4 comments about Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Studies in Maritime History).

1. This is a major revisionist interpretation of British naval policy as conceived and carried out by Admiral Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord between late 1904 and early 1910. In fact, there appears to be hardly a single conventional assumption about Fisher's policies, and the policies and technical flexibility of the Admiralty during this period that is not subject to reconsideration in the book.

   What I found most interesting was the startling - to me - degree to which senior British naval officers readily accepted the potential for torpedo-armed submarine and destroyer flotillas to change naval warfare, and the amount of effort they were willing to put into devising ways to use this revolutionary potential to reinforce British naval supremacy. The book is filled with descriptions of British investment in submarine technology and the ongoing discussions between naval officers of ways to adapt that technology to British needs.

   According to the book, Fisher's planned great revolution in naval warfare was not intended to be the Dreadnought battleship that his name is still commonly associated with. Instead it was to be a British fleet made up of a combination of battlecruisers with Dreadnought-scale heavy armament, great speed, and excellent gun laying based on analogue computers, designed for overseas force projection; and a submarines and destroyer flotillas designed and deployed for protection of Great Britain and such other narrow seas where they could be used to bottle up potential enemy forces. This assertion is thoroughly backed up with detailed quotes from personal letters and Admiralty memos and position papers, plus the evidence of how Fisher spent funds available to him.

   The plans of Admiral Fisher and others in the British Admiralty were developed in largely hostile political environment. The British government during this period, and the opposition political parties, were intent on reducing British naval expenditures, and not at all interested in developing the ability to expand British ability to project naval force overseas. Therefore, Fisher and his allies had to act largely in secret, while disguising their true goals from most of their political masters.

   This book has a lot of trees in its forest. I did not find it easy reading, and I would not recommend it to someone with only casual interest in British naval history or the history of naval technology. To fully understand appreciate the book's thesis and scope, the reader must be willing to delve along with the book's author into British domestic politics, British foreign policy, and a host of technical issues beyond those mentioned above. I personally found it difficult at first to fully understand why, given that Fisher had much of the Admiralty behind him, and that Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty from 1910 up to 1915, also had great faith in submarine and destroyer flotillas to control narrow seas, the Royal Navy didn't manage to make the changeover desired by Admiral Fisher. The way I finally understood it, it comes down to one basic fact, Fisher, Churchill and their allies in the Admiralty simply did not have enough time. Not enough time to educate and prepare the politicians and the British public, not enough time to nurture the necessary submarine building industry in Britain or in one of the Dominions, and not enough time to guarantee a completely united front in the Admiralty needed to quickly push through such radical change in naval policy. Given that it was less than a decade between Fisher's appointment as First Sea Lord and the outbreak of WWI, that is probably reason enough.




2. An interesting book on the politics of defense spending and its relationship with grand strategy and domestic politics. Tedious at times, and often unbalanced as to proving the grand point and instead focusing on partisan minutae, this book is still interesting to consider; you have to commend Lambert for his exaustive research behind the common assumptions. He did major work in the primary sources.

   The point is that much of the arms race theory before WWI is not genuinely correct. The motivations for the growth and posturing of the British Navy prior to WWI had less to do with fear of Germany -although using that fear was an effective tool- than with a naval revolution by the Admiralty's First Lord, Sir John Fisher. It is an intersting foray into the dynamics of defense spending politics, and how that ultimately impacts capabilities and strategy.




3. This is a superby researched book, though it falls flat on its major premise, that Fisher and the Royal Navy were ahead of the times in terms of naval strategy, armaments or hwat not.
   
   Also the book is a misnomer, as it's more on the rivalries amongst the Board of Amiralty than on Fisher, and its dubious claim that Fisher pioneered the so called "flotilla defense" by submarines and torpedo boats stretches credulity, as Fisher is notorious for NOT beleving in a Naval War Staff, or any war plans at all.
   
   The author also neglects, being a fan of Fisher, to point out that the latter's morbid fascination with "battle cruiser" led to the fiasco in Jutland, though all British historians and apologist will claim that they may have lost a battle there, but ultimately won the war!



