5 comments about The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime.

1. As other have noted, it is a little disjointed as it is a compilation of some previously published material. However, as someone with little knowledge about how the economics of ocean transport works, I found it insightful, infuriating and interesting.
   
   The blurbs on the cover make you think it is about "corporate malfeasance" and while the author does seem to want more control over the oceans, it is a bit more nuanced than that. He does recognize the impossibility of regulating such a vast expanse. Even on the environmental issue of how to control the business of scrapping ships (which is done these days on heavily polluted beaches in India) he is not willing to make the scrappers the villains. Rather, he notes that while the work is dangerous and not environmentally friendly, to simply outlaw the practice would increase insurance fraud and put a large number of poor people out of work.
   
   Langewiesche does not provide much in the way of answers, but the book is a good place perhaps to start the conversation.



2. Considering that the subject matter of this book is shipwrecks, smuggling, castaways, piracy, and a host of other lurid ocean-related themes, I was surprised to find it on the tedious side.
   
   Langewiesche's basic strategy is to discuss shipwreck after shipwreck, and then investigate the seamy underworld of the shipping companies lurking behind the disasters, and the laws that have helped to engender the situation.
   
   But the book is poorly organized and Langewiesche gets distracted easily: for example, after going on and on about the wreck of the Estonia, he continues for a couple of dozen pages about the various conspiracy theories surrounding its sinking. Digressions like this are common.
   
   The book also has no logical beginning or ending, and I can't see why Langewiesche even divides the work into chapters. A glimpse at the titles of the chapters (e.g., "To the Ramparts," "On a Captive Sea," "The Ocean's Way") is enough to suggest that there is no progression of thought being realized in the book, and other than a general lament on the rough and shady nature of international shipping, the book ends up having little to offer.
   
   Certainly not in the way of entertainment!



3. I could not put this book down. Some other reviewers' complaints (too many digressions, no central theme) are precisely what I like about it. Great stuff!
   
   Best of all, Langewiesche is a great writer. It was a joy to read poetic sentences that were not poetic for their own sake. Langewiesche is a good writer who does not write good sentences merely to dazzle but to actually tell us something.
   
   If this book is any indication, I'm ordering all of his others and look forward to reading them.



4. This is one scary book. Pirates, murders, breakups at sea, the loss of the huge ferry Estonia with many innocent passengers and so on. It is well written, but it is sort of like if somebody wrote a book about all the people who had been horribly murdered in public restrooms. I don't know how many of those there have been in the last 100 years, but let's say there were fifty and suppose I were to gruesomely describe ten of those. After reading that book you'd never be able to walk into the men's (or ladies) room again without getting the shudders. You'd likely be buying adult Huggies to avoid the whole possiblity of having to take the chance.
   
   Well, that's the way this book is. It's scary, and after you read it you will have to think twice about getting within a hundred miles of any large body of water. That's you, of course. Now I live on an island, so what the hell am I supposed to do.



5. This book covers a wide range of subjects related to shipping and explains that many aspects of life at sea are unregulated, or regulated only on a voluntary or theoretical level, and that consequently, maritime life is just as dangerous as it has ever been. The book discusses flags of convenience, negligence in maintenance and inspections, piracy, and shipbreaking. Most of these topics stand alone as decent essays. However, Langewiesche tries to tie them together with vague lines in each chapter about the uncontrollable quality of the sea and anything having to do with it, a device that looks like a last-minute, unconvincing way of binding a collection of essays into a book. The longest essay is the excessive, 94-page treatment (out of a total of 239 pages) of the 1994 wreck of the Baltic ferry Estonia. Much of this section concerns media vampires and conspiracy theorists drawn to the tragedy. In this section, it is easy to forget that one is reading a book about the sea.

3 comments about The Unfinished Bombing: Oklahoma City in American Memory.

1. 'The Unfinished Bombing' provides a glimpse into what happened in Oklahoma City AFTER the bombing, and details the evolution of the National Memorial completed in 2000. In light of what happened on 9/11/2001, this book provides a remarkable insight into how we as a society grieve and memorialize sites of national tragedy. This is not any easy or simple process, and Linenthal does an excellent job in explaining what happened in OKC, and the wide variety of issues that were confonted in developing the memorial.

   I would recommend this book to anyone considering how America should memorialize the World Trade Center site.




2. The 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City shook the nation and produced a modest flurry of books. This late addition fills in a few blanks that may interest specialists.

   A life of Timothy McVeigh might enjoy wide appeal, and terrorist plots have a gruesome fascination, but readers wonýt find them here. Edward Linenthal, Professor of Religion and American Culture at the University of Wisconsin spends little time on the bombers and the explosion. He has written a history of ideas, an academic field in which the books may outnumber the readers. In works of this genre, the author first asks a question. Thus, was the bombing a senseless atrocity? Or was it an act one would expect in the U.S., a culture that glamorizes violence? Having asked a question, the author doesnýt answer it. He collects everyone elseýs answer, assembling page after page of quotes from editorials, talk shows, pundits, politicians, clergymen, and academics. After recording these thoughts, the author draws no conclusions. The chapter ends. Another chapters introduces another question. Was God or Satan responsible for the catastrophe? Oklahomans are a conservative people, and there is no shortage of feeling that a federal government that keeps the Bible out of schools bears much responsibility. Ironically, clergymen are far more restrained than laymen in laying blame. Mostly, clergymen admit they canýt explain it.

   For years after the blast, the city argued vehemently over a proper memorial for the victims. The author considers this such an important controversy that he devotes half the book to it. With the memorial complete, I doubt if many residents of Oklahoma City want to read about the pros and cons of the design. It has even less appeal to anyone else.




3. In so many ways this is a fascinating and thoughtful book on one of the most important tragedies in American public life in the last decade of the twentieth century. No area of historical study in the last twenty years has been more important than the nature of memory and "The Unfinished Bombing" is an attempt to understand how Americans have recalled the April 19, 1995, instance of domestic terrorism that took place in Oklahoma City. On that day Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols conspired to explode a truck bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building killing 168 people, injuring many more, and opening a wound on the national landscape about the nature of modern American democracy. It is an exceptional study of how stories about the past become a master narrative, and what lessons they teach to those affected. This memory is constructed gradually over time as people reflect on the meaning of what has transpired, and much of what emerges is not so much a fable or falsehood as it is a kind of poetry about events and situations that have great significance for the people involved. The memories over time become more significant than the cold, hard facts of the past, insofar as they are recoverable at all, and become the essential truths of the past for the members of a cultural group who hold them, enact them, or perceive them. This book helps to pull those ideas together into a coherent discussion concerning the 1995 bombing.
   
