5 comments about Churchill: The End of Glory : A Political Biography.

1. John Charmley did not do his homework. There are so many things about Churchill he missed. He greatly understates his case that Churchill, by fighting World War II, lost Britain's empire. Far from being a vigorous and foresighted leader, Churchill was incredibly lazy and inept, and Charmley misses this. Churchill failed to prevent the spread of television, failed to stop the invention of the transistor and the integrated circuit, was completely asleep at the switch during the invention of the jet engine and the intercontinental jet airliner. And these are only a few of the things that Churchill didn't stop! Of course, it was these, combined with the continued outward spread of the Enlightenment from Europe, that lost Britain its empire. So, if the lost empire is the "fruit" of Churchill's leadership, at least let's be complete in our condemnation of the man. Otherwise, he might be seen as a leader of bottomless courage, able to inspire an entire nation to rise above itself and distinguish itself for all time, while in the bargain saving Western Civilization. Churchill knew evil when he saw it. Given how difficult it was to launch the D-Day invasion, the mind boggles at what would have happened had Britain gone down.



2. I was sorely disappointed when finishing the book, not because of poor authorship, but, on the contrary, because Charmley's abrupt ending after a laborious examination of Churchill's political career did not seem at all adequate. He begins with a lurid examination of Churchill's early life and transformation into a political maverick, assaying his beginnings as a freshman MP in 1901 to his rise as one of the most powerful statesmen in the world. Among the most engrossing, although not necessarily new, criticisms are the Prime Minister's deference to the Roosevelt administration's foreign policy, which the author believes, with very much justification, was a catalyst that helped to bring about the Cold War and the eventual dismemberment of the British Empire. Charmley also draws parallels with Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler in 1938 with that of Churchill's handling of Stalin in 1945, and infers Churchill was hypocritical in his criticism of the Munich Pact, in part because of his later policies with regard to the Soviet Union. But after the chapter on the fall of the Churchill government in 1945, the book wraps itself up with a conclusion of little more than two pages; this is hardly befitting such a monumental undertaking. Charmley does not take interest in documenting Churchill's postwar exploits, and makes almost no reference to his Fulton speech or his return to power in 1951. For those already familiar with the standard "song and dance" given by most Churchill biographers, this work is definitely worth your time, but those expecting a more plenary reference on all of Churchill's political career, not just that until 1945, should look elsewhere.



3. I regard Churchill as one of the alltime overrated figures in history, and certainly enjoy seeing him cut down to size. Charmley provides a veritable all-you-can-eat buffet for Churchill haters, as he recounts in excrutiating detail the extraordinarily flawed personality of Churchill.

   After setting the stage by illustrating Churchill's early years as a relentless opportunist and self-promoter, Charmley begins to build his case that Churchill was not the great wartime leader that posterity would have us believe, and in fact did not even have a sound grasp of military operational strategy. The most glaring example is, of course, the Gallipoli Campaign, which was an unmitigated disaster and effectively ended Churchill's political career for more than two decades. Churchill had gotten his shot at the big time (by becoming First Lord of the Admiralty) and had blown it. When he got his second chance, he showed that he had learned effectively nothing in the intervening period about military operations. Throughout World War II, he would attempt to undertake various zany military campaigns, most of which were politely ignored by the Allied commanders.

   While demonstrating Churchill's ineptitude in this area, Charmley (clearly a Neville Chamberlain apologist) builds a reasonably convincing case for Chamberlain, arguing that Chamberlain was using appeasement more as a tool for buying time than anything else. Far from being the naive optimist, Chamberlain was quite sure, argues Charmley, that Hitler was not to be trusted in any agreement. While giving Hitler what he wanted, Chamberlain was quietly building up Britain's military strength for the war he was sure to come. Because one cannot create a potent fighting force overnight, Chamberlain knew he had to buy time by whatever means necessary. Churchill, by contrast, was ready to rush into war with Germany in 1937-38, when Britain was in no way prepared to fight a continental war.

   Up to this point, Charmley's treatment of Churchill is reasonable from a scholarly standpoint. He can make coherent arguments and back them up with citations and evidence. However, Charmley's main beef with Churchill has never been that he was reckless & impetuous, or that he wasn't the great military mastermind. Charmley's problem with Churchill is that he lost the British Empire. At this point, Charmley's book begins to fall apart.

