagreement is really the book itself. This "new" book on insurgent warfare is really a great gazette of all the current knowledge that has been around for years plus the all necessary Army doctrine, without which the lowliest private cannot have a bowel movement. The Army's "can't do it without doctrine" attitude is what made this book come out so far behind the power curve to begin with. All this information is and has been known and available but the Army couldn't "discover" it. The US has a long insurgent history that is little studied or learned from. Our nation was founded by an insurgency. We've fought insurgents throughout our history: Native Americans, especially in the West, the border struggles during the Civil War, Phillipines, Cuba, Nicuagua, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. As organizations that need to be highly adaptable, the Army and the Marines need to stop paying tuition for the same lessons over and over again. I realize that not all of this lack of organizational awareness is theirs. A great deal of the responsibility for lack of responsiveness lies at the feet of elected officials who do not do their part and provide the clarity of purpose upon which coherent military strategies are based. The mist in Congress becomes a dense fog for those who are tasked with the nation's defense.



5. I actually bought this book some months back but I kept putting off picking it up because I assumed this would be a dense work filled with military jargon and more acronyms than one could shake a stick at. I assumed that it would be a tedious and difficult read so I found reasons to put it off, but when I finally forced myself to begin this book I was quite shocked. The book is very easy to read and very well written. The book has just a few acronyms that I had memorized within a couple of pages after their introduction, and the book is very well laid out with impeccable organization (as should be expected I guess). I dare say I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book on all levels. Of course the information and the knowledge to be gleaned from this work is extremely important.
   
   I think if this book were to become required reading for students then I think we could prevent some costly misadventures in future because this book really details what an occupation requires. Everyone would understand that military action will require a deep level of commitment for the military and on all levels of civil society as well.
   
   I also think it is the least we can do as citizens to educate ourselves on what our military men and women are doing and attempting to implement in situations where they face this type of conflict. One gets a sense of what a soldier goes through and the huge load that is put on the ordinary soldier. It is an extremely difficult task they are asked to perform in these situations, and they are asked to perform this task with honor and discretion in the face of terrible situations.
   
   There are some good reviews here that speak more to the content of the work by people obviously more versed in the topic than myself, so I will just say that this book is very well done and an easy read. If you are like me and are putting off reading or buying this book, then let me just say go ahead. It is worth the money and the effort. I highly recommend this book.

5 comments about Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.

1. For this reader, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife's value centers on two main premises: 1) those who fail to learn the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them; and, 2) a large, monolithic organization such as the U.S. Army will struggle to adapt unless it adopts a learning culture. Both relate to the U.S. Army's experience in Viet Nam. It is clear that the U.S. Army has only recently begun to learn from its earlier failures fighting a stubborn insurgency in 2004-06 and to implement strategy and tactics appropriate to the situation.
   
   Eminently readable for an Oxford PhD thesis, what sets Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife apart from many other books attempting to explain the failures in Viet Nam is the degree to which the author supports his arguments. He combines exceedingly thorough research befitting a PhD thesis with fully developed and clearly articulated arguments. By examining the British Army of the Malay Campaign and the U.S. Army fighting in Viet Nam in terms of their organizational cultures - that is, the degree to which they promoted learning, flexibility, and adaptability - the author does a superb job of explaining why the British were successful in defeating the communist insurgency on the Malay Peninsula and why the Americans failed in South Viet Nam.
   
   Of course, Nagl has his detractors. There are those who would suggest that the conflict in Malaya in the 1950s differed markedly from the conflict in Viet Nam in the 1960s and early 1970s. For instance, the Viet Cong were able to leverage a well-funded, well-organized, and well-trained North Vietnamese army against the U.S. Army in South Viet Nam. By contrast, the British really only had to confront a communist insurgency in Malaya. However, those readers who point to the dissimilarities in the two conflicts are really missing Nagl's point.
   
