5 comments about Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive.

1. In the book's preface, Professor Palmer asks the thought provoking question "Did he and his lieutenants simply have a couple of bad days? Or were there other factors at work? ....could the strategic offensive, then be the shared thread, the common denominator that might help to explain Lee's failures?" He then reviews Lee's Maryland, Gettysburg and Bristoe Station campaigns to answer his question.

   In Chapter 1, Palmer states that lacking published plans and with an ambiguous objective, Lee moved into Maryland without Jeff Davis's prior approval . The author asserts that the Maryland campaign was a Federal success and allowed "the Lincoln administration to solidify its political support...." Quite the contrary happened. Aghast at the Antietam casualties, northern voters in the 1862 fall elections for governors and congressmen, gave Lincoln's party several major reverses. The chapter makes the ridiculous comparison that "Lee was one of many southerners caught up in a wave of `victory disease', not unlike that which gripped the Japanese before the battle of Midway". The Japanese defeat at Midway was not due to "victory disease" but due to their naval code having been broken and Admiral Nagumo's bad tactical decision,

   Nevertheless, regarding Maryland, Professor Palmer correctly writes "Why had Lee failed? The answer is simple: virtually all of the assumptions upon which he based his plans were unfounded."

   The Gettysburg campaign chapter is well written and objective. The review of events leading to the Gettysburg campaign is excellent. Normally given limited coverage, the narration of the meetings in Richmond with Davis and his cabinet plus the correspondence regarding Lee's Gettysburg campaign is very interesting. Palmer reviews Lee's organization problems writing "....two of the three men leading corps and three of the nine men leading divisions were untested at their new levels of commands....Such dramatic changes in the organization and leadership....suggested the need for delays, not haste." Considerable space is devoted to whether Lee wanted to fight a major battle in Pennsylvania quoting Lee stating in 1868 that "he did not want to fight" and ending with Lee biographer Emory Thomas's statement "that battle was central to Lee's plan."

   Palmer noted "....two fundamental forces worked against the successful execution of Lee's campaign, First....it was never was properly developed....Second, Lee relied on a very decentralized approach to command and control." Lee's decentralized command philosophy required component subordinates. Regarding the competence at Gettysburg of Lee's key commanders, Stuart, Ewell, and Longstreet , the book provides a brief review of their failures concluding that "....while Ewell's incompetence and Longstreet's recalcitrance were important factors, Lee's unwillingness to issue direct orders or to take charge of the battle lay at the root of the problem".

   Analysis of Lee's strategic offensive continues with a review of the Bristoe Station campaign. Again Lee initiated a campaign in secrecy, without a clearly stated objective, no detailed operation plan and limited or misleading communications to Richmond. The author speculates that one motive for the campaign was to prevent further detachment of Lee's troops to the west and states "Lee moved north to engage Meade because the latter had not come south....Had Meade been more aggressive in August or Lee been able to take the offensive, Davis would never have sent Longstreet west." The book notes that the command problems evident at Gettysburg had not been corrected and lacking capable corps commanders another debacle occurred. Professor Palmer states that "while Heth and Hill were blamed, Lee also bore some responsibility for the failures of his subordinates" and concludes at Bristoe Station "....for Lee to attack an army twice the size of his own in October was absurd."

   Evaluating Lee, in the fourth and final chapter the author asks the critical question "Could the South have won the Civil War?" Professor Palmer contends that while the North had countless advantages, the Confederacy had several advantages noting that the South did not need to invade or conquer the North to win stating "The Confederacy had only to survive until the Yankees lost their will to continue the struggle." Referencing the writings of Clausewitz and Delbruck, Southern strategies are evaluated noting that the Confederate government failed to adopt either a strategy of exhaustion or of annihilation. He further states that Lee's contributed to the South's failure to adopt a consistent strategic policy in that he usurped Davis's role as commander-in chief while Davis failed to respond and shape a well-defined national strategy.

   Professor Palmer writes Lee launched all three offensives without anything approaching a formal plan basically commanding by the seat of his pants. He writes "LEE'S TWIN PENCHANTS for the offensive and for secrecy contorted the outline of Confederate national strategy between 1862 and 1863 and led to his own failures as a commander." He notes that the traits that served Lee so well for strategic defense failed him when his army went over to the strategic offensive.

