3 comments about Captain Jack & the Dalton Gang: The Life And Times of a Railroad Detective.

1. This book is very well written, The story quickly moves from page to page about a period in our nation's history before automobiles. Trains were the major mode of transportation, Our great-grandparents lived a daily life of danger and threats of crime much like today. The western prairie was a very dangerous place!
   Hanging Judge Parker was quite an interesting person to read about.
   This book should be read by any person interested in our history.



2. Captain Jack And The Dalton Gang: The Life And Times Of A Railroad Detective by John J. Kinney chronicles the true story of his great-grandfather Jack Kinney, the chief detective for the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad and his armed and violent confrontation with the infamous Dalton gang. Researching old journals and newspaper accounts for details of the controversial forty-minute battle at Adair in the Indian Territory on July 14, 1892 between Captain Jack and his posse with the nine-member outlaw gang known as the Daltons -- as well as other exploits in the life and career of the man who also served as the chief detective for the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad, a Texas Ranger, and a U.S. deputy marshal who worked for "Hanging Judge" Isaac Parker on the lawless American frontier. Captain Jack And The Dalton Gang is a superbly presented, engagingly informative, biographically oriented, rivetingly entertaining story of outlaws and the lawmen who pursued them. Highly recommended reading!



3. This book goes back to the old days when train robberies were more fashionable for some bandits, including the "Dalton Gang." Kinney chronicles the story of Captain John Kinney, chief detective for the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad, and describes what happens when he is one day confronted with the members of the Dalton gang during a train robbery on July 14, 1892 in the small community of Adair in Indian Territory. This was the first time the Dalton gang encountered armed resistance, which was organized and ready for them. The author is the great-grandson of Captain Jack and after growing up with tales of the man, he decided to seek out the truth. Searching through old journals and newspapers, the author found not only the life and facts for his ancestral roots, but the facts about the Daltons. This will be a fine addition to this Old West genre.
   
   
   Mike Koch, author of "The Kimes Gang."

5 comments about The Southern Haunting of Truman Capote.

1. This book is simply a rehash of information which has already been published. I am a big fan of Marie Rudisill's and loved FRUITCAKE and SOOK'S COOKBOOK. I advise she work on her own and not coauthor with Simmons again--her books with him just don't allow her wit and humanity to show through.



2. This book has so much detail in such few chapters. This story tells how Truman was first left to stay at Jenny's house..Also featuring the special tree house, the bone fence and the Sunday dinners. All these stories were wonderful. I've never read such interesting, real detail about Truman's life..this book is a must have for every Capote fan. Way to go Marie



3. This book has so much detail in such few chapters. This story tells how Truman was first left to stay at Jenny's house..Also featuring the special tree house, the bone fence and the Sunday dinners. All these stories were wonderful. I've never read such interesting, real detail about Truman's life..this book is a must have for every Capote fan. Way to go Marie



4. The reviews of this book vary widely from Capote fans that treasure every shred of information to those that feel the book recycles known information to others critical of the co-author. I am a Capote fan and do treasure information on Truman. The book is short but I found it well written and fascinating. The text also captures the Southern frame of mind so common among those raised in the South (as I was). In addition, the hardcover is an attractive book and will stay on my shelf for years to come. It has a high quality binding; the dust jacket and interior are handsome and well made. Given the price, not only is it a fine volume for Capote fans but it is a good value.



5. I REALLY LIKED THIS LITTLE BOOK BECAUSE THERES NOTHING LIKE READING ABOUT SOUTHERN PEOPLE AND SOUTHERN WAYS. IT WAS JUST A WONDERFUL LAID BACK MOOD. VERY RELAXING TO READ.

1 comments about Grand Master Workman: Terence Powderly and the Knights of Labor (Contributions in Labor Studies).

1. Phelan's biography of Terence V. Powderly, along with his previous works on William Green and John Mitchell, places him in the premiere rank of labor biographers. His task in GRAND MASTER WORKMAN is to present a revised and much more favorable view of Powderly and his fourteen year (1879-1893) tenure as head of the Knights of Labor. Phelan targets the generations of American labor historians, particularly Norman Ware and Philip S. Foner, who dismissed Powderly and the Knights as a last gap of the utopian traditions of the antebellum years which were unsuited to the economic realities of the Gilded Age. This argument was specifically the case in regard to the rise of the rival and ultimately successful American Federation of Labor (AFL) with its more apolitical craft unionism. Powderly himself was charged with, among other things, being sensitive, vain, naive, and arrogant. Recent studies of the Knights, especially on the local level, have transformed the view of the Knights into that of an authentic working-class organization with a convincing critique of industrial capitalism. Unfortunately, the view of Powderly had not been transformed, until now. Phelan's Powderly is not a pusillanimous utopian but a worthy if somewhat flawed hero who articulated the collective progressive vision of the working masses in the face of the oppression and inhumanity of the industrial capitalist system and its leaders which eventually crushed the Knights. Phelan uses the voluminous archival papers of Powderly, on deposit at The Catholic University of America and available on microfilm, to present Powderly in his own words. The liberal use of quotes, such as Powderly's opinion of his former protege and personal Judas, John William Hayes, as a "Skunk" and a "Pimple," are a special treat and a great insight into Powderly's personality. Although the focus was on labor, Phelan could have written more on Powderly's later career as a government official, first as Commissioner-General of Immigration, 1897-1902, then as Chief of the Division of Information of the Bureau of Immigration, 1907-1921, and Commissioner of Conciliation of the Deparment of Labor, 1921 until his death on 24 June 1924. It was during this time that Powderly became a bosom friend and correspondent of the great labor advocate, 'Mother' Mary Harris Jones, the celebrated 'Miners' Angel.' In conclusion, Phelan's GRAND MASTER WORKMAN is the most definitive and balanced account of Powderly's years in the Knights of Labor but a more complete and detailed biography encompassing the rest of his career is still needed. END END

No comments about William H. Emory: Soldier-Scientist.