   The author's contention that the British Army eventually succeeded in defeating a thinking, adaptive enemy is instructive. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, we are told that for any institution to be successful when faced with new and decidedly different operational challenges, it must be capable of learning and adapting. This includes everything from changing strategy and tactics to completely reorganizing. In fact, it may even need to develop a whole new set of core competencies. In the context of armed warfare, this may mean viewing victory through a different lens. As members of the Bush Administration have readily pointed out, the war in Iraq will not end with a formal surrender aboard a U.S. battleship. More to the point perhaps, Nagl's work compels us to think differently about how we define success in a counterinsurgency.
   
   For the U.S. Army currently operating in Iraq, adapting really means moving away from war fighting strategy and tactics appropriate to a linear battlefield and more toward an approach that better recognizes the nature of the threat. The current threat in Iraq is more socio-political than military. In fact, it is now an article of faith that for our counterinsurgency efforts to be successful, U.S. war fighters must win the hearts and minds of the local populace. If the local Iraqi citizens believe they are more secure and hence can live productive lives, they will be more willing to cooperate with the "occupying" Army. That cooperation will take the form of alerting nearby ground troops to the presence of Al Qaeda fighters and Sunni insurgents.
   
   For any large military organization, adapting to an entirely different threat characterized by a highly complex and dynamic situation involving ethnosectarian conflict, religious persecution, and violent criminal activity such as we see in Iraq today requires tremendous innovation and agility. As Nagl points out, the British were able to eventually embrace change and pursue an effective counterinsurgency strategy while facing a similar set of conditions. He argues persuasively that British and Malay counterinsurgency forces eventually were structured to respond quickly to the communist insurgent threat precisely because they were quite flexible. In large part, the Brits' success can be traced to their approach to counterinsurgency warfare in that era - centralized command with decentralized control. This approach recognizes that the fight is really very different in each province and therefore strategy and tactics will need to be different to attain success.
   
   As Nagl points out, to enjoy the kind of success the Brits had in Malaya, the U.S. Army "will have to make the ability to learn to deal with messy, uncomfortable situations an integral part" of its organizational culture. It must, per T.E. Lawrence, be comfortable "eating soup with a knife." Additionally, as a previous reviewer states quite clearly, "it must be ready to work with outside resources as well, such as the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and various religious institutions."
   
   Overall, Nagl offers terrific analysis. This work should be required reading for all officers of all branches of the U.S. military.



2. Haven't read the book quite yet. I plan to get it done by the time I am to attend CCC though.



3. A very interesting analysis of two contrasting counterinsurgency
   methodologies. Not exact parallel circumstances but shows well enough that military muscle is in itself not the answer to such problems.



4. As the war in Iraq slides into it's fifth year I am sure most Americans are perplexed on why things remain so screwed up over there. Why can't American's just handle it and come home. This book sort of explains the why. This book is excellent. It really defines what an insurgency is. It isn't like the traditional war like WWII which we see on the history channel. Anyone who wants to get perspective on events needs to read this book.
   
   The book has a second point too which anyone can apply. This book shows how the organizational culture can effect the ability to solve problems. The author does that in studying the British experience in Malay vs. the American experience in Vietnam. He shows how the British were adapt and could learn then apply as they go along. The LTC then shows how the American's were not flexible and paid the consequences. LTC Nagel shows how the American's were so preprogrammed in fighting a WWII type battle they couldn't grasp any other solution. The Generals were preprogrammed in Vietnam to such a degree they threw out any fact that upset the model in their mind. They may have changed the buzz words but the core way of doing business was the same throughout Vietnam for the Americans, search and destroy. While the British had a way to listen and apply the lessons learned from the bottom up. The result of such innovation was that they won their war and we didn't. Insurgencies tend to be as much of a political fight as anything else. LTC Nagel shows that in the book.
   
   Any manager of any large organization needs to read this book because it shows how organizational culture can choke a team to death.
   
   LTC Nagel does identify what an insurgency is but doesn't offer much remedy to fighting that war directly. He does talk about how the British did it and how some American's had theories in handling that type of war. It would be interesting to hear of his insight in the context of Iraq. However I feel that the planners in this surge probably read this book. It has a lot of similarities with the British Malay model.
   
