5 comments about Fahrenheit 451: A Novel.

1. Fahrenheit 451. 451 is the temperature at which paper burns. How did we find this out? Learning, and with learning comes books, and according to this story with books comes burning. This story follows one man, one guy actually. Guy Montag is a fireman. However not the definition of fireman of which you think. This is a world where the past is burnt and all is forgotten and minorities are eliminated. Books are for burning and your family is all on a T.V. wall. People die and nobody cares. Nothing matters as long as people are happy. Houses are fireproof and books are the exact opposite. I really liked this book. Bradbury's book shows our own flaws as well as those to come. Montag's fire captain, Beatty, tells him how the firemen got started, "`Give the people contests they win by remembering the words to popular songs [1] or the name of state capitals [2] or how much corn Iowa grew last year [3].'" We have all of the game shows. 1. Don't forget the lyrics. 2. Are you Smarter than a 5th Grader. 3. Jeopardy. This book was written in the 50's. Over 50 years later (almost 60), this is beginning to form. I hope that this does not happen. For if it does, who knows what we will lose next. Will it be our real families? Our front porches? Our books? Our identity? This book is very controversial. It's ironic that every one in this book is anti controversial and don't ask questions and yet this book brings up so many questions. It also makes you question yourself and what you think. With all of this technology being brought into our world, we're not against it but we don't hate it. With all of the new innovations by the time we buy something it's already obsolete. When you buy a computer in a few weeks they all ready have an updated version. Sometime its just nice to stop and smell the roses. Thank you for your time.
   -Marvin



2. Fahrenheit 451 is the story of Guy Montag in a future where most people live their lives in willful ignorance and the job of firemen is to find books and burn them. The story follows Guy, who is a firemen, as his new neighbor gets him to open his eyes to the world around him. The plot is enough to keep any reader chugging along, but the main hook to this book is Ray Bradbury's disturbing vision of the future. You can form your own opinions on if its an accurate vision, but whether you think it is going to happen or it is just a load of crap, it should defineatly get you to think about the world around you. This book certainly deserves the 5 stars I gave it and if you haven't read it then I seriously suggest you get a copy.



3. Good read!
   
   The most amazing part of "Fahrenheit 451" is that it was first written in 1950. Wow! That blows me away, a futuristic book written 58 years ago that in many ways is was right on.
   
   The characters and story are excellent. Some of the writing in the book, I found to be difficult to grasp. Alot of intense dialogue between the main characters, several times, I wasn't quite sure who was talking to who.
   
   Overall, a very good book, I look forward to reading some of Ray Bradbury's other classics!



4. Ray Bradbury's "Fahrenheit 451" is one of his finest works. It was first published in October of 1953, and then serialized in the March - May issues of Playboy magazine. The novel originally began as a short story "Bright Phoenix", though that was not published until 1963, and from there it was lengthened into the novelette "The Fireman" which was published in February of 1951 in "Galaxy Magazine". It is a novel of a dystopian society, and stands along with George Orwell's "1984" and Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World" as the best early examples of that type of work.
   
   Though it is easy to find similarities between "Fahrenheit 451" and the other two books, there are some key differences between them. In the earlier two works, the State appears to be the controlling force. We see this in the education centers in "Brave New World" and every aspect of the society in "1984", but in this work the society seems to have evolved from this through a change in social norms. People are judged by the number of wall sized televisions they have; books and intellectuals are spurned and eventually considered harmful to society. One should be happy, so news of the war is all in the background, and even the attempted suicide, or someone's death are mentioned in only in passing quickly and then the focus is back on happier subjects. People spend more time being entertained by a program called "My Family" then they spend interacting with their actual family, and for some children are a nuisance, so they are either not had, or if one has them they are sent off and only seen for short periods.
   
   One of the most effective parts of this short novel is the way he incorporates the feel of the society into his writing style. One of the key descriptions of the life which the hero, Fireman Guy Montag, is living is noise. He can't think, because of the noise of the televisions his wife has on, and it is apparent that he didn't even notice this until he met Clarisse McClellan, a free-spirited teenager who has moved in next door with her parents and her uncle. His conversations with her are different, they require thought, and there is time for him to think because they happen outside of the noise of life. This noise continues and gets worse when Clarisse disappears from his life, but she has helped bring forward his natural curiosity. The noise continues, and as Guy deals with his wife, her friends, his boss, the mechanical hound, the other firemen, the signs of war, an old professor acquaintance, etc. This noise is felt by the reader two, as Bradbury throws this mix together, though leaves it clear enough that the reader picks up on what is really going on.
   
   This noise is there through the first two sections of the book, and into the third section where at last Guy is pushed over the edge and commits the most desperate of acts, and by doing so he frees his mind. From then on, Guy is able to focus on the situation at hand, his being hunted, his escape, and his desire to save the thoughts and words of the books he has been destroying for so many years. He is able to discuss and think about the war and about Clarisse, his wife Mildred, and his actions; even though those are mostly sad and disturbing thoughts. The reader also feels the noise pressure is lifted, though he is certainly in danger.
   
   This is a tremendous book, though very short as far as novels go. It is not simply a rewrite of "Brave New World" or "1984". Those works were produced first, and those authors are often given more literary merit while Bradbury is too often thought of as a writer of speculative fiction. Those works teach us to be wary of the government becoming too powerful, while this work teaches us to be wary of our own laziness and the anti-intellectual movement of our society through entertainment such as television. This work also teaches us to be tolerant of those who are not like everyone else. This work was selected to receive the Retro Hugo in 2004 for novels written in the year 1953.



5. I am sad to say I had not read this book till age 27. What was wrong with my high school? No Bell Jar, no 451?
   
   *Anyway* fascinating read and crazy to think that books may be obsolete in the future, quite sad, since I'm an avid reader. The premise of the story is about a fireman who knows nothing else but his job and what life is like now, until he meets a young "strange" girl who discusses actual real life with him. After that, Montag starts to wonder things outside the realm of what he always knew and starts to question his job and the purpose of burning books. He ends up rebelling and fighting for the cause.
   
   If you liked 1984, this book is similar is some aspects (to me at least). The sad bleak future that these authors dreamed up with the loss of individualism and the control of telescreens/televisions everywhere with lack of intellect.

5 comments about Terror and Consent : The Wars for the Twenty-First Century.

1. Since the time of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the nation state has been viewed as a "sovereign entity," designed to protect and promote the general welfare of its citizens. Now, according to Philip Bobbitt, in the age of globalization, this sovereign entity is becoming increasingly "porous." As nation states integrate into the global economy, the constitutional foundations dedicated to protecting their rights and liberties are no longer adequate. The new entity that is emerging is what Bobbitt calls the "market state," a term he borrows from a previous work, The Shield of Achilles, in which he traced the evolution of the nation state.
   
   This new market state Bobbitt describes is no longer confined to a sovereign territory, it is a decentralized and privatized network of relationships. It has all the characteristics of a multinational corporation and it treats its citizens much like a consumers. The market state has many upsides in that it presents its citizens with unprecedented freedoms and opportunities.
   
   This book, however, is about the downside of the market state and the opportunities it provides terrorists. Today's terrorist networks are a byproduct of the market state, indeed they are an opportunistic parasite of the market state. They harness its technology and networks to wage war against it.
   
   Bobbitt is not a neoconservative, he is a law professor who sees the need for a new constitutional order that reflects the needs of this new market state. Although he supported the war in Iraq, he now emphasizes the need for stronger international alliances and a "commitment to globalize the systems of human rights and government by consent." In other words, market states must collectively protect human rights and liberties.
   
   On the counterterrorism side, Bobbitt calls for more invasive intelligence gathering, not only domestically but across national borders. Something along the lines of the Total Information Awareness program. He also calls for "preclusive" actions on the part of governments. Containment and deterrence are no longer adequate since terrorists now have access to weapons of mass destruction; they must be neutralized before they act. In short, terrorism must be fought more aggressively without undermining fundamental human rights and within the framework of international alliances.
   
   This is a very well-researched and very well-argued work on how to fight terrorism in the 21st century. Bobbitt concludes that there is something in his proposals to offend everyone. Liberals will not like his call for preclusive actions by the governments and conservatives will not like his call to abide by some international standards. Achieving a so-called state of consent is already difficult in theory, it will be even more so in practice.



2. Phillip Bobbitt has a big idea with many consequences. Terror is not just the result of acts of terrorists; it includes the acts of mercenaries, pirates, resistance movements, and Mother Nature (e.g., earthquakes and floods). States are not just nation-states; Al Qaeda is a State. War is not just war; pursuing narcotics traffickers or Terror is also war.
   
   In Terror and Consent, Bobbitt wishes to fundamentally change the way we think about the problem of security in the new century. His prescriptions would have significant impact: changing the balance of powers among the branches of government, extensive "reform" of laws and regulations including more extensive surveillance, modified distinctions between internal and external security, and fundamental changes in the missions and powers of the armed forces. Hence, Bobbitt's arguments warrant close scrutiny.
   
   His big idea is an "impending change in the constitutional order of states" (p544), a transformation of nation-states into market states. Changes in the constitutional order drive changes in globalization and vice-versa. These developments are driving the emergence of a global terror network, which is undermining nation states. If we are not sufficiently proactive in anticipating threats and preparing responses in advance, the parlimentary democratic order we favor may succumb.
   
   Is the constitutional order changing? The strongest evidence for this proposition would have to be the European Union, yet Bobbitt tells us that the US is the leading state advancing the new order. But there have not been wholesale reforms in the US at the level of its formal constitution. The changes have occurred at the more ephemeral level of government policies and regulations. We indeed see the trends collected together in the hypothesis of emerging market-states: the emphasis on international trade, the outsourcing of government, even military functions, and a contested shift from welfare-state security to individual market-based opportunity - grandly, the increasing penetration of capitalist relations into the public sphere.
   
   We also see, however, a push-back against these trends, notably in the drive for national health insurance and rising protectionist sentiment. The 19th century era of laissez-faire trade and migration demonstrates how trends may be reversed. Laissez faire trade peaked around the 1880s; social and economic dislocations provoked a rising recourse to various protections and migration regulations. Trade continued to increase, but with the boundaries of European imperiums as the leading powers raced to acquire colonies to expand their protected markets for labor, raw materials, and finished goods. This reversal of free trade and renewed imperialism should serve as a caution: It is simply too early to predict the triumph of a constitutional order of market states.
   