   The book's weakness is that it does not ask "why ?" With Lee's respect for authority, why didn't Davis control strategy directing Lee to comply and fully reveal his plans? Why would a commander noted for honesty and integrity try to deceive Richmond? Regarding a strictly defensive strategy, was Lee independently responding to Frederick the Great's chilling aphorism "He who defends everything, defends nothing."? Why was Lee secretive, was it solely to deceive or was it basically because both North and South were getting critical intelligence from the newspapers? Etc.

   Some may take offense at the concluding statement "...what Lee failed to understand was that a commander of an army can no more effectively shape national strategy on the sly and on the cheap, than a tail can wag a dog." But for the historian or serious student of the Civil War, this short book is worth reading as thought provoking, often controversial, issues are raised.




2. Mr Palmer's "work" is a factually challenged, agenda-driven piece that cannot standup to common sense, much less proper historical analysis. His "criticisms" of Lee are such that one is left wondering what background in military history Mr Palmer possesses. As a consequence, Mr Palmer misunderstands the strategic situation facing a numerically weaker side, what a numercially inferior side MUST do to have a chance to win, and how Lee reacted under these circumstances. Without a doubt, Mr Palmer's most laughable assertion is that Lee went North in the Gettysburg campaign without any clear cut objectives. Clearly, Mr Palmer needs to do a lot more reading. I suggest two different books if one wants to gain a much better understanding of the Confederate strategic situation: these are Richard Tanner's "Retreat to Vicotry?" and Scott Bowden's "Last Chance for Victory."



3. Understanding the military campaigns of the numerically weaker side is one of the more challenging issue in history. Unfortunately, Mr Palmer displays a thorough lack of historical perspective in this very weak presentation.

   Palmer's protrait of Robert E Lee as lacking all the necessary mental capacities when it comes to undertaking offensive warfare is completely devoid of historical understanding of the campaigns involving generals such as Hannibal, Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon and many others who commanded numerically inferior armies. And of course, Palmer offers absolutely no supporting evidence to prop up his claims because in this book the outcome of the campaign is proof enough.

   I agree with another reviewer here that this piece is very agenda-driven, simply because of the thin presentation, no supporting evidence, which could only come from a lack of understanding of the campaigns involving the Great Captains.




4. Having read several books on Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, and having a very high opinion of General Lee, I decided I should try and be objective by reading some books that were critical of General Lee. But I was very disappointed in Palmer's work. I was hoping to read some well researched criticism. What I got was a joke. Most of Palmer's arguments have serious flaws to them, any some don't make any sence at all. Don't waste your time with this one.



5. I'm in no position yet to refute or substantiate the author's assertions, but he does make a compelling argument that the myth surrounding Lee has induced many scholars and buffs alike into not fully appreciating the fact that all three of Lee's attempts to take the war to the North failed to succeed, and that Lee's leadership was largely to blame. The author draws on many primary documents, often quoting from them at length, and everything is referenced so that detractors can determine for themselves just how accurately his sources were interpreted.

No comments about John Todd And the Underground Railroad: Biography of an Iowa Abolitionist.

1 comments about Ulysses S. Grant: A Bibliography (Bibliographies of the Presidents of the United States).

1. While the high list price may scare the general reader from this work, it is a valuable research tool for anyone wishing to develop an in-depth interest in Grant. Although a truly complete bibliography on Grant may be impossible to compile, Kelsey, as far as I can see, has come commendably close. No matter what aspect of Grant's life you wish to study--his childhood, military career, Presidency, his Memoirs, etc.--you are sure to be steered to a plethora of citations, intelligently and frequently wittily annotated.
   
   A postscript: I also appreciated Kelsey's pointed reference to Grant's "Alleged Alcohol Problem," as well as her implied willingness to speak favorably of Grant's enigmatic mother, Hannah. In the "Grant community" nowadays, doing these things seems to require some courage. Good for her.

2 comments about Sea Wolf of the Confederacy: The Daring Civil War Raids of Naval Lt. Charles W. Read.

1. Although a life-long Civil War buff I had never heard of this attempt by a young Confederate Naval officer to take the war to the seas off New England. Lt. Charles A. Read had previously served on the ironclad "Arkansas" and the commerce raider "Florida" and had seen a lot of hard fighting - which he seemed to relish. In February, of 1863, the "Florida" captured a Union merchant vessel and Read was given permission to take over and convert this captured ship into another commerce raider. Read promptly sailed to the North and with only one small cannon on board began to wreak havoc on the New England fishing industry. The Northern states then began beseeching Washington for more protection - threatening to divert resources from the bloackade of Southern ports. Shipping insurance rates started rising, too.
   