No comments about Well Satisfied with My Position: The Civil War Journal of Spencer Bonsall.

5 comments about George B. McClellan and Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman.

1. Thomas J. Rowland set out to prove that, although George McClellan was not a great general, neither was he as bad as so many Civil War historians and writers have depicted him. I believe that he has succeeded. Having read Stephen Sears' classic biography on "Mac", I was certain that the definitive McClellan verdict was a fait accompli. How wrong I was! Historians T. Harry Williams, Kenneth P. Williams, and Bruce Catton were also cited for a less than even-handed assessment of McClellan. Still, one must add that Rowland did not maliciously criticize the intent of these historians. He merely pointed out that they needlessly made Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman--men who remain giants without anyone's help--larger than they should be, at McClellan's expense. After examining their records during the first two years of the war, each of these men showed less than a superlative level of performance, contrary to popular assumption. I think that Rowland's book is one of best buys I have ever made. A more superbly-written, well-argued, and illuminating book on George McClellan and his impact on the Civil War and its interpretation would be hard to find. It's great. Buy it!



2. Thomas J. Rowland set out to prove that, although George McClellan was not a great general, neither was he as bad as so many Civil War historians and writers have depicted him. I believe that he has succeeded. Having read Stephen Sears' classic biography on "Mac", I was certain that the definitive McClellan verdict was a fait accompli. How wrong I was! Historians T. Harry Williams, Kenneth P. Williams, and Bruce Catton were also cited for a less than even-handed assessment of McClellan. Still, one must add that Rowland did not maliciously criticize the intent of these historians. He merely pointed out that they needlessly made Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman--men who remain giants without anyone's help--larger than they should be, at McClellan's expense. After examining their records during the first two years of the war, each of these men showed less than a superlative level of performance, contrary to popular assumption. I think that Rowland's book is one of best buys I have ever made. A more superbly-written, well-argued, and illuminating book on George McClellan and his impact on the Civil War and its interpretation would be hard to find. It's great. Buy it!



3. The author, Thomas J. Rowland, develops his thesis that General George McClellan has been unfairly characterized by both contemporaries and historians. The first half of the book discusses the common criticisms of McClellan. In Chapter 2 the so called psychological profile on McClellan is reviewed stating that "Of all the reasons why McClellan may have been a gravely flawed commander, the exploitation of the psychological model is the most flawed itself...." He notes that both Grant and Sherman "....trailed a significant baggage of personality deficiencies into the Civil War" observing that "If anyone came close to experiencing a psychic episode during the Civil War it was Sherman in Kentucky."

   In the chapter discussing McClellan's lesser faults, the author notes that both Grant and Sherman had similar faults, but they weren't judged by these faults nor should McClellan's strategic abilities be evaluated by his peccadilloes. Acknowledging that McClellan played a major role in his poor working relations with Lincoln, the author notes that "....the president was not frank about how military goals were to be shaped by the political dimensions of the rebellion." In addition, Stanton's dislike of McClellan did not help in the commander's poor relationship with the president. However, the author does not imply that McClellan was faultless noting "....his failure to delegate authority and his obstinate secrecy" Another fault was his unwillingness to take risks. The greatest question is whether he made the best use of the Army of the Potomac. Rowland concludes that "In any comparison with other Civil War commanders, particularly those to whom he is unfavorably compared, McClellan's personal shortcomings were not that remarkable."

   Chapter 4's discussion of the early months of war provides valuable insight into the ultimate conduct of the war. The widely held Northern belief that most Southerners were not committed secessionists initially led to a limited war strategy. After the First Manassas McClellan recommended that to restore the Union in the shortest time, the North had to "crust the rebellion at one blow...." Rowland notes "McClellan's was....a well reasoned strategic proposal. His conservative views.... reflected....widespread appeal throughout the North at that time...." In support of this strategy, he launched the Peninsula Campaign which was undermined by Washington politics and lack of support. The book states

   "....the half defeat on the Peninsula.... spelled the end of the conciliatory" strategy. For this campaign to succeed, joint operations were mandatory; and the author observes that in the early stages of the war, the inability of Federal armies to cooperate in joint operations contrasted sharply with the military situation Grant inherited in 1864.

