No comments about The Inner Life Of Abraham Lincoln: Six Months At The White House.

2 comments about Sea Wolf of the Confederacy: The Daring Civil War Raids of Naval Lt. Charles W. Read.

1. Charles W. Read was an inept student, he graduated last in his class at Annapolis in 1860 just before he re-signed his commission in the US Navy. What he showed (just like US Grant and a lot of other military minds) was that some people do best by doing, not studying. Having lost his steam ram in a battle on the Mississippi River near Vicksburg. He is called to work on a "Raider" out of Mobile Bay.
   
   Once on the open ocean "Florida" sailed into the Caribbean where they attacked Union commerce and merchant marine. Taking a captured ship "Tacony" with one howitzer and some fake (Quaker) wood guns, Read proceeds to damage over twenty ships on his way up to Portland Maine where they are caught but only after they steal a US Revenue Cutter and blow it up. The story is a lot like that of the "Shenandoah" which had two books about it published in 2005; more interesting from an historical point of view but not that thrilling. (How exciting can it be to read about the capture and burning of fishing Schooners?)



2. Although a life-long Civil War buff I had never heard of this attempt by a young Confederate Naval officer to take the war to the seas off New England. Lt. Charles A. Read had previously served on the ironclad "Arkansas" and the commerce raider "Florida" and had seen a lot of hard fighting - which he seemed to relish. In February, of 1863, the "Florida" captured a Union merchant vessel and Read was given permission to take over and convert this captured ship into another commerce raider. Read promptly sailed to the North and with only one small cannon on board began to wreak havoc on the New England fishing industry. The Northern states then began beseeching Washington for more protection - threatening to divert resources from the bloackade of Southern ports. Shipping insurance rates started rising, too.
   
   Shaw skillfully interweaves the two sides of the story - the motives and actions of the protagonist, Read, and his antagonist, Union Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles. The author may have a Northern bias but it does not ruin the story. There are many good accounts of Civil War naval actions - we can add this one to the list.

1 comments about Ulysses S. Grant: A Bibliography (Bibliographies of the Presidents of the United States).

1. While the high list price may scare the general reader from this work, it is a valuable research tool for anyone wishing to develop an in-depth interest in Grant. Although a truly complete bibliography on Grant may be impossible to compile, Kelsey, as far as I can see, has come commendably close. No matter what aspect of Grant's life you wish to study--his childhood, military career, Presidency, his Memoirs, etc.--you are sure to be steered to a plethora of citations, intelligently and frequently wittily annotated.
   
   A postscript: I also appreciated Kelsey's pointed reference to Grant's "Alleged Alcohol Problem," as well as her implied willingness to speak favorably of Grant's enigmatic mother, Hannah. In the "Grant community" nowadays, doing these things seems to require some courage. Good for her.

5 comments about Lincoln's Tragic Admiral: The Life Of Samuel Francis Du Pont (Nation Divided).

1. Weddle has given us a sympathetic tale of one of the premier figures of the 19th century navy -- Samuel Francis Du Pont, whose statue initially graced Washington's Dupont Circle before it was moved to his home state of Delaware and replaced by a fountain.
   
   The climax of Du Pont's career was his least-succesful campaign -- the abortive attempt to take heavily-fortified Charleston from the sea. Weddle convincingly argues that this attack -- undertaken in spite of Du Pont's reservations -- was doomed to failure. The early ironclads were simply no match for heavy shore-based fortifications. In the best tradition of inter-service rivalry, the Navy rejected Du Pont's request for a joint army-navy assault: "I beg of you not to let the Army spoil it."
   
   Equally interesting is Weddle's description of Du Pont's early career, which spanned a period of rapid technological change, from sail to sidewheeled steamers to ironclads with screws. Perhaps Du Pont's most important and lasting contribution was his successful struggle to introduce merit into the navy's promotion system.