   Shaw skillfully interweaves the two sides of the story - the motives and actions of the protagonist, Read, and his antagonist, Union Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles. The author may have a Northern bias but it does not ruin the story. There are many good accounts of Civil War naval actions - we can add this one to the list.



2. Charles W. Read was an inept student, he graduated last in his class at Annapolis in 1860 just before he re-signed his commission in the US Navy. What he showed (just like US Grant and a lot of other military minds) was that some people do best by doing, not studying. Having lost his steam ram in a battle on the Mississippi River near Vicksburg. He is called to work on a "Raider" out of Mobile Bay.
   
   Once on the open ocean "Florida" sailed into the Caribbean where they attacked Union commerce and merchant marine. Taking a captured ship "Tacony" with one howitzer and some fake (Quaker) wood guns, Read proceeds to damage over twenty ships on his way up to Portland Maine where they are caught but only after they steal a US Revenue Cutter and blow it up. The story is a lot like that of the "Shenandoah" which had two books about it published in 2005; more interesting from an historical point of view but not that thrilling. (How exciting can it be to read about the capture and burning of fishing Schooners?)

No comments about Matthew Lyon, "New Man" of the Democratic Revolution, 1749-1822.

No comments about The Life And Times Of Hannibal Hamlin V2.

1 comments about Sanctified Trial: The Diary of Eliza Rhea Anderson Fain, a Confederate Woman in East Tennessee (Voices of the Civil War Series.).

1. Dr. Fain has done an excellent job of compiling and editing the diary of Eliza who wrote of her experiences and feelings during the Civil War.

No comments about Ulysses S. Grant: Defender Of The Union (Civil War Generals).

2 comments about John Charles Fremont: Character As Destiny.

1. There were few Americans of the nineteenth century with greater name recognition than John C. Fremont. His five controversial treks across the uncharted Rockies aroused interest and controversy. His military exploits in Mexican California brought him a court-martial. He struck gold in California, became an outspoken abolitionist, and ran as the first Republican candidate for the Presidency of the United States. Married into one of America's most powerful political families, he won and then lost a major command in the Union Army. He habitually cheated investors on several continents out of millions of dollars, only to be bankrupted himself by bigger sharks. There is a great story here.

   Unfortunately, Andrew Rolle's biography of Fremont is a bit flat, perhaps because of the author's announced intention of probing the psychological motivations behind this life of stupefying behaviors. Rolle states in his preface that he studied psychiatry and psychoanalysis to prepare himself for this work. Most readers will find themselves wishing he had spent more time with cartographers. In a work whose hero is called "The Pathfinder," there is not a single map! It is no exaggeration to say that for literally half the book the reader is never certain exactly where the Pathfinder is.

   It is equally fair to say that despite the author's best efforts, we don't get an unprecedented roadmap of Fremont's inner psychological journeys, either. It is clear from the simple factual narrative that Fremont, like Hamilton, was ashamed of his humble origins, that he was blessed or plagued with wanderlust, that he instinctively rebelled against authority figures, that he was addicted to risk taking and suffered significant deficiencies of empathy and moral character. This personality profile would have emerged easily enough from a straightforward telling of the tale, without the baggage of psychoanalytic spin. Curiously, the psychodynamics of Fremont's marriage to his lover/promoter Jessie Benton, are not addressed. The story of the remarkable Jessie, however, is one of the redeeming features of this work.

   Since very few readers are likely to be millionaires, there are probably many like me who would like to know how one loses a million dollars. Fremont accomplished this several times, with different commodities, different economies, different schemes, and even different countries. He was a master of losing money imaginatively. Rolle is spotty in his accounts of Fremont's financial empire. The reader is left to surmise that investors were attracted to The Pathfinder's name recognition and that the Fremonts lived beyond their means, but obviously there is much more to this ongoing financial soap opera that can only be guessed at.

   The good news for the reader is that warts and all, this is still a reasonably captivating biography. Rolle's style is professional and his character compelling. If at times the reader feels as lost as the disastrous Fourth Expedition, the views from the top and the bottom of Fremont's career are still quite spectacular.