   How necessary is Bobbitt's big idea to his policy analysis of the implications of Terror and his prescriptions for the Wars against Terror? Bobbitt's key argument is that because of the changing constitutional order we are facing new challenges. Terrorism is no longer the product of nationalist movements; it is international in scope and highly networked. The old ordering of strategy and law, where law concerns internal matters and strategy addresses external challenges, is insufficient for current circumstances. Strategy and law must be reformed to work in concert. Strategy without law de-legitimizes action and prevents the formation of the coalitions necessary to achieve strategic goals. Law without strategy may block effective actions, increasing the damage from terrorism. This in turn de-legitimizes governments unable to provide security.
   
   The spread of WMD is a threat multiplier. Increasing levels of international commerce and communications exacerbate the threat of WMD, providing channels for proliferation which may allow terrorists to acquire these weapons. This undermines the old anti-proliferation strategies of containment and deterence; international-networked terrorism presents no concentrated center of gravity for containment or retribution. This presents a fundamental challenge to states where government is based on the consent of the governed. Terrorist attacks with WMD are likely to lead towards martial law as publics will be willing to sacrifice liberty for security. In Bobbitt's formulation, this is a victory for Terror, for consent, which implies the ability to chose, is precisely the target of terrorists: they do hate us for our freedoms, the choices offered by markets and democracy. Therefore, waiting for attacks before responding will not provide adequate protection for states of consent. Such states must be prepared to act preclusively or even pre-emptively to head off such attacks before they happen.
   
   Bobbitt also adds natural disasters and threats to human rights to the regime of Terror. This is a matter both of legitimacy, i.e., the demand of the public for effective security; and pragmatics: only the military has sufficient forces, resources, and organization to respond effectively to the largest disasters or conduct humanitarian interventions.
   
   Here is an irony: the de-centering of the nation state requires a centralization of powers: Internally, the executive must have increased powers of surveillance and intervention, including the power to deploy the military in anticipation of attacks or in response to disasters. Internationally, the UN, even NATO, diffuse power too much for effective action. We should form a League of Democracies, which if it constrains US actions nevertheless expands the power to intervene where non-conforming states or terrorist virtual states present threats. This League would be essentially a multiple-participant global hegemon. Despite Babbitt's special pleading, I doubt that this hegemon would arouse much less opposition from those states left outside of the club than a unipolar hegemon. How would threatened states desiring to preserve autonomy react? By driving to acquire WMD and supporting terrorist groups whose actions might draw the attention and sap the power of the hegemon, escalating the threat it is supposed to counter?
   
   Bobbitt's calls for a War against Terror, not a struggle under some less dire cover term. Terror threatens the survival of constitutional order as states of consent; where survival is at stake, war is the appropriate response. What are the consequences of declaring war, indefinite in geographic and temporal extension, against a loosely defined enemy?
   
   In a state of war, the president gains wide powers in the role of commander-in-chief. Indeed, George W. Bush sought a war against Iraq from the beginning of his administration, in part because he sought to expand his power to act outside of the checks of Congress and the courts. This is a problem Bobbitt overlooks. If he takes the administration to task for many errors, he assumes that the executive uses its expanded power only to prosecute the Wars against Terror. Declaring a Long War against Terror and centralizing more power in the executive weakens checks on the executive and harms the constitutional order of states of consent that Bobbitt wishes to preserve. Like the Bush administration, Bobbitt tends to exaggerate the threats and discount the importance of non-military responses.
   
   In arguing the need for changes in the law, Bobbitt misrepresents the powers already available under FISA for surveillance, or for police to detain and inspect vehicles suspected of transporting WMD. In affiliating natural disasters to Terror and calling for intervention by the national armed forces, he overlooks the powers of governors to call up military forces under state control - the National Guard. Following Hurricane Katrina, the Bush adminstration withheld aid to New Orleans, attempting to discredit the Democratic governor and to force her to turn over command of the Lousianna National Guard. Power seeks more power, and power corrupts. If the goal is to preserve states of consent - democracies under the rule of law, responses to terror must be more narrowly tailored to the likely threats than Bobbitt's proposals.
   
   Many of Bobbitt's points are well taken, particularly his insistence on combining law and strategy, our interdependence with other states in pursuing security, the need for a clear and coherent doctrine addressing terrorism, WMD, and humanitarian crises, and the need for a broad consensus on the legitimacy of our actions. His big idea adds a richness to his discussion by seeking grounding in historical contexts. Nonetheless, his big idea both overdetermines the unfolding of events and is not very necessary. Consent is necessary for any open state order, market state or nation state. Bobbitt asserts that legitimacy for markets states is particularly vulnerable to the threats of Terror, but offers little supporting evidence. The necessary responses to terror will be similar in either case. Successful responses may indeed forestall the necessity of changes in the constitutional order of nation states.
   
   There are other problems. Bobbitt collapses vital differences between different players and events, leading to their conflation, elevating terrorism, control over WMD proliferation, and natural catastrophe into Terror. Many believe that it is necessary to maintain the kinds of distinctions which Bobbitt collapses in order to tailor more efficient and effective responses to threats at a more appropriate scale of action. Such responses with their smaller scope will generate more narrow opposition, more easily overcome. Divide and conquer - the principle that enabled Great Britain to form a global empire, leveraging its limited resources to exercise effective control over a far larger population. This is the essential element of the recent successes in Iraq, often attributed to the "surge" - recognizing the differences between various resistance, insurgent, and terrorist groups in Iraq, and using them to multiply our ability to project force. If Bobbitt calls attention to some of the failures of the Bush administration in the occupation of Iraq, he hails the doctrine of preclusive intervention, and integrates the conflation of threats into the core of his big idea. The pre-surge strategy in Iraq led to an escalating cycle of violence; we cannot risk applying Bobbitt's similar idea on a global scale.
   
   The big idea of Terror and Consent and many of the arguments are problematic. Bobbitt nevertheless makes many thought-stimulating proposals and sometimes dead-on analysis of particular problems, particularly in his discussions of legitimacy and international law. Bobbitt's work will provoke much comment and debate, and that is to his credit.



3. Bobbitt follows The Shield of Achilles with Terror and Consent : The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. The Shield of Achilles is a work for the ages; Terror and Consent is a work for our time, seen in the light of the ages.
   
   In the previous book Bobbitt cast new light on the linkage between a State's ways of war and peace and its self-image and history. These evolve together according to a State's needs for survival and the challenges it faces. "The State is born in violence," writes Bobbitt, and the first things it must do are secure a monopoly on internal violence so that it may rule and secure a monopoly on external violence so that it may act strategically towards its ends. He traces the development, from Machiavelli's Italy to the present, of five successive forms of the State and shows that we are in the metamorphosis of a sixth form, the Market State.
   
   In Terror and Consent, he shows that terrorism is also adapting. In each age, the "anti-state" has matched the State's ways and means, but chosen opposite ends. Now, in our heavily networked world, the same world that Thomas Barnett looks to for our salvation (The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century) the terrorists have found their place in the network. Bobbitt takes A. Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation enterprise as an example: Khan provided knowledge and expertise, found subcontractors for materials and equipment, and managed the entire affair for clients just the same way an outsourcing firm might build and manage a data center for a client. Bin Laden built al Qaeda with similiar capabilities, but with a military dimension: the parts have redundancies; they are less dependent on a single point that can be isolated, arrested, or blown up. And, in the age of the Market State, an entity such as Al Qaeda may reside entirely within the geography of other states, making it immune to the traditional tools of statecraft and warfare.
   
   Dealing with these networks has proven difficult for our existing institutions and systems, and as the terrorists get smarter it the difficulties increase. This is a crisis with profound moral, legal, and strategic dimensions, and the dimensions interlock. Worse, we are hamstrung for want of a definition of terrorism that allows us to consider the three together. Bobbitt proposes a definition, then examines the nature and recent history of the problem and its likely solutions. He admits that there is something here to offend everybody, but reminds us that neither the enemy nor the government is the sole threat--real or potential--to our freedoms.
   
   The title, Terror and Consent, refers to the conflict between States based on terror (internal and external) and States based on the consent of the governed and good faith relationship with other states. Bobbitt shows us that to survive in a world filled with geographic and virtual States of terror we must know how we and our enemies understand means and ends. We must change the relationship between Law and Strategy because our enemies attack each one through the other. We must change not just our processes but our entire understanding of the world.
   
   Nor does Bobbitt offer easy solutions. His last full chapter, Triage of Terror, identifies three principle foreign policy goals and shows that they will provide us with a delicate balancing act, since every action we take towards one will probably compromise the other two to a greater or lesser extent. They will also leave us open to charges of inconsistancy in foreign policy and in the Wars against Terror, requiring government and the press to explain seriously what the choices are and what the priorities must be.
   
   The good news is that the USA is uniquely suited to lead the change, and will make things immeasurably better if we do so. Uniquely suited, because we have driven the change to the Market State. Immeasurably better, because if we lead change in the rules instead of ignoring them we will free ourselves of much criticism and distrust. Modern limited sovereignty began with these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident" and we of the USA still understand it better than anyone else. Now we must understand how we have changed the world, and how we must change the implemention of our principles to match.
   
   This is a deep and comprehensive analysis, not to be read in one evening or even two. Bobbitt achieves what von Clausewitz called critical analysis: he untangles the issues so that each part of the situation can be regarded on its own, and their interactions properly assessed. This is no small achievement; a clear analysis invites critics to advance it, refute it, or find other policies to recommend to answer the need.
   
   In reading other reviews, I feel as if I did not read the same book. People react reflexively and Bobbitt admits that he brings something to upset everyone. Before you respond to your deepest fears, ask whether Bobbitt is calling into question your principles or the legal and strategic ways that we have protected those principles in the world of the past. Bobbitt also admits his party affiliation, which explains what I think unfair blame (in light of his last chapter) of people trying to make the best of a situation that, until now, no one has understood. But this is a dust mote on a great work.
   