   Edward T. Linenthal, now at Indiana University where he edits the "Journal of American History," draws on extensive field work in Oklahoma City to construct this analysis of public memory and memorialization. Most interesting to me was how three preferred narratives emerged from the bombing, all rooted in personal understandings of what took place. The first was a progressive story of how the tragedy was overcome. It was about the heroism of the rescue workers, the support of citizens throughout the nation, and the recovery of Oklahoma City through urban renewal, commemoration, and a demonstration of character. This is very much, as Linenthal wrote, a story of "yes, it was horrendous but..." (p. 41) before telling all of the good that emerged from the experience. A second narrative, Linenthal believes, is one of redemption, "A crisis of meaning, as people struggled to locate it in an ongoing religious narrative" (p. 53). In this narrative, the pain and suffering of those who died, as well as those who survived, served as a sacrament, in the words of one survivor, Susan Urbach, "an outward and visible sign of an inward and invisible grace" (p. 70). Finally, Linenthal unpacks what he calls a toxic narrative, one filled with loss, mourning, pain, and suffering. Sometimes it manifested itself in anger and agony, sometimes in fear and a desire for retribution, sometimes in the broken lives those who could not deal with the tragedy.
   
   It is this last narrative that Linenthal spends the most time with, writing at length about what he calls a "wounded community." He describes in detail the process whereby members of the families of those at the Murrah building waited to hear if their loved ones had been rescued, or if bodies had been recovered, and finally how they commemorated those lost. Not only that, the toll on those working on the rescue efforts was intense. The best example, well told in "The Unfinished Bombing," is of Chris Fields, the fireman who became a celebrity when his picture was taken bringing the body of a one-year-old girl (Baylee Almon) out of the rubble, and the mother of the child, Aren Almon-Kok, who also became a celebrity. Neither had any desire for such a spotlight to be shined on their lives, but modern media omnivorous in its appetite for visuality turned them into public figures. The fact that they handled this scrutiny, dare I say intrusion, into their private lives with grace during a time of trauma says much about the quiet dignity of many of those who had to deal with this act of homegrown terrorism. Linenthal, tells in this episode the interweaving of the toxic, redemptive, and progressive narratives in the lives of those at the Murrah building on the morning of April 19th.
   
   Toward the end of this account Linenthal discusses the process of commemoration of this terrorist act. Here he is concerned mostly with the public memory offered for all to see. He notes that in such instances considerable debate is necessary to determine hat exactly "is being remembered, who is being remembered, and the forms through which remembrance is expressed" (p. 195). Hierarchies of those who suffered found expression in the commemoration, discussions of whether or not to mention the terrorists who perpetrated the bombing also took place. And then, of course, there was the difficult process of deciding on the design to be employed in the memorial. What resulted was akin to a public park, and questions about its serene nature overcoming the horror of the event abounded. In the end, through a convoluted process of discourse involving huge numbers of people most agreed that this memorial was a fitting tribute to those killed, as well as those injured both physically and emotionally, in this terrorist attack. Its incorporation into the National Park Service ensured that it became a major part of the official memory of the United States.
   
   There is much to praise in this important book, and little to criticize. I recommend it as a fine case study of how we remember tragic events in the United States.

5 comments about Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror.

1. I would give it ten stars if I could.
   
   This is a very clear, complete and concise treatment of Jihadist ideology. I have read literally dozens of works on Jihadists, terrorism and Islam (including the Quran, 4 collections of the Hadiths and the works of Qutb and Mawdudi) and have never seen it explained so well. I wish I would have had this book ten years ago. If you want to understand how the Jihadists think, make decisions, treat other Muslims and believe, read this book before all others.



2. Knowing the Enemy
   
   This is an Outstanding Book. As we in the West are beginning to realize, the war against Salafist Jihadists is.... all about ideology. Although unnatural to western minds, which have long been conditioned to compartmentalize ideology - and especially religion - in such a way as to pretend that it has no bearing on the `real' issues in life (meaning: those things we can see, smell, touch or somehow scientifically measure), the fact of the matter is: violent Jihadists act the way they do because they believe the way they do. Action proceeds from belief. (Isn't that usually the case?).
   
   That being the case, an understanding of militant Islamist thought is necessary in order to understand their actions, and one day defeat them.
   As others have said:
   
   "It is necessary to understand the ideology of extremists and to counter it with one's own in order to combat terrorism successfully." (Farid Shafiyev)
   
   "The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world and whether the threat of jihadist terrorism continues..." (Building Moderate Muslim Networks - RAND Corp)
   
   "Unless we understand this ideology that gives rise to extremist violence, we will not succeed in defeating either the terrorists or the "non-violent" Islamists who seek to trigger a clash with the West." (Zeyno Baran)
   
   Our Strategy Recognizes That The War On Terror Is A Different Kind Of War, Involving Both A Battle Of Arms And A Battle Of Ideas. (U.S. National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism).
   
   Mary Habeck's book goes a long, well-worded way toward helping the reader understand the bases of militant Islamist belief. I've been on a personal quest to understand just that since Sep 11 2001 and have read not a little on the subject. Dr. Habeck's book is the best I've seen. She does an admirable job of covering the necessary bases - yet not in the "touch and go" fashion often employed by others. She not only introduces several of the major ideologues of the past, whose ideas underpin current jihadism, but deals with them in sufficient depth to leave the reader with a good grasp of both their significance and the beliefs they left behind them.
   
   This book was recommended to me and I, in turn, heartily recommend it to others who have a desire to understand the thought behind the current madness of Jihadist terrorism. It is, after all, a well reasoned and ideologically informed madness. Therein lies the threat - and, one hopes, a vulnerability.



3. Good information but it is the same information over and over again. It could have been two chapters instead of a book.



4. I came across this book while researching terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Of about 20 books I read for research, this book is by far the most thorough and well written. It is repetitive in some ways and could be shorter due to this fact, but overall presents a wealth of understanding on jihadist ideaology.



5. Clear and concise summary of Jihadism in the Middle East. Backed up with many references. Helps understand the history, and relationship to the present Muslim world, of this particularly virulent sect.

5 comments about America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy.

1. While obviously opposed to the Bush approach to foreign policy in general and to Iraq in particular, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay have nonetheless succeeded in producing a remarkably fair book attempting to explain the reasons behind the President's about face from recent U.S. foreign policy. The attacks on 9/11 and other terrorist activities over the past decade had gradually convinced the President that the internationalist view espoused by Bill Clinton and his own father was simply no longer the answer. Bush has chosen instead to embark on a new unilateralist course favored by most of his senior advisors that the authors argue may be somewhat productive in the short run but likely to be a disaster over the long haul. Extremely well written, thoughtful and meticulously documented, this book should be an essential read for any citizen seeking to get up to speed on foreign policy issues before the 2004 Presidential election.



2. Unlike the rather vitrioic and harsh rhetoric of the Bush-hating left, this book presents a fair yet reasoned critique of the Bush foreign policy. It rebuts the common assertion that Bush is an idiot or that he is being a tool by a neo-conservative cabal.
   