   Charmley is writing from the perspective of someone who thinks the British Empire was a pretty neat thing, and wishes that Britain still had its empire, just like the good old days. In subsequent writings, Charmley has taken his argument even further, casting FDR as an anti-imperial villain who had, as one of his wartime goals, the deliberate destruction of the old colonial empires. In Charmley's opinion, the primary goal of the British High Command during World War II should have been the preservation of the British Empire. The defeat of the Nazis and containment of the Soviet Union? Sure, the British could have tried to do that also, but the preservation of the Empire was the important thing.

   In fact, the British High Command was trying to do exactly that, and was continually butting heads with General George Marshall over priorities in strategy. The US wanted as its goal the invasion of Europe proper, and had hoped to launch the Normandy campaign in 1943, a full year before D-Day. The British, by contrast, favored a peripheral approach, sending valuable resources to reclaim portions of British territory that had been seized by Germany & Japan. The British also wanted opportunities for their commanders (such as Montgomery) to win glory on the field. The concessions the US made to Britain, it can be argued, prolonged the war in Europe by up to a year.

   So Charmley's argument that Churchill did not do enough militarily to preserve the Empire is not particularly valid. Charmley probably understands this, because he also comes as close he can to stating (without actually doing it) that maybe, just maybe, Churchill might have been well-advised to cut a deal with the Nazis, keep the Empire intact, and focus on the real enemy, which was (in Charmley's conservative viewpoint) the Soviet Union. Charmley does not explicitly say this, because he would then run the risk of being lumped into the same category as the likes of David Irving. However, he makes this argument repeatedly, in as an oblique a fashion as he can muster.

   The whole problem is that Charmley bases his argument on the premise that the British Empire could in fact have been saved, and this is where the biggest flaws in this book creep in. Charmley would like to ignore the fact that the British Empire had been slowly coming apart at the seams since the Boer War. Even during Victoria's reign, Britain had been struggling to provide the resources necessary to maintain Imperial control. The attrition of World War I was effectively the final nail in the Imperial coffin; it was only a matter of time before the inevitable occurred. One only has to look at post-war France, which tried to restore its colonial empire by force, to see how things probably would have turned out for Britain.

   One can also ask the question, is Charmley's belief that the Empire deserved to be preserved valid? This is definitely a matter of perspective. Did the British Empire ultimately do more harm than good? Conservatives like Charmley and Thomas Sowell may think that the British Empire overall was a good thing, but I do not agree with that at all. When you get right down to it, the Empire was simply the subjugation by Britain of other peoples & cultures by naked military force. I don't recall too many subject people voluntarily entering the British Empire. If FDR wasn't bent on destroying the British Empire, he should have been.

   While Charmley does provide some valid criticism of Churchill in this book, overall his most important criticisms are based on some seriously flawed premises. In the end, this calls into question the ultimate scholarly value of the book. While it has certainly been controversial enough, does this book truly contribute much to the scholarly debate over Churchill and the history of the 20th century? I don't believe so.




4. While Churchill's status as an icon is entirely too uncritical of a brilliant but erratic and flawed statesman, this is hardly a good faith effort to due Churchill justice. Charmley's constant apologies, evasions and outright deception regarding Neville Chamberlain's failed and ongoing efforts at appeasement after Munich & Churchill's opposing efforts clearly stems from an agenda more to rehabilitate Chamberlain's reputation than to do justice to Churchill's actions. Charmley's deception in this area is extreme. His reference more to Chamberlain & Halifax's diaries & letters than to Churchill's for the 3 chapters leading up to Churchill's ascent to Prime Minister doesn't do him much credit nor does his uncritical and adoring acceptance of Chamberlain's evaluations of virtually everything and everyone, including Hitler of all people. To give an example, Charmley, disregards 3 separate accounts of Churchill not rising to applaud Chamberlin's speech in the House of Commons upon his return from Munich as not being either recorded at the time or of being suspect due to malice toward Chamberlain. This same `critical' eye paints Chamberlain as being relentlessly opposed to Hitler after Hitler's entry into Prague in May 1939 in spite of Chamberlin's constant well documented efforts to continue appeasement after that time. He even neglects to mention Chamberlin's efforts to continue appeasement negotiations that continued even after Poland's invasion, not even mentioning something as significant as the Cabinet's revolt and ultimatum to Chamberlain that he must put a deadline on negotiations to Hitler & withdrawal from Poland on the 2nd day after Poland's invasion. All in all this book has some valid debunking of Churchill's myth and questions about the long term costs of Churchill's decisions but it is at times blatantly deceptive and far, far too uncritical of Churchill's rivals, none of whom except Eden are subject to much criticism.