   The review of civilian leaders alarm regarding Washington's safety is noteworthy. Extraordinary concerns for the capital's safety contrasted with months of endless nagging McClellan to assume the offensive. However the troops needed for an offensive had to come from those providing the capital's defense. Both McClellan and Grant faced the problem of Washington's safety with McClellan trying to comply and Grant often giving only limited support. The book concludes "McClellan's Peninsula campaign, the first major Federal offensive in East, experienced problems uniquely its own, not the least....was the administration's failure to sustain plans they had.... agreed to support." During the first two war years, many Northerners believed the Confederates would be quickly defeated perhaps in one major campaign. When McClellan assumed command in 1861, he inherited an untrained and disorganized army. The author notes that McClellan implemented schools of instruction and all volunteers were given basic training directed by an experienced officer. In addition, he recognized the deficit in trained officers (several were political hacks) and arranged effective training. The book frequently notes, that the training and organizing of the army was a major contribution. Considering, the sheer folly of his predecessor's taking an unprepared army to defeat at the First Bull Run, McClellan's unwillingness to assume the offensive in 1861 with an untrained army was prudent and not excessive caution. Unfortunately, in 1862, politics and lack of support doomed his Peninsula campaign.

   Rowland writes "....little attention is paid to the context in which McClellan dealt with the difficulties that faced the Federal army in the first fifteen months of the war. ....his early tenure deprived him of the advantage of leading mature and seasoned civilian soldiers, adapted to the demands of a new age of warfare...." As one historian noted, McClellan "suffered the frictions and frustrations of being first." The text notes that Sherman observed that Napoleon took three years to build an army and "....here it is expected in ninety days..." The author notes the irony that McClellan was relieved of command when "He had effectively divided Lee's army into widely separated halves, intending to drive between them. The celerity of those moves alarmed Lee...." This could have been a critical blow.

   The text continues that McClellan might have been forgiven a multiple of failures had he kept his eye on the military objective, the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia. However, McClellan's strategy to capture Richmond was not without merit as Richmond was a critical manufacturing, transportation and financial center. The Tredegar Iron Works alone justified the capture of Richmond. Richmond's fall during the first two war years would have been devastating to the Confederacy. Regarding Antietam, Rowland correctly notes that regardless of McClellan's shortcomings, Antietam was a Union victory. McClellan had stopped Lee from delivering a demoralizing blow on northern soil.

   The book concludes, "McClellan's strategy, though reflective of the unrealistic war aims of the years 1861-62,was cogent, reasoned, and consistent with conventional military wisdom.... McClellan can scarcely be elevated to the ranks of the great captains of war, but he was hardly the worst that the conflict dragged into the center stage."

   The book is somewhat repetitious and devotes too much space to comparing McClellan's faults with similar faults of Grant and Sherman. However, the book is worth reading for its discussion of Union military and political strategy during the first two years of the Civil War.




4. As an Amazon.com reviewer, I can see that I am going to be in the decided minority in my opinion on this book. Hopefully I can adequately point out my perceived problems with Mr. Rowland's work, and yet maintain the positives other reviewers have posted.

   I have long been fascinated with George B. McClellan as not only a Civil War general, but as a Civil War personality as well. Here we have a man who should have been the one, single, Union military success - a man who had it all: brains, looks, youth, education, and family. And yet, there is no single Union general who managed to accomplish so little in over a year's time, with so much.

   I hoped that Thomas J. Rowland's "George B. McClellan & Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman" would provide some insight into McClellan's flawed character that did not come forth from modern biographers such as Stephen Sears. Yet within Rowland's work, I was sorely disappointed.

   Rowland sets forth to disprove Little Mac's critics by doing the one thing in Civil War writing that I abhor - rather than building up his subject, and letting McClellan's story stand on its own - he sets out to drag everyone else down. For some strange reason, there appears to be more and more of this going on in Civil War historiography of late, much to the detriment of our understanding of history.

   Rowland sets out to outline the perceived problems with McClellan's personality and generalship, and rather than refute the contentions directly, often sets out to discredit others such as Grant, Sherman, and Edwin Stanton. If Rowland's guy cannot stand tall, then no one else will, as well. For example, we have on page 67 a typical statement of Rowland's: "The notion that McClellan was the butt of more embarrassing incidents than anyone else is greatly diminished by any extended review of the war's comical and tragic mistakes." And from there, rather than review Little Mac, Rowland sets out to review other participants on history's stage.

   Rowland attempts to minimize McClellan's flaws by qualifying his admittance of such flaws throughout the book. Thus, we see Rowland admit, cautiously, that McClellan could be petty, vain, and vindictive "on occasion." In other places, his review of other historian's work is tinged with statements like "Unfortunately, that is not entirely true." The reader is left to try to ponder which portions are partially true, and partially not.

   This book is not a comprehensive analysis of the life and times of General George B. McClellan, but a selected bibliography of truth and half-truth that uses only what the author wants the public to see about McClellan - and more importantly, anyone else held in higher esteem than the Young Napoleon that can be drawn down to the perceived level that history holds McClellan.

   All in all, this was a very disappointing work. If you want to come to grips with the enigma that was McClellan, this book will leave you very short of your expectations.




5. I am in two minds about this book. On the one hand: history has not been kind to "Little Mac", and it was about time somebody stood up for McClellan. Mr. Rowland has picked up the gauntlet. Lately, it seems to me, one can detect a bit of a trend towards that end. Mr. Rowland and other authors have reexamined and reassessed the General's personality and actions. Mr. Ethan S. Rafuse's book on McClellan ("McClellan's War") is another example of a fresh look at McClellan.
   To do so and fly in the face of the "communis opinio" (the widely held view) of McClellan is in itself commendable.
   