   As the authors demonstrate in this book, the major problem with American foreign policy under this administration is the rigid adherance to notions that are demonstratively false. The Bush Administration seems to believe that offending allies carries no risk and that multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, are worthless in the international sphere.
   This view is dangerous and in my view, demonstrative of the stunning arrogance of the Bush Administration.



3. The book is an adequate overview of President Bush's foreign policy through the first three years of his office. But it does not do justice to the more intelectually challenging questions of the administration's foreign policy such as why exactly did America go to war in Iraq and what kind of role are the neo-conservatives playing in the administration.



4. The present book is a compelling read and covers many but not all of the major issues on terrorism and Iraq.
   
   I feel like I have been on an overdose of these books just having read House of Bush, House of Saud by Craig Unger - the biggest tell all blockbuster (my opinion), The Choice by Zbigniew Brzezinski (an excellent analysis), Disarming Iraq by Hans Blix, Noam Chomsky's Hegemony of Survival (truly a book that makes one think), Thirty Days (about Tony Blair) by Peter Stothard, and Price of Loyalty by Paul O'Neill (excellent book), Why America Slept by Gerald Posner, the very popular best seller Against All Enemies by Richard Clarke, and the Rise of the Vulcans by Mann and Mann. I put together a "listmania" list of the 25 best books - the best books - mainly non political taken together, no strong bias conservative or liberal - a spectrum of opinion when you take them all together.
   
   Many of the books are "gotcha" books that link Bush with some wrong doings or alternately books like Brzezinski that lay out solutions. This book is a bit different. It is more of a chronological history, and the book has been highly acclaimed by the Economist, NY Times etc. After reading I can see why.
   
   I started to read the present book and was unable to put it down until I had read it virtually cover to cover. It is a surprisingly good book and neutral in tone and a compelling read - for myself it was a page turner. It brings together the story of Iraq and WMD's in chronological order (all briefly). It starts with the Bush campaign and what he says in his run for the presidency regarding foreign policy, his philosophy, the team that he put together, plus the authors put in some historical perspective starting with Washington, then Wilson, Truman, etc. It then works its way through pre and post 9-11, Afghanistan and Iraq until late 2003.
   
   Surprisingly I found that this book is in almost complete agreement with some of the more recent "tell all" books (Blix, O'Neill, Clarke), and I would strongly recommend reading this book. The overlying theme or conclusion is that the intelligence was flawed and incomplete. Like the Hans Blix book there were no WMD's in Iraq. The Iraq war was pushed by Wolfowitz and others prior to 9-11, and can best be described as a distraction or even an incitement of Muslims towards anti-Amercian feelings. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan lacked realistic follow up plans for the post military invasion. So those conflicts still remain unresolved. Also, the more serious threats of Iran and North Korea remain almost unsolvable due to the potential negative consequences of a military solution for those cases including the threat of North Korea dropping nuclear weapons on South Korea.
   
   An excellent book and I highly recommend.



5. Just read this helpful little book. Daalder and Lindsay describe President Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy revolution. It's easy to read and is a fine introduction into the world of neoconservatism (though he doesn't really use the term "neocon" to describe Bush's worldview). The authors point out that the Administration is a bit more heterogenus than most recognize: some of the folks around the President really believed in the power of democracy, some believed that America must remain strong and assertive to protect its national interests. As has been told many times, Bush had his attention elsewhere prior to 9/11: a little foreign policy, but mostly domestic issues - and certainly almost no focus on terrorism. That changed, of course. We can all dispute the long-term impact of the supposed Bush revolution in foreign policy, but if things don't turn around soon in Iraq - and now Afghanistan - we may see another quick revolution back to a more realism-based look at the world. As Daalder and Lindsay pointed out, thankfully there are relatively few people who want to do away with an internationalist perspective. Retreating to within our borders and the believe that oceans can protect us has been thoroughly rebuked by reality. But that does not mean that the power of military preemption (or prevention) should be our stated right as a powerful nation.
   
   Daalder and Lindsay are most powerful in their analyses of the major speeches and documents to come from President Bush and his administration.
   
   Helpful book, but others are better: Rise of the Vulcans by James Mann is far more useful for understanding the different viewpoints of the Administration. That and he offers compelling of the major players in the Bush administration (although there is little discussion about Bush himself).

5 comments about Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.

1. Mr Rashid does a great job introducing this region to a reader who is only familiar with this area through the news reports. Central Asia covers an area nearly the size of the contiguous USA west of the Mississippi excluding Texas. Kazakhstan to the north comprises about 2/3s of this area. The remaining four "Stans" are squeezed between the Caspian Sea to the west with its vast oil reserves, China to the east and Iran and Afghanistan to the south.
   
   Within these chapters is an adequate, short, understandable introduction to the history of the area from the Mongol invasions through their subjugation by the communists. You are introduced to the geography and the political boundaries, which were drawn by Stalin, and the state of affairs in each country between the downfall of the USSR and 2001. You learn that communist style dictators rule all but one of these countries and all the countries are both repressed and impoverished.
   
   The meat of the story seems to begin with the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the USA's efforts to thwart that assault. Our work with the resistance fighters through Pakisitan brought the outside world into central Asia for the first time in 60 years. With the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan and the USSR's collapse, these countries were plunged unprepared into the modern world. The continuing repressive natures of their governments coupled with the arrival of fanatical Muslim missionaries soon lead to the birth of several Islamic fundamentalist organizations.
   
   The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), Hizb ut Tahir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are the main focus of most of the book. Each of these organizations aims at overthrowing the current governments in the area and replacing them with some form of repressive Islamic state; however, none of the groups is particularly clear on what that would be. I think that Mr. Rashid does a very good job at portraying these organizations as destructive, reactionary groups with no plan for the world after they win.
   
   Finally, the strategic concerns of Russia, China and the USA are dealt with and how they relate to Central Asia. I would like to point out to future readers that whenever the USA's influence in the region is mentioned America is indicted because its military and economic aide is not tied to political reform; regional leaders are just encouraged to reform. However, no such concern is ever once raised by Mr. Rashid when he discusses the influence and aide of Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, any European Country or any other player in Central Asia. Also, not once in the book is there ever any discussion of the responsibility that the residents of each of the "Stans" have for the maintenance and good government of their own lands.
   
   All in all this is a well written and worthwhile book. It covers the subject area briefly, but well. I came away from this book with a much better understanding of this region, its problems and what we will be facing for many years to come.



2. Jihad by Ahmed Rashid provides an explanation for the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia. I purchased this book because I enjoyed another of Rashid's works, Taliban, and because it was on sale. Within the first few pages, the significance of Rashid's book is obvious. For one, the author is an objective journalist (that term should be redundant but, sadly, it isn't) with first-hand experience in the region. And, more importantly, Jihad was largely written before 11 September 2001, before our national interest in religious extremism became colored by emotion and an agenda to support USA military efforts in the Middle East.
   