5. Charmley, and some his reviewers, have got things wrong. Sure Churchill was an empire man, that is why he got so unpopular between the wars, when he resisted efforts to give India even the most limited self-government.
   
   But Churchill had no war aims, save victory. OK, victory was important, but we would not have had victory on Churchill's watch.
   
   He was terrified of D-Day, believing a re-run of the Battle of the Somme was in the offing.
   
   All his life, he was a side-show man. When troops were needed in Normandy, he pleaded for them to stay in Italy.
   
   In 1939-40 he even floated a notion - you could not call it a plan - to attack Germany via the Caucusus! The small matter of crossing Russia didn't seem to daunt him.
   
   Then there was his little known adventure in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1943: this was an attempt to drag Turkey into the war. It was a dismal and humiliating failure.
   
   Unlike the other two leaders, Churchill lacked post-war aims.
   
   Stalin was quite clear: he wanted to take Communism westwards. He got his way.
   
   Roosevelt had clear war aims: one of which was to break down the system of trade on which the British Empire was based. He got his way, though he did not live to see it. (Globalisation started here.)
   
   Churchill? He basked in glory, a romantic to the end. Was he good for Britain, though?
   
   He got it wrong, very wrong on Europe: one of the biggest lost opportunities in British history was waved away by a nation that ended the war under the killer illusion that it was still a great power.

1 comments about Churchill: A Photographic Portrait.

1. The bookshelves of the world are bowed low with books about Sir Winston Churchill -- biographies, analyses, defenses, debunkings, plus collected speeches, articles, and other writings. And there's no shortage of life-in-pictures books, either. Of the later category, I have no hesitation in declaring that this one is the best. Any Churchillophile (and there are lots of us) should be sure to add this to his collection.

   There are two primary reasons this title is so good. One is the vast number of photos collected between its covers. The second is the fact that the collector, and commentator, is Churchill's official biographer, Martin Gilbert, the man who arguably knows Churchill better than anyone now living (with the possible exception of his daughter, Lady Mary Soames). Not only is Gilbert's selection of photos excellent and illustrative, but his discussion of them is as well. As an accompaniment to the Official Biography, or any of the spate of other recent biographies, this book shouldn't be missed.

No comments about Churchill : A Major New Assessment of His Life in Peace and War.

No comments about Benjamin Disraeli (Jewish Encounters).

No comments about Sir Winston Churchill: His Life and His Paintings.

No comments about Gladstone: 1809-1865 (Shannon, Richard//Gladstone).

1 comments about DDG-81 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, U.S. Navy Destroyer.

1. And the fact that there is a U.S. Navy ship named after him is further testimony to it.

2 comments about Disraeli: A Biography.

1. Dr. Stanley Weintraub's biography of Ben Disraeli is excellent. The scholarship is at the top. The only other biography that I would consider but I have some reservations is the one by Lord Blake the problem with his as compared to Dr. Weintraub's is it is too thick. This one spends plenty of time on his political and publishing career. I thoughly enjoy the biography, and for all those who harken back to a time when are politicans had some flare and style will enjoy this book.



2. I found this book to be a solid, scholarly biography of Benjamin Disraeli. The subject is thoroughly researched and presented in great detail. One will certainly come away with great insight into the Prime Minister who Queen Victoria so adored.
   But Weintraub's book is so detailed and his prose can be so very dry in places, that one finds oneself sometimes plodding along.
   I found Christopher Hibbert's biography (Disraeli: The Victorian Dandy Who Became Prime Minister) to be superior. Hibbert's prose is more lively, and one comes away feeling that they have gotten to know "Dizzy" far more intimately.
   Having said that, however, Weintraub's Disraeli is certainly well worth the effort.

5 comments about Churchill: Visionary. Statesman. Historian..