4. In Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution Nicholas Lambert has provided a comprehensive analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Royal Navy in the ten years before the outbreak of World War One. Displaying a remarkable command of the source documents Lambert examines grand strategy, tactical concepts, national financial policy and politics with great skill and fluidly moves between these seemingly disparate subjects with ease. It becomes apparent as Lambert dissects events that much of the research that has went on before on this subject and which forms the basis for many people's ideas about era is superficial and incomplete.
   
   This is a complicated subject but Lambert's grasp of narrative and clean clear prose makes it easy for the interested reader to follow the string through the maze that was British naval policy in the Fisher era. Lambert makes it clear that Fisher was not appointed First Sea Lord in 1904 to introduce the dreadnought battleship/battlecruiser but to cut naval spending. This fact spurred Fisher to introduce new technologies to maintain Britain's naval supremacy when that supremacy was increasingly under threat from a number of quarters. Lambert puts emphasis on Fisher's ideas about the use of flotilla craft. These were small submersible boats and surface craft armed with torpedoes that could close the narrow seas around the British Isles to enemy battle fleets thus freeing the British fleet to roam the high seas, bringing battle to the enemy and protecting her own huge ocean trade. Lambert shows how on the eve of the war, the Royal Navy was on the verge of stopping battleship construction altogether on favor of flotilla craft. This is new ground.
   
   Fisher was faced with four other areas of crisis which this book delves into: financial constraints, manpower limitations, ship deployment policies and forging new tactics that would take advantage of the developing technology that was changing the face of naval warfare. Lambert also makes clear that the senior officers of the Royal Navy in the decade before the war were not operating in an intellectual vacuum, countering the unfortunate impression that many historians have fostered that the navy was resistant to new technology, unable to think critically, and too lazy for deep analysis and staff work. While a number of hidebound ignoramuses had managed to reach high command, most senior officers were energetically working to exploit the emergent technologies to the full extent.
   
   Lambert's story of the Royal Navy before 1914 presents a picture completely different from the accepted one. It is one that is wholly convincing and presents a more satisfying explanation of what happened, and why, than we have had before. I recommend this book to those who are familiar with the subject and have a desire to go deeper into it. You won't be sorry.

2 comments about Donitz: The Last Fuhrer.

1. Karl Donitz began his career as a Naval officer at about the age of twenty, being commissioned just prior to the outbreak of World War I, where he quickly earned an Iron Cross Second Class and his own command. He finished the war a British POW. Unlike other senior Nazis (Goring for example) Donitz never played socialite; he was a naval officer at heart and in deed from the age of twenty until the last days of World War II when he was appointed by Hitler just prior to his suicide to take his position as Chancellor of the Third Reich. He is best known as the commander of the German U-Boat forces during the entirety of the war and later (beginning in January, 1943) as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
   Padfield's biography is excellently researched. It is a detailed portrayal of Donitz as both man and officer and also presents a throrough review of naval (especially U-boat) strategy during the second world war. What's more, Padfield illustrates a strong link between the personal Donitz and the often fatal strategic decisions he made. There is evidence of Donitz's complicity in Nazi war crimes not seen in many other sources describing him.
   Read this book if you are interested in the facts behind one of the deadliest aspects of the war in Europe (30000 of 40000 U-boat officers and men lost their lives) or if you'd like to know more about a key figure in the Third Reich not often remembered alongside more prominent names like Goebbels or Himmler. If you are hoping for a book that portrays Donitz as he was seen during his life, an officer who did his military duty and kept his hands clean of the atrocities of the Nazis, try another. Padfield is very harsh in his judgement of Donitz. If you dislike lots of statistics and are looking for nothing more than biographical data, I would try Donitz's memoirs.
   In all, it is a vivid portrayal of Karl Donitz and a good read for Naval Enthusiasts.