   As argued by Rashid, the seeds of today's radical Islamic movement in Central Asia were planted by Stalin. The present borders of those republics -- Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan -- were drawn by that dictator explicitly to fragment ethnic allegiances, to try and force the local populations to become homogenized (but 2nd class) members of the Soviet empire. Collectivization caused further resentment, as did Bolshevik suppression of Islam. But all the latter accomplished was to push religious practice underground and give the people a rallying point to come together against the government.
   
   When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, leaving former Communist Party members as presidents of the five republics, the equilibrium changed. The government was still unpopular and oppressive, and Islam was still officially to be suppressed, but the governments had lost their power to achieve their objectives. With the repeal of Soviet control came the withdrawal of Soviet forces and resources. Militant Islamic groups, suddenly free(r) to seek their own agendas, rose up to divide and topple the reigning, impotent regimes. Rashid works systematically through various movements in the region and their histories, but he pays special attention to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its connection with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
   
   Jihad by Ahmed Rashid is a valuable and important book for anyone that wants to understand how the rise of militant Islam is not a new phenomenon but a continuation -- an effect -- of the Cold War.



3. The book is tedious, but comprehensive and does explain a lot that has been said about the region. It offers confirmation of many statements about the region, usually those offered without reference. Recommended for anyone interested in "Fundalmentalist Islam" and/or the politics of the former Soviet Uniion.



4. This book is the most comprehensive source of information concerning Islam & Terrorism.



5. Sad. What this person tries to do is excuse his own country ( may be Pakistan OR India, hard to tell from his retoric)for all the ills that have been created in his own country by his own corrupt neighbors. His claim to fame is rubbing shoulders with Karzi and other yuks. Rather like Barrack saying Farakan is not a friend of mine. ( sure) anyway. don't sucker for the full hardback cost like I did--I wasdoing research--THAT he does provide good references on Paki and Afghstan socialism--wait for it to hit the dollar rack--soon

4 comments about Stormbreaker: The Graphic Novel (Alex Rider (Graphic Novels)).

1. I teach junior high students. I had a lot of kids read the novel version who also liked the graphic novel. Also, this book was good for bridging kids from graphic stories to other kinds of text.



2. This is a creative re-imagining of the Alex Rider series. This novel closely follows the plot of the first novel. Alex Rider lives with his distant Uncle until his Uncle's sudden and surprising death. Alex soon learns that his Uncle was actually a spy and is recruited to finish his last mission, to find out what secret the rich and reclusive Harold Sayle is hiding. Alex, in the role of teenage James Bond, gets his own gadets and will rely on those, as well as his quick thinking, to save Britain from Sayle's evil plot.
   
   This popular series is actually enhanced by the change into the graphic novel format. The pictures enhance the action and suspense of the story, making an already accessible story even more accessible. Readers who love the series, as well as those who never have read the book, will both enjoy this engaging and well done graphic novel.



3. unfortunatly this graphic novel uses the movie script instead of the book as its inspiration. The drawing is good and easy to follow.



4. I love well-done graphic novels, and while I'm a much more frequent browser of them than a buyer of them, I had to buy this when I bought the DVD ALEX RIDER: OPERATION STORMBREAKER. Even if this graphic novel had turned out to be average, I think it would've been worth the purchase. As it happens, I think it's top-notch (just as the cover thumbnail intimated to me), and it's the almost-ideal written counterpart to the DVD. The artistic style, while based on manga, still retains more than enough Western characteristics to suit a Western character and a Western literary genre, and the well-written text fills in some details that aren't found in the DVD.
   
   Alex Rider (in the graphic novels even more than in the movie and in the novels) resembles a literary alter ego of my own so uncannily that I sometimes think Anthony Horowitz must've been peeking at my notes. In truth, it's obvious that we've been drawing upon the same archetypes independently, only a generation apart (meaning I was doing it twenty years before he was, when I was Alex's age and even younger).

5 comments about The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America.

1. I read the preceding reviews and wonder: is it me?... Perhaps, but I found this book disappointing. While containing good material, I have to say that the book is poorly written and unorganized. Perhaps that's the fault of the editor, for the authors are obviously qualified by their experience to speak on the issue of terrorism. I've read several books on this subject, and understand it well enough to fill in the blanks. By the same token, however, having to do so was a bit of a frustration.
   The chapter fields of Jihad is a fairly good overview of the countries involved in birthing and spreading jihadist Islam, however - overall the book is wordy and cumbersome. I think a hallmark of a good author is that he/she uses few words and uses them well. That is not the case here. I guess I expected more: well-qualified authors, great subject matter, interesting title...but overall (to me) a disappointing read.
   I would not recommend this book. Save your money and invest it in "The Cell" or "The New Jackals" instead. Both are impressive and engaging accounts of terrorism in action.



2. Though slightly dated-it was published in the interim between 9/11 and the Iraq War-this book by two U.S. government anti-terrorism officials is an excellent description of what is commonly referred to as the Global War on Terror. From the mechanics of the attacks on September 11, to the ideology of the terrorists themselves, to our government's response to Islamism, this well rounded book is an excellent resource for those looking for a window into a very complicated subject.
   
   Most interesting in comparing this book first published in hardcover in October 2002, with events since then. Benjamin and Simon lay out a reasonable description of why 9/11 happened, as well as certain measures we can take to overcome the enemy. The large leap the Bush administration has taken away from these reasonable steps is striking--and disturbing.
   
   I highly recommend this book.



3. The book is easy to read and clearly explain the historical progress of radical Islam.
   
   My only problem is the authors are not quoting primary resources of radical Muslim thinkers but quoting others who wrote about these thinkers.
   
   In page 46 Ali is described as Muhammad's son-in-law and nephew. That is a huge mistake as Muhammad have no brothers or sisters and Ali is his cousin.
   
   Such mistake which is repeated in the reprint of the book in the paperback edition make me think, what else is not accurate in the book?



4. The central theme of this book is that Americans continue to underestimate the danger from Muslim terrorists. We couldn't conceive of a day like 9/11, and therefore it appeared a remote possibility. To the extent that we fail to understand this enemy's resolve, and the uncompromising hatred which it bears for us, we will enable them to continue to strike us. Steven Simon was Senior Director for the National Security Council's Directorate of Transnational Threats, and Daniel Benjamin was Director for Counterterrorism in the Clinton administration. It is stunning what they knew then and it is most remarkable what they have learned since then.
   
   The book starts with a summary of recent terrorist acts committed against American interests in the name of Allah, and then goes back to the earliest of the Muslim fundamentalists. They show the cyclical nature of terrorism, and how Islam has metastasized over the last 700 years since Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya and his Kharijites introduced terror as a core concept within Islam. We learn of the contributions of Muhammad ibn Abdel al Wahhab, of Rashid Rida, and of Hasan al Banna and Sayyad Qutb. But that's just the first 94 pages since this isn't a history; it's an analysis of contemporary events. Accordingly, the focus is on the present incarnation of the Muslim nightmare, Usama bin Laden. Throughout this historical narrative we learn that both the subculture of terrorism and the broader Muslim culture are strongly connected, so that the basis for terrorist violence is well established and legally unassailable.
   