   On the other hand: I don't think that there is much purpose to this excercise. As I see it, and I'm pretty sure in that many other ACW scholars, buffs and aficionados, share this point of view, no matter how fresh or objective one tries to look at George Brinton McClellan, one reaches the same conclusions again and again: that the General was a deeply flawed man, to say the least, vain and boastful, and yet (or perhaps even because of this) also extremely cautious, highly insecure and frankly, paranoid. I've read of people, in his own time already, not just smart-mouth Amazon book-reviewers like yours truly, referring to him as a crackpot. I even think it was Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. Well, we know that Secretary Stanton was no great friend of McClellan and that he was quite stern in his opinions about the Generals he had to deal with, but in this case his ususally hot-headed judgement is not necessarily a wrong one.
   
   Is it time for some revisionist history concerning McClellan? Is this necessary? Are the commonly held views of McClellan subject to debate, are these views thought to be untrue, unjust, unfair or even unhistorical by a growing number of ACW scholars, students and buffs? No, of course they are not. Because the general view of McClellan is born out of something "Little Mac" himself so conspicuously lacked: common sense.
   
   Major General George Brinton McClellan had it all when he was called to Washington in 1861. He had a towering reputation (which was undeserved, after his successfull but minor campaign in Western Virginia, but the Union was elated to have a military success at last), he was hailed as the savior of the Union and he was given command of the Union's most important field army. The President and the cabinet trusted him, deferred to his judgement and put themselves at his disposition in stead of the other way round. He soon succeeded in ousting Winfield Scott, the venerable US Army Chief, and became General in Chief of all Union armies. McClellan, catapulted into this position of enormous power, then started to believe the adulation and the flattery of the people, the press and the politicians himself. He seemed to need it more and more, because as his influence and power increased, so did his insecurities, his doubts, his paranoia and his unbalance.
   Well, we don't need to make to much of McClellan's flaws, after all, who of is isn't flawed in some, or even many, ways. Mr. Rowland correctly makes that point. McClellan wasn't more or less flawed than Grant and or Sherman. The thing is, however, that Grant and Sherman overcame their flaws, faced their demons and learned to function adequately if not superbly in command.
   McClellan did not succeed in ridding himself of his fears or in learning to control them, nor in curbing his insecurities and his paranoid tendencies, and as such he was definitely not the right man to command the Army of the Potomac in the field.
   
   Also there is cause to question his moral and indeed even his physical courage: McClellan stayed well away from the field of fight during any action. And there are more instances of behavior which justify this question mark against "Little Mac"'s honor of than the often cited episode of McClellan sailing away on a gunboat just after the beginning of the battle of Malvern Hill. An "unforgivable act of pusillanimity", as was said by some at the time, for which McClellan never offered an adequate explanation. Well, surely he was not prepared to get down to the level of his accusers and react to such slander, mr Rowland says. Yeah, right. That is the way in which people like McClellan usually respond to such considerations. I think, as do many others, that there remains a reasonable doubt as to McClellan's courage, based on his actions.
   
   As to his judgment, well, let's name an aspect of this that puts a different light on the General's fitness for command. I'm talking of course of McClellan's tendency to systematically overestimate the number of enemy troops opposing him. He did this from day one in command and kept it up to right after Antietam, when he was finally relieved, in october 1862.
   
   Why oh why did he do this? How did he come by those incredibly fantastic figures of hundreds of thousands of rebels opposing him and his poor little army? Was it all Pinkerton's fault? The great detective, after all, supplied the figures to McClellan. Pinkerton later said that he and his operatives had always given McClellan true numbers to the best of their knowledge. He also stated that they had not supplied McClellan with data which would support the exaggerated numbers of troops McClellan claimed Johnston and after him Lee had arrayed against him. In other words: McClellan took what Pinkerton gave him and then did some calculating of his own. He tailored the facts to fit his opinions and impressions, a professional hazard for a General, made all the more probable by McClellan's psychological make-up.
   Whatever the psychological reasons; his inability to admit mistakes is one of the least attractive traits of McClellan's character.
   After the war, indeed even during it, it became clear that Johnston and Lee had never commanded anything near the numbers of men that McClellan had claimed in his frantic cries for reinforcements and on which he had based his overcautious strategies.
   After doing some maths it must have dawned on the people of the North that the war, which had gone on for four bloody years, could have ended in 1862. It could have ended with McClellan taking Richmond in june 1862 or with McClellan crushing Lee's badly outnumbered army at Antietam. In those days McClellan had acted too cautiously because he had convinced himself he was outnumbered. Even McClellan must have known, pretty soon after the war, that he had been tricked, by the rebels and by his own mind. But he never made any comment on the question!
   He never apologized (well, that would have been impossible for a man like him) but neither did he ever explain his behavior. He never said on what he had he had based his now manifestly wrong actions in the Peninsula and Antietam campaigns!
   
   What I even less understand, why weren't the people of the Union states furious with him for failing to win the war in 1862? He dawdled, faltered and failed and in doing so wasted the opportunities to end the war out of weakness, lack of resolve, moral cowardice and pig-headedness! He had Lee's battleplans in his possession just prior to Antietam, for Pete's sakes!! Why wasn't there more of an outcry against him? The war lasted two more years thanks to him! Why was he not dragged before congress or before a court-martial? In my view there was every reason to do so.
   