2. A fascinating book! I particularly appreciate the way the author integrates Du Pont's human strengths and frailties with the bureaucratic, logistical, and armament systems of the time. He provided just enough background information on Du Pont's family, peers, and related events for readers to appreciate their impact without being taken off track. Ultimately the reader sees the guy as very much a real man with skills, challenges, successes and failures that are just as relevant today as 150 years ago. (Anyone who doubts the relevance of history to modern events need only read this book.) Finally, I greatly enjoyed learning about the technological advances of the day in the context of the times. It's easy for us today to look back at the Civil War as being an "old-style war" like that of 1812, but in reading Weddle's book I was enlightened to the fact that from a technological attitudes standpoint, the Civil War was much more of a "modern" war than I had previously realized. What kid isn't fascinated by the battle of the Monitor and the Virginia (Merrimack), for example? In history books that event is always presented as an isolated incident, but thanks to this book I now realize that steam-powered vessels and ironclads were the wonder weapons of their day -- they captured the public imagination (and those of military planners) just as tanks, jets, and nuclear weapons have in more recent times. It has been a truly delightful read and I've learned a lot. Incredible the peers Du Pont rubbed elbows with at the time -- legendary heroes like Stephen Decatur and Matthew Perry. If you like history, you will love this book. Not only does it offer fascinating facts and insights into a man and his times, but it reads like a novel. Don't miss it!



3. For those of you who eagerly await the one book on Civil War naval history for every fifty released concerning the land war, you will not be disappointed. Not only is this book an exceptional biography of Admiral Du Pont, but it also provides a thorough look at the Navy during the service's formative years prior to the Civil War. This is possible because Du Pont's influence proved instrumental during this period; he authored the first comprehensive national maritime strategy (which provided guidance for transforming the Navy from a coastal defense force into a "Blue Water" service with offensive capability), as well as catalyzed much-needed personnel reform. Du Pont's at-sea adventures in the Mexican War and during a hazardous voyage to the Far East also make for great reading. What sets this book apart from any good biography, however, is the insightful discussion of civil-military friction and ill-conceived reliance on technology that characterize Du Pont's 1863 attack on Charleston, SC. Du Pont was against this operation (believing it to be an unnecessary peripheral enterprise that would siphon off valuable - and limited - resources from the all-important blockade), but Lincoln, Navy Secretary Welles, and Assistant Secretary Fox all though the capture of Charleston had important symbolic value. Since civilian leadership sets policy and related strategic objectives, Du Pont saluted smartly and began planning the operation. Friction arose when the admiral tried to persuade Welles and Fox that Charleston could only be captured via a joint Army-Navy operation. Welles and Fox (demonstrating blatant service parochialism) favored an all-Navy operation, and instructed Du Pont to proceed without Army assistance. Despite evidence to the contrary (Drewry's Bluff, VA and Fort McAllister, GA), Welles and Fox were convinced that monitor ironclads alone could destroy Charleston's forts and capture the city; as a result, they confidently assured Lincoln that the monitor technology would prevail. Of course, Du Pont was correct and the operation tragically ended in failure. Civil-military friction and technology as a military panacea are familiar themes throughout American military history - and we see them still in the current global war on terrorism. Colonel Weddle, therefore, does the reader a great service by providing such a thought-provoking discussion and analysis of these crucial issues. Superbly written, thoroughly researched, and well organized, this book was a pleasure to read and I highly recommend it.



4. Great read! Easy, smooth flowing syntax and text. Almost reads like a novel. A nice mixture of text, maps, and images. Substantial research has brought together the personal man as well as the public man and his concern for United States protection and the well being of his naval forces.
   Coming from a naval family, I was very interested in seeing the evolving history of the US Navy. I was also interested to follow the interaction of husband and wife and her influence on DuPont. Highly recommend this book.



5. Kevin Weddle has blazed new trails in this long-overdue look at one of the U.S. Navy's most important but little-known leaders. He has tapped into the extensive resources of the Du Pont family to capture the essence of a complex figure who stood tall at the cusp of a critical period of American history. The book is a quick read and Samuel Francis Du Pont's story is told with balance, style, and accuracy.
   The best biographies hold relevance for for present and future leaders - and this one is no exception. Du Pont plays key roles as mariner, technological innovator, personnel reformer, diplomat, strategist, combat commander, and family man. Through it all, he remains a man of steadfast principle.
   Kevin Weddle has spun a superb yarn and created an impressive work that shines a contemporary lamp on a long-neglected giant of the U.S. Navy. This volume is a worthy addition to the library of those with an interest in naval history, the Civil War, or leadership.