   Overall it is an easy read. He does get lost in the military terms a little. The material he talks about is the same concepts you read about in the newspapers. It will help the reader understand what is going on.



5. Good read. Great knowledge. I wish the authore had stayed in the army becasue he knows what he is talking about.

5 comments about Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior.

1. I remember having a conversation with a friend of mine and we were trying to figure out what training produced a more deadly efficent incredible (man/soldier/warrior) although, I am more biased towards the navy seals, as my son is one, my friend was formerly in the special forces. He recommended that I read this book and I am amazed once again at what people are capable of learning and doing. It truly is amazing the types of situations these soldiers get themselves into and out of, what they have to do to get there, what they have to do once they're there, and what they have to do to get home. I can't say enough how interesting this book is. I enjoyed it a lot as you might be able to tell from my review.



2. This is a great book on Special Forces. The author, Dick Couch, was offered complete access to thhe Special Forces training process. And he has experiance in being a Spec Op, he was a U.S. Navy SEAL.
   
   This book, covers the whole training and selection process. And it even includes some pictures.
   
   Overall, I highly recommend this book to anyone that is interested in being a Green Beret, or any type of Special Forces, or to anyone that loves reading these kind of books.
   
   5/5



3. Mr. Couch had the privelege of tagging along with a group of SF candidates throughout their selection and training process - his book offers a level of candidness and insight that only such first-hand experience can provide. His background as a Navy SEAL allows him to accurately highlight the crucial differences between the modus operandi of Army and Navy SOF - differences of which not many are aware. If you want to know about the road to becoming an Army Special Forces solider and the caliber of man it takes to travel it, this is an outstanding choice.



4. Dick Couch has provided great insight into the selection and training of one or our premier units.
   He has a great blend of personal and training highlights that give a great feel for the making of a SF soldier.
   Highly recommended for those wanting to know more about the making of the next greatest generation.



5. My son is a Green Beret, and I had only heard a few of his stories about the intensive training that he went through. This was a real eye-opener for me to see exactly what went on. He was able to identify some of the cadre who had fictitious names assigned by the author.
   
   If anyone is interested is signing up for SF, they need to read this book to get the real inside story.

5 comments about Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army.

1. The concept of creating a private security force, allowed to go anywhere needed to enforce and support American Foriegn Policy, is a frightening one. Not accountable to Foreign Governments within whose territory they operate, not accountable to American Military Forces, not accountable to American Government laws. In fact not accountable to anyone, including the families of those employees killed in the line of duty, this organization and similar groups need to be brought into line. private armies acting at the behest of policy makers and their commercial friends is not the way to maintain security in the world. For those people interested in American Foreign policy, I would suggest that after reading this book, they read the manifesto promolgated by John MccAin in, I think November 2007.



2. I read everything from far right to far left. I stopped reading this book on page 44, the first book I have not completed in maybe a decade. Mr. Scahill apparently believes that one uses the first 40 pages of a book to destroy the reputations of the people he will be discussing for the rest of the book.
   
   In his preface, the author indicates that the Blackwater team refused to be interviewed for the book and as a reader I could not imagine why. After 40 pages, I knew that the presentation would be so slanted that there would have been no reason for the Blackwater executives to even considered an interview. ------ too bad, I really wanted to know about the company.
   
   Page 12: "As he grew older, Erik became increasingly active in right-wing politics, landing a six-month internship in George H. W. Bush's White House" ---- If you like this and enjoy the terms: right-wing, Christian (with non-flattering adjectives), neo-conservative manefesto etc., this is the book for you.