2. John Charles Frémont is history's version of an unscrupulous, morally inverted Forrest Gump. In the 1994 film Forrest Gump, Forrest was the affable idiot-savant who constantly became intermingled and unwittingly influential in larger than life world events. John Charles Frémont's life runs a somewhat darker parallel. Highly intelligent and ambitious, Frémont crashed head long into the historical events of his day but was consistently overwhelmed by them precisely because of his own self-serving inscrutable morality. Andrew Rolle's choice of Frémont as a subject for psychobiography is akin to taking pot-shots at the broad side of a barn. However, it is the subject's vulnerability in this vein that makes Rolle's work a tremendously interesting, dishy read.
   Actually, Rolle's psychological observations are more muted than one might expect. He saves most of his thoughts in this regard for the final chapter, which psychologically deconstructs the subject using the case heretofore constructed. Rolle's two primary psychological analyses of Frémont reside in the loss of his father. As a result of this loss, Rolle examines his ongoing hostility in his relationships with older male authority figures and his narcissistic streak. The older male hostility thesis, while well argued, doesn't quite hit the mark. It seems more likely, through Rolle's own presentation of the facts, that Frémont's precocious early successes meant that those he would inevitably clash with were naturally older in age. Therefore, it is merely circumstantial that those who held sway over Frémont's life happened to be older. On the other hand, Rolle provides a highly compelling case for Frémont-as-narcissist by delving into Frémont's mounting odd behavior during the Civil War.
   Frémont's narcissistically driven ambition led him to make rash and often self-destructive decisions, according to Rolle. Frémont's third and fourth expeditions are damning evidence of this aspect of his character. Try as he might, even Rolle is unable to penetrate Frémont's thinking deeply enough to untangle some of the unconscionable decisions made by Frémont regarding these expeditions. Rolle again and again uses the lack of male authority figure as a bromide for Frémont's actions. Although compelling to a certain extent, it simply cannot explain the entire mountain of poor decisions made by the man. Frémont simply placed himself in situations in which he was out of his element and insolated himself so successfully from potentially helpful guidance that he was doomed to remain out of his element while in the eye of many storms. Lack of a male authority figure cannot wholly account for this inability to perceive the difference between right and wrong. In addition, having allowed so many others to defend him in the court of popular opinion, Frémont only singled himself out as a man who, in reality, required much defending. Rolle notes a conversation between Abraham Lincoln's secretary John Hay and Lincoln:
   "Frémont would be dangerous if he had more ability and energy," grimaced Hay.
   Abraham Lincoln responded with one of his typical anecdotes, "Yes. He is like Jim Jett's brother. Jim used to say that his brother was the d---dest scoundrel that ever lived, but in the infinite mercy of Providence he was also the d---dest fool."
   As Virginia J. Lass notes in her review of Character as Destiny in The Journal of Southern History, Rolle posits, perhaps, a more illuminating aspect of Frémont's character and personality. Lass gleans from Rolle that "Frémont suffered from arrested emotional development that influenced his actions and decisions as an adult." In other words, Frémont was born on third base and went through his life honestly believing he had hit a triple. Well, to be fair, allotting due for overcoming the financial and societal obstacles of his early years, perhaps he hit a bloop single to center field.
   To his credit, Rolle makes every attempt to outline Frémont's contributions to the exploration of the American West. He attempts, to a certain extent, to justify the American public's adoration for Frémont, much of which seems to originate in the propaganda from Jessie's pen. Despite this noble attempt, Frémont remains a lemon and not lemonade.
   How does Rolle's psychological analytic approach differ from other contemporary biographies of similar historical figures? Not much. It seems as if Rolle is aware of the desire of his reading audience not to get lost in psychobabble. He treads carefully in this area and, as mentioned before, reserves most of his psychological analysis for closing. However, it is clear that Rolle is necessarily far more interested in Frémont's decision-making process in relationship to the events that formed his life than the events themselves, as previous Frémont historians have done. And, while not especially groundbreaking, it appears to be the most appropriate approach to take with a subject such as Frémont, as opposed to John Wesley Powell, for instance, whose actual achievements in geology and exploration of the America West far outweigh any overriding aspects of personality.
   Character as Destiny is a very well written and a highly enjoyable read despite its rather despicable subject. Rolle says of Frémont halfway through the book "Once more nothing had gone his way." On the contrary, everything came easily to this unsavory character, John Charles Frémont, on a silver platter. He simply had a grand knack for consistently knocking the darned thing over.

No comments about Pombo: A Man of Che's Guerrilla : With Che Guevara in Bolivia 1966-68.