   And this isn't the turgid prose of academic research, of ancient history, or of political wonkism. The writing is positively entertaining: "The Jordan Rift Valley, a deep and unstable fissure in the earth's crust, provides a metaphor for the country through which it runs. The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan straddles political fault lines ... and if any of these divisions widen, it could bring down the palace roof." And later: "Yousef and Kansi were anomalies; they fit no part of the accepted taxonomy of terror, with its two great phyla, the soldiers of national liberation groups, and the agents of state sponsors."
   
   And Americans still don't get it. Terrorism is now parodied on stage, and has become the staple of movie plots. The more we treat Muslim terrorism as a peripheral problem, the more we believe that we've broken the back of the problem, or turned the corner, the more vulnerable we become. They hate us; they're still out there; and they have the means. They don't want to negotiate; they don't want to influence our actions; they want to annihilate us.



5. This book, by two top Clinton administration directors at the National Security Council's counterterrorism desk, is an excellent work on the rise of radical Islam and America's response. It contains sustantial details about Islamic terrorism in the 1990s and the corresponding responses from their administration. It is not an introduction to the matter. While it is not deeply analytical, it also assumes some knowledge on the part of the reader, which one would better find in The Crisis of Islam by Bernard Lewis.
   
   The book contains serious merits which broaden its appeal. The authors simultaneously recognize the distinction between mainstream Islam and the radicalized Islam of the terrorists, and yet also the fact that they are indeed radical Muslims while a firm devotion to their interpretation of Shari'a and not poverty-stricken revolutionaries or misunderstood intellectuals.
   
   At the same time, the authors fall into a series of traps.
   
   For one, they are more sympathetic to Bill Clinton and hostile to the Bush administration without presenting substantial reason. On the one hand, this is both innevitable and excusable; they were Clinton administration insiders privy to the presented logic and extended internal debate, whereas they are forced to the Bush team from the outside (they even admit as much). At the same time, however, they operate on what seems a consistent double standard. The soil samble from al-Shifa is determined a legitimate cause for 1998 missile strikes, but biological contaminants in Iraq are simply passed over. This bias obscrues their most important argument against the Iraq war- that because the Iraq war has and will involved a continued guerilla war against an insurgency that will attract new members and will never be wiped out, it makes the country into a training ground where young terrorists can hone their skills.
   
   The authors also draw on the Cold War-era moral equivalency mindset when making an extended literary sidetrip into Christian fundamentalism and Jewish terrorism. It is almost a token attempt to appeal to more 'open-minded' and 'level-headed' readers taken aback with their pragmatic take on terror and the clarity of its status as a global enemy. While some of the Jewish points are valid, it is virtually irrelevant as an addative to their overall argument; and talk about Timothy McVey and the Christian Identity movement is laughable. The Christian Identity movement is a white supremacy movement founded on anti-Semitism far more removed from Christian orthodoxy than Islamic radicals are from their mainstream. This divergence from the narrative greatly detracted from the overall cogency of the book.
   
   Third, the authors seem convinced- and convinced that no reason needs be given- that international terrorism conducted by Islamic radicals is the most pressing foreign policy threat facing the United States in the early twentieth century. Perhaps a symptom of a limited, terror-oriented perspective or perhaps due to a antipathy toward the Bush administration, the authors repeatedly decry that Bush administration's campaign and first-year emphasis on the rise of communist China and the shift from the Clintonian view of China as a 'strategic partner' to a 'strategic competitor.'
   
   This is likely the chief pitfall of the work: the failure to recognize that the threat of radical Islamic terrorism, however important, is at least matched by the rizing hegemony of China, first in East Asia, and then in the global South.
   
   That said, however, I found this to be an excellent work filled with detail about both figures and operations within terror cells and the Clinton administration. It raises the bar for debate and leaves me looking forward to learning more about this existential threat.

5 comments about Why I Am Not a Muslim.

1. Why I Am Not a Muslim
   
   A need to read book.



2. You know, sometimes I really hate writing these things, but some of them really deserve a bit of an enlightening oppinion. Okay Ibn Warraq it seems to me was a frustrated child who was never listened to, but that's neither here nor there since this is supposed to be a review on the work and not the creator of the work.
   
   I'll start with the first mistake that I noticed in this work. Warraq says in the Qur'an Surah 1 Verse 29 it states, On the day we shall unto hell, art thou full? And it shall reply, is there yet any more? Now any layman that is familiar with the Qur'an can see that this is ridiculous. For starters, the opening of the Qur'an mentions nothing about hell. Secondly, the opening chapter of the Qur'an is called the cure. Now why if this chapter is called a cure would it perscribe something like hell as a remedy. Thirdly, if you didn't already know, the opening chapter of the Qur'an which is the Fatihah has only and I repeat ONLY, seven verses. And he says Surah 1 verse 29. Check for yourself.
   
   Next he talks about the Trinity in the Qur'an and gives three proofs (so he says). And one of them is Surah 4 verse 169. In this verse it says, "Except the road of Hell, to abide therein forever; and that is easy for God." Now if you have read what I read, where do you see the trinity labeled in this surah. Nothing remotely points out a trinity. Warraq also points out two others in the Qur'an that talks about the trinity. They are Surah 5 and verses 77 and 116. They are too large to write in this review to show of warraq's incompetence on his "knowledge" of the Qur'an. I encourage all to go and look up these accusations for themselves.
   
   Lastly, Warraq talks about Zoroastrianism, which I will not go into in great detail for the sake of space, but in his explanation of Zoroastrianism he fails to introduce and inform the reader of what Zoroastrianism really is. Warraq makes the false claim that Islam origins can be found in Zoroastrianism, which is a totally false claim. Zoroastrianism is or was the end product of an evolutionary process which began with nature worship, passed through a more discrete polytheism, and finally concluded with a monotheistic deity. (Zepp Muslim Primer)
   
   I say all this to say that as readers we should be careful in the information we receive from writers like Warraq. He appears to be knowledgeable, because he was raised Muslim and taught the Qur'an at a young age until as he says "was able to think for himself." He seems not to either have not been taught correctly or he may have forgotten what he was taught, because this book is filled with numerous fallacies that can be taken to heart by the ignorant reader. Warraq needs a revised version of this book or needs to cease in writing about things he really has no idea of himself. To be so blatant in his claims, but yet so ignorant in his knowledge of the subject matter is absolutely perfidious.