1. John Lukas clearly states at the beginning of his short book that his collection of essays is neither a biography nor a scholarly study of Winston Spencer Churchill (pg. xiii). Therefore, potential readers of Lukas' book who do not know anything about the key milestones in the life and career of Churchill should not start here. These readers can read books such as "Churchill a Life", "Churchill a Study in Greatness", "Clementine Churchill The Biography of a Marriage", "Winston and Clementine The Personal Letters of the Churchills" or "The Wit & Wisdom of Winston Churchill" to fill in the most glaring gaps in their knowledge of Churchill for that purpose.

   Lukas writes to the attention of an audience who has an unquenchable thirst to know more and more about an individual who remains a source of inspiration to many men and women who stand in the way of barbarity and illiberalism around the world.

   Although Lukas is generally sympathetic to Churchill, he is not blind to his major shortcomings: impetuosity, impatience, stubbornness and fancifulness (pg. 4, 154). Furthermore, Lukas reminds his audience in his essay "His Failures. His Critics" that Churchill had accumulated errors and mistakes that Churchill critics and detractors were attributing to his flawed character (pg. 129). For example, Churchill's futile fight against granting Dominion status to India from 1929 to 1935 was perhaps compatible with his imperialist credentials but certainly a clear blemish on his record. As a very experienced politician and knowledgeable historian at that time, Churchill should have known much better (pg. 14-15, 24, 135-136). Therefore, Lukas' collection of essays should not be construed as a shameful hagiography.

   Furthermore, Lukas reminds his audience in "Churchill's historianship" and "Churchill the visionary" that Churchill was generally cognizant of the lessons that he could draw from past events to articulate his often-visionary policies while reflecting on and shaping history on his turn (pg. 1-18, 47). Churchill was not only a spectator, but also a key actor and play writer of human comedy (pg. 102).

   Lukas also explores the ups and downs that Churchill had in his relationships with other history shapers such as Charles De Gaulle, Dwight Eisenhower, Adolf Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin (pg. 19-20). Lukas convincingly explains that Churchill was facing an unpalatable choice between a Europe entirely ruled by Nazi Germany or half of Europe dominated by the Communists in case of allied victory (pg. 11, 27-28, 35). Churchill rightly first gave top priority to successfully fighting Hitler to death before trying in vain to stop Stalin in 1944-1945. Unlike some unimaginative people, Churchill understood right at the birth of the Soviet Union that the Bolsheviks should be stopped immediately before they grew into a gathering threat to the world. War-weary, the victors of WWI, unfortunately, gave only half-hearty support to the White Russians in their desperate fight against the Soviets (pg. 23). Once again, long-term pains were the reward for short-term gains.

   Some (American) readers will not be very pleased while reading Lukas' unflattering portrait of Eisenhower and the men around him in "Churchill and Eisenhower." As mentioned above, Churchill was definitely right to try to thwart in 1944-1945 the apparently irresistible advance of the Soviets in Central and Eastern Europe. Churchill clearly understood that geography and territory mattered, not ideology (pg. 42). For that reason, the British army met the Russians east of the entry to the Danish peninsula at the request of Churchill in 1945 (pg. 45). Unfortunately, the American leadership did not want to hear anything about it at that time (pg. 35-40, 46). Some European regions such as former East Germany and the Czech Republic should have been eventually spared the murderous and inefficient rule of the former Soviet Union (pg. 43). The Greeks should continue to be very thankful to Churchill for saving them from a communist tyranny (pg. 41, 48).

   In his famous, visionary Iron Curtain speech in 1946, Churchill expressed his concern with the murderous, inefficient embrace of Communism in the European regions under Stalin's control. American reception of this historic speech was at best lukewarm (pg. 47). Churchill knew better and was predicting at the end of 1952 that time was not on the side of Communism (pg. 48, 79).

   After the death of Stalin in 1953, Churchill, Prime Minister again, could not convince his friend Eisenhower, who in the meantime became President of the U.S.A., of finding some kind of accommodation with the new Soviet leadership (pg. 70, 73-74). Subsequent events proved that Eisenhower was right when he saw no difference after Stalin was gone (pg. 71, 77). Contrary to what Lukas thinks, Eisenhower should not be described as a leader without any vision under the nefarious influence of men such as John Foster Dulles (pg. 79-80). Many western leaders shared Eisenhower's views on this subject (pg. 81-82). The former Soviet Union was not yet in sufficient decline in the early 1950s to negotiate in a position of force with it as world leaders such as President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher understood very well in the 1980s.