   Now to the plus side. McClellan made the Army of the Potomac. He built it from the masses of raw volunteers that came to Washington in 1861. He trained these men, and selected their commanders, and he made some inspired choices in this regard (men like Gibbon, Hancock, and Hunt, for instance). He drilled the army, organized it and fed, clothed and housed it. He kept the army in good health an kept it supplied.
   The fine performance of the men of the Army of the Potomac, especially that of the infantry and the gunners, owed a very great deal to the rigourous training programme to which McClellan subjected them. The General turned out to possess an enormous talent for organization and training. He honed the skills of the army and prepared it to an excellent degree for it's task. The credit for this is largely due to McClellan. Maybe this was part of the problem: McClellan built the army and knew it's strengths and it's weaknesses. After having made this huge army he was reluctant to commit it to action. They were all so green! There were so few regulars! He could not do what the French had done in 1793 when they fused the professional Royal Army with the new volunteer army, made up of inexperienced national guardsmen. They amalgamated the two types of soldiers in a new army: they put one regular army batallion in a demi-brigade with two batallions of volunteers. In this way the old sweats showed the rookies the ropes of soldiering and infused old-fashioned discipline while in turn the volunteers were an example and an inspiration of revolutionary elan to the old soldiers.
   McClellan could not do this: there were only some 17.000 regular soldiers in the US Army in 1861. He felt he had to use his army very very carefully and cautiously, if he lost it, he would lose the war, and the Union with it. This realization, of which he convinced himself, eventually paralyzed him.
   
   This is book that makes you think, and think again, on McClellan. Four stars for that!!!
   I do not share Mr. Rowland's conclusions, though. In 1862 McClellan was not the best man for the job to command the Army of the Potomac.
   It would have been for him and for his reputation had he continued in an organizing/facilitating capacity. Lincoln should have made him Chief of Staff in Washington, in fact, should have given "Little Mac" the job Henry Halleck got in 1862, or should have made him Quartermaster-General or even Secretary of War.
   It would in all probability have meant that McClellan would have become the Lazare Carnot of the Union: "The Organizer of Victory" The man who supplied the tools that won the war for the Union. He could then have supervised the productions of arms and ammunition, the supplying of the army, it's transportation, the training of it's new recruits, and he would more than probably have done a great job. He was the born military organizer. He was not, alas, a great field commander. McClellan would have lived to great respect and glory and would not have died at 58, of a heart condition which probably stemmed from the stress of supreme command, and which after the war was aggravated by the constant stress of battling to keep his reputation intact. McClellan died a controversial figure, respected and yet partly tragic, partly ridiculous. But he had only himself to blame for this.

3 comments about Damned Yankee: The Life of General Nathaniel Lyon.

1. Christopher Phillips provides the reader with a fascinting insight into the character of Nathaniel Lyon. Rarely in reading a biography has the reader come away with such a clear and precise understanding as to what the central character's personality was really like.
   By providing this insight into Lyon's character the reader can clearly understand what motivated Lyon to take the actions he took in the troubled 1860's in Missouri. Lyon was a not very likable individual, He brought a zealot's zeal to virtually everything he believed in or did regardless of the conseqences. In the end this zeal brought about his own death. A great read...two thumbs up.



2. Damned Yankee provides a surprisingly detailed study of the life of U.S. Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon. Author Chistopher Phillips probes deeply into Lyon's background, family, and military career. The product is a fascinating portrait of a determined and disturbing figure.
   
   Nathaniel Lyon seized the initiative in Missouri, never allowing the determined secessionist governor an opportunity to guide the state out of the Union. While Missourians overall desired neutrality and elected secession convention delegates who soundly rejected secession, the elected state government leaned far more Southern than strictly neutral. From the moment of his entry onto the scene in St. Louis, Lyon worked tirelessly to frustrate Southern ambitions on the Federal arsenal. He butted heads with his more passive superiors in St. Louis; and he successfully conspired with various political figures to usurp and replace these impediments to his perceived mission.
   
   Lyon is a unique personage with an intensely individual interpretation of right and wrong. The author's central theme is that Lyon sought to punish those who strayed from what Lyon perceived to be the right path; and the author is effective in presenting his case. Lyon's disagreements with superiors and fellow officers were frequently intense, often to the point of insufferable insubordination. His punishment of subordinates for infractions was also extreme to the point he was successfully court-martialed for excessive punishment.
   
   The events in Lyon's career I found most disturbing related to his sanctioned and authorized reprisal massacres of Native Americans in California. This certainly makes his declaration of war in Missouri far more threatening: "Better, sir, far better, that the blood of every man, woman and child within the limits of the State should flow, than that she should defy the federal government."
   
   As a military commander and organizer, Lyon proved incredibly capable. Here was a commander with the bold aggressiveness of Grant, the self-assured intensity of Forrest, and the discipline of Stonewall Jackson. However, he also possessed huge flaws such as an inability to get along, political inflexibility, and subversive intrigue that likely would have undone him had he not perished at Wilson's Creek. His eccentric and caustic beliefs were likely to produce outrages.
   
   The author does a fine job of presenting the various viewpoints and back and forth of central characters. When he does present his own conclusions though they are not always convincing. The argument that Lyon was the irritant that leading to much of the eventual conflict in Missouri falls particularly flat, as does the pronouncement that without strong Federal action Missouri's pro-Southern governor and government would still have been unsuccessful in their aims.
   