3. You'll see right away why this book gets such a range of reviews. The man speaks his mind. After 9/11, when I set about clarifying my own beliefs about gods and religions, this and Bertrand Russell's Why I Am Not a Christian were the two most useful books I found. No great surprise of course that the have much the same things to say. I appreciated Warraq's going into some detail about Islamic history and culture. Shame on my ignorance. But of course Jewish/Christian/Muslim are shoots of a common seed. An Episcopal priest friend of mine describes himself as a rabbi, and Muslims acknowledge Moses and Jesus. The pond is small. I used to make Buddhism a benign exception to what goes wrong in other religions but not so much anymore after a glimpse of Sri Lankan history. Take Me With You When You Go Nutty to Meet You! Dr. Peanut Book #1



4. I am a Muslim. Take it as you will when reading the following.
   
   I've been studying Islam since the age of 10. I am now 24, and have still continued my pursuit in obtaining knowledge in Islamic theology, methodology, etc. Even so, I still find myself interested in reading books such as these, simply because my curiosity intrigues me to listen to the other side.
   
   Yes, "the other side", as I am not convinced Ibn Warraq actually knows the religion he claims to have once been a part of. Indeed, after reading his book I was baffled at how it has sold so many copies. Then it struck me: Ibn Warraq does a phenomenal job and redefining Islam, and feeding it to his innocent audience, who without knowing, eats it up. It is not the audiences fault that the author is telling you "Boogieman: Islam Edition". How are they to know?
   
   What do I mean by this? Imagine if you were interested in buying a Hondo, but had never owned a Japanese car in the past. I offered you a book called, "Why I would never own a Japanese car", and as such, claimed I was once a prominent investor in Honda Motors. Throughout the book, I would paint my audience a picture of children in sweat shops, building these cars by hand. On top of that I would use auto-junkie vocabulary to under-sell the car.
   
   How likely would you believe me? Well... I guess that depends whether or not you realize that sweat shops are predominantly found in China, not Japan ;)
   
   This book is not for those looking to educate themselves on Islam. This is a book for those who need a reason to hate someone who is not like them.



5. 
   This man is extremely intelligent, knowledgeable, incredible! Offering a plethora of information, not only his opinion but countless others' as well as history from I cant even recall how many sources.
   
   **College Level Reading** don't waste your money if your not on the higher end of the grammatical totem poll and have at least a fair knowledge of common Islamic phrases and Arabic.
   
   OVERALL BEST BOOK I'VE EVER READ!

5 comments about The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation.

1. I've read a number of books about September 11; the global politics and policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations, and I not only found this book engrossing and fascinating, but full of surprises.



2. This book is a must read for every individual who has read the 9/11 Commission Report and still believes the report was independent and is the most reliable and accurate assessment of the 9/11 attacks. Philip Shenon clearly shows how the most important member of the Commission, Philip Zelikow, the Executive Director and the 9/11 Report's main author, did his best to manipulate and sway the investigation and final report in favor of his friends and like minded ideologues in the Bush Administration.
   
   This book will undoubtedly infuriate most Americans who try to believe in our government and who expected honesty and credibility in the 9/11 investigation. Choosing the heavily conflicted Zelikow as the ED was the type of decision one would have expected from a third world country, it was the kind of decision that democracy suppressor Vladimir Putin of Russia would have been proud to have gotten away with. Shenon basically shows that when you start with rotten fish, you end up with rotten fish.
   
   Overall, I would recommend this book, it provides some good additional insight into the 9/11 investigation and shows how politicized it really was. Following are some of the other positives and negatives of this book:
   
   Positives:
   
   1. It's an easy and entertaining read, similar to the 9/11 Commission Report, and also written for mass appeal and corporate media approval.
   
   2. Has a good focus on Zelikow's many significant conflicts of interest and how the investigation and final report were heavily influenced by these conflicts.
   
   3. Highlights the incompetence and credibility concerns of Condoleezza Rice and other top Administration officials (particularly Tenet and Ashcroft, and to a lesser extent, the infinitely incurious President Bush).
   
   4. Provides some interesting insights into the commission's investigation and how important issues were addressed and resolved, including with the White House and the intelligence agencies.
   
   5. Provides interesting color and background on most of the commissioners and a handful of the key staffers.
   
   Negatives:
   
   1. Somewhat light on new facts. A lot of Shenon's information can actually be found in the 9/11 Commission Report (although with much less attention and / or buried in the footnotes) and Kean & Hamilton's, "Without Precedent." It does have the benefit of some additional insight from interviews with approximately 40 commissioners and / or staff, as well as Andy Card.
   
   2. It is almost comical that Shenon writes over 400 pages citing significant conflicts of interest by the commission's top member and author, a manipulated investigation and final report, significant and blatant intelligence failures, attempted "known" cover-ups, lying and unaccountable government and intelligence officials, etc, but then unquestionably assures us in about 1 page that only al-Qaeda was responsible??? It seems like a questionable conclusion on Shenon's part given some of the facts in his book appear to at least give rise to the "possibility" of complicity by others. David Ray Griffin's above review on March 19, 2008, actually addresses this issue in greater and more eloquent detail.
   
   America failed the victims and families of 9/11 when we sat idly by and blindly accepted the white washed 9/11 Commission Report. Unfortunately, we will probably never have a reinvestigation of the 9/11 attacks, but Philip Shenon has at least done his part in showing a vastly different story to the account held in the 9/11 Commission Report. For his part, Shenon has corrected a small piece of history, I can only hope that some of the other commissioners or staffers follow in his footsteps in further setting the record straight.



3. If you are interested in 9/11 quickly move your mouse to the 1-click button (nay, sign up for Amazon Prime first so the book arrives faster) and read this book and The Looming Tower. From the latter you will learn about Al-Qaeda -- those that created and run it and those that try to stop it. From the former you will learn about those who tried to stop it, and those such as Aschroft and Rice, who claim they tried but did everything they could to ignore it.
   
   Although the primary story of the book is the dysfunctional workings of the 9/11 commission and the whitewashing that occurred as they were manipulated away from politically damaging information and instead took a "praise everyone" approach, the back story of the inept handling of information in the CIA, FBI, NSA and White House is even more interesting.
   
   The book will leave you wondering "Why?". And more importantly, will we need to wait 100 years before all the players are dead and someone can really dig into and write about what really happened.
   
   If you are a diehard Bush supporter, don't read this book. It will force you to question whether Bush and his advisors are great. And that would be problematic for a simple world. Also avoid fairy tales such as "The Emporer Has No Clothes" which could equally test your faith.
   
   If you are unsure or mixed about your feelings of the Bush presidency, or you think he and the war in Iraq stink, this book will be fascinating and will raise many questions.



4. This book is about the machinations behind the scenes at the 9/11 Commission and how those machinations ultimately led to the report of the 9/11 Commission. There was a great deal of skepticism about the credibility of the 9/11 report and it is these beliefs, often true, though sometimes not, which Shenon investigates in this revealing and somewhat disturbing book. I say disturbing because of the extent to which the commission was politicized and employed to fight partisan battles. Obviously it would be impossible to withdraw political considerations from any process, but one would think that in an investigation into one of the most tragic, dreadful attacks on the United States, important people could put aside political interests and simply tell the truth. Obviously that was unlikely-I am not Pollyannish enough to believe otherwise, but one can hope.
   