2. This was my first book by Lukacs and I am not a historical scholar. I picked it up to learn more about Churchill, and where this admirable leader was coming from. If you are looking for a primer or a thorough biography of W.S., this is not the book for you. However, if you are already familiar with his background, ancestry, and accomplishments in detail, this book serves as a kind of postmortem love letter.
   
   It is certainly well-written--Lukacs is a talented writer who knows how to turn a phrase, as he exhibits in his diary entries describing Churchill's funeral. However, for all of W.S.'s greatness, Lukacs seems a doggedly loyal to the man and utterly resistant to any criticism. There is also noticeable resentment toward Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and other American officials, as the author apotheosizes Churchill above any and all other leaders during the most critical time in 20th century history. Regardless of the veracity of his position, I would recommend reading up on other perspectives to temper Lukacs' ode to Churchill's infallibility.
   
   Overall, this is a brief and awe-inspiring read: a worthy eulogy for a worthy man that sometimes sparkles in prose, sometimes fizzles in excessive reverence.



3. What we have is a series of essays written about Churchill by a man who is both a highly regarded historian and a fan.
   
   The last essay, I found quite moving where he discusses his time at Churchill funeral.
   
   Yet the quality of these essays is not brilliant. In some ways they are repetitive with the same facts repeated again in another essay. Also the writer is also prone to exaggeration eg that the Germans could in June or July 1940 successfully invaded Britain.
   
   I have read much on Churchill and found this book disappointing maybe as from a historian of the quality of John Lukacs, I expected more.



4. I read this book here in Brazil, last year.It's cheap, concise and easy to understand.There's failures in this book?Yes.
   At first, this book is biased.John Lukacs is a Churchill's fan.
   To exemple, Mr. Churchill was a deeply eugenist.This book never talks about this.Another exemple is that in 1899, Winston Churchill spoke against Islam something like this:"How dreadfull are the curses which mohammedanism slays on its votaries...No stronger retrograde force exists in the world..."
   The core of this book is to show Churchill after 1930.Even this, it fails sometimes.In chapter 4, Lukacs claims that Eisenhower was wrong about than USSR, and Churchill was right.In fact both were right.The american politics for Cold War, was basically the same, for every american president, since Truman,in 1945, to George Bush in 1991.
   Churchill also was among the men who created Iraq.Churchill also put the last Iran's Xah in power.All of these Churchill's mistakes aren't in this book.
   This is a fan's book, not an unbiased book.



5. This is another of the "short" Churchill books that have become popular over the last several years and are less than full blown biographies but more than just private musings of the author. This author has an engaging style and if you've read any of his previous books on this subject it should come as no surprise that this book is for the most part a positive portrayal. The book covers the several themes stated in the title with a varying degree, (in this reader's opinion), of success. The high points include insight into Churchill's role, (and motivation), as an historian, his role with Stalin and the division of post WWII Europe and the evolution of Churchill's relationship with Eisenhower, (maybe the best chapter in the book). Considering all that has been written on Churchill this reader found some "new" perspectives and food for thought in the above. On the downside, several of the other chapters - the rehashing of Gallipoli, Churchill's "wilderness" years do not provide much detail or insight and the last chapter - a journal entry written contemporaneously describing Churchill's funeral - was little more than filler to this reader. This disparity in the writing is unfortunately one of the salient points I took away from the book. That being said, (written), this book would not be the place to start with Churchill but it is a more than an adequate supplement.

1 comments about Clementine Churchill: The Biography of a Marriage.

1. This biography gives great insight into the lives of the Churchills'.It was written by Mary Soames, the youngest child of Winston and Clementine Churchill. It was amazing to see the love and devotion Clementine and Winston had for each other. They were ever faithful letter companions from the start of their romantic and strong relationship. While reading the profound letters they wrote to each other you feel as if you were there with them, feeling every emotion they felt. This biography also includes great stories and antecdotes that will keep you laughing, crying, or shouting for joy for hours. The effects this biography has on you are numerous, but the strongest one would have to be one of awe. Their marriage is a marriage to look up to. They did have troubled times. Like, when Winston went to join in the action of World War I after his loss of the position of First Lord of the Admiralty. Or of the times before WWII when Winston was trying so hard to get people to listen to him about the danger and potency of Hitler and the Nazis. They stayed together in good times and in bad and in sickness and in health. They stayed together until the death of Winston. I highly recommend this book so that you can experience this wonderful and lasting marriage and all that comes along with it.