No comments about Jean-Paul Sartre: A Life (Lives of the Left).

1 comments about Young Sidney Hook: Marxist and Pragmatist.

1. The later career of Sidney Hook is well known. However, his earlier career as a Marxist intellectual and activist has been long ignored by historians and biographers. In this short but brilliant work, Christopher Phelps shows us a completely different Hook and makes an important contribution to the literature on American socialists of the twentieth century. This book is even more crucial because Hook himself disavowed his radical past, making an examination of the complexity of his political trajectory more difficult to follow and study. From the first to the last page, this is a compelling book, providing carefully researched insights into Hook's world including Hook's debates with Max Eastman, Hook's role in the brief but important journal, Marxist Quarterly, and his participation in defending exiled Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky against bogus charges by the brutal Stalin regime. Phelps also discusses important insights about his theoretical views. At a time when utterly disorienting and nihilistic postmodernist theories are fashionable in the social sciences, Phelps' work is like a breath of fresh air that captivates his audience to learn more about history from below, by and about the workers and radical intellectuals that have shaped society. Anyone interested in the history of the 1930s American socialist movement should give this book an immediate place on their bookshelf.

5 comments about A. J. Ayer: A Life.

1. A.J. Ayer,whose book "Language,Truth,and Logic" introduced logical positivism to the English-speaking world, and which has become and remains a classic of philosophy, finally gets the biography he has long deserved. Ben Rogers,a philosophically-trained journalist, does a fine job of not only giving the details of Ayer's life,but of explicating his philosophy,as well as criticisms of it. The Oxbridge and London milieu in which Ayer moved is wittily and affectionately portrayed, so that we get to meet characters on the order of Wittgenstein,Ryle,Russell,and other dons and eccentrics. Ayer,after the success of Language,Truth and Logic,was once asked what came next, and he replied "Nothing comes next. Philosophy is over." An anecdote like this gives one both the flavor of the enfant terrible that was the young A.J. Ayer,as well as that of this interesting book. For an academic philosopher,Ayer had a surprisingly interesting life,and for those who want to discover its details this biography is highly recommended, to be placed along side Monk's Wittgenstein.



2. A.J. Ayer was a second rate thinker not worthy of serious consideration. Unfortunately, many do not agree with my assessment of Ayer's ideas and his ill earned fame and influence persists even in this century. One may prefer to ignore Ayer, but pragmatically this is not wise. Ben Roger's splendid book does much to assist us to learn more about Ayer and those who worship the ground he walked on. Ayer is a quintessential example of how a highly rewarding career can be built upon deliberate iconoclasm and trendiness. Pseudo intellectualism is often warmly received by the Left leaning members of Great Britain's university milieu. In such a dilettante environment, one's ability to shock and entertain is valued far more than true intellectual brilliance. The author spends significant time dealing with Ayer's relationships with members of England's upper crust. This class of people psychologically eviscerated by self doubts and low self esteem are perfect cannon fodder for Ayer's pernicious charm.

   Ayer gravitated towards a personal philosophy that served to rationalize away his faults and mistreatment of other human beings. The central premise of Ayer's so called philosophy (which is actually an anti-philosophy) is that only phenomena that can be ascertained within the severely limited parameters of Logical Positivism merit our attention. Thus, nothing is worthy of valid interest that cannot be empirically verified. Questions concerning love, God, values, evil, the possibility of life after death, are to be relegated to the dust bin of history. The very underpinnings of a viable social order are inevitably threatened by the tacit conclusion of Ayer's thoughts. Ayer was a charlatan who seduced his adoring faithful into embracing a way of looking at matters that legitimately belong to the realm of the hard sciences. Unfortunately, this approach fails miserably when addressing the unavoidable existential issues of human life.