   Terror and Consent deserves careful reading by everyone serious about the threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, government-caused humanitarian crises (think Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and New Orleans) and the ability of functioning government to survive natural and artifical disaster. The problems won't go away by themselves; they will get worse as our enemies learn and adapt.
   
   You may be sure our enemies will read Terror and Consent.



4. Philip Bobbitt's Terror and Consent is a big book, enormous in concept, ambition, and sweep, full of portent for transnational politics in the twenty-first century. Portentousness in a book can be a good thing, provided it delivers as promised. This brilliant, polymathic book delivers more intellectual punch on the fraught relationship between state and society, terrorism and terrorists, than any book I know. Let me simply adopt Niall Ferguson's judgment, on the front page of the New York Times Book Review, calling Terror and Consent the "most profound book on the subject of American foreign policy since the attacks of 9/11 - indeed, since the end of the cold war."
   
   Not everyone feels this way; one indicator of the book's intrinsic interest is the volatility of the reviews. The Economist was distinctly cool; Bobbitt's grand ambition, it said, "is confusing, hard to digest, and perhaps wrong." But a problem with much current analysis of terrorism, terrorists, and US responses is that it thinks small. No lack of windy tomes, true, but while much genuinely serious stuff is admirably analytic, breaking matters down into bits and pieces, it seemingly dares not synthesize the bits back into a whole again. Today's most serious efforts tend to avoid anything resembling grand strategy for winning a long-term struggle against terrorists and terrorist organizations, and the states that sponsor and shield them.
   
   Favored instead is the narrowing method of cost benefit analysis and (adopting one version of it) a tendency to favor defensive, protective, immediate measures that are most obviously cost effective. Talk of "victory" or "winning," meanwhile, might be thought to propose talk of "war" - but these days few dare call it war, at least if one wants to remain respectable among Western policy, academic, and political elites. Governments shrink back, in fear of precisely the Muslim backlash their timidity invites, and increasingly cannot even bring themselves to identify the terrorists as Islamist, let alone Islamic. Terror and Consent, for its part, is heterodox on a long list of things. Bobbitt thinks the struggle against terrorism is plainly a war, to be called a war, fought as a war, against religiously-driven Islamist ideologues who seek to establish, he says, their vision of the caliphate and which he flatly calls "states of terror" that must be defeated. Nonetheless, changing conditions of twenty-first century war, because of changing conditions of the twenty-first century state, mean that war is not as it has long been.
   
   Regnant approaches to terrorism are driven not just by narrow cost benefit analysis, but by a still narrower focus on something we might call "event-specific catastrophism": preventing the next attack. This is as true of the Bush administration as of its leading opponents. What has the Bush administration focused upon, in speech after speech to the public? The imminence of the next attack, and the need to prevent it. One hopes this is mobilizing rhetoric for larger policies against jihadist terrorism, but in considerable part, the uncertain next attack is the focus of policy - a long-term strategy, if one can call it that, even after seven years, of just trying to make it to the next day unscathed.
   
   This is understandable, considering what administration officials see every day in threat assessments. The US attorney general since late 2007, Michael Mukasey, mused publicly how constant and serious the threats against the United States are; despite no successful homeland attacks since 9-11, he is "surprised by how surprised I am." Self-serving administration rhetoric? Perhaps. But despite much discursive rhetoric about long-term policy and the war on terror, much US policy is what, in a strategically informed plan, might well be considered the last defensive perimeters. Airport security, daily monitoring of cell phone traffic, internet analysis in hopes of seeing spikes that might indicate imminent terrorist action, watch lists, and many, many cement barriers. Presumably no one in Britain is reassured by the fact that the Glasgow attack was prevented not by perceptive police work, nimble intelligence agents, deep penetration of homegrown terrorist cells - but simply by a physical barrier at the airport. But perhaps people are comforted; the cement barrier worked, after all, effectively and cost-effectively, while the rest of the counterterrorism apparatus, at enormous absolute and relative cost, did not. Still, these are fundamentally defensive measures aimed at preventing the next attack, counterterrorism in a vital but stiflingly narrow sense. The cost benefit analysis underlying such planning, shaped toward event-specific catastrophism, is necessary and fruitful, but bears little resemblance to planning or conducting a "war" on terrorism or, really, any strategic conceptual response to jihad that goes beyond preventing particular events of uncertain probability and magnitude.
   
   Terror and Consent, by contrast, offers strategic thinking on an unapologetically grand scale. There is nothing minimalist about it. It is synthetic across three large fields: history, law, and strategic international politics. In an age where academic specialization is supreme, Bobbitt's ability to move across fields is bound to annoy narrow disciplinarians - it will seem to some to be a very old-style grand explanation of the kind that academics gave up a couple of generations ago, and they will find particulars to quarrel over. Bobbitt is able not only to range across academic fields, but also to combine academic and real world experience - a Democrat by affiliation, he has served in senior positions in both law and intelligence in the Clinton and Bush senior administrations. Bobbitt understands political theory and he understands the practicalities of governing. Terror and Consent's core insight is that transnational jihadist terrorism must be understood on the largest historical scale, and that requires understanding the shifting nature of the state and society in both the liberal democratic West and the rest of the world. Sometimes nothing but the large historical scale will do. Why?
   
   Jihadist transnational terrorism gets going by being able to exploit the interstices of the state system, not just on a geographical basis - the failed state of Afghanistan, for example - but on a historical basis, as the nature of the state moves from its incarnation in the twentieth century to something quite different in the twenty-first. Readers, in other words, should not be confused wondering why the book seems peculiarly focused on the historical and political theory of the evolving state, rather than narrowly on terrorism today. Bobbitt's deep point is that Al Qaeda terrorism, and what might eventually replace and transform it, cannot be understood without reference to the state system and its evolution over a long period of time. This leads Terror and Consent into a long walk through the history of the state in the West. Once again, narrow specialists will register many particular objections, and if one rejects in principle the notion of grand synthetic history, then one's reaction will be positively allergic. Bobbitt tells us, as a deliberate caricature, a kind of rough historical sketch (and picking up the thread of his earlier masterwork, Shield of Achilles), that the "princely state" system of Europe eventually gave way to the nation-state system that gradually emerged in the nineteenth and then dominated the twentieth century. Wars of the twentieth century were wars of Westphalian nation-states, and enemies in the wars of the twentieth century nation-states were themselves, by and large, nation-states; even the wars of de-colonialization were fought largely by parties that aspired to the status of nation-states.
   
   Since the end of the Cold War, at least, however, liberal democratic nation-states - what Bobbitt calls "states of consent" - have been moving toward something different from the nation-state, something Bobbitt calls the "market-state." In the market-state, consent becomes less that of the citoyen and much more that of the consumer, for whom the state is a supplier of services. The market-state itself bears some resemblance to a corporation, outsourcing and privatizing significant activities, and is both more relaxed about its territorial sovereignty while at the same time willing to extend its regulatory reach beyond its borders. Globalization's increased wealth is one driver of the market-state, but so is the secular (in both senses of the term) drive of individuals toward greater individual liberty. "States of consent" contrast with "states of terror," the end aim of the transnational, nongovernmental and, today, Islamist terrorist groups that are also able to grow in the eco-system of economic globalization and the relaxed conditions of, and among, market-states. States of terror are the evil twin of the states of consent - parasitical upon and enabled by the states of consent, at once pre-modern and post-modern but never really modern, and irremediably hostile toward states of consent.
   
   Bobbitt's market-states crucially retain key markers of states. This is not the dissolution of the state, the disaggregation of the state, eagerly awaited by watchful academics of international law, scanning the horizons for the breakdown of state sovereignty and the rise of some form of global governance and so to fulfill, after many heartbreaking centuries, the academicians' utopian, universal, planetary dreams. On the contrary, it is precisely because market-states continue, for Bobbitt, meaningfully to be states that they are able to have national interests, marshal resources against the states of terror, and provide for security for their citizens. And vice-versa. Indeed, in considerable part because Bobbitt insists on market-states as states, he likewise insists that the response to terrorism is a war on terror. Criminals, yes, but also enemies: states make war upon their enemies. War enables forms of strategic thinking about jihadist terror organizations that neither cost benefit analysis nor the legal conception of terrorists purely as criminals allows as a conceptual frame. The double-sided vision of Bobbitt's market-state leads Terror and Consent to a remarkably rich strategic vision of how concretely to make war against terror, terrorists, and violent jihad - a vision that will make everyone, however, on every side of the strategic debate, unhappy in some measure.
   
   Law, including international law - the Geneva Conventions, for example - is crucial. The Bush administration's forays into nearly Schmittian arguments of permanent emergency displacing the rule of law have been as disastrous as they are wrong. On the other hand, while deeply respectful of international law, Bobbitt does not think it - its meaning, interpretation and evolution - lies in the hands of international law professors and international bureaucrats. Bobbitt is a committed multilateralist, not a purveyor of utopian supranationalism. His is a nuanced and practical international law regime gradually shaped by the practices of states as conditions shift - very much, in fact, the pragmatic view that the US State Department has held of international law over many generations. As to domestic law and terrorism, Terror and Consent is, for example, decisively against Alan Dershowitz's `special circumstance' arguments for torture and many other alterations to existing presumptions of the rule of law. Yet the constitution is no `suicide pact' for Bobbitt - he endorses preemptive detention for terrorist suspects, significant increases in electronic and other surveillance, and coercive techniques short of torture in some circumstances, among other things.
   
   Terror and Consent sharply criticizes the Bush administration for the incompetence of its post-invasion Iraq policy. It observes that many mistakes arose from the profoundly erroneous belief that this was a war of nation-states in which the fall of the regime completed things whereas, in the wars of market-states and terrorist and insurgent groups, the war was just getting underway. Yet Bobbitt not only supported the Iraq war, he firmly believes (unlike many others following Iraq) in preventative war - he thinks we will need more of it over the long run, not less, because of the nature of terrorist threats. His strategic vision embraces carrying war to an enemy defined as such.
   