   The Bush administration was opposed to the concept of an investigation into the September 11 attacks at first. They were grudgingly forced, by the protests of some prominent widows of the September 11 attacks and increasingly, by public pressure, to agree to the formation of a commission. Philip Shenon, who covered the activities of the Commission for the New York Times has turned over a lot of stones and investigated a lot of leads to see where interference and stonewalling manifested themselves in the investigation; of course such activities were not universal, but they did happen a lot.
   
   Once the Bush administration realized they would have to accept an investigation into the attacks of September 11, President Bush selected controversial former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to be executive director. The executive director would be the commissioner who signed off on all parts of the commission's findings. However, his unwillingness to divulge some of his clients cut short his candidacy for the position and instead, the White House turned to Philip Zelikow, a Russia scholar with close ties to Condoleeza Rice, then US National Security Advisor. His ties to Rice were deemed unimportant during the selection process and he was cleared to be head of the Commission. Additionally, Shenon writes that the White House's selection of high-profile bi-partisan heads of the commission, men who would have given the commission more credibility and who might have made its mandate more urgent-former Sen. George Mitchell and former Clinton cabinet member Richard Holbrook among them-could not serve, and instead the White House turned to former Rep. Lee Hamilton (R-Indiana) and former New Jersey governor, Thomas Kean (D). Both men were very reasonable and competent but it would seem their lesser political stature and more passive political identities hindered their ability to get access to the full range of documents they might have wanted in order to conduct a more complete investigation for the Commission. Whether their selection was welcomed by those who wanted to cover up some of the activities which happened in the run-up to 9/11 is unknown, but it would seem that the Commission could have done a more comprehensive investigation (whether one liked what one found being immaterial) had the Commission been headed by Mitchell and another more prominent politico.
   
   Shenon was the beneficiary of a lot of co-operation from people integral to the investigation and this enhances the credibility of his book. We know that the conclusions he reaches are based on the co-operation and involvement of many with a great deal of influence within the Commission. We get sufficient background on all the commissioners so that we know a little bit about all of them, and what their interests might be. The vast majority of the commissioners seem to be well-chosen for their task and they seem, by-and-large, to do a great job in a very challenging and historic investigation.
   
   The book, ultimately, seems to be the story of the very smooth but somewhat manipulative way in which Philip Zelikow leads the 9/11 Commission. He creates enemies on the staff due to a brusque, imperious manner, and the perception that he is a tool of the Bush administration in an attempt to game the commission. Shenon also documents the manner in which Zelikow sets up the commission so that he has the final say on the way the various sections of the report are worded which does not diminish claims that Shenon is a biased player in the investigation into the events preceding 9/11. To this reader, Zelikow's selection was a very crafty way to game the findings of the 9/11 commission. More than that, the selection of Kean and Hamilton allowed Zelikow to lead the commission with a freer hand. It would seem-at least to me-that Kean and Hamilton were not skeptical enough of Zelikow's motives.
   
   In any case, this is ultimately a carefully researched, thoughtful look at the work of a commission whose work was undeniably valuable, but which was to some degree gamed by interests within the Bush administration. For anyone curious about a very politicized era and the degree to which the 9/11 commission was compromised to some degree by politicization, this is a crucial read.



5. I have to point out that I really enjoyed this book just for the sheer insider details on the inner workings of the very flawed 9/11 Commission investigation provided by someone that was there from day one, and that is Philip Shenon.What sealed it for me was how Shenon quietly and mysteriously leaves and open ended statement for all to ponder over at the very very end of his book (page 423). SEE BELOW.
   
   What do I mean by that? Well, to me, Shenon contradicts all other 400 + pages of his book with that final selection of words.And to me, that is fascinating in the fact that he confesses to wanting to tell us more but he is afraid to.Why? Is he terrified of losing his D.C. insider status?
   
   
   As someone else points out here, you must read David Ray Griffin's review
   of Shenon's book to find out what very important issues Shenon leaves out of his book.See March 19th,2008 review.
   
   I don't need to go over all the points to DRG's review, but I urge you to read it for yourself.
   
   But ultimately, BOTH Griffin and Shenon fail to point out the main ommission, and that is Israel's complicit connection to the 9/11 attacks, which is the smoking gun.
   
   Despite all the coverups that seem to lead above and beyond just hiding whom was at fault in the U.S. government - past and present, Shenon does not go above and beyond to find out the real story.
   
   It disturbs me to this day that Shenon writes (page 118) in his book that conspiracy theories were well debunked early on and that evidence of Al Qeada alone was behind the attacks based on a Bin Laden video tape (which was proven to NOT be him) and that OBL dispatched 19 Arab hijackers personally and that all of them were aboard the four planes is laughable being that the mainstream media and other credible sources , domestic and internationally, have reported 7 of the hijackers alive post 9/11.
   
   Then Shenon mentions the well documented money plot.Where in his book does he describe the commission's details on the money plot? Kean himself was quoted as saying that "the money trail was of unimportance".
   But we all know it is and was, it's just that the commission did not even mention the Pakistan ISI Chief and his wiring of $100,000 to Atta just prior to 9/11.
   
   This part of Shenon's book may NOT of been read by most reader's because it is in the ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS section of the book at the very end and in the final paragraph.Shenon writes this:
   
   "if the full truth is ever told about
   September 11, 2001, 'it will be the doing of the
   9/11 families'
   . "It has not been told yet."
   
   What hasn't been told yet? Shenon writes that the attacks were just what the commission said it was.19 hijackers on four planes as ordered & carried out by Bin Laden.
   
   Shenon tells us of the failures of the Bush administration,the CIA,the NSC,FBI, and so on and goes into detail about the blame game.
   
   It seems to me Shenon covered it all here.
   
   What truth by the 9/11 families is there still yet to be told? And how would they be the ones that will tell it, if no one in the U.S. government is willing to reinvestigate despite the numerous protests by the families and 9/11 activists?
   
   I emailed Shenon initially once to praise him for his book and he replied immediately with a thank you.
   But when I followed up with several emails with this question, he has ignored me.
   
   Hi Philip,
   
   One quick question.
   
   What did you mean SPECIFICALLY about the ending comment in your book The Commission? Being that your book just came out recently, what does the family have left in their game plan after all these years (it's been about 4 since the commission report was published).Is there something we should know about?
   
   What truth if ever told would be the doing of the 9/11 families that has not been told yet?
   We already know about the sheer incompetence at the least.
   
   There is only one thing left.
   
   I can handle your thoughts if you are willing to share them with me!
   
   Best,
   Marc
   
   As far as I am concerned, Shenon's book has added to the conspiracy phenomenom of 9/11.
   

5 comments about Terrorist Trail: Backtracking the Foreign Fighter.