   I suspect that I'm encouraging people to read Ben Roger's book for reasons that will not entirely thrill the author. Roger almost certainly doesn't share my caustic appraisal of Ayer. That, however, is Roger's problem and not mine. We should read Roger's book to learn from the past so not to fall prey to similar nonsense in the future. Karl Popper, an ardent foe of Ayer's central beliefs deserves your rapt devotion. Popper is truly a giant for all time, and scathingly took Ayer and his ilk to task. I also whole heartily encourage the reader to obtain a copy of the recently released --The Abolition of Britain--by Peter Hitchens. Another work , --The Intellectuals--by Paul Johnson, takes an insightful look at other high profile individuals who have also done much damage to civilization. Johnson whole thesis revolves around the absurdity of pretending that one's personal behavior does not influence their intellectual life.




3. "I warned you," Anthony Blanche said to Charles Ryder in Evelyn Waugh's Brideshead Revisited. "I took you out to dinner to warn you of charm. . . Charm is the great English blight. It does not exist outside these damp islands. It spots and kills anything it touches. It kills love; it kills art; I greatly fear, my dear Charles, it has killed you."

   Anthony Blanche could have just as well been speaking of A.J. "Freddie" Ayer, for he was to philosophy what Waugh's Charles Ryder was to art: a celebrity more noted for being such rather than for his work, which is found to come up short. Overshadowed in philosophy by Wittgenstein and in both philosophy and celebrity by Russell (who had a unique talent of reinventing himself so as to appear new to each generation), Ayer is mainly known for one work, Language, Truth and Logic, a depressing tome that relegates anything that is not empirically verifiable or true in virtue of linguistic rules as meaningless. Questions of God and metaphysics are lumped in this category.

   Despite being overshadowed by Russell and Wittgenstein, Ayer may have had the last laugh, for his influence on philosophy far surpassed theirs. As Rogers notes, Ayer wanted to put an end to philosophy. For Ayer, the only role for philosophy is the logical clarification of the concepts of science, rather than the quest for truth and ultimate reality.

   With that stroke of the pen, Ayer succeeded to dealing philosophy a near mortal wound from only which she is now recovering. Ayer took philosophy from the general reader and rarefied it to the world of specialization and academia. Where once philosophers as Hegel, Schopenhauer, McTaggart, Bergson and Russell wrote for an educated public, today philosophers write for other philosophers. Instead of a search for ultimate truths, philosophy has become a series of problems made sterile in the world of academia.

   But how could the iconoclastic Ayer accomplish this? The answer is simple: charm. Rogers astutely chronicles Ayer's smooth relationship and movement through the upper classes so often found in the environment of the English university. Ayer grasped quite quickly that if one can't out-think one's opponent, it is just as well to out-entertain him. And for that task Ayer was well suited. He became a sort of celebrity on the BBC, always playing the iconoclastic philosopher, whether debating Frederick Copleston on the existence of God for BBC radio or discussing the nature of knowledge for a televised lecture series. Learning from Russell's mistakes, Ayer eschewed the leftist radicalism that defined the later Russell in favor of a trendy leftist posture that guaranteed entree to the moneyed classes that dominated England and America.

   Bur the real delight in Rogers's book comes when he describes not A.J. Ayer, thinker, but "Freddie" Ayer, hedonist, filling in what Freddie does not tell us in two volumes of autobiography. Unilke Alfred Jules, the Thinker, Freddie the Fop thought with a different organ, judging from his marriages and numerous affairs, sometimes seeing two or more women at the same time. There is a strange hilarity is seeing one of England's foremost practitioners of rationality being such a slave to his libido when not on duty. And Rogers does a first-rate job interlocking the two into a seamless whole, knowing when to switch gears and keep the reader's interest on the page.

   The funniest passage in the book is the confrontation between Ayer and one Mike Tyson (yes, that Mike Tyson) who shanghaied a young Naomi Campbell into a spare bedroom during the course of a posh party with something other than debate on his mind. How does it turn out? I leave it to you to find out the power and limits of charm.




4. Excellent! A very enjoyable read about a man I've heard disparaged more often than most in 20th century philosophy. While it's true Ayer's work seems to be fairly derivative, and still extremely influential, he was restating a vein of British philosophy that I for one feel pretty favorable about. On reading his life story, I find that Ayer did more than I knew to bring the anti-metaphysical views of his hero Hume to the public, the academy, and a large and interesting slice of cultural limelights. Sure, his flaws were many and glaring, and you'll find a clear cataloging of his vices in these reviews as well as the book itself. What was surprising to me was to read of his many less reported virtues, including an aversion to discipleship, an agile interest in philosophical developments throughout the world, courage in the face of wooly-headed public theism, and a valiant record of worthwhile public service (a rarity in the history of PHI giants). While Wittgenstein romantically isolated himself wringing his hands in the service of a semi-secular priesthood, Ayer made real gains in reforming British adoption, schooling, and discrimination against homosexuals.