3. The author provides a great deal of information on how Blackwater came into being and some information on their operations and incidents prior to the campaigns of the US military in Iraq. He goes through extraordinary efforts to speak about the Christian religious affiliation of the founder, Mr. Prince as well as discussions of many of the employees of the company from low level to former politicos. I was not at all thrilled with the absolute liberal bias and anti-Christian or Judeo-Christian sentiment of the author. Further, his bias towards what is conservative, i.e. G.W. Bush and his crowd became a distractor for and diverted from what could have been more indepth reporting on Blackwater. I would have preferred him writing about what facilities and training they put teams through, more on criteria for accepting jobs, etc. He did not provide this. I will point out that I am not religious, never attend religious events of any faith and yet this authors attitude toward Christianity left me disgusted with him as an author. He makes Blackwater out to be a Christian Army organization. He speaks of securing the US Border and Blackwater's relationship to that and those who want a secure border as anti-immigrant and not anti-illegal/criminal immigration. He did provide some insight on hurricane Katrina and Blackwater which I did not know and did not like, but the overall information and tenor of his book was not as much on Blackwater as it was a statement against the American Right and "Neo Cons" and Christians. I am a current military officer serving and have my own biases, but this was very much like a NY Times expose' on individuals and not the story of Blackwater. But, if he had not written this way he could have wrote the story for a Time Magazine article of less than 10 pages.
   I have read many other books and listened to many audio books pro and con on the War on Terror. Fiasco was well written and although the author had some biases he kept those in check by staying on topic and not dwelling on individuals.
   My view is that this book will not provide you much more than you can get on reading articles about the Fallujah incident in the news and off the internet. It is sad to say I will not purchase or read another book by this author due to his underlying bias.



4. We live in a world where 1984 is a silly cartoon in comparison. Wake up America and put a tax end to this nightmare!



5. Funny that I call this a "must read," then give it three stars.
   
   To explain, first, I listened to the recorded version of the book. I still don't like that medium much. In the case of this book, the subject matter MUST be studied, investigated. In the recorded version there are no "footnotes," so those who purport to dislike the book can say, "There's no footnotes so it has no credibility." Nonsense, to be sure, but you'll see the argument. Next, again, the subject is so terribly important. Indeed, many who're taking part in the mercenary war should be tried for treason. So the "paper" record needs to be availble so that more people know what's really going on in that debacle we call a "war."
   
   So, what is it that makes Iraq an unusual situation in our country's history? Aside from the massive debt we're building to pay for it, we're relying on mercenaries, paid troops, who're making immeasurably more than the troops who're putting their lives on the line.
   
   And what connection does that mercenary war have with, say, religion? Well, the Bush administration has been notorious for cronyism. Even conservatives have noted that, people hardly qualified sliding into UN positions, FEMA positions, Pentagon positions. It's true that "it's not what you know, it's who you know." And Dubya's connections with the "religious" have paid the latter off. That's come up in countless books, now in Scahill's.
   
   I wish I had more detail but, frankly, I finished this about a week ago and, again, it doesn't sink in like it would had I had the time to actually read it.
   
   The only objection I have to the text is that it does tend to be quite repetitive. A few times, I thought that maybe I'd slipped an earlier disk into the player as I'd heard the same lines before. That seems trivial but it can be disconcerting.
   
   In short, this is a book that every legislator should read before conducting a complete investigation into the mercenary industry that is costing us taxpayers dearly. Read it...and act!

5 comments about A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn - the Last Great Battle of the American West.

1. 
   
   I have a shelf full of Little Big Horn Campaign, 1876, material, from Custer to the Indians to the archaeology of the battle, many from University of Oklahoma Press. I need another book on this subject like I need to be older. Hah!
   
   But after checking this book out from the local library I can only say that this book deserves at least a 5-star rating, shame it cannot be given more. It is a page turner, compelling a reader to finish the book quickly. I have my own copy now on order!
   
   Usually I give much more in depth reviews, however, on this book, why waste the effort? It is the standard approach to the 1876 episode only offering a wider view than most. It begins well, too, directly inside the front cover is quite a map of the SIOUX WAR COUNTRY 1876, and actually it is 3 maps in one: Sioux War Country, The Battlefield, and Little Bighorn Campaign. Jeffrey L. Ward designed this map and in doing so, did the reader quite a favor. With other smaller, detail maps also included in the book as well.
   