2. Do not read this book if you have any interest in German naval strategy or tactics during World War II, nor indeed if you have any interest in an objective appraisal of the life and work of Karl Donitz as a man. This book is undoubtedly well researched, with the co-operation of some people close to Donitz, including his family, but that research is utterly wasted by the author's own cultural prejudices.
   
   There are precious few times when objectivity is allowed a rear its head by the author. These are to be found in the acknowledgements where the author states that he knows that this book will hurt member's of Donitz's family who helped him; in the introduction where the author acknowledges the difficulties that the cultural divide has caused him and in the postscript where the author truthfully reports that other reviews found he displayed "distaste" for Donitz, even "torturing" the evidence against him.... a total want of charity."
   
   The few good words that are said about Donitz almost all come from other Naval personalities, especially his superiors during his rise up the ranks and his contemporaries in the Allied navies. The author even acknowledges that the official histories of the Allied navies are generous towards Donitz, but that does not alter his perspective.
   
   Throughout the book, the author refers to the German struggle against `England' in both World Wars rather than against the British Empire or even Britain. That is central to the author's flaws. The American and Canadian navies are barely mentioned in the book, unless there is an opportunity for criticising them as well! The Empire navies don't seem to exist. Every alleged or real atrocity by U-boats crews is rehearsed with scarcely an acknowledgement that atrocities were also carried out by Allied navies. That the German's may sometimes have been reacting to British or Allied acts, is never conceded.
   
   There is a complete absence of analysis of the actual battles in the Atlantic. These are mentioned at the most superficial, strategic level. Even this level of analysis is corrupted. Unlike Winston Churchill, the author does not allow for a second, that had Donitz managed to have greater influence on German military and naval strategy at the start of the war, then Germany might have won the Battle of the Atlantic.
   
   There is barely a paragraph that isn't laced with a very amateur psychologist's attempt to interpret Donitz's actions, usually as pejoratively as possible, regardless of lack of evidence. For example `photographs of him from the period convey an impression of a man peering out suspiciously from inside his skull as if haunted by the past and wondering whether it was going to blow up beneath him' The author strongly believes Donitz should have received the death penalty at Nuremburg. Many readers will find that this book may be more deserving of the death penalty.

No comments about The Military Order of World Wars.

1 comments about Waddling to War on LST 834: The Ventures and Adventures of a Skylarking Sailor in World War II.

1. Mr. Shannon is a veteran and served his country and I thank him for that fact. I'm sure it would be nice to have a cup of coffee with this man and shoot the breeze, he seems to have sense of humor for sure and an intelligent writing style. I'll read just about anything, and believe the LST has been a neglected topic. Although not a technical treatment of the LST or of battle strategy, this book is an honest chronology of a young man's journey to war in the Pacific. However, this is a thin read, low on facts and mostly sticks to the lived reality of an eighteen year-old in Naval service during WW II.
   
   One of the refreshing aspects of the book and something I congratulate Mr. Shannon for is his non-conformist and anti-authoritarian attitude. As an enlisted man, he details the hypocrisy of the officer class during wartime military service and illustrates many fine examples of elitism, discrimination, and incompetence, many of us will recognize. There is also NO self referential patriotic flag waving at all in the read, which so many times get in the way of a good story. Also there are some interesting stories of post war occupation life in Japan immediately after the war and the human side of the Japanese civilians.
   
   All and all an OK book and relevant to the time period with many true anecdotal stories not found elsewhere. If you're interested in operational exploits try another of the LST books listed on Amazon. For an equally honest and more in-depth World War II biography. Try: Boy soldier: Coming of age during World War II. Available at Amazon.

No comments about Black American Military Leaders: A Biographical Dictionary.

1 comments about The Sky Suspended: A Fighter Pilot's Story.