   And this points to what makes this book far more interesting to read than the lives of most British philosophers - He actually lived a life worth reading about! Hardly a famous cultural figure lived through post-war Britain without having dinner with Ayer. He even lectured the Kennedy family! For Ayer, philosophy and life were separate affairs for the most part (and of affairs you'll read plenty). He firmly believed that when one began to speak beyond the realms of empirical evidence, one risked speaking nothing but nonsense, and to his credit he seemed to mostly avoid the temptation. In my humble opinion, that is good for philosophy, bad for your fan club.

   I for one gained from reading this book. While I don't see Ayer as a member of heroic pantheon to be emulated, I do have a new respect for this most "sensible" public intellectual.




5. A.J.Ayer stood in the tradition of David Hume, Bertrand Russell and the early Wittgenstein. For all of these, metaphysical statements, because they could never be verified by sense observation, were, in a philosophical sense "meaningless". Meaningful statements had to be precisely phrased and then verified by sense observation.
   
   When Ayer was still a classical scholar at Eton, his interest in philosophy was aroused by Bertrand Russell; and his tutor at Christ Church, Gilbert Ryle, introduced him to Wittgenstein's work. Ryle was the only Oxford academic to have taken an interest in Wittgenstein; nor for that matter did Russell figure in the Oxford philosophy syllabus. Oxonian philosophers almost all came to the subject through the classics, whereas the Cambridge men had a mathematical or scientific background, which was so much more congenial to a branch of philosophy which aimed to pursue the subject with scientific rigour. Ayer's background was classical, too; but he responded enthusiastically to Wittgenstein (whom he still thought to be the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus: when the Philosophical Investigations were published, Ayer, like Russell, would think that Wittgenstein had gone soft.) He wanted to use the interval between his Finals and taking up a lectureship at Christ Church, to study under Wittgenstein. But Ryle thought the Wittgenstein cult was bad for both of them, and persuaded him instead to go to Vienna and study under Moritz Schlick, one of the leaders of the Vienna Circle. The Circle's philosophy, itself originally inspired by the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, was becoming known under the name of Logical Positivism.
   
   It could be said that Ayer was already a Logical Positivist before he went to Vienna; but certainly by the time he returned to Oxford, there was noone in England better informed about Logical Positivism than he. Ayer was the first to lecture in Oxford on Russell, Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap (a member of the Vienna Circle).
   
   Isaiah Berlin persuaded Ayer to write a book on his theories, and the result was Language, Truth and Logic, published in 1936, when Ayer was only 26. The book itself would become a standard text of 20th century British philosophy. Ben Rogers writes: "The position he defended had become canonical, which was strange considering that it was hard to find anyone who agreed with it. Logical Positivism, as represented by Language, Truth and Logic was probably the school that under-graduate philosophers knew best, but it was a school that, from the beginning, most were taught to refute." But the refutations, such as they were, eventually came not from metaphysicians who had attacked the book so much from the beginning, but from philosophers who, like Ayer himself, were concerned with the meaning of propositions; and they included Ayer himself, who over the remainder of his life fine-tuned or modified several theories he had put forward as an impetuous and (Rogers maintains) as an angry young man - angry with the establishment at Oxford which, he felt, had at that time denied him the prizes and promotions that were his due, for reasons that had to do both with philosophical vested interests and with antisemitism.
   
   One shortcoming of Rogers' book is that the arguments of scarcely any of Ayer's critics, with the exception of his main rival, J.L.Austin, are given a proper airing; and the criticisms that are stated of Language, Truth and Logic in the biography are largely those of Ayer himself in later life as he modified his original thesis.
   