   I suggest this book will eventually take its place with only the best. It is one well written book chocked full of facts and pictures, and some rather unknown items, at least unknown to me: offers a clearer picture of Sitting Bull, his akicita of which Crow King and Gall were members, brings Inkpaduta's history into the battle, as well as offering more personal data for the leading characters. Didn't know Sheridan actually came from Ireland or that Armstrong almost fell into bankruptsy. Best to go out and get a copy of this one, judge for yourself just how good a book it is.
   
   For me this book is a budding classic, and should be accepted as such by most well read readers of the 19th century military west. It may in time even become a standard work on the subject. But you do need to judge that for yourself.
   
   I've been reading on this episode in the Powder River country for at least 40 years, and this book is one of the more notable ones I've had the pleasure to read. And yes, I have the Utley, Michno, Hutton, Gray, Kammen-Lefthand-Marshall, among others, but this book takes 2nd place to no other. Don't miss it, pardner.
   
   Semper Fi.



2. Among other things this effort by author James Donovan teaches us that the United States army was underpaid, ill-equipped, and for the most part made up of untrained individuals in Indian fighting. Officers such as Custer, Marcus Reno, Frederick Benteen, George Crook, and others were, to use Doris Kearns Goodwin's term for Lincoln's cabinet, a team of rivals with jealously and hatred brimming to the surface. Author Donovan brings out the personalities of the key individuals involved from the Civil War, the Battle of the Washita in 1868, to the Little Big Horn in 1876, and ultimately to the massacre at Wounded knee, South Dakota, in 1890. Great detail is provided regarding the ill-fated ride into the Greasy Grass where Custer divided his regiment and whether or not he disobeyed orders. Author Donovan feels Custer did disobey orders, but Custer was given permission to use his discretion to do what he felt best since he had fought Indians previously. Did Custer ride his men too hard when he realized he had been spotted by the Indians when a rest would have been more appropriate? Should Custer have divided his regiment? Did Reno's retreat contribute to Custer's annihilation? How much was Reno in possession of his faculties (drunk)? when he should have taken a leadership role in his retreat? Did Benteen dawdle in following Custer's order to come to his aid, or was he correct to remain with Reno when he saw Reno's desperate situation? It was interesting to read that Custer's men shot their horses to get some protection to fend off their attackers. This illustrates how desperate the men viewed their situation since to remain on the plains without transportation was a death sentence in itself. A court of inquiry regarding Reno's behavior at Chicago's Palmer House Hotel exonerated Reno's behavior. When Chief Sitting Bull was murdered on December 15, 1890, The New York Times wrote, with apologies to General Philip Sheridan, that Sitting Bull is now "a good Indian." The book concludes with the Wounded Knee massacre on December 29, 1890, and the author speculates what prompted the shooting that led to this infamous incident in American history. Eighteen members of the army were awarded the Medal of Honor for their role in this slaughter. American history is not often pleasant, but this is a book you need to include in your library.



3. Did you know that Custer was at Gettysburgh? I didn't. Did you know he was one of the top calvary generals of the civil war? I didn't either, but I learned these and many other facts about his life leading up to the battle of Little Big Horn. This is a very well told, very read-able tale of Custer's life. This is a very interesting history book, I learned a lot and enjoyed reading it very much.



4. I hate to sound like a hackneyed reviewer, but I've just finished James Donovan's book, and that's the (inadequate) phrase that springs to mind.
   
   The research is stunning and the comparative analysis truly important. The narrative is handled deftly, with great confidence, and more than a little elegance. Donovan is a helluva writer.
   
   This is a topic I knew little about beyond the myths we all grew up with and a handful of books read over the years. But this book draws one in quickly and refuses to let go. The characters come alive, the events unfold with a cinematic sweep, and beneath it all, the deep research reassures that the only agenda at work here is to tell a fascinating story with balance and a strict adherence to the knowable truth.
   