   Each bit of this will discomfit someone. But the success of Terror and Consent as an argument depends largely on whether `market' and `state' can be corralled together as Bobbitt proposes or whether, instead, the categories eventually fly apart. In my estimation, the argument is highly persuasive; its success as policy in the real world, however, depends upon something different: whether the market-state partakes of more than simply the ethic of the market. The logic of the market, after all, is to write off the past as past, treat sunk costs as sunk, cut losses and get out as soon as cost benefit analysis says things are looking dim, look not sentimentally back to the past except as a source of future dividends, coolly calculate anticipated future flows of value, mark to market, and each and every day ask, "But what have you done for me lately?"
   
   Is that really enough? If those are indeed the values that the market carries into the market state, is the market-state sufficiently nurtured by other values to have the will to defend itself as a political community? As consumers and not - in the older sense of the word, at least - citizens? Defend itself as a political community against not only external terrorist enemies, against states of terror, but also to have the courage to defend core internal values, not just of the market, but of liberal democracy - as against those, for example, who would see liberal democracy converted, in the name of multiculturalism, to a form of religious tribalism and religious communalism?
   
   George W. Bush and Tony Blair have found it weirdly easier, after all, to send whole armies to fight in faraway places than ever to say no to demands of communalist, ultimately illiberal, Muslim groups at home; easier to fight wars abroad than to insist at home upon the liberal separation of church and state, mosque and state; insist upon a public sphere that is neutral as between varieties of religion but which insists on the independent values of a liberal society; insist that this means limits, firmly drawn and enforced, to today's tightening ratchet of one-way religious accommodations; and, finally, insist that these limits are integrally part of liberal toleration, a regime of liberal toleration that is a species utterly apart from fashionable and, for liberal values, fatal multiculturalism. Communalism is not liberalism; the religious communalism of the Ottoman Empire was, in its way and time, a relatively humane order, but it was not and never could be liberal. It is, however, the path of least resistance that Britain appears to be taking.
   
   A believer in liberty and consent, I should greatly like to share Bobbitt's hopes for the market-state. It does not take a conservative to wonder, however, whether this is enough to sustain liberal democracy in the face of spiritual threats requiring a vision and courage to stick with it, rather than the cold, reactive calculus of net present value. A long tradition of what Lawrence Solum has called the "left Burkeans" - Christopher Lasch, for example, or Zygmunt Bauman - has argued that the market is as much socially corrosive of the values of liberal democracy as it is materially supportive. The market and liberal democracy are both sustained by wells of social capital that stable material prosperity helps deepen, but which are not the moral logic of the market itself.
   
   The market of the market-state is not self-sustaining. On the contrary, it requires a form of social life that goes outside it in order to function in the long term. Honor, loyalty, sacrifice, courage, gratitude to those who came before - these are not the evident virtues of capitalism, but they are necessary virtues in a liberal-democratic-capitalist form of life. Without them, society eats its seed-corn, devours and uses up today the social capital bequeathed by the past to bless the future. Even after the marvelous argumentation of this marvelous book, therefore, room remains to question whether the market-state pays sufficient attention to the spiritual habits of the heart that make the market-state - and the willing defense of the market-state, states of consent as against states of terror - over the long struggle of years in this twenty-first century, even possible.



5. This is not a review of the Terror and Consent per se, although the title is somewhat ironic, given the problems I encountered ordering the book. This is a complaint about the Amazon web site. I am not a master of the Amazon web site, just an easily confused user. Both my wife and I order items routinely from Amazon. On my last order for Terror and Consent I clicked the purchase item button and was unable to confirm that I had ordered it. I think my wife may be set up for one-click shopping. Thinking I had not ordered it, I ordered it mistakenly again. When I realized my mistake, the item had already been shipped. I immediately submitted a request to return the second copy, and I was charged for return shipping. The return procedure did not allow for this kind of error. I believe this to be unfair.
   
   As far as the text goes, I haven't finished it yet. I find Dr. Bobbitt rather wordy and repetitive. He does not clearly (to me) define what a market state is. He doesn't (as far as I've read) distinguish a MAJOR difference between the market and nation state: the ability of the nation state to tax. The ramifications of of this oversight could possibly knock down many of the thesis proposed. As I continue to read I will be looking for a clearer definition of market state and the above distinction between the market and nation state.

5 comments about Phantom in the Night (B.A.D.: Bureau of American Defense, Book 6).

1. This was my first Sherrilyn Kenyon book or Diana Love book. I know where have I been! Together they have created a fun, fast read. Not your typical romantic suspense with it's over the top James Bond action, but what an incredible read.
   
   The humor. Charming and subtle.
   
   The pacing. Fast-moving and exciting.
   
   The characters. Vividly realistic. Nathan Drake is a hero with a dark side. He moves from a prison cell to the streets of New Orleans to avenge his brother's death. Terri Mitchell is a kick butt heroine with issues of her own. Not the least of which is saving Nathan from himself.
   Their romance sizzles.
   
   The plot's a page turner with twists and turns you'll never predict as Nathan and Terri work to stop a world threat that could take the lives of thousands of innocent people.
   
   Phantom is intriguing and emotional. I can't wait for the next B.A.D. adventure.



2. I really liked this book. The story was great and the romance was very good. The only negative I have to say is - if Terri Mitchell was such a good cop, why in the world did she keep messing up so much? And, she spent so much time trying to prove how good she was as a cop, I actually got sick of hearing her tell everyone "I can handle it" and "I am good at my job". If you can over look her stupidity, then you can like her. Nathan Drake was very hot. Over all this was a very good story and the chemistry between them was hot.



3. Another good read by Ms Kenyon. I didn't enjoy it as much as the other BAD books, but really enjoyed it. Definitely worth a look! =]



4. This book, like all of her books was excellent. Could not put down and read it in one day.



5. This was one of the most boring books I have ever read. This was a complete sellout by SK towards her fans. Diana Snell wrote this mess. There was NO SK excitement, anticipation, sexiness, fun. None! The Female what's-her-name was a reminder of that horrible Cat from Devil May Cry and the male Drake character was hot. Again, a great male character with a too-dumb-to-live female character who mistakes being a smart-mouth with strength and courage. The bad guys live on. Big deal. What a Dud book. SK's anthologies have been horrible lately, She made up for it with the Kinley MacGregor book, but totally destroyed it again with the Devil May Cry mess. She has better not mess up Acheron's book in August or I am done with her money hungry butt. How dare she sell out her fans with this garbage.

5 comments about Firefight: Inside the Battle to Save the Pentagon on 9/11.

1. "Shoes. Bits of clothing. Wallet-size photographs. A suitcase. They were routine objects, unremarkable in ordinary life, yet it was hard to look at them. He felt a confusing mixture of sadness and anger that had been simmering inside, rapidly coming to a boil. As he sat on the bucket, engrossed by the sight of the everyday belongings on the ground in front of him, Titus realized that his feet were still dry. He was grateful for the small comfort." Patrick Creed and Rick Newman describe a FEMA worker's observations of the FBI evidence recovery operations on September 12, 2001.
   
   Patrick Creed's firefighting background and Rick Newman's writing talent combine to provide an incredibly detailed look at the efforts of the men and women who fought to save the Pentagon after Flight 77 crashed into the building.
   
   The story begins from the perspective of the Arlington County Fire Department, the "first responders" for the Pentagon. Fire Chief Ed Plaugher, the initial incident commander, quickly finds himself coordinating efforts in four different sections of the Pentagon, the largest low-rise office building in the world. To add to the confusion, the FBI arrived to investigate the crime scene; FEMA arrives to aid in the recovery efforts; and the incredible outpouring of individuals and organizations who simply want to help. By 6 pm on September 11, almost nine hours after the attack, the command structure is announced and the first signs of synergy among the various agencies finally emerge.
   
   The tales contained in this book range from the heart-wrenching to the downright humorous. Even with such a tragic event unfolding, it's hard not to laugh when you read of Nero the rescue dog who almost snaps at a wasp flying around Vice President Cheney's hand.
   
   The book's 463 pages go very quickly, as the book is very well written, although readers with a weak stomach should be prepared for some gruesome descriptions in the book. This book is an outstanding tribute to the men and women in blue who led the rescue and recovery efforts for the Pentagon.



2. When you think of the horrendous events of September 11 2001, you can't help thinking of the towers of the World Trade Center, burning and then collapsing and killing thousands. The visual record of the events is enormous. The same goons that brought down the towers, though, were also responsible for the crash of American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon. That act of terrorism is understandably overshadowed by what happened in New York, and more attention seems to have been paid also to United Airlines Flight 93 which was brought down in Pennsylvania, kept from hitting its target by brave and resistant passengers. Still, the Pentagon crash killed 59 passengers and crew and 125 people in the building. Evacuating the survivors and fighting the fire were huge tasks that were carried out with remarkable success. Over a hundred victims were transferred to hospitals, for instance, and only one of them died. Many of the rescuers were in serious danger, but none of them died. The success story is told in full in _Firefight: Inside the Battle to Save the Pentagon on 9/11_ (Ballantine Books) by Patrick Creed, a firefighter, and Rick Newman, a journalist. This account is big, but through the almost 500 pages, there is enough heroism, conflict, skill, and necessarily grim humor to make it a fascinating look at rescuers at a "career fire", the greatest challenge of their professional lives.
   
   The account starts with three firefighters on station, those who had the dull assignment of being at the Pentagon's helipad where nothing ever happened, and suddenly, "The plane was flying straight at them from the west, rapidly filling the sky like some kind of surreal 3-D video game." The plane, almost 100 tons including 11,000 gallons of jet fuel, slammed into the side of the Pentagon at 530 miles per hour and expended all its kinetic energy within eight tenths of a second. The fire at the Pentagon was more complicated than a comparable fire at, say, a warehouse or apartment building would have been. It was a work location, with thousands of employees within, and there was no way just to shut down the work for the day and evacuate. Another problem peculiar to the Pentagon was that there were so many secret documents and gadgets within. Some papers were just floating away in the winds. Others remained in safes that had melted closed so documents could not be retrieved, or they were sealed in safes that require two people to open, when one of the two might be dead or missing. A particularly difficult problem was that fire got under the thick slab of concrete covering the roof, with these flames proving the most intractable because they were inaccessible. It took three days to make sure all these were out, by the exhausting cutting of trenches in the roof as fire breaks. The roof housed the satellite linkages for everything the Pentagon does. If that electronic equipment had been touched by the fire, the Pentagon would have been cut off completely. It is a long, tense fight to get the roof fires under control. The problem of high-ranking brass was compounded by the White House, which wanted to show scenes of firefighters marching directly into the most dangerous areas of the disaster for debris removal rather than working from the most stable outer areas inward as safety dictated. This dangerous micromanagement was stopped only after a debate with White House officials.
   