   The part of Language, Truth and Logic that drew the severest criticism from outside was the position known as "emotivism", which declared that moral judgments (as well as aesthetic ones) are no more than the expression of a speaker's approval or disapproval. Moral statements have to do with values, and values are not a proper subject of philosophy as such. This position made some opponents agree with a Westminster housemaster who described Ayer as "the most wicked man in Oxford". (Doubtlessly Ayer's reputation as a libertine was also seen as consequence of what he had written about morals.)
   
   And yet Ayer, like Bertrand Russell, did have strong moral feelings and felt that he had to live up to them. Certainly these did not include conventional moral feelings about sexual behaviour; but he actively supported a number of progressive social and political causes. He even agreed in his retirement to become founder President of the Society for Applied Philosophy -an odd position for someone who had argued that philosophy had no role in advising people how to live. He now described that earlier idea as "rather insular": although philosophy cannot lay down moral codes, it can at least help people to clarify their moral choices. And, as a human being, we ought to make choices - as long as we don't think that they are grounded in philosophy as such. In this respect he spoke of commitment in much the same way as did the existentialists, for whose general philosophy, with its strong element of metaphysics, he of course had no sympathy. Ayer knew well that there were things outside of philosophy which were wonderful but about which philosophy as such has nothing to say.
   
   The philosophical parts of Rogers' book are not always easy: he takes quite a lot of philosophical knowledge for granted. But even readers who do not have such knowledge will be fascinated by the image he gives us of this zestful man and of the society in which he moved. With all the many reservations one can make of Ayer's character (and about which even his wives were fully aware and articulate), he was hugely admired and loved as a person by a great many people: women, colleagues, students, and others. The author, who met him only once and for the most fleeting of moments, admits to liking and respecting him. One can deduce this also from the fact that the people who detested him (and there were some) make only a marginal appearance in the book.

4 comments about Sartre: The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century.

1. Sartre: The Philosopher Of The Twentieth Century is an impressively researched biography by French provocateur Bernard-Henri Levy of Sarte, the famous French novelist whose existential works held up a mirror to reflect the confusion of the twentieth century. Presenting the events of Sartre's life that worked to shape his intellectual and political views; Sartre's fascinat-ion with Freud and psychoanalysis; and the enduring qualities of literature, Sartre: The Philosopher Of The Twentieth Century is a very highly recommended addition to 20th Century Philosophy Studies in general, and insightful, essential reading for students of Sartre's life, thoughts, and works in particular.



2. Sartre: The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century by Bernard Henri Levy (Polity Press) 'A whole man, mode of all men, worth all of them, and .any one of them worth him' This was how .Jean-Paul Sartre characterized himself at the end of his autobiographical study, Words. And Bernard-Henri Lévy shows how Sartre cannot be understood without taking into account his relations with the intellectual forebears and contemporaries, the lovers and friends, with whom he conducted o lifelong debate. His thinking was essentially a tumultuous dialogue with his whole age and himself. He learned from Gide the art of freedom, and how to experiment with inherited fictional forms. He was a fellow-traveller of communism, and yet his relations with the Party were deeply ambiguous. He was fascinated by Freud but trenchantly critical of psychoanalysis. Beneath Sartre's complex and ever-mutating political commitments, Lévy detects a polarity between anarchic individualism on the one hand, and a longing for absolute community that brought him close to totalitarianism on the other. Lévy depicts Sartre as a man who could succumb to the twentieth century's catastrophic attraction to violence and the false messianism of its total political solutions, while also being one of the fiercest critics of its illusions and shortcomings.