3 comments about Bull's-Eyes and Misfires: 50 Obscure People Whose Efforts Shaped the American Civil War.

1. General James Ripley's efforts as Chief of Ordnance put more reliable, mass produced, and effective weapons in Union Soldiers hands than any before or after him. Ripley did not (like so many claim without really looking at all available sources) stand in the way of innovation, but rather the chaos and confusion of non-standardized arms and ammunition. Ripley inherited a department that in 1861 had 600 different types of artillery ammunition, more than forty different types of cartidges for shoulder arms, and barely produced 14,000 weapons a year. By 1863 Artillery ammunition was reduced to only 140 different types, and the Springfield Armory was producing over 218,000 weapons yearly. As to Ripley turning down the Spencer rifle, Ripley's judgement was sound and right on. First, the Spencer was never really able to be mass produced like the Springfield. By June 1862 three promised deliveries had not been made, so the order was cut from 10,000 to 7,500. The reason for the delays were obvious; the gun still needed modifications to work properly. Problems obtaining skilled workers, machine tool parts, and raw material also delayed the Spencer. In all only about 12,000 Spencer rifles were delivered during the War. Of the M1860 Carbines, almost half of those produced never made it to the hands of troops before the South surrendered. General Ripley was an ordnance officer since 1814; he was an expert, and understood that breech loading was the next step in weapons evolution. He just did not feel that any one weapon had this principle perfected enough to be mass produced. Dependable ammunition for these guns was still several years away from full development and he knew it. It wasn't the Ghost of Ripley or something "strange" that made the standard weapon of the Cavalry the Model 1873 Springfield carbine. It was the fact that it worked well and the Spencer didn't. S.E. Whitman writes in The Troopers: "Because of the demonstrated faults found in all repeating carbines available at the time, the Ordnance Department reverted to a foolproof weapon of its own design, the Model 1873 Springfield carbine, which was to be the mainstay of the Cavalry until the 1890's."
   At the time Ripley left as chief of Ordnance, the .58 Cailiber Springfield rifle was the standard weapon of choice for the Army. There was no shortage of these reliable standardized weapons or their ammunition. Ripley accomplished this by making his department a production agency for standardized, reliable, time tested weapons rather than a research and development facility in time of war. In my judgement this accomplishment hastened the Civil War's end, not prolonged it.



2. Although I am no "buff," I consider myself fairly well read on the Civil War and I only recognized about ten of the fifty names here and almost none of the stories discussed. The author's research makes it clear, though, that these people had a very important role in the war. You can object to his classifications - most people would think Colonel Gorgas was one of the best administrators either side had, not the "misfire" Mr. Johnson claims him to be - but challenging his judgments is part of the fun.



3. Compiled and written by Civil War Reenactor and enthusiast Clint Johnson, Bull's Eyes And Misfires is an unique anthology of true stories about fifty different people whose obscure and often overlooked roles had lasting impact on the course of the American Civil War. Ranging from how Joseph Anderson and George Rains efficiently kept the Confederacy supplied with cannon and gunpowder, to how Julia Grant helped her husband General U. S. Grant win battles, to "Crazy Bet" Van Lew who ran one of the best possible spy networks for the North, to a series of terrible and costly mistakes of judgment attributed to leaders on both sides, Bull's Eyes And Misfires offers a wealth of lore and evidence of how even small details can have great effects on the tide of battle and is very highly recommended reading for all American History and Civil War buffs.

1 comments about J. Patton Anderson, Confederate General: A Biography.

1. This is the only book on this important Confederate general that served in the west, and commanded in Florida after the battle of Olustee. Raab's book is recommended for people interested in Florida during the war, or in the western theater.

5 comments about How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War.

1. The whole premise of this book is thrown out the window by the fact that Robert E. Lee was not promoted to Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate Forces until 31 January 1865, before that he was the Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia thus defending Virginia. Before that it was President Jefferson Davis who was calling the statragic maneuvers of the war. If Lee had been promoted earlier, things might have been different.