   There were plenty of other bureaucratic conflicts during the huge operation. Firefighters in the middle of keeping the blaze under control, were amazed to see an FBI agent run up to them and yell, "This is a crime scene! Don't touch anything!" Eventually boundaries were drawn, and the cooperation became admirable, between firefighters who were used to breaking in and doing fast rescue work, FBI agents who wanted pristine evidence, and even eventually contractors who worked on the demolition of the mess and the reconstruction of the building. _Firefight_ reads well as an account of many motivated professionals with diverse individual goals working toward one big one. It also has plenty of grim descriptions of the dangerous work those inside the building had to do. One section deals with a firefighter inside, carrying his hose, who "... had trouble keeping his footing, tripping over debris every time he tried to turn. There wasn't a flat surface anywhere, and he felt like he was fighting a fire in a junk heap." There are many descriptions of finding bodies, or even more often, body parts: "There were only parts of skeletons, with no evidence of arms or legs. The bones almost looked as if they had been stacked in a pile - like cordwood, it seemed..." There is also some comic relief, as when a military officer, requested to find some Gatorade for the firefighters, borrowed a sledgehammer and went to a vending machine, yelling "This is a national emergency!" smashing the machine and liberating all the drinks. There are many memorable scenes in this fine book which adds an important dimension, often an inspiring one, to the history of that terrible day.



3. Firefight is primarily about the heroic efforts of the firefighters at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. What is of interest to us is the attack on the Pentagon described by the authors, Patrick Creed and Rick Newman. They write:
   
   - "The plane crossed Washington Boulevard, . . . traveling more than 500 miles per hour and was less than 30 feet off the ground."
   
   - "the planes wings knocked over several light poles that line the road."
   
   - "As the Flight 77 flew nearly to ground level, its right wing sliced into a 750 kilowatt generator . . . The plane's right engine ripped a hole in a fence near the generator . . . the left engine grazed the grass . . . Both wings began to break apart, hurling metal fragments into the air."
   
   - "The nose of the plane hit the facade, . . . about 14 feet above the ground, going 530 miles per hour."
   
   - "The airplane's tail, 45 feet tall, was still attached to the plane as it plowed into the Pentagon."
   
   - "Along the outer wall, 21-inch-wide concrete columns, . . . stood every ten feet, . . . The impact of the plane knocked out eight of them completely, and severely damaged two others."
   
   - "The body of the hijacker who had been flying the plane ended up in the D Ring about 107 feet from the point of impact."
   
   - "The punch-out hole . . . was created by explosive energy".
   
   In my article "What really happened at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001," published by The Wisdom Fund (twf.org), I debunk the theory that Flight 77, a Boeing 757, struck the Pentagon.
   
   At the Dept. of Defense (DoD) News Briefing on September 12, 2001, the words "American Airlines," "Flight 77," "Boeing," "Dulles," and "passengers" were not mentioned.
   
   Standing in front of the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, Jamie McIntyre, CNN's senior Pentagon correspondent since November 1992, reported: "From my close up inspection there's no evidence of a plane having crashed anywhere near the Pentagon. . . . . The only pieces left that you can see are small enough that you could pick up in your hand. There are no large tail sections, wing sections, fuselage - nothing like that anywhere around which would indicate that the entire plane crashed into the side of the Pentagon. . . . It wasn't till about 45 minutes later . . . that all of the floors collapsed."
   
   Arlington County Fire Chief Ed Plaugher, incident commander at the Pentagon on September 11, corroborates Jamie McIntyre's report. At the September 12, 2001, DoD briefing, when asked: "Is there anything left of the aircraft at all?" said: "there are some small pieces of aircraft ... there's no fuselage sections and that sort of thing."
   
   Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs - "presenter" of the DoD briefing, did not contradict Chief Plaugher.
   
   Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski, who from her fifth-floor, B-ring office at the Pentagon, witnessed "an unforgettable fireball, 20 to 30 feet in diameter," was called for stretcher duty. She describes "a strange absence of airliner debris, there was no sign of the kind of damage to the Pentagon structure one would expect from the impact of a large airliner. This visible evidence or lack thereof may also have been apparent to the secretary of defense, who in an unfortunate slip of the tongue referred to the aircraft that slammed into the Pentagon as a 'missile'. "
   
   Barbara Honegger, military affairs journalist at the Naval Postgraduate School, writes that NORAD's: "Gen. Larry Arnold, revealed that he ordered one of his jets to fly down low over the Pentagon shortly after the attack that morning, and that his pilot reported back that there was no evidence that a plane had hit the building."
   
   Similar skepticism among the firefighters is noted by Creed and Newman.
   
   They write in Firefight, "Denis Griffin . . . had been working in the aftermath of the attack all day, and seen wreckage that looked like it could be from an airplane, but there were so many wild stories going around that he wasn't sure what to believe."
   
   Two statements in the book by Creed and Newman are striking:
   
   - "FBI photographer Jennifer Combs (formerly Jennifer Farmer) went far out of her way to pull hundreds of photographs from archives and narrate all of them".
   
   How did they get access to these photographs, when others have Freedom of Information Act requests pending for these photographs and Pentagon videos?
   
   - "Plaugher came by . . . "We think it's al Qaeda," he said, citing a villain many of them had never heard of."
   
   What would cause Plaugher, Fire Chief of Arlington County, to make such a statement so soon after 9/11? Plaugher was the incident commander at the Pentagon on 9/11. He now serves as "a key member of the IAFC Terrorism Committee."
   
   It should be noted, that to this day, the only passenger lists made public have no Arab names on them, Bin Laden is not wanted for 9/11 at the FBI's Most Wanted, and the only evidence offered by the government to substantiate their claim of a Flight 77 having struck the Pentagon is a fuzzy video that proves nothing -- indeed the flight recorder data released by the government shows that a plane flew about 400 feet above the Pentagon.



4. The authors do an excellent job of describing the events at the Pentagon following 9/11. I write for a blog on 9/11 conspiracy theories, and this book is a refreshing change from that nuttery, but that is not what this book is about. This book is about the heroism and professionalism of the military and the first responders. Every page will keep you interested, and inspire you with the strength of how these ordinary Americans got through this extraordinary and horrendous event.



5. The authors do a good job of capturing the turmoil, stress and confusion of firefighters coping with a true disaster. During the events of the day, many of us overlooked the firefight at the pentagon when faced with the realities of the towers and the plane in Pennsylvania. This book has a good feel for the magnitude of that day at the Pentagon.

5 comments about The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason.

1. This book is a must read. I encourage everybody who apologizes for every religion (especially Islam) to read Sam Harris. I found Chapter 3 to be most entertaining; it's called, "The problem with Islam." Harris provides a long list of quotes from the "religion of peace."
   
   I encourage everybody to buy this book, read it, and then pass it to a friend or family member. If you've got any questions, please email me at the below email address. Thanks!
   
   Zach Watkins
   zachw2007@gmail.com



2. My sister (an atheist) gave me (a practicing Catholic) this book and asked me to read it. She said someone at a bookstore thrust it upon her, practically begging her to read it and write a review of it. "No one reads this book," he said, "but everyone should!" My sister doesn't have time to write reviews so she gave it to me. (That's her story and she's sticking to it.)
   
   I have to admit, it's a lot better read than "The God Delusion," which I just finished struggling through. Harris is not as angry as Dawkins, and he has a solid background in philosophy, which is conspicuously absent in Dawkins' works. (In their own ways, they're both very good writers, actually, but Dawkins' anger really turned me off.) Harris is erudite, often open-minded, humorous and has a gift for language. He also addresses many of the counterarguments to atheism.
   
   That said, this book has glaring lapses in rationality. Harris is a good thinker on relatively small-scale matters but comes to bizarre conclusions on the big stuff. He's very good transmitting what he's learned about philosophy and neurobiology, but in regards to human history, either his knowledge is spotty, or he wears blinders when he reads. He asserts religion is an almost-altogether evil influence and must be abolished if the human race is to survive. He provides lots of evidence of the evils of religion: the Spanish Inquisition, of course, and the Holocaust (which, though Hitler called Christianity a religion of weaklings was, according to Harris, Christianity's fault because it encouraged Antisemitism). He spends a lot of time on Islamic terrorism. But for every example he raises, another one clearly could be found of religion's good effects: the brokering of peace (the Pope, Jimmy Carter, etc.); the protection of the defenseless (the Jesuits in the New World, etc.); the grass-roots works done by religion in inner-city schools, soup kitchens, hospitals, clinics, leper colonies....
   
   Harris argues that the few good things religious people do is not due to religion's effect on them: that they would still do good if religion didn't exist. So religion gets full credit for its failures and no credit for its successes? Not exactly rational or fair.
   
   The religionist's reply to the Spanish Inquisition example has always been that, in the 20th century, far more innocent people were murdered by atheists (Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Mussolini) than by religionists. I give credit to Harris for naming this objection, but his reply is inadequate, to my mind. He says that Stalin and Mao created movements that were religion-like. In other words, these atheist movements were capable of evil because they were really religious movements. But isn't that argument fallacious? Couldn't he, using this method, label anything that weakened his argument "religion"?
   
   And what about other examples of atheist violence? Marat, who perpetrated the September Massacre during the French Revolution? the Hebertists during the same? These men clearly had little creed other than, perhaps, anarchy. And what about the Bolshevik terrorists? Wasn't the word "terrorism" first used during the French Revolution and then coined during the Russian?
   
   Do we now have to relabel the international worker's movement a "religion"? Maybe we should just condemn all gatherings of people (other than at universities, of course).
   