   I'm also highly skeptical of the author's characterization of Lyon's reasoning for fighting at Wilson's Creek as being a punitive crusade. Lyon was right that he must use his force or lose it. He was also correct that if he retreated without a fight he would give the secessionists control of southwest Missouri. I can't fault the logic of forcing an engagement before determining whether or not to retire in such a circumstance.
   
   There are a few errors in the descriptions of events in Lyon's Civil War campaign, but overall they are well presented. I will note that I was disappointed the author did not point out Lyon's quartermaster Justus McKinstry was later successfully court-martialed for his activities in disrupting Union supply. No doubt that would have detracted from the author's case against Lyon's circumventing of a clearly broken supply system in St. Louis.
   
   Despite the above observations about the author overselling points of his case I agree with his central theme. This is a well-researched book and provides a complete profile of Nathaniel Lyon as a soldier and a man.



3. This paperback* is useful as a cheap (book can be purchased at a deep discount) means to get an idea of what occurred in Missouri during the first part of the Civil War. Phillip's attempt to psychologically profile General Lyon with today's sensitivities provides the reader with comic relief in this account of some of the darkest days in our history.
   
   *note: one needs to be able to read between the lines of Phillip's politically correct revisionist slant on history.

5 comments about Ansel Adams: A Biography.

1. With the many monographs, existing biographies and the letters already published Mary Street Alinder provides an insight into the "real" Ansel Adams. Without destroying the legend, his life is shown as imperfect, human. This is the complete Adams, the great image-maker, the technical genius, environmentalist, pianist, social figure, but also alluding to a less than perfect personal life. Alinders' position as assistant has allowed her a unique perspective of the world's best-known photographer, the result is a book that is well-structured and entertaining to read. It shows where Adams fits into the greater picture, his associations with other photographers, figures in the art world and his political as well as social connections. The only weakness is the fully justified attack on the trustees of the Ansel Adams legacy; this may not be the place for such personal comments. Ansel Adams: A Biography is an excellent book, whether you think you know about Adams or have never heard of the great man.



2. Alinder has written a superb book, which for the first time, gives us the real Ansel Adams.

   And here on the printed page we find what has been whispered about for decades: Ansel wasn't exactly a nice guy. Poor Virginia (his wife who tolerated his infidelity); poor Michael and Anne (his kids who rarely saw him).

   Adams joins the ranks of Weston and Stieglitz, who we've also learned were not saints at all. Not even very nice people. But exceptionally gifted artists nonetheless.




3. I thought it was very interesting it was of thought and simplicity it had lots of interseting perspectives about one's own life....



4. The book is interesting and quite well written, if you don't mind the non-chronology of it. I just came away thinking even less of Mr. Adams than I did going in and that was a let-down for me. I think some of his photographs are very pretty, but I would never call them art! They don't "move" me and neither did this book.



5. Rarely do I start rereading a book immediately after I finish the last page, and it is even more rare for the book to be a biography. Mary Street Alinder's biography of Ansel Adams is one of these.

   I have studied and admired Ansel Adams' photography for many years: his mastery of composition and virtuosity in the darkroom are unrivaled. His books on photographic and darkroom technique are well read and have a prominent place in my technical library. I did not know anything about Ansel Adams the man.

   Mary Street Alinder was Adams' assistant during the final years of his life, becoming a close confidant and co-authoring his autobiography and later collecting and publishing his letters. In that unique position she had access to almost 70 years of correspondence, tens of thousands unprinted negatives, and more important of all close access to Ansel and his family.

   The image of Adams that develops through the pages of the book is a difficult one to interpret. His friendships with other photographers, naturalists, and numerous female assistants were deep and life long (though in the case of the latter never intimate). His relationship to his family was a different matter, and this is where the difficulty lies: Ansel was first and foremost dedicated to, if not obsessed by, his art, at the expense of his wife and children. In this he comes through as less than likable. But it also becomes clear that inside Ansel was always a child, excited by all around him and exuberant with life and a single self-centered focus towards doing what he could for the places he loved.

   Alinder's writing is clear and concise. The organization of the book is not strictly chronological. Instead each chapter documents specific events, people, places, or photographs. This can be disconcerting at first, but it is an effective approach that leads to a more interesting read. Chapter 13, "Moonrise," is especially fascinating. It is Alinder's favorite picture, and she was fortunate enough to be in the darkroom with him as he made a print from the original negative. The description of Ansel's process is musical.

   Alinder is not an apologist for Ansel's personality flaws: she presents him honestly, though not critically. The book is rife with citations: there are over 60 pages of notes supporting the story.

   If you want insight into Ansel Adams the Photographer, the Naturalist, and most importantly, the Man, then I highly recommend this book.

5 comments about Leaders of the Lost Cause: New Perspectives on the Confederate High Command.

1. President Jefferson Davis once wrote his brother that great generals only come around once in every generation. Unfortunately, Davis explained, the Confederacy needed a half a dozen."
   
   During the war the South had eight full generals. Of these only Lee proved to be fully up to the demands of the job. Albert Sidney Johnston died (Shiloh) before he could really prove himself. The others Joe Johnson, P. G. T. Beauregard, Braxton Bragg, Samuel Cooper, Edmund Kirby Smith, John Bell Hood did not live up to the expectations of Davis.
   
   Many of these men have not received the attention due them while other generals of lessor rank have received much more. Samuel Cooper, in particular is little known. As the adjutant and inspector general of the Confederacy, he spent the war behind a desk. But it was from this desk that the men, weapons, food and other supplies went to the front line armies.
   