2. The book is sloppily researched and uses too much uneducated opinion. Bonekemper is certainly no military theorist or tactician. The author allows for no discussions of alternate opinions and presumes too much. I new look at Lee and his generalship is long overdue, but I owuld not waste your money on this. Try Emory Thomas or if you hate Lee this much, read Connelly's the Marble Man. At least Connelly's was well researched even if I do not agree with the opinion. That so many here pile on the praise of this book I would suggest taking a basic course in military theory.
   
   A couple of thoughts for you to ponder. What would the Confederacy have done if Richmond had fallen? That the author claims that Lee bled his army white shows his lack of knowledge about other contemporary battles, particualrly Solferino and the Napoleonic Wars.
   
   If Longstreet was not wounded at the Wilderness, Grant would have beeen forced back across the Rapidan.
   
   The author makes a better case with his book on Grant, but this is garbage.



3. Bonekemper has written a book that many Civil War history buffs will find outrageously controversial. His thesis, that Gen. Lee lost a winnable war through incompetent leadership, is broken down into the following claims:
   
   1) By taking the war into the North, Lee followed an ill-conceived strategy that had no chance of ultimate success. He could not maintain himself in supply at that distance from his base. He would eventually have to retreat, making it seem like he had been defeated, whether he had been or not. Further, he was making poor use of the two strategic advantages that the South had: a) they did not have to conquer the North in order to win the war, they only had to outlast them; and b) with their internal lines of communication, they could shift men and resources to the places where they most needed them.
   
   2) Lee's strategical viewpoint was influenced by his focus on the war in the East, and particularly the war in Virginia. He demanded and received the best of everything the South had to offer, and used it to fight for Virginia rather than for the South as a whole. He ignored important developments in the West, and denied that theatre resources that might have prevented its collapse. This myopia eventually allowed his own forces to be cut off and surrounded.
   
   3) Lee's strategy was made even worse by his preference for being on the offensive tactically. He failed to grasp that technological changes in weaponry had made massed charges on well-prepared defensive fortifications tantamount to suicide. He sent his soldiers into numerous assaults on Northern positions, that, even when they succeeded in driving back the enemy, were using up his manpower resources at an unsustainable rate.
   
   4) Compounding the above errors, Lee was not good at managing his army. He failed to provide himself with an adequate staff that could oversee the carrying out of his orders. His orders themselves were often vague, discretionary, and delivered verbally so that they were subject to misinterpretation and distortion.
   
   Anyone who is not wed to the image of Lee as a brilliant military commander will probably find himself being swayed by Bonekemper's arguments. Although born and raised in the South, my opinions on the Civil War make me an honorary Yankee. Therefore, I was entirely open to reading criticism of Lee, in spite of his iconic status. I found that at some point, though, I began to lose confidence in Bonekemper's objectivity. No possible objections to his viewpoint are presented or answered. He sets up the facts he want the reader to focus on, and ignores everything else. Nowhere does he mention that the idea of an invasion of the North was promoted by Johnston before Lee ever took command, or that it was also floated by Jackson at the end of his Valley campaign. Nowhere does he mention that the weight of public opinion in the South was completely opposed to a defensive war, and would probably have forced the resignation of any general who attempted to fight in that manner. (Lee could hardly have argued in favor of a defensive war using the prestige that he only enjoyed due to his willingness to go on the offensive.) Nor does Bonekemper mention the material advantages in resources and advanced weaponry enjoyed by the North that would have made a defensive war unlikely to succeed. Although weaponry made great technological advances during the war, the South did not possess the advanced weaponry as soon or in the same quantity as the North. For example, the South's retreat in the face of McClellan's advance during the Peninsula campaign was necessitated by their lack of long range guns that could respond to an artillery bombardment by Northern batteries.
   
   That said, I think there is some truth in Bonekemper's book, even if he does overstate his case. The South did not lose solely because of the decisions of one man, but Lee does bear some of the responsibility for the loss (not that I would have wanted the outcome to be different). Had Bonekemper tempered his arguments and taken into account some of the possible objections, this would be a much stronger book. Even so, I think it is worth reading for those who already have some knowledge of the issues. It is not a good book to start with in learning about the Civil War, though, and it is definitely not the last word on its subject.