   And the last line is a killer.



5. This ably written popular history of the U. S. Army's 1876 campaign against the Sioux and Cheyanne clearly targets the general reader more than readers familiar with the wars against the Plains Indians. This is shown by the author's provision of considerable background material designed to familiarize the reader with the situation facing the combatants in 1876. This includes summaries of the careers of the main personalities on both sides, the history of the unceasing pressure on the Sioux and other tribes from the 1860's on, the Indian way of life and method of fighting (and the US military's contemptuous lack of understanding of the same), the lack of training and experience among US soldiers, the frequently poor quality of the soldiers themselves, the often bitter dislikes and rivalries among the Army's officers and the high degree of racism and greed that fueled the Plains wars. Much of this can only be sketched because a single volume of 401 pages of text prevents detailed exposition of this general background (interested readers can find more detailed information on these subjects relatively easily). All of this material and more will be familiar to readers knowledgeable about the destruction of the Plains tribes.
   
   The book is a narrative of the facts much more than an analysis of the events, although Donovan does comment on some factors such as Reno's failures both in the valley and on the hill and Custer's repeated splitting of his 660 man force in the face of greatly superior numbers. Donovan does a good job of evaluating the often conflicting factual evidence. In the end, he cannot fully solve the mystery of why Custer did what he did for the simple reason that neither Custer nor any of the key officers who accompanied him on his last foray were around to explain their actions. Donovan does occasionally make some educated guesses on the "whys" that are reasonably insightful and he is good at providing information and letting the reader draw his own conclusions. For example he discusses the success that US foces had enjoyed against Plains tribes although often fighting greatly superior numbers, notes the Army's lack of understanding of how the Indians fought (particularly their reluctance to "stand and fight" to the end with the heavy losses entailed thereby, a tactic that demographics made impossible for the tribes but that the soldiers often mistook for cowardice) and explains the elementary tactics that had so often brought the Army success.
   
   Donovan is particularly good in discussing Reno's conduct during his badly handled attack in the valley and later in the makeshift position on the hill. He carefully weighs the evidence but, aside from showing that Reno was probably drinking heavily throughout the engagements, pretty much lets the reader evaluate the facts for himself. These fights had plenty of survivors, many of whom had strong opinions (mostly hostile to Reno and laudatory of Benteen). Most were willing to share them with fiends and Army cronies but were not willing to speak frankly for official purposes. Some were concerned about their own conduct, some feared making professional enemies and all were concerned about the image of the regiment and the Army generally. The Army brass also wanted to look good. All concerned were only too willing to participate in a whitewash at the Reno Court of Inquiry, although they continued to blister Reno privately for many years after. The Army set up the dead Custer as the scapegoat, calling him rash, overly aggressive, a glory hunter and accusing him of failing to follow orders. Custer certainly made mistakes (plenty) but so did many others, including his superiors. None of the senior campaign leaders (Crook, Gibbon and Terry) performed particularly well in the campaign and much could arguably be laid at their respective doors. In context, Custer's blunders are understandable if, in the end, perhaps not forgiveable.
   
   The book then traces the aftermath in summary form to and including the 7th Cav's Wounded Knee attack on surrendering Indians and the events surrounding it. This part of the book again covers a lot of ground, including Libbie Custer,s efforts to remedy what she saw as the injustices to her dead husband and the subsequent careers of some of the main survivors. Again this is done briefly, probably again for reasons of space.
   
   In short, James Donovan tries to provide the general reader with all he needs to know about the 1876 campaign, its culminating disaster and its aftermath. Overall he does a good job. He has pursued the evidence and evaluated it well with no unfair axes to grind. He is especially good at using the evidence of lower ranking officers, common soldiers and Indian witnesses (including those serving with the US Army). His writing is clear and readable. This is an excellent overview for anyone wanting basic facts and knowledge and it provides an excellent start for those interested enough to want to pursue the issues themselves.