   I remain entirely unconvinced that the world would be a better place without religion. Being religious is an aspect of being human. It's a tool for good or evil, depending on how we exercise our (God-given) free will. You could just as easily argue that art should be abolished because of what the Manson family got out of the song "Helter Skelter"; or the human family because of child and spousal abuse; or even science, because of global warming, Bhopal and Chernobyl, the ozone layer, antibiotic-resistent germs, the dangers of cloning,...
   
   Harris also seems to have some quite odd ideas on other matters. On page 52 - 53, he seems to say that it is okay to kill someone for having dangerous ideas. Could it be that I misread that? But what about pages 192 - 199, where he argues for the morality of torture? or pages 199 - 203, where he writes that pacifism, on the other hand, is immoral? and the long section (pp. 158 - 164) in which he shows complete disdain for opponents to the legalization of drugs - surely a debatable issue? - and blames drugs'illegality on, irrationally but not surprisingly, religion's influence on our society.
   
   At the end of the book, Harris offers his substitution for religion and his cure for the evils of the world: mindfulness meditation. He praises Eastern religions for having invented it and suggests that, if we adopt it, we'll find happiness and become more empathetic and, therefore, more moral. (He seems to see no problem, by the way, in reaching these states by using hallucnogens. Ever study the Mayan and Aztecan civilizations, Harris? They took a lot of hallucinogens, too, and were really into human sacrifice. A connection there? Possibly?)
   
   I myself meditate in the yogic sense as well as pray in the old-fashioned, Christian sense. But if meditation works so well, and the East has had access to it for thousands of years, why isn't the East a happier place? How did Mao, Pol Pot, the Japanese Empire, etc., rise to power? And there are many reports that life in some monasteries and ashrams is often no more admirable than in some of their western counterparts.
   
   I have a lot more to say but, alas, no room. I would recommend this book to others, as long as they're capable of questioning what they read.
   
   Okay, Sis, I've written my review. And I've got a few books to send your friend in reply: William James' "The Will to Believe" and "The Varieties of Religious Experience": Stephen Jay Gould's "Rock of Ages"; Dostoyevsky's "The Brothers Karamasov"; and a historical movie: Anchor Bay's "Amazing Grace." I wonder if your friend will read (and watch) them?



3. I don't normally write book reviews, even for books I enjoy. However, after having read "The End of Faith", as well as many of the reviews of it, I just HAD to recommend it. Apart from being an excellent writer, Mr. Harris' logic is so sharp and compelling, so utterly brilliant that I read most of it in absolute awe.
   None of the more negative reviews that have questioned his arguments have been in the least bit convincing, in fact, most seem to miss the point entirely. One reviewer mentioned all the good that is done by religious organizations and all the evil committed by atheists as though Mr. Harris doesn't even address these issues (which he does).
   The End of Faith is not just an argument against religion. It is an argument against FAITH. Blind, unverifiable, faith, in anything. This is why he mentions The Holocaust and other atrocities committed by "atheists". These people may not have believed in religion, but they're evil acts were committed as a result of unverifiable, illogical beliefs, that have a firm background in religious premises none-the-less. Furthermore, while many religious organizations do help others, public service and helping others would still occur even without faith, and for better reasons.
   In the end, this book makes so much sense that it's scary. This is probably why so many people of faith have found it so threatening. If you have even the slightest interest in the future of our species, please do yourself of a favor and read this book.



4. I wanted to like this book, and while I did agree with some of what Harris has to day, it seems superficial in many ways, particularly where he says:
   
   "It seems that if our species ever eradicates itself through war, it will not be because it was written in the stars but because it was written in our books; it is what we do with words like 'God' and 'paradise' and 'sin' in the present that will determine our future"
   
   In the not too distant past, I can cite the Vietnam War as one that had nothing to do with religion or god...and there are other examples to be had...perhaps if he had phrased this to mean it this has been the case in the past (but not exclusively) and will likely be the case in the future, especially given they myriad of conflict we are now enmeshed in. I think Harris book would have been much more effective had he stuck to the negative effect that religion can have/is having on our government (or any democratic government for that matter), which was, I feel founded on reason and logic. I also can't get 100% behind the idea that if we just got rid of those particular books and God that there would be no more terrorism or war in the world, I think it's in human nature (religion aside) to be warlike, selfish and cruel at times. I agree with him that it seems unbelievably foolish to think that any book contains the literal word of God, but that has been written by men. The idea that after 2000+ years they are in no way in need of updating and revising to take into account advances in knowledge and human understanding, is simply ridiculous. Overall it was an interesting read, but I don't think I'd recommend this or want it for my permanent library. I give it 3 stars.



5. I agree with most of Harris' thesis and was sympathetic to those views of which I am not in agreement up until Harris' argument regarding moral equivalency. Of course a moral equivalency between the bombing of the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan during the Clinton administration and the events of 9/11 is an atrocious argument to make, but I think Harris betrays the intellectual justification for his entire thesis by glossing over and discounting the discussion here.
   
   As enlightened as contemporary Christian nations may be when compared to their predecessors in centuries past, it is impossible to ignore, as it appears Harris does, the clout the idea of heaven has for American Christians. Harris implores his critics to simply take Muslims at their word and look at the motivations they espouse as justification for their actions, but then when it comes to Christianity and the West he ignores those same motivations. The implicit understanding in Christian cultures is not far off from that of the Muslims.
   
   With the same degree of certainty as the Muslims, American Christians feel that they are justified in their transgressions against humanity so long as they can hide behind a thin veil of rationalization regarding their intentions. "We weren't trying to kill thousands of people, so killing thousands of people is ok." You see this argument repeatedly advocated by our President, the one who thinks he talks to god, and other Christian politicians and pundits. They tend to think that since our crimes are crimes of the heart rather than crimes of the mind, that we had good intentions but the result turned out bad, we should be absolved of moral responsibility. Harris makes the same argument in this book.
   
   This arrogance and ethnocentrism leads us to pursue policies that we know will result in innocent death while providing our minds with a supposed moral disconnect from reality that allows us to believe that our crimes are not really crimes at all since we were well intentioned. All of your objections to the contrary notwithstanding, it makes no difference to the mother of a child who was killed in an air raid whether or not you intended to drop the guided bomb unit on her child's school. And then when, rather than accepting responsibility for it, you as a nation attempt to rationalize and justify this reprehensible act, you breed the hatred and contempt that is felt for the West, the United States in particular, in the Muslim world.
   
   Although a moral equivalency does not exist, we must realize that we cannot simultaneously preach the tenants of modern liberalism/libertarianism while arrogantly spreading that ideology through force and ignoring the negative consequences of that policy simply because we are not as morally reprehensible as the other guy.
   
   As much as I agree with most of Harris' arguments so far, his errors with respect to this topic have biased me against his subsequent contentions.
   
   Having read Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens and Russell, Harris' conclusion regarding mysticism and spirituality devoid of dogmatic religious faith is what makes him stand out among the crowd. What I find most frustrating about End of Faith, even more so than the problems I mention above, is that Harris concludes with that remarkable argument, but does not do it justice. Having established that dogmatic religious faith is a detriment to human happiness, his proposal of an understanding of our existence based on empirical evidence, rather than ignorant superstition, is the most valuable contribution of this book. Compared to the extended lengths to which he goes to establish his argument against Islam, he merely glosses over the concept of Eastern mysticism and a legitimate connection to our existence that transcends petty terrestrial bickering. He sells himself short on this front. Hopefully once Mr. Harris completes his doctoral work on neuroscience he will release a follow-on title elaborating on this topic.

5 comments about Because They Hate: A Survivor of Islamic Terror Warns America.

1. This was a very eye opening book about a subject that our schools and media don't talk about. I highly recommend this book and even bought the audio book version for my friend that doesn't like to read. I wish all of our government officials would read this book before meeting with countries in the Middle East.



2. All I can say is WAKEUP Canada.Open your eyes and ears to a very real threat to your freedoms.



3. Brigette Gabriel does an awesome job of showing what Islam really intends to do on a world scale. I have been researching Islam for over a year, and this book only adds the personal testimony of a person who has lived through the result of ignorance regarding Islamic intentions. I anxiously await the next book to be written. If Brigette comes to my area I will definitely go to see and hear her myself.
   Pastor Dave Aune