1. The Sky Suspended: A Fighter Pilot's Story is the remarkable and memorable autobiography of Jim Bailey, who in the summer of 1939 while a 19-year old student at Oxford University felt strongly that war between England and Germany was inevitable. That was when he signed up to become a fighter pilot in the Royal Air Force. Baily flew British fighter planes in aerial combat missions that ranged from the Battle of Britain, through the action at Gibraltar, and the Anzio beach-heads, to the landing in the South of France. One of the true heroes for which Winston Churchill was to acknowledge with his famous declaration that never had "so many owed so much to so few", The Sky Suspended is the true life story of heroism, survival against the odds, and a remembering of so many that did not make it through -- but to whom so much is owed to that generation of young men by all of the generations that follow. This special large printed edition of The Sky Suspended is a great read, and a welcome addition to the growing library of World War II memoirs and biographies.

No comments about Lejeune: A Marine's Life, 1867-1942 (Bluejacket Books).

1 comments about A Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen's Captivity.

1. This book is perfect for American history buffs. It is written by Ethan Allen, the Revolutionary War hero who captured Fort Ticonderoga. It describes the Ticonderoga episode and then tells of Allen's captivity by the British after his unsuccessful attempt to take Montreal. Allen is a wonderful American historical figure and it is most interesting to read of his experiences first hand. This book is a good companion to Stewart Holbrook's delightful and sympathetic historical biography of Allen, Ethan Allen. Allen is one of the least remembered heroes of that bygone era and definitely deserves more attention than he gets in today's history books. He was intelligent, self-educated, outrageous, gallant, brave, profane, classy and is just plain fun to read about.

2 comments about 24 MAU: 1983: A Marine Looks Back at the Peacekeeping Mission to Beirut, Lebanon.

1. As an American Studies and Education major at Rowan University, I am often required to read books on pivotal events in the history of our country. I find most of them to be tedious and written in such a language that they are difficult to follow. THIS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE BOOKS! Mr. Dolphin, you've written an insightful and poignant recall of the events that occurred during your time in Beirut. I was a teenager when these events occurred and knew only what I remember seeing on the news. Your first hand account brought me a new found clarity on the lives of Marines stationed outside of the U.S. borders. My nephew is a Lance Corporal and is presently stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC. He recently returned from Iraq, so I will be sending him this book before he returns to Iraq in September. I feel blessed to have gotten an autographed copy here on [...] and I will treasure it always...
   Penny Kowalski, Williamstown, New Jersey



2. This is the story of the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut that was destroyed by a suicide truck-bomb. It is not a history; it is a memoir. It is the recollections of the author with respect to what he saw, heard, felt and otherwise sensed during the course of this horrific event. The author was a junior officer in the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit, the second in command of the communications section. He was well situated to observe the operations of his battalion. This memoir humanizes the members of the 24th MAU.
   
   The reader gets to know many of the Marines, their likes and dislikes. We feel the oppressive heat and humidity. We sense the danger in the armed militia organizations that are ravaging Beirut and the surrounding area. We get to know the challenges of dealing with senior officers and senior staff NCOs. And we get some small sense of what it was like when a five-ton bomb detonated at daybreak and destroyed the Marine barracks, killing 241 of its occupants. The before-and-after photos of the building provide a dramatic contrast.
   
   It is a powerful reminiscence that will appeal to anyone who has spent time in the military, particularly the Marine Corps.
   
   Like any memoir, the scope of this work is limited by the limitations experienced by the author. A junior officer was not privy to the considerations and objectives of presidents, diplomats or even his own commanding officer. His was but to do and die; but that applies to all of us. His story is his story -- and it is well worth reading.
   
   There are little things in this book that tend to become annoying. For example, the author repeatedly dismisses embarrassing and offensive incidents provoked by senior officers, and calls them "lessons in leadership." Bullshit!
   
   One questionable aspect of the book is in the last chapter and its unfounded reliance on a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia as the final authority for facts that place responsibility for the bombing on Iran. The court case was one in which victims of the bombing, including the author, sought money damages from Iran as compensation for their injuries. The case was not contested and the testimony of FBI personnel and other "expert" witnesses was not subject to the scrutiny of cross-examination. By the way, the term "expert witness" does not mean a person who is highly qualified; it means one who is minimally qualified. Interestingly, the author makes no mention of the fact that he is one of the claimants in that case.

No comments about Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte (Memoirs of Napolean Bonaparte).