4. This is a very thought provoking look at Lee's career. Read with THE REASON THE SOUTH LOST and WHY THE NORTH WON, it gives one a very different view of the relative capabilities of the generals involved and the constraints placed on both sides -- both physical and emotional. Lee undoubtedly has to bear the major blame for the South's defeat -- Bonekemper details and quantify's Lee's shortcomings in his grasp of strategy and the South's resources. I enjoyed this book a lot and would recommend it whether you agree with his argument or not.



5. Calling Robert E. Lee myopic in any context of the war he fought is crazy. Lee followed a strategy that was highly tuned to Southern desires. His strategy was well calculated to exert influence in the North and the crowned thugs in Europe. Lee could see a truth in the war nobody else could see, the war could be lost in either the east or west but only won in the east. Lee knew his men in the east were superior to the generals in the west, this however gave Lee no satisfaction but he did know it. As far as Lee being too aggressive is out of play as well. The southerners demanded aggressiveness and clamored for one thing, more war! Lee's style was exactly what southern temperment required. Look at what he achieves during the war and any one can see that because he was not successful does not mean he was wrong. At Seven Days he saved Richmond, at second Manassas he gave Lincoln a true emergency and at Chancellorsville, with the exception of Grant, haunts all other generals in the North during the rest of the war. Lee alone gave the Confederacy its only chance of victory and lived a life that was a vibrant heritage to everyone. So all of you on the Robert E. Lee myopia train need to get off, quit playing Monday morning quarterback and start studying a piece of history that can hold some water.

1 comments about Military Record of Louisiana: Including Biographical and Historical Papers Relating to the Military Organizations of the State.

1. Originally published in 1875, the Military Record of Louisiana is a collection of various written records, casualty lists and regimental muster rolls pertaining to Louisiana's participation in the American Civil War. It was compiled by Napier Bartlett, a native of Georgia who had studied in Louisiana prior to the war and entered the service of the famed Washington Artillery when the war began. The collection is, as Bartlett admits, "in no sense complete." Among the scattered and fragmentary items that one can find in the Military Record of Louisiana are, for example, the Journal of the Orleans Guard, the muster and partial casualty list for the 6th Louisiana Infantry, and The Louisiana Brigades in Virginia and Their Last Commander. By far the largest document that the book contains is Bartlett's own account of the service of the Washington Artillery. Despite the fragmentary nature of the Military Record of Louisiana it is without a doubt an important Civil War resource, and therefore a valuable addition to every Civil War buff's library.

No comments about "-Like a stone wall": Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, CSA (Civil War commander series).

1 comments about The Union Generals Speak: The Meade Hearings on the Battle of Gettysburg.

1. This book is truly a unique look into the politics of Army of the Potomac as well as the thoughts of the men who commanded it at Gettysburg. It is a work that most Gettysburg enthusiasts will greatly enjoy and will also serve as a valuable reference tool.
   
   The book in essence is the congressional testimony of some of the most important men involved in the battle of Gettysburg on the Federal side. The highlight of the book are the testimonies of Generals such as George Meade, Gouverneur Warren, Winfield Hancock, Henry Hunt and John Gibbon. Men whose testimony give us much insight into what their thoughts were during the battle and why it was fought the way it was.
   
   Also included in the book are some not so honorable testimonies by men whose goal at the hearings were to settle political and personal scores with Meade. The testimony of Dan Sickles will make even the most novice Gettysburg enthusiast's blood boil. To say it is full of lies and falsehoods would be an understatement. The testimony of Dan Butterfield isn't much better. The two men set out to destroy the reputation of Meade but in the end only managed to tarnished their own names in history.
   
   As important and interesting as these testimonies are, what really takes this book to the next level is the commentary by Bill Hyde. His comments put these testimonies in context and really help enhance the reader's understanding of what the men both testifying and on the committee were trying to accomplish.
   
   If you hold a strong interest in the Battle of Gettysburg then you are really going to enjoy this book. It will be a valuable addition to your Civil War book collection.