4. Brigitte Gabriel paints a grim picture of the islamic threat to U.S. and western civilization. Along with Noni Darwish's book Now, They Call Me Infidel Because They hate sounds an alarm that Americans should heed. Gabriel, a Lebanese Christian journalist details her experience under the Islamic Jihad that created the civil war in Lebanon. She also reveals that even the Christian maronite parochial school which she attended demonized the Jews and the Israeli's. So what else is new. The Christian faith continues to demonize the Jews. During WWII The Catholic Pope was the first foreign state to recognize Hitler. The Pope made a deal with him. If the nazi's left the jews converted to Catholicism alone, the Pope Vatican would turn a blind eye to the suffering of Europe's Jewish citizens. Now that Chritians too are under attack, they are sympathizing somewhat with their Jewish brethren. Too often in the past they were sacrificed as expendable to placate the hateful policies of other countries and nationalities including the Nazi torture and persecution of an entire people and civilization. Roosevelt knew what was happening and did nothing about it. Now as a nation we cannot afford to ignore the evil intentions of Israel's Muslim neighbors. As she says in her book "First comes saturday and then comes Sunday." This Arab phrase means "First we kill all the Jews. Then we kill all the Christians." Make no mistake. This is the fundamentalist intention. They are using our bill of rights against us. Spewing hateful speech to incite violence, they cite their first amendment rights to prevent any government action to stop it. While I applaud Brigette Gabriel's bravery in coming forward to speak publically about this threat, I do think she has gone a bit far. After reading these two books I not only support ethnic profiling, but I encourage it. Controlling discourse on campus and religious institutions is another ball of wax. Once we start down that slipery slope who knows where limitations on our 1st amendment rights of free speech, free press, and free religion will stop. Since the essence of a democracy is freedom of speech, press, and assembly, we could end up selling our American soul to preserve it. Then what would we have saved. Perhaps, more important would be to give equal funding and access to speakers like Noni Darwish and Brigitte Gabriel on college campuses and other forums. Gabriel's characterization of the entire democratic leadership as indictable for treason goes a bit too far. These comments indicate that she doesn't really understand the democratic process set up in this country. I gave this book 4 stars instead of 5 for three reasons. First, that she draws the line too far. Second, her prose is often repetitive, and thirdly, it is not elegant. I still think that this book is a must read for every American. This woman is in constant danger because of what she states publically. I think that she and Noni Darwish are alive only becasue they are women who are viewed as inconsequential in the Muslim culture. Assasinating her would give her credence. She lays to rest the western belief that female suicide bommbers are participating out of feelings of desperation. They are participating after being harrassed and cajoled and accused of honor violations for which they will be killed. Particularly telling is the incident of the Arab girl raped by her two brothers and then killed by her mother because she had sexual intercourse outside of marriage. Her mother suffocated and beat her for 20 minutes before she died. How can we ever hope to understand this culture and win it over by conciliatory means? They understand and respect only force and strenght. Gabriel puts and end to the notion of Islam as a peaceful religion. The issue presented is where do we draw the line to protect ourselves without giving up completely what makes us Americans. First, I think we should use the Israeli Mossad for security profiles and follow their recommendations on profiling. The petrochemical complex already uses ex mossad agents for their security. One is unaware of this heightened security when entering the plants, but it is there. Like England we need more video surveillance. We must pay senior intelligence and FBI agents competitive salaries so that we don't have agencies run almost entirely by 'junior pilots", because the senoir people have left for more lucrative jobs in private industry. We must see the fundamentalist muslim threat as immediate and real. We must be politically incorrect at times to deal with the danger. College campuses must remain vigilent that professors treat students of any faith or nationality with equal respect. If Arab professors present a pro Muslim viewpoint equal class time should be given to talented speakers presenting the opposing view. Thus, students will not be unduly influenced by a polarizing Jihadist, anti-western, anti-Israeli view. Most troubling to me was the chapter on the fifth column at college campuses. The students who will be our future leaders and captians of industry are at a very impressionable age. It is too easy to imbue a professor with mentor like qualities held up as an ideal to be followed. We must also be vigilent on the true recipients of charitible donations. However, when it comes to Mosques preaching hatred and death, we must tred carefully. Any law abridging such speech could also be used to curtail legitimate government critisizm, a hallmark of democracy. Certainly, Barak Obama's pastor's speech would fall under this umbrella. I deplore what the Rev. Wright and his progeny have said, but I defend his right to say it. Where should we draw the line and how? Gabriel gives some suggestions, but I think they go to far. I do agree with her section on profiling. We could present more options for patriotism in classrooms such as reciting the pledge of allegiance. We could keep books such as this one and the Darwish book on school and public library shelves. We could also place the books on recommended reading lists on high school and college campuses so that students are assured of getting both sides of the argument. Right now they are primarily hearing the pro-muslim side only. Keep up the good work, Brigitte. However, I think



5. This is a very personal, emotional book to read - you have to prepare yourself. It is so moving, visual and shocking. Brigitte is an excellent writer and really knows how to express herself - you feel as though you're right there in the bomb shelters with her and her parents as they suffer unimaginable horrors. I'm so glad I was able to read this book because it is a real warning for America not to fall into complacency - that we all need to stay vigilant and know and understand our enemies. This story is so inspiring; it'll make you feel like you can accomplish anything after reading what she went through to beat the odds and become an American success story.

5 comments about Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam After Iraq.

1. Having lived in the Middle East, I concur with most of the author's assessment of what one might call the "Muslim mindset." I cannot, however, agree with his political and moral assessments. He heaps blame on Clinton for not responding to terrorist acts, but fails to condemn Reagan for the initial (and fatal) decision to withdraw our troops from Lebanon after the bombing of the Marine barracks.
   
   His suggestion that fire-bombing Kabul and Kandahar (killing many hundreds of thousands of innocents) would have been an appropriate response to 9/11 is sickening. If we're going to become barbarians ourselves, what's the point?



2. This is a wise, irritating, condemnatory, even funny book written by someone who knows his stuff and has a fine sense of the bizarre, and ignorant, and even humor! Apparently his main point is that shallow willful ignorance, a gloating sense of cultural superiority, in step with obviosuly inane and dangerous foreign mishaps and disasters, have caused Islamic terrorism. Why do they hate us? Not because of our elections, "superior culture", (though this is surely debatable), or our love of freedom. Simply our occupation and wars in the Mid East, never ending support of Israel, and not just minding our own business over there! Obviously with oil, this is a near impossibility, but still his point is well taken..So what do we do? Though acknowledging our catastrophic mistakes, first and foremost invading Iraq, we should show real mettle, resolve, and basically stop pussyfooting around with the strongest military in the world. The numbers (reproduction rates) are against us, and he says we should learn from our mistakes, unlike the Europeans, and other soft power types out there. Quite a contradiction, and it sounds good, but the author, though leading us along with some great quips and criticisms, and knocking just about everyone out there, of any political stripe, seems vague about the obvious question."So what do we do about this mess?" For this simplistic approach, and an inability to find anything right about we in the USA have attempted, only 4 stars, though it was a great read, with many. many fine ideas and criticisms.



3. If you've misplaced your copy of Mein Kampf and want to read something that would make Hitler happy, here's your book. Right up there with Pat Buchanan's latest screed, this book is comforting in it's reliable idiocy. Let me make my position clear so that the above does not sound left wing:I'm voting for McCain.



4. Michael Scheuer provides a useful review of the our foreign policy errors which now, more than ever, threaten the security of the USA. The author's
   emphasis on the regrettable uncritical support for Israel by the USA leadership since 1973 is well placed and argued. His brief on this issue is informed and documented. But the author shows major inconsistency in arguing that Bush I should have gone on to Baghdad after the repelling of the invasion of Kuwait when in another part of his book he is persuasive that Bush II's invasion and destruction of Iraq destroyed the effective Iraqi and Syrian wall against movement of Al Quaeda westward to the Mediterranean. One can't have it both ways. Mr.Scheuer is correct that lifting the USA's (and the EU's) boot from the Muslim neck would neutralize Al Aquaeda's appeal and achieve major healing of relations with the indigenous people's of the Middle East.



5. Scheuer has long been arguing that Arab violence against the United States is "blowback" for US policies. It's not a matter of Muslims hating our freedoms or passages from the Koran inciting them; but rather, they hate that U.S. policy planners have supported a brutal occupation of Palestine (which degrades the security of both Israelis and, obviously, Palestinians)Washington Report on Middle East Affairs - Without Supplemen, we've propped up vicious dictators in countries like Saudi Arabia The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, and we imposed sanctions that killed hundreds of thousands of innocent people in Iraq Iraq Under Siege, Updated Edition: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War. Scheuer sites policies that go back to 1973, but U.S. aggression in the region goes back much further. Authors like Stephen Kinzer point to 1953 as a pivotal moment, with the U.S. overthrowing the democratically elected Mossadegh in Iran All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Few are aware of the history of U.S. intervention in places like Lebanon, books like Seeds of Hate: How America's Flawed Middle East Policy Ignited the Jihad provide insight. And documentaries like Our Own Private Bin Laden illustrate how we gave birth to the militant Muslims. The West's meddling in the region, including Britain's, goes back even further.
   
   Scheuer suggests that we in the U.S. have a "pacifist" media. He must have a different cable system than I do, because I regularly see warfare being glorified in movies like "Blackhawk Down" and on channels like the Military Channel. The military is the subject of idolatry during sporting events and in programs like JAG and others The Hollywood War Machine: U.S. Militarism and Popular Culture. Then there are all the video games that serve to train kids to be killers, as Lt. Col. Dave Grossman points out in his book, Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill : A Call to Action Against TV, Movie and Video Game Violence
   Scheuer also feels the intelligentsia is "pacifist," yet it is often there to promote our permawar Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship.
   
   Lastly, Scheuer feels the U.S. military hasn't applied enough savagery to defeat the people responding to our state terror. How many hundreds of thousands of people dead, even more wounded, and millions of refugees would he like to see? I would like for U.S. citizens to break free from various delusions and work toward less pathologically violent policies that are allegedly committed in the "national interest," but which actually serve corporate interests Why We Fight.

5 comments about To The Death.

1. After I converted these CDs to MP3 for on my iPod, I gave the disks to some Canadian friends. Then I started listening to the book and wanted to take it back before they listened to it. Made me embarrassed to be an American. Patrick Robinson didn't used to be a boorish writer.
   
   I like his stories. I usually prefer him in audio, because he's so detailed. It's easier to listen and multitask. Just don't know where he lost his sensitivity.
   
   --pat



2. Patrick Robinson has had a great run with Admiral Arnold Morgan. His crabby protangonist has grown tired saving the United States from various and sundry enemies. To The Death is intended to be the coda to Morgan's tale. Unfortunately, Robinson should have put Morgan to bed one book ago.
   
   To The Death starts out strongly. A terror attack on Logan Airport, some torture in Guantanamo, then a nice bombing in Syria. Things are looking great. However, looks are deceiving. By page 80 or so, To The Death dies! The rapid fire action and dialogue we have come to love disappears. Even a submarine cameo can't bring To The Death back to life.
   
   In a situation similar to Joel Rosenberg's Dead Heat, Robinson faces the dilemna of maintaining action while ending a series. He can't introduce new characters, he can't create new plot lines, he can't leave any loose ends. So, To The Death becomes, almost by necessity, a slow march to the grave.
   
   I would strongly urge new Robinson readers to go back to the beginning. Read Kilo Class and all the early volumes in the series. Then pretend To The Death was never written and create your own ending to Morgan's duties. Not only will you be able to create a better tale than Robinson did here, you will also save yourself 20 bucks.



3. Having read his previous books in this story line, I eagerly awaited this latest one. I wasn't disappointed. It was by far his best. I had to force myself to take a break from reading it due to nature's insistances. So what's next from this gifted author?
   Morty Fink



4. I read and enjoyed two of Robinson's earlier works, Hunter Killer and Ghost Force. Both received "rave" reviews from me.
   