   This is an excellent book, covering an aspect of the war not seen before.



2. Eight men became full generals in the army of the Confederate States of America. Four in the first months and four during the course of the war. All of us know some of the names, students of the war know more but few can name all eight men. They were diverse but in many ways similar, all West Point educated, all intelligent and well to do by the standards of the times. One never led an army in battle, one was killed in battle, two fought with President Davis almost constantly and one almost destroyed his army. Overall, most of them were not very good generals being unable to work within the system to produce victory on the battlefield.
   
   Each man is the subject of a 30 to 40-page essay covering his life, outlining his pre and post war activities but concentrating on the war. Each essay is written by a different person, which both adds and subtracts from the book. Taking a positive approach to J.E. Johnston or Braxton Bragg is a challenge but taking a very negative approach detracts from the book. Depending on your view, the essay on AS & JE Johnston, Bragg and Hood will be enjoyed or disliked. I found the JE Johnston essay to be very negative and overlooked many of his contributions. Bragg got a fair and even handed critique, while Hood is cast as a tragic figure. Beauregard's essay was excellent and I enjoyed Cooper's essay the most.
   
   The book is badly needed and while not a "must have" is a valuable introduction, I would have liked it much better if it had been less partisan.



3. Gary Gallagher and Joseph T. Glaathaar are two of our most eminent Civil War scholars! In this new volume they have asked several Civil War scholars to write brief essays on the eight men who were full generals of the Confederate States of America.
   All of the articles are of high quality:.
   1 P.G.T. Beauregard by Charles Roland. The doughty Creole was
   the hero of Ft. Sumter and served well during the siege of Petersburg. His service during First Bull Run was exemplary.
   He was not up to the top notch of battlefield leadership, coming up with some chimerical strategic ideas during the last months of the war. His service
   was good not great.
   2. Braxton Bragg by the eminent Jackson biographer Bud Robertson
   shows this grouchy and inept commander at his worst.
   3. Samuel Cooper is little known today but William C. Davis gives him a passing grade as the administrative leader of the
   Confederate government. Cooper was born in 1798, was northern born and never held a field command for the South.
   4. Albert Sidney Johnson is dubbed the Hamlet of the South by Stephen D. Engle. Johnston died at Shiloh. He was a close friend of Jefferson Davis. What might have been had he lived to fight further battles is pure conjecture.
   5. Snarl, Sneer and Quarrel is the opinion of Robert K. Krick the acerbic writer of the article on Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston's Fabian tactics of retreat in the Georgia campaign was a failed stategy. Krick is a great historian and his article is
   worth the price of the book!
   6. It was the dubious duty of Edmund Kirby Smith the Florida native to defend the Trans Missssippi region during the war.
   He was a good subordinate but was in way over his head at such
   a difficult assignmentaccording to Joseph T. Glatthaar whose
   article is well done.
   7. Keith S. Bohannon's picture of John Bell Hood is a man of all brawn and dash but little in the brain department! He was promoted beyond his abilities as he led grey legions in the Atlanta and Tennessee campaigns of 1864.
   8. Robert Edward Lee was a great geneal who led the Confederate armies with bloody tenacity. Gary Gallagher is one of my favorite Civil War authors and his portrait of Lee is limned with excellent scholarship and judicious appraisal.
   This is a good book to whet the appetite of readers eager to
   learn more about Civil War leadership. As an old Civil War buff I learned some new angles to these commanders. The book is well
   recommended for someone just getting their feet wet in the vast
   ocean of Civil War scholarship. Excellent!



4. "Leaders of the Lost Cause" offers interesting biographical sketches of the eight men who became full general officers in the CSA. This book seems designed for the casual reader who may be suprised that the likes of Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet are not included. Nonetheless, both serious students of the war and casual ones will profit from the book.
   
   The essays are generally of the highest quality. Gary Gallagher offers an excellent concise biography on Robert E. Lee and attempts to explain why he could remain popular in the army and with civilians despite high casualites. Charles Roland provides a solid look at the enigmatic P.G.T Beauregard and finds that the Creole general's character often undermined his leadership. William Davis offers a readable essay on the obscure Samuel Cooper and one is left with the conclusion that Cooper was the Confederate Halleck, a somewhat disagreeable, though competent, paper pusher. Stephen Engle concludes that Albert Sidney Johnson, who entered the war with high hopes and simply could not live up to them (and didn't based on his handling of the West), by dying at Shiloh, saw his reputation restored as one of the great "what ifs" of the war. Robert Krick takes Joe Johnston to task in his essay and one is forced to agree that Johnston undermined his reputation by his own comments and the book he wrote. Joseph Glatthaar agrees with Robert Kerby, the magistarial historian of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi South, that Edmund Kirby Smith was a competent young officer who was handed a task that nobody could have done in leading that isolated region during the second half of the war. At the same time, Glatthaar crushes the idea that Tom Connelly expressed of Kirby Smith having a messianic complex. The essay would have been a bit stronger if it went into Kirby Smith's rivalry with Richard Taylor and how he was able to juggle friendships with Jeff Davis and his archrival Joe Johnston. Keith Bohannon adds to the conventional wisdom that John Bell Hood, while a solid divisional commander and an agressive leader, had no business leading an army.
   