1. Mr Poole does it again. Another lifesaver for the troops.
   
   Will use it in our training. If you are into tracking; check out the chapter on urban tracking, it's old techniques put in a new environment, might just save your life.



2. Terrorist Trail by LTC John Poole (USMC-Ret) is one of the great books explaining how operations should be run in Iraq (and Afghanistan) to minimize damage to the local civilian population, while downgrading the ability of the insurgents to re-supply & operate. The book explains irregular warfare at it's best. How to assist the local population without having to destroy it! Unfortunately the GameBoy Generals of the Pentagon do not understand that all that glitzy billion dollar weaponry they love so much causes more damage in the long run to the war effort than it helps. They like to use a sledge-hammer to pick-off a flea.
   
   Instead of relying on massive firepower from the air or artillery, the US military needs to go back to training troops how to become excellent at small unit infantry skills. Let the Platoon & Squad leaders with eyes on the target, knowing his unit's capability, make the decision on how to attack a positon or control a target location. Instead of investing more billions in "real time" micro-managed command & control from CentCom, invest millions in highly effective light infantry training (*See the other works by John Poole regarding infantry training) on how to ID & target insurgent controlled areas while enlisting the help of the local population.
   Tracking is one of man's oldest survival skills. Early man tracked to find food & when he "evolved" tracked other men to kill them. This skill is as old as it gets for survival - except for running. The fastest man survived, the slowest was dinner. If the US military wants to survive & even thrive in an asymmetric 4th GW environment it has to evolve & change it's methodology of warfare in the coming years. Terrorist Trail explains beautifully the "how to" methodology of fighting the insurgents and winning in Iraq & in other back waters of the world. Will our current military leadership look at this work as sage advice? Highly un-likely. Most senior military leadership is looking to retire & move on to high paying jobs in the military-industrial complex (better know as Beltway Bandits)& down & dirty combat tactics just won't get them a hi-tech job!
   
   John Poole explains very clearly in Terrorist Trail who the insurgents are & where they come from, who & how are they supplied. The US military can acquire the intelligence to effectively fight & defeat the Jihadists. If you can ID the insurgent, know his mentality & fighting methodology, you can defeat him using the tactics & techniques recommended by LTC Poole in this book.
   I highly recommend this book to anyone going in harm's way overseas & to anyone who wants to understand the dynamics of defeating the insurgents at their own game.



3. Future historians will identify John Poole as one of those clairvoyant savants of military art who told us of the threat long before it happened, exactly what we should expect, and how to train to fight it. He will also be remembered as a perceptive author whose books were read and studied by the Soldiers and Marines who fought the wars of the 21st Century but, unfortunately, not read and studied by the generals who led them. In Terrorist Trail, he has again identified the threat, their modus operandi, and where to find them. He has identified why we haven't done very well at finding and eliminating the insurgents because of the lack understanding the threat, the absence of true soldier skills, and the burden of a very heavily laden attrition mind set on the part of most of the senior officer set.
   
   Terrorist Trail is a well researched volume based on keen insights into the Arab mind and culture. Moreover, the Trail follows the flow of foreign fighters right through the valley of the Euphrates and across the borders of Iran. This is more than just insight, it is information - nay, intelligence - from what is happening on the ground based on first hand accounts and observations. It is a detailed account which could be used as a continuity document for units in Iraq to read and understand as they rotate into these areas.
   
   Poole takes us on a tour d' force through successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations throughout history and in the third world - pointing out lessons that should be learned if we are to ever master COIN ops. It doesn't take a mental giant to understand that this is a primer on "how to", but if unread, the lessons have no chance of being learned. If read, the lessons have to be implemented at a level to be effectively applied. Some of Poole's recommendations might be discerned in the new Army/Marine COIN Manual, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006, but these similarities exist in too few areas to think they are more than serendipitous. It would take an entirely different leadership, cultural mind-set, force organization, and training to implement Poole's recommendations, and there is no significant evidence of that in the conventional U.S. Army or Marine Corps.
   
   There is some flavor of Poole's prescriptions in Special Forces, but they too suffer from conventional generals with 2d generation thinking. Poole makes the case for decentralization of training in order to be able to create the type of army that can successfully combat the terrorists. He goes so far as to suggest: "If America's brigade commanders can't figure out how to fight more effectively at short range, they should defer to the collective wisdom of those who do it for a living - their rifle squad leaders." Such an outrageous statement, no matter how true, will provoke more of a defensive reaction by the hierarchy than the more appropriate determination to improve. One suspects that just such a thing is happening as there is now a shortage of his books in the Post and Base Exchanges. As the world situation continues to deteriorate, being good has become far more important than looking good. Poole has developed and tested a new "bottom-up" squad training method. Until more U.S. infantry units adopt it, they will continue to have problems at short range in either conventional or unconventional warfare.
   
   Thank you, John Poole, for doing some serious research and thinking on tactics, operations, and strategy and translating that into this newest great book, Terrorist Trail.



4. Examines the roots of an aspect of what is currently being faced in other climes and places. The author is uniquely qualified to write on the subject.



5. My biggest challenge in reviewing Poole's books is trying to find new ways to say essentially the same things: they are a refreshing, authoritative source of well-documented research and in-depth analysis of modern tactical warfare that are unequivocally the troops' best reference tools and the status quo's greatest threats. This book certainly continues that tradition.
   
   The book was organized into three inter-related parts. In the first part, Poole provided a great, detailed history of the terrorist relationships between Africa and the Middle East, and the increasing influence of Eastern (Chinese) methods and presence in the Middle East. Chapter 4, "Euphrates Pipeline," which read like a detailed intelligence summary of suspected infiltration routes in the Iraq-Syria border area, was the first of three `must-read' chapters for individuals and small units deploying to Iraq.
   
   The second part was an analysis of small unit actions and lessons from many years of African insurgency-counterinsurgency conflicts. I was especially impressed with Chapter 10, the second `must-read' chapter, which highlighted the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. In the final part, Poole shared his experienced perspectives on how to train for and win against the terrorist threats we are likely to be facing for the foreseeable future. This final part includes the final `must-read' chapter, "To Truly Win in a Place Like Iraq," from which the following quote is taken that pre-dated and predicted the kinds of successes that we are starting to see from the surge efforts in Iraq:
   
   "...America's leaders must override their cultural impulse to "think big" and start "thinking small." It will all come down to the basics - basic 4GW [4th Generation Warfare] skills for U.S. troops and basic services for oppressed populations. That means humanitarian light infantrymen instead of infrastructure destroying and jihadist-generating smart bombs. Some squads would anchor neighborhood security through CAP [Combined Action Platoon] platoons, while others mantracked and arrested perpetrators. Only then will the cycle of violence be broken."
   
   I look forward to the challenge of reviewing my next Poole book, but not as much as I look forward to the day when our troops and small-units get the kind of training and leadership that they deserve. Read this book to see what they are facing and how they can be victorious against our terrorist foes.