3. For the French Bernard Henri Levy the philosopher of the century is the French Jean Paul- Sartre.
   My guess is however that for the professional philosophers of the twentieth - and now twenty- first century the 'philosopher of the twentieth century ' was Wittgenstein.
   As for Sartre he in some way seems to me less a philosopher than a 'philosoph' a kind of French Enlightentment man- of - letters capable of pouring out an endless stream of words on any contemporary subject. Not truly a scholar, but also not a philosopher in the deepest and most profound sense- not one who presents us with a metaphysic which somehow aims to explain the world. But then two of Sartre's intellectual forebearers( The great philosopher of anti- philosophy, of non- systematic thinking, Kierkegaard- and the 'philosopher for whom it was no longer enough to understand the world but rather necessary to change it- Marx) broke the old mold of philosopher as 'understander of all' that I have just presented.
   Moreover( against what I have just claimed) it might be pointed out that Sartre wrote two major 'philosophical works' his early 'Being and Nothingness ' and his later 'Critique of Dialectical Reason ' which have the kind of verbiage that the great philosophical systems do.
   Only here I would maintain that by the time that they were written this way of philosophizing was already irrelevant. As I understand it, and its possible of course to understand it otherwise 'philosophy' had taken flight to a different direction, a different form of discourse.
   In any case Sartre, to my mind was a person who at least in his early years had a 'real idea' of what he was doing. In his early development of 'atheistic existensialism' he presented a way of seeing things which many today would readily concur with. We are thrown into the world , and we have no essence. And our life is the making of those decisions those acts of freedom by which we turn existence into essence. Radical contingency and accident rule the world, and mankind in its ' projects' and with its freedom tries to shape a meaning of its own in an essentially meaningless universe.
   Bernard Henri Levy celebrates Sartre for this first- stage of his philosophy. He is more critical about what it is very easy to be more critical about , the latter stage, the stage in which Sartre was the ready political dupe of Communism. This was too the stage in which Sartre justified all kinds of violence .It was the stage in which the world came to see the ugly side of Sartre. The 'intellectual' who had never been in the line of fire, who as Malraux said was getting his plays put on with the approval of the Nazi censor during the Second World War. The intellectual Sartre who sung the praises of the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba. This is the Sartre who is not the ' philosopher of the twentieth century' but one of its political dupes and fools.
   There is another ugly side to Sartre which BHL does not really see that way. The relationship to Beauvoir was one in which both exploited those weaker than themselves , for their own sexual and voyeuristic enjoyment. This 'user' Sartre connects of course with that other side of Sartre's philosophy , his "hell is other people' side. Sartre could not really keep friends , or be a very considerate helper to anyone. Words, words, words on the page and from the mouth. Ironically BHL talks about Sartre coming to at the last stages of his life an acquaintance with the work of the French Jewish philosopher Levinas whose star has been on the rise for some time now. For Levinas it all begins with 'the other' and the ethical is the basis of the philosophical. A different conception from the Sartrean one entirely.
   All this is not to dismiss Sartre but rather to suggest that Levy perhaps overvalues him a bit, as he might too slightly overvalue himself.
   An excess of 'amour propre' on the side of the subject and perhaps also the author of this work.



4. Levy needs help. This book is incoherent and poorly constructed. Except when Levy takes a detour to unload on Heidegger, which he does wonderfully and with real passion, he meanders all over the place. The book is full of non sequitors and bizarre assertions. It is not clear at all what his point is. Must be in here somewhere.
   
   Editing: Zero Stars. Someone needed to have a quiet word with Bernard-Henri. Sentances running 39 lines are a bit much. Where is the verb?
   
   Copy Editing: Five Stars. Very Clean.

1 comments about Descartes: His Life and Thought.

1. Genevieve Rodis-Lew is Professor Emerita at the Sorbonne and has written a splendid biography on the life and thought of a major and influential 17th Century European philosopher. Ably translated into English by Jane Marie Todd, Descartes is vividly presented in the context of his time. Drawing upon his own correspondence, Rodis-Lewis traces his disillusion with the Jesuit scholastic method and his attraction mathematics and then to metaphysics. Descartes emerges for the modern reader as a complete and complex man, so much more than a mere footnote in the history of science or the evolution of western philosophical traditions.

No comments about Sex and Philosophy: Rethinking De Beauvoir and Sartre.

No comments about Dumont on Religion: Difference, Comparison, Transgression (Key Thinkers in the Study of Religion).

1 comments about Tillich (Outstanding Christian Thinkers).