   James Robertson contributes perhaps the best essay in the collection, a look at Braxton Bragg. Robertson maintains that no "better organizer and disciplinarian exsisted in the Confederate armies" than Bragg (p. 72) and reminds readers that, with the exception of Lee, he was also the most agressive army commander. At the same time, Robertson does not overlook Bragg's many flaws as a man and as a commander. This is an interesting essay; it does not descend into the hagiographic praise for the subject that seems to plague Civil War biographers. At the same time, Robertson is challenging a great deal of conventional wisdom by showing Bragg as a better leader than most historians believe. That does not mean that Robertson has a positive view of his subject but he does indicate that Bragg had more talent than is commonly believed. One is forced to ponder his point, even if not fully accepting it.
   
   There is little that is new here on the leading generals though a good deal of insight on the more obscure Cooper and Kirby Smith as well as Robertson's new take on Bragg. This combination of new insights and familiar biographical details make this a book that can appeal to both the casual and serious reader. In an age of dry books aimed for specialists, "Leaders of the Lost Cause" is a bit of a pleasant suprise and, unlike many books on the subject, does not fall for the old "moonlight and magnolias" worship of Confederate leaders. None of these leaders comes off unscathed and some come off rather badly.
   
   This is a readable and fair book that offers a great deal to scholars as well as readers with only a passing interest in the subject. I can not think of higher praise for a work of non-fiction.



5. Excellent analysis of not the best generals of the Civil War, outside of General Lee, but the early leaders of the armies in the field. Lee is oddly out of place in this collection as Braxton Bragg, Beareguard, Joeseph E. Johnson, Hood and Smith seem to have such negative images compared to Lee. Albert Sidney Johnson's early death at Shiloh allows him to stand apart as his intial success at Shiloh to a degree limits a longterm look. The most interesting essays, as one familar with the Civil War's generals would gather, are on Bragg, Beareguard and Johnson. Robertson writes a fascinating bio on Bragg who is the most puzzling general in the Confederacy. A gifted organizer but he lacked the ability to be a leader and inspire his men and generals. Bragg had an often nasty disposition and was often argumentive, allegedly even with himself when in dual roles. But Robertson points out that Bragg was, outside of R. E. Lee, the most offensive minded general of a major Army in the Confederacy. Beaureguard is pictured as having grand battle designs but also suffering from an inflated ego and like Joe Johnson, a total inability to get along with Davis. Johnson is looked upon rather severly by author Krick who notes Johnson's life long preoccupation with rank existed in the old army long before he festered over it as a Confederate General. Krick well details Johnson's passion for retreat and no plan that does extend the joke that his eastern line in the sand would have eventually been the Mississippi had he not been wounded at Seven Pines. These eassys on these three are rather negative (Krick gives a broad hint with his title on Johnson, "Snarl, Sneer and Quarrel" )though Beareguard gets high marks for saving Petersburg in 1864. Hood is also quite interesting as his career is meteor like in spite of his woundings and his intrigues in the western army help promote him to commanding general. He suffers from his weakened physical condition and the peter principal demonstrated by frequent attacks around Atlanta to destroying his army at Franklin. Smith and Cooper are less intersting but important. Smith because he becomes the Trans Mississippi commander after serving an odd satelite command in Kentucky co-existing with Bragg. Cooper is necessary as he was the senior ranking General in the Confederacy and William Davis tells the who and the why very well. William Davis is right when he called Cooper a great Civil War trivia question. The only negative, is that the majority of these characters have such major flaws described by the authors that you have to wonder how they reached such high command, but maybe the answer is simple, Davis picked them. Or perhaps, the authors are a little too critical. But these are all great essays by legendary Civil War historians James I. Robertson, Jr., Wlliam C. Davis, Robert Krick along with Gary Gallagher, Charles Roland, Stephen Engle, Joseph Glatthaar and Keith Bohannon. With historians like these, it's a full house.

2 comments about The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier.

1. History is usually written by the victor, or at least from the victor's perspective. To some extent this is unfortunate, since historical "truth" requires a balanced perspective. If one is truly interested in understanding the American Revolutionary War, then one must actively seek out the perspective of the losing side. That is why books like, Piers Mackesy's The War For America, 1775-1783, David Syrett's The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1775-1783 & Edward Cashin's The King's Ranger are so important. The first two put our revolution in overall geopolitical perspective from the British point of view. The latter focuses exclusively on the often neglected "southern campaign". With the excitement generated by the 1999 movie, "The Patriot", this book is re-released at an opportune moment. While the beginning and ending portions focusing on Thomas Brown's pre- and post-american life, respectively, are somewhat dry and could stand more judicious editing, the central meat of the book is an excellent and scholarly contribution to the study of the American Revolutionary period. In this book we gain insight into the significant role of tories in America as well as the american indian contribution to the campaign in the south. We learn what happened to most tories after their cause was lost and come to realize just how close we came to being on the losing side. This is a scholarly work of history, portions require concerted effort and concentration to wade through. However, the "pearls" contained within, particularly in the central portion, are well worth the effort.



2. For years people in the Southern US have been taught to loathe this man. Of course, the crime he is mainly hated for today is thathe refused to commit one.
   
   The book gives a very good description of the feelings and actions of this bravely loyal fellow. While, like most biographies, the author takes a personal liking to the subject and is likely to give facts in a way to make him seem better than he was, the book is very accurate.
   
   I only wish more loyalists get this type of Biographical treatment.