   Unfortunately, "To The Death" is a turkey. It is dull, highly predictable, contains many factual errors and borrows heavily from the plot of The Day of the Jackal. The novel, which is billed as the "conclusion of his bestselling series starring Admiral Arnold Morgan and his terrorist nemesis, General Ravi Rashood".
   
   The book begins with a bang, so to speak, with a terrorist bomb in Boston's Logan Airport. This scene is so far-fetched that I was tempted to set the novel aside within the first few pages. I would have been better off doing so.
   
   I don't like getting into a lot of plot details for fear of spoiling it for others who may not share my opinion of this book as a waste of time. After all, if you're looking for something to put you to sleep while stuck at an airport or on a long flight, "To The Death" may be helpful.
   
   In any event, the clumsiness of the opening scenes is simply a harbinger of all that follows. A Middle Eastern appearing male in line at an airport security checkpoint asks "Excuse me, sir . . . I have two quite heavy briefcases here and I'm just going over to the Starbucks for some coffee. Would you mind keeping an eye on one of them for me . . .?" The story is set in 2012. Does Thompson seriously expect us to believe that someone would be stupid enough to go along with this request? How is the Middle Easterner going to exit the security queue? No questions about how he is going to manage carrying a coffee with his two "quite heavy" briefcases? In any event, the companion to the yokel who agrees to watch the one briefcase notices - big surprise - that the Middle Eastern appearing gentleman has passed the Starbucks and is heading for the exit.
   
   There begins what is supposed to be an exciting sequence where a cop grabs the suspicious briefcase, runs through the concourse, across the roadway, throws it into the parking lot where it explodes without seriously injuring anyone. Believable? No.
   
   The bomb tossing cop's partner just happens to spot a car picking up the terrorist and manages to shoot the driver, capturing the other terrorist. Believable in the circumstances? No.
   
   Lt. Commander Jimmy Ramshawe, assistant to the Director of the National Security Agency, is frantic over a call the NSA has intercepted. One call to Damascus. Yeah. Sure.
   
   By page 12, this novel has fallen on its face. It is simply unbelievable. I won't go futher into the plot, but it pits Ravi Rashood, deserter from the British SAS and convert to radical Islam, his (what else would you expect?) ravishingly beautiful terrorist wife Shakira against Admiral Arnold Morgan, former NSA head, confidant of Presidents and his colleagues. Rashood, Morgan and others were interesting characters in earlier books. In "To The Death", they are transparent and unbelievable.
   
   The storyline concerns Rashood's obsession with assinating Morgan. One unbelivable scene follows another. Of course, brilliant Ramshawe is always both a step behind and a step ahead in warning Morgan that an assination plot is afoot, but stubborn old Morgan won't listen.
   
   Ultimately Robinson borrows a big part of the plot from "The Day of the Jackal", which only makes this novel worse than it already was.
   
   Robinson either wrote this in a hurry, didn't do his research, has contempt for his reader's intelligence or all three. Factual errors abound.
   
   For example, the devout Muslim General Rashood is aboard a naval vessel belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran - where he enjoys a ham and cheese sandwich. Ham on a ship belonging to the Iranian Navy? A supposedly devout and fanatical Muslim eating ham?
   
   On the same ship, Robinson describes the captain as being so knowledgable that "[u]pon the slightest problem with the ship, the crew aways called on the commanding officer, who understood the workings of his ship better than anyone else". Can you imagine any ship's captain who would put up with crew members coming to him to solve their "slightest problem"? Give us all a break, Mr. Robinson.
   
   Like all too many authors these days (Barry Eisler being a particularly egregious example), Robinson tries to fake a knowledge of computers and information technology. Robinson - not for the first time - has Rashood doing a search with Google. He has Rashood "waiting patiently" while a search is carried out. In another instance, he has Google taking nine seconds to return results. Google, of course, is famed for the speed of its searches. A Google search for "Patrick Robinson" returned 245,000 results in 0.27 seconds. Mr. Robinson either doesn't know how to use Google or believes his readers dont'. It appears to be the former since this super sophisticated know-it-all terrorist submits some truly silly search requests.
   
   To enhance the supposed importance of one of the characters, Robinson has him ferried from Washington to Scotland aboard Air Force One, which Robinson correctly says bears another designation when the President is not onboard. Simply unbelievable.
   
   He has one of his protagonists using a Sig Sauer "revolver". As far as I can determine, Sig has never produced a revolver. A 7.62mm rifle with a silencer is featured. While such a suppressor would reduce the noise of firing at the shooter's location, there would still be the crack produced as the supersonic bullet moves through the sound barrier, thus making the use of a silencer worthless in the situation Robinson describes.
   
   All in all, "To The Death" is readable, but you'd probably have to be desperate to read it. I was simply foolish in doing so. I wanted to see if it could get worse than it was - and it did. A great disappointment from Patrick Robinson, whose earlier work I enjoyed.
   
   Jerry



5. 
   
   I have been a big fan of Patrick Robinson's series with Arnold Morgan. Maybe it's me, maybe I'm jaded or maybe the novelty has worn off.
   
   Maybe the series is just grinding and winding down. For some reason, I grew bored with this tale, which tracks arch villain Ravi Rashood - a/k/a The Towel head - in his obsessive quest to assassinate Adm. Arnold Morgan.
   
   By the end, you might be begging Rashood to put you out of YOUR misery.

5 comments about Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.

1. I won't bother with a lot of comments. Put it this way, if you want to read one book that explains how we ended up where we are with Islamic extremism, this would be the one. It is real thick and has small type, but you will tear through it. It is excellent.



2. Exceptional read. In hindsight, one can only imagine what would be if we had taken the left instead of the right (no politics) or not chose certain countries to be part of the end game.



3. The only way this book would score more than one star is if people buy it as a work of fiction. It is riddled with factual holes and just plain wrong information, I don't know if this was by design to create an element of fiction, or just terrible research. Please avoid this turkey unless you're into fictional analysis.
   
   - I have 4 years of in-depth, on ground research in the area he describes. I didn't need an iota of that experience to dismiss this hogwash, the factual inaccuracies are so profuse that most people from the region are able to dismiss this without any formal background in technical political analysis.



4. The subtitle of this book says it all. If you take nothing else away from this review recognize that. Anything I have to say after that is pretty meaningless by comparison.
   
   The Third World War goes on today. It's not a war in the traditional sense like WWI or II. During World War I and World War II our enemies were unable to cross the Atlantic or Pacific and strike mainland America. Like the attack on Pearl Harbor, 9/11 indicated that we were at war we just didn't know it yet. That war began before September 11, 2001 but that was the first major strike of the war. The Third World War isn't about ideology but about unfinished business in countries where the Soviets and the United States had interests, slights against other countries and religion.
   
   Steve Coll's excellent, well documented book GHOST WARS examines the events leading up to 9/11, how our policy enabled these horrible events to occur, the inability by U.S. analyst to see (or to have people in power listen to them)and miscalculations/lack of involvement in Afghanistan after the Soviet's pulled out allowed the Taliban to take power and isolate those that might have been our allies. In the process, bin Laden rose to power creating his the insidious network of suicide bombers all in pursuit of his jihad.
   
   Colon does an exceptional job of documenting how all this occurred. The research that Coll and Griff Witt did as the background to this fascinating but also terrifying story provides exhaustive detail on how policy makers could bungle the latest threat that the United States and the rest of the world face today.
   
   Coll begins his book going as far back as 1976 during the Carter administration and the seige on the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan and traces the roots of discontent that would bear deadly fruitation in 2001. He connects the dots showing how all of these steps from that seige to the bumbling invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. support (and abandonment) of anti-Soviet guerrilla commanders in that country when brewed together with foreigners such as bin Laden creating the toxic soup of terrorist activity seen before and since that fateful date in 2001.
   
   Coll's book won the Pultizer Prize and is highly recommended for an exhaustive and fascinating glimpse into the pieces of the puzzle that, when put together, gave us a picture of the murder of innocents, destruction and evil. If politics is war by a different means, than so is terrorism.



5. i ordered this book about 2 weeks ago and have not yet received it. PlEASE EXPLAIN.

5 comments about The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century.

1. Must read for all Americans, gives a detailed history on living and growing up in the Middle East, most American have little understanding fo the culture and lifestyle in these countries.



2. Peterson's review is very good and captures the essence of the book. There is a good deal of information about the Saudi Monarchy in this book that can fill out reading from other sources. It's a poignant story at times evoking the normal tragedies of life in the early deaths of Mohamed, the founder of the dynasty and his heir, Salem. Mr. Coll has a gift for narrative non-ficiton and weaves the constant theme of aviation into the Bin Laden story as well as the destructive side of their construction business. It is a fascinating study of the Bin Ladin family and of Saudi Arabia as it grew into the twentieth century. As he did with Ghost Wars, Mr. Coll has produced another great book.
   
   I will plug Frontier of Faith here for a further study of where the battle formed and rages between Islam's radical arm and the West.



3. Picked up this book after hearing the author interviewed on PBS. Given the family's aversion to publicity this represents an exhaustive effort to pry out detail. Coll tracks the family history from their humble beginnings in Yemen to the patriarch's rise in business association with the Saudi royal family, and to the present day. Usually after finishing a book this size I am ready to switch to something els, but at the end of this 575-page volume I found myself going back to reread the first few chapters. This held my interest and is worth the time.



4. What an insight Mr. Coll gives to the Bin Laden family...I highly recommend this book!



5. Yes, this is a long book; worth every minute. The depth of research is mind-boggling, but it is written with a clear, quickly-moving presentation. It is long on detail, extensive and interesting, short on editorializing: Coll leaves that up to the reader. Given the opacity of the Saud and bin Laden families' entrepreneurship, one is certainly left wondering! My favourite line actually appears at the very end: "...in the meanwhile, each time his audio- or videotapes reached Al-Jazeera or CNN, Osama reemphasized, like a Barbary pirate with a marketing degree, the impunity that he still enjoyed, as well as his continuing capacity to plan and inspire mass violence by exploiting the channels and the ethos of global integration." Another Pulitzer for Coll?