1. This is truly an exquisite Tillich-monography! John Heywood Thomas, who studied with Tillich and remained friends with Tillich until Tillich's death, provides us with an in-depth account of the life and work of Paul Tillich (1886-1965), the remarkable philosopher-theologian who implemented the thought of Schelling, Kant and Hegel, just to name the most prominent of his philosophical influences, directly and explicitly into the theological discourse of the twentieth century. Apart from accounting for these influences, Heywood Thomas interprets Tillich's many points of contact with some of the great intellectuals of the twentieth century, including Heidegger, Otto, Bultmann, Adorno and Barth. Though not as extensive as some of the older, established commentaries on Tillich (such as J L Adams' famous commentary, Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion [New York: Harper and Row, 1965] or the earliest, and still the most valuable, collection of essays on Tillich's work, The Theology of Paul Tillich [Kegley, C & Bretall, R W eds., New York: MacMillan, 1952]), Heywood Thomas' book should to my opinion be regarded as the most penetrating and illuminating account to date of Tillich's extraordinary ability to exploit hardcore philosophical concepts within the realm of theology. These concepts include phenomenology into a "phenomenological theology", existentialism and critical theory into Tillich's own theological theories of "existence" and "estrangement", Neo-Marxist critique into a "theology of culture" and, famously, his "ontological approach" to Christology and salvation. Paul Tillich was indeed a remarkable and unique theologian, exactly because he was as much at home in a philosophical discussion as he was in the pulpit and seemed as keenly interested in art and politics as he was in his life-work as a professional theologian. The book consists of ten chapters, each dealing with a predominant theme in Tillich's work. Chapter 1 (Tillich's life and career) provides the reader with the kind of biographical information which could be considered as crucial for understanding Tillich's philosophical inclinations and his areas of specialization in theology. Tillich's experience of the trench warfare in World War I, for example, had a fundamental impact on his psyche and contributed substantially to him taking leave of the claims of traditional Protestant theology or, at the very least, his reinterpretation of Lutheran theology (pp. 5-10). Actually, it was the war experience that initiated his progressive activist attitude in politics and the church. Much ado has been made of Tillich's debauchery and his infamous erotic experiences with women directly after his wife, Grethi, left him in 1919 (p.9). Heywood Thomas puts this tragic phase of Tillich's life in sympathetic perspective. He certainly was an ambiguous character though: His arrogant personality and lifelong prone to vanity stands in sharp contrast with the gentleness those close to him came to know. He had always been very quick in expression of self-defence and very sensitive to criticism, easily accusing anyone who did not agree with him as personally hostile to him. On the other hand, he was an excellent lecturer and companion. On the one hand, he displayed an unconscious egocentricity which had always been typical of him. On the other hand, he showed himself to be extremely generous. Heywood Thomas contextualizes this complex character in the world of German (and later American) university life, showing that Tillich was many things, a man as complex as his work. I found this first chapter invaluable, not because of a biographical sketch one can read elsewhere, but because Heywood Thomas delicately links up the man with his surroundings and the texts that influenced him so deeply. In chapter 2 (p.28) Heywood Thomas discusses the interconnection of theology, revolution and culture in Tillich's work. It is tempting to begin characterizing Tillich's theology by describing it as a theology of culture, to be distinguished as such from the theology of his contemporary, friend and colleague Karl Barth. Heywood Thomas shows that this contra-Barthian depiction of Tillich's theology has been his fate as a theologian and that this fundamental contrast has lead to a misinterpretation of both theologies. This simple opposition of the two theologies has been an unfortunate misinterpretation of both - Barth's as much as Tillich's. Barth's protest was not against culture but against a simplistic correlation of Christianity and culture. Likewise Tillich was as concerned to spell out a theological critique of culture as he was to rediscover the vitality of theology in an engagement with culture. Heywood Thomas looks carefully at Tillich's argument and represents it with eloquence and style. Being educated in the Barthian tradition myself, at least to a very large extent, I found this chapter to be the most informative in terms of understanding the idiosyncrasies in Tillich's thought; especially with regards to the way in which he seems to re-implement philosophical concepts directly into archaic theological categories. This is compulsory reading for those who still understand Tillich and Barth as being in direct opposition to each other. The situation is much more complex and nuanced than we are led to believe by some Barthians in particular. ...

No comments about Political Memoirs (Religion and Society in the New Millennium).

No